THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

VOLUME  I 


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CO.M.MANIMNC:    TIH:    AK.MV    <>K    NOKTIMOKN    \'II;<;IMA 


THE 

LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

OR 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  ARTILLERY  OF  THE 
ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA 

With  a  Brief  Account  of  the  Confederate  Bureau 
of  Ordnance 

BY 

JENNINGS  CROPPER  WISE 


ILLUSTRATED 


TWO    VOLUMES 
VOLUME    I 


1915 

J.  P.  BELL  COMPANY,  Inc. 
LYNCHBURG,  VIRGINIA 


COPYEIGHT,    1915 

J.  P.  BELL  CO.,  INC. 


DEDICATED 
To  THE  MEMORY 

OF 

MY  FATHER 
JOHN  SERGEANT  WISE 


8402:3 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

VOLUME    I 

PART  I 
CHAPTER  PAGE 

PREFACE 15 

I.      EARLY  ORDNANCE  WORK  AND  STATUS  OF  ORDNANCE 

IN  1861 23 

II.     ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  ORDNANCE  AND  ITS 

EARLY  OPERATIONS 34 

III.     ORGANIZATIONS  AND  OPERATIONS 52 

IV.     ORIGINAL   ARMAMENT   OF   THE   ARMY   OF   NORTHERN 

VIRGINIA 61 

PART  II 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     THE  ARTILLERY  OF  THE  EARLY  DAYS 85 

II.     THE  VIRGINIA  MILITARY  INSTITUTE  AS  A  SCHOOL  OF 

ARMS 95 

III.     THE  FIELD  ARTILLERY  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES 

OF  AMERICA 107 

IV.     THE    VIRGINIA   VOLUNTEERS 112 

V.     ACTIVE   OPERATIONS   COMMENCE:     BIG   BETHEL   AND 

GAINESVILLE     118 

VI.     BLACKBURN'S  FORD  AND  FIRST  MANASSAS 127 

VII.     WINTER    OF    1861-62 140 

VIII.     TACTICS  AND  EARLY  INSTRUCTION 149 

IX.     FEDERAL  ORGANIZATION  AND  TACTICAL  CONCEPTS 156 

X.     THE  HORSE  ARTILLERY  AND  THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN   162 

XI.     THE    PENINSULA    CAMPAIGN 176 

XII.     GENERAL  LEE  ASSUMES  COMMAND — REORGANIZATION 

— BEGINNING  OF  THE  SEVEN  DAYS 197 

XIII.     GAINES'   MILL   _  _   210 


10 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

XIV.     SAVAGE'S  STATION  AND  FRAZIER'S  FARM 215 

XV.     MALVERN  HILL 221 

XVI.     CEDAR    MOUNTAIN    241 

XVII.     GAINESVILLE    AND    GROVETON 255 

XVIII.     SECOND    MANASSAS    266 

XIX.     THE    MARYLAND    INVASION — HARPER'S    FERRY    AND 

SOUTH  MOUNTAIN 277 

XX.      REORGANIZATION,  FROM  SHARPSBURtr  TO  FREDERICKS- 
BURG    327 

XXI.     FREDERICKSBURG 357 

XXII.  THE  WINTER  OF  1862-63 — KELLYSVILLE  AND  THE 
DEATH  OF  PELHAM,  "THE  GALLANT,  THE  INCOM 
PARABLE" — REORGANIZATION  AGAIN 409 

XXIII.     THE    BATTLE    OF    CHANCELLORSVILLE — PRELIMINARY 

DISPOSITIONS    442 

XXIV.     CHANCELLORSVILLE — MAY    IST 458 

XXV.     CHANCELLORSVILLE — MAY  2o — JACKSON'S  ATTACK —   466 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

VOLUME    I 

FACING 
PAGE 

GENERAL  ROBERT  EDWARD  LEE,  COMMANDING  A.  N.  V., 

Frontispiece 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL    JOSIAH    GORGAS,    CHIEF    OF    ORDNANCE, 

C.  S.  A. 32 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WILLIAM  NELSON  PENDLETON,  CHIEF  OF 

ARTILLERY,  A.  N.  V. 64 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ARMISTEAD  LINDSAY  LONG,  CHIEF  OF 

ARTILLERY,  SECOND  CORPS 96 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  EDWARD  PORTER  ALEXANDER,  CHIEF  OF 

ARTILLERY,  FIRST  CORPS 128 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  REUBEN  LINDSAY  WALKER,  CHIEF  OF 

ARTILLERY,  THIRD  CORPS 160 

COLONEL  JAMES  B.  WALTON,  CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY,  LONG- 
STREET'S  CORPS  192 

COLONEL  STAPLETON  CRUTCHFIELD,  CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY, 

JACKSON'S  CORPS 224 

COLONEL  JOHN  THOMPSON  BROWN,  ACTING  CHIEF  OF  ARTIL 
LERY,  SECOND  CORPS 272 

COLONEL  STEPHEN  D.  LEE 320 

COLONEL  WILLIAM  NELSON,  ACTING  CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY, 

SECOND  CORPS 368 

COLONEL  THOMAS  HILL  CARTER,  ACTING  CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY, 

SECOND  CORPS 416 

COLONEL  WILLIAM  JOHNSON  PEGRAM_.  _   469 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 


PREFACE 

THIS  work  has  been  written  in  my  first  year  as  Com 
mandant  of  the  Corps  of  Cadets  of  the  Virginia  Mili 
tary  Institute.  Its  writing,  therefore,  has  been  attended 
by  many  interruptions  incident  to  my  military  and 
academic  duties.  Convinced  that  the  Field  Artillery  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  has  received  too  little 
attention  on  the  part  of  the  historian,  I  have  for  years 
projected  such  a  work  as  this.  In  fact,  writers  on  the 
Civil  War  have  almost  as  if  intentionally  ignored  the 
subject,  referring  but  casually  to  the  gunner's  part  in 
the  great  tragedy.  Their  failure  to  discuss  this  subject 
has  no  doubt  been  due  to  a  feeling  of  uncertainty 
whenever  they  sought  to  enter  upon  what  they  conceived 
to  be  a  more  or  less  special  domain.  Nor  was  this  senti 
ment  uncommon  to  the  participants  themselves.  The 
reports  of  the  various  commanders  engaged  in  the  war 
are  generally  vague  in  matters  pertaining  to  the  artil 
lery.  Not  failing  in  tribute  to  the  gunners,  they  have 
failed  to  record  any  definite  information  concerning  the 
artillery. 

The  result  is  that  to-day  he  who  enters  into  an  investi 
gation  of  more  than  the  most  casual  character  finds  him 
self  involved  in  a  game  of  historical  dominoes,  with 
many  of  the  pieces  lacking.  I  will  illustrate  my  point 
by  saying  that  even  Maj.  H.  B.  McClellan,  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  in  his  history  of  Stuart's 
campaigns  avoids  the  mention  of  the  horse  batteries  on 
certain  occasions  as  if  by  design.  Yet  these  batteries 
were  as  much  a  part  of  Stuart's  command  as  the  cavalry 
troops  themselves.  He  does  not  even  include  them  in 
the  organization  of  the  cavalry,  which  he  gives  in  an 
otherwise  most  valuable  work. 

More  often  than  not,  the  corps,  division,  and  brigade 
returns  include  the  artillery  personnel  in  the  strength 
of  the  infantry,  and  rarely  are  the  names  of  the  batteries, 
or  the  number  of  guns  engaged,  specified.  Over  such 


16  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

details  is  merely  thrown  the  cloak  of  the  mysterious 
word  "artillery,"  as  if  that  should  suffice  for  the  curious. 

While  little  in  the  way  of  service  statistics  is  to  be 
obtained  from  the  survivors,  I  have  secured  many  clues 
from  the  veteran  soldiers  of  my  acquaintance,  who  have 
often  assisted  me  to  make  the  mask  of  time  less  inscru 
table. 

Originally,  I  had  intended  to  treat  the  subject  in 
three  distinct  parts, — that  is,  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance, 
its  resources,  operations,  and  organization;  the  organi 
zation,  material  and  personnel  of  the  Field  Artillery, 
and  the  tactics  of  the  arm.  But  almost  immediately 
after  beginning  the  work  I  concluded  that  the  two  last 
sub-divisions  should  be  combined  for  the  sake  of  brevity, 
as  well  as  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  treating  them 
separately,  which  would  have  at  least  entailed  much 
repetition. 

Once,  in  the  literary  enthusiasm  of  youth,  I  gathered 
together  a  number  of  my  speeches  and  papers,  and, 
having  them  printed,  I  distributed  copies  of  the  pamph 
let  among  my  friends.  But,  as  is  usually  the  case, 
vanity  betrayed  me,  for  some  of  these  pamphlets  fell 
into  the  hands  of  able  critics,  who  quite  frequently 
attacked  my  comparisons  between  the  Confederate  and 
Federal  artillerymen,  despite  my  repeated  denials  that 
"odious  comparisons"  were  intended  to  be  drawn.  My 
Northern  friends  simply  declared  that  comparisons  were 
inherently  odious,  and  that  I  could  not  make  them  other 
wise.  I  learned  my  lesson,  and  in  this  work  I  have 
endeavored  to  avoid  anything  that  even  savored  of  a 
comparison,  except  in  matters  of  material,  organization, 
equipment,  and  tangible  things  in  general,  believing  that 
history  would  best  be  subserved  by  presenting  the  facts 
and  allowing  each  reader  to  draw  his  own  conclusions. 

To  me  the  record  of  Lee's  artillery,  or  his  "long  arm," 
has  been  one  of  surpassing  interest.  Each  chapter,  as 
it  unfolded  itself,  seemed  more  and  more  in  need  of  a 
stronger  pen  than  mine.  Yet  I  feel  that  if  I  have  failed 
to  draw  the  proper  inferences  from  the  tangle  of  avail- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  17 

able  facts,  the  proof  that  I  have  erred  will  at  least  dis 
close  the  truth,  and  I  will,  therefore,  have  been  in 
directly  responsible  for  a  better  account  than  my  own. 

The  story  of  the  gunners  of  Lee's  army  has  always 
appealed  with  peculiar  force  to  my  imagination,  by 
reason  of  the  lasting  repute  so  many  juniors,  from  the 
standpoints  of  both  age  and  rank  in  the  service,  acquired. 
Every  Southern  child  has  heard,  in  terms  of  praise  and 
tenderest  affection,  the  story  of  Pegram,  the  youthful 
colonel;  of  the  one-armed  Haskell;  of  Latimer,  the 
boy  major;  of  Breathed;  of  Caskie;  of  Jimmie  Thom 
son  and  Preston  Chew.  And  lives  there  a  son  of  the 
Southland  who  has  not  heard  of  Pelham,  "the  Gallant," 
so  named  by  the  lips  of  Lee  himself?  It  seems  almost 
invidious  to  mention  these  few  and  to  omit  the  names  of 
their  peers.  Ab  uno  disce  omnes. 

While  the  cherished  deeds  of  the  Confederate  artil 
lery  subalterns  are  in  no  wise  comparable,  according  to 
a  strict  standard  of  military  accomplishment,  with  the 
achievements  of  such  soldiers  as  Longstreet,  the  Hills, 
Ewell,  Mahone,  Gordon,  and  many  others  of  like  mold, 
yet,  in  the  South  at  least,  of  the  two,  the  personal  recol 
lection  of  many  of  the  juniors  is  the  more  lastingly 
tender,  and  the  general  interest  in  them  grows  greater 
with  each  year,  by  reason  of  the  heroic  traditions  that 
cluster  about  their  youthful  memories. 

Undoubtedly  there  was  something  in  the  spiritual 
composition  of  these  boyish  soldiers,  a  mixture  of  dash 
and  conviction,  not  akin  to  mere  bravado,  but  more  like 
divine  faith,  which  made  them  unconquerable.  Living, 
they  possessed  that  quality  electric,  more  spirituelle  than 
physical,  which  gave  temper  to  their  steel  and  made 
their  thrusts  the  keener.  Dead,  there  survives  in  con 
nection  with  their  memory  that  elusive  influence  which, 
lingering,  when  appealed  to,  makes  brave  men  of 
cowards. 

It  may  be  suggested  that  a  sympathetic  note  in  the 
scale  of  sentiment  is  struck  by  the  heroes  of  defeat.  But 
no,  the  luster  of  which  I  write  is  not  the  shimmer  of 


18  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

pathos.  It  was  while  living  and  victorious  that  they 
touched  the  souls  of  their  people  and  laid  the  foundation 
for  that  everlasting  renown  which  depends  not  for  its 
freshness  upon  the  written  pages  of  history, — in  which 
their  names  are  scarcely  mentioned. 

Amid  the  cherished  traditions  and  in  close  association 
with  the  companions  of  Pelham  and  Pegram  and  the 
others  of  whom  I  write,  I  have  found  an  inspiration  at 
least  to  essay  the  task  of  recording  some  of  their  hero 
isms,  tarrying  now  and  then  to  point  out  the  transcend 
ent  quality  of  their  valor.  And  from  the  pages  of  the 
numerous  books, — many  of  them  professional  works, 
bearing  the  autographs  of  Lee,  and  Johnston,  and 
Pendleton,  and  Cocke,  and  Crozet,  and  Mercer, 
and  Bomford,  and  Mordecai,  and  Gilham,  and  many 
others, — to  which  I  have  had  the  privilege  of  access,  I 
have  drawn  another  inspiration;  that  is,  to  be  just  to  the 
noblest  foe  an  army  ever  had,  to  a  foe  who,  after  all, 
whether  the  equal  or  the  superior,  was  but  the  brother  of 
the  artilleryman  whose  history  I  have  sought  to  record 
in  more  collected  form  than  it  has  hitherto  existed. 

Should  the  narrative  seem  to  ignore  the  part  played 
by  the  other  arms  of  the  service,  it  must  be  recalled  that 
this  work  professes  to  be  but  a  history  of  the  Field 
Artillery.  In  undertaking  such  a  specialized  work  there 
is  always  grave  danger  that  the  writer  may  be  charged 
with  undue  partiality,  that  his  enthusiasm  for  his  par 
ticular  subject  may  be  at  the  expense  of  others.  But,  in 
this  case,  the  author  can  only  deny  any  intent  to  laud 
the  Field  Artillery  by  disparaging  its  sister  arms,  and  he 
has  not  failed  to  point  out  its  faults  as  well  as  its  virtues. 
There  is  glory  enough  for  all,  and  he  recognizes  the  fact 
that,  in  the  last  analysis,  the  artillery,  however  important 
and  valiant  its  services  may  have  been,  was  in  1861-65,  as 
it  always  will  be,  but  the  auxiliary  arm  of  the  infantry, 
and  that  the  exploits  of  the  Field  Artillery  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  depended  upon  and  were  made 
possible  by  what  was  perhaps  one  of  the  most  superb 
bodies  of  foot  soldiers  war  has  yet  produced. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  '19 

To  Gens.  Thomas  T.  Munford  and  Scott  Shipp,  Col. 
R.  Preston  Chew,  Maj.  R.  W.  Hunter,  Capts.  William 
T.  Poague,  W.  Gordon  McCabe,  William  W.  Chamber- 
lame,  J.  J.  Shoemaker,  and  Judge  George  L.  Christian, 
all  of  whom  were  intimates  of  and  soldiers  under  "Stone 
wall"  Jackson,  and  all  of  whom,  except  the  first,  served 
with  his  artillery,  I  am  much  indebted  for  aid.  And  to 
Capt.  James  Power  Smith, — who  was  one  of  Jackson's 
gunners,  and  who  to-day  is  the  sole  surviving  member  of 
his  staff,  and  with  whom  I  had  the  honor  to  serve  on  the 
staff  of  the  First  Battalion  Field  Artillery  Virginia 
Volunteers  for  several  years, — I  am  also  deeply  grateful 
for  much  information.  To  Col.  R.  T.  Berlin,  Professor 
of  English,  Virginia  Military  Institute,  I  desire  to  ex 
press  my  thanks  for  his  interest  and  advice. 

To  Col.  J.  V.  Bidgood,  Virginia's  efficient  Secretary 
of  Military  Records,  I  am  also  indebted  for  much  as 
sistance.  His  untiring  industry  and  splendid  system 
has  made  available  for  the  student  a  vast  amount  of 
historical  material  which  is  a  priceless  asset  of  the  State. 
There  are  few  who  know  the  real  nature  and  extent  of 
his  labor  and  the  results  he  has  attained. 

The  portraits  illustrating  this  work  have  been  col 
lected  with  great  labor.  Many  of  them  have  never  be 
fore  been  published.  Of  many  of  the  famous  Confeder 
ate  artillery  officers  no  pictures  are  to  be  had. 

The  author  is  conscious  of  the  fact  that  maps  showing 
the  topography  and  positions  of  the  battlefields  de 
scribed  in  the  text  would  add  greatly  to  the  value  of  the 
book,  but  it  has  been  found  impracticable  to  include 
them.  The  use  of  the  series  of  maps  published  in  con 
nection  with  the  Rebellion  Records  is  recommended  to 
military  students. 

In  conclusion,  I  desire  to  call  particular  attention  to 
the  part  the  Virginia  Military  Institute  played  in  fur 
nishing  officers  to  the  Confederacy  as  a  whole,  and  to  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  particular,  and  the  direct 
influence  it  exerted  upon  the  greatness  of  "Stonewall" 
Jackson.  JENNINGS  C.  WISE. 

Lexington,  Virginia, 

July  1,  1914. 


PART  I 

CONFEDERATE  BUREAU  or  ORDNANCE 

ITS     ORGANIZATION,     PERSONNEL,      MATERIAL,     AND     RE 
SOURCES,  WITH  AN  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  ORIGINAL 
ARMAMENT     OF     THE     ARTILLERY     OF 
THE     ARMY     OF     NORTHERN 
VIRGINIA 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 


CHAPTER  I 

EARLY    ORDNANCE    WORK    AND    STATUS    OF    ORDNANCE    IN 

1861 

IN  the  nature  of  things  a  study  of  the  artillery  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  involves  an  investigation  of 
the  system  under  which  the  material  therefor  was  pro 
vided  and  the  resources  from  which  it  was  drawn. 
Hence  we  find  ourselves  at  the  very  outset  face  to  face 
with  the  Ordnance  Department,  its  organization,  and  its 
personnel,  in  addition  to  the  material  resources  at  its 
command. 

Military  critics,  passing  judgment  after  the  event, 
seldom  prosecute  their  investigations  beyond  an  inquiry 
into  the  actual  movements  of  the  troops  and  the  battle 
orders  of  the  commanders.  The  war  chest,  the  weather 
conditions,  and  such  things  as  material  and  equipment 
frequently  escape  their  attention  entirely.  Public 
opinion,  that  bogie  of  military  men,  is  generally  totally 
ignored.  The  move  that  would  have  surely  resulted  in 
success,  had  it  been  made,  is  unfalteringly  pointed  out, 
and  woe  to  the  general  who  failed  to  execute  it,  no  mat 
ter  what  the  obstacles  in  his  path  may  have  been.  There 
stands  the  height  which,  crowned  with  a  hundred  guns, 
could  have  changed  history.  The  fact  that  it  was  on 
the  particular  day  of  the  battle  beyond  human  ability  to 
place  those  guns  on  that  hill,  or  that,  even  if  they  had 
been  there,  a  sufficient  supply  of  ammunition  was  lack 
ing,  due  to  some  influence  beyond  the  control  of  the 
general  commanding, — such  things  as  these  enter  not 
into  the  calculations  of  the  critics  a  century  later. 

The  logicians  of  war  alone  appreciate  the  skill  and  the 
labor  which  others  must  have  brought  to  the  aid  of 
Cassar.  They  know  that  an  army  moves  on  its  belly,  and 


24  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

that  its  thrusts  are  no  keener  than  the  weapons  it 
wields.  And  it  is  well,  in  studying  Lee's  artillery,  to 
commence  with  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  limitations 
which  circumstances  imposed  upon  its  employment. 
Any  layman  must  know  that  the  artillery  is  dependent 
upon  the  Ordnance  Department  for  material,  equip 
ment,  and  stores,  and  that  however  efficient  the  artillery 
personnel  may  be  its  effectiveness  bears  a  direct  relation 
to  the  efficiency  of  that  agency  which  provides  it  with  the 
machinery  of  war.  Ordinarily,  as  in  the  case  of  Ger 
many  in  1866  and  1870,  and  of  the  Balkan  States  in 
their  present  struggle  with  Turkey,  material  and  equip 
ment  are  manufactured,  stored,  and  issued  in  advance 
by  a  well-organized  corps  of  experts. 

Few  instances  are  recorded  where  a  belligerent  has 
actually  created  the  very  factories  for  the  fabrication  of 
its  arms  and  munitions  of  war  after  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  with  a  powerful  adversary.  This  was  true, 
however,  in  the  case  of  the  Confederate  States  of  Amer 
ica,  although  it  has  been  frequently  charged  and  very 
successfully  disproved  that  Mr.  Davis  and  Mr.  Floyd 
used  their  office  while  Secretary  of  War  of  the  United 
States  to  transfer  arms  and  military  supplies  from  the 
North  to  Southern  arsenals  where  they  might  be  more 
readily  seized  in  the  event  of  secession. 

The  condition  of  his  ordnance  and  ordnance  sup 
plies,  as  well  as  his  Medical,  Commissary,  and  Quarter 
master  Departments,  undoubtedly  made  impossible 
Johnston's  immediate  advance  upon  Washington  after 
Bull  Run. 

Had  the  Confederate  Bureau  of  Ordnance  been 
created  de  novo,  we  might  begin  our  study  with  the  year 
1861,  but  since  it  was  the  offspring  of  an  old  system,  we 
must  look  further  back  in  order  to  appreciate  the  charac 
ter  of  the  foundation  upon  which  it  was  raised. 

At  the  very  outbreak  of  the  War  of  American  Inde 
pendence  Congress  appointed  a  committee  to  consider 
ways  and  means  to  supply  the  Colonies  with  ammunition 
and  military  stores,  a  most  important  provision,  since 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  25 

Great  Britain  had  prohibited  the  shipment  of  such 
things  to  America  and  was  in  a  most  advantageous 
position  to  enforce  the  restriction.  This,  then,  was  the 
inception  of  the  American  system  for  the  supply  of 
munitions  of  war,  for  the  mother  country  had  very 
wisely  created  no  plants  for  their  manufacture  in  the 
colonial  wilderness. 

The  recommendations  of  the  committee  led  to  the 
appointment,  in  1776,  of  a  Commissioner  of  Artillery 
Stores,  in  cooperation  with  whom  the  business  of  pro 
curing  material  and  ammunition  was  conducted  by  a 
secret  committee  of  the  Board  of  War.  This  and  vari 
ous  subsequent  provisions, — quite  inadequate,  as  shown 
by  experience, — were  relied  upon  until  the  War  of  1812, 
when,  in  May  of  that  year,  the  Ordnance  Department 
was  created  by  Act  of  Congress.  After  having  passed 
through  various  legislative  vicissitudes,  as  an  independ 
ent  bureau  of  the  War  Department,  it  was  abolished  by 
Act  of  March  2,  1821,  and  merged  in  the  Artillery.  The 
President  was  authorized  to  select  such  artillery  officers 
as  might  be  necessary  for  ordnance  work,  and  to  each 
regiment  of  artillery  one  supernumerary  captain  was 
attached  for  ordnance  duty.  When  assigned  to  such 
duty  these  officers  were  subject  to  the  direct  orders  of 
the  War  Department  only,  a  provision  almost  tanta 
mount  to  preserving  the  independence  of  the  bureau, 
yet  hampering  it  in  the  interest  of  economy  with  an 
organization  soon  found  to  be  impracticable.  As  a 
result  of  eleven  years  of  bitter  experience  the  Ordnance 
Department  was  organized  on  an  independent  footing 
by  the  Act  of  April  5,  1832. 

Following  the  reorganization  of  the  system,  the  War 
Department,  in  1834,  during  the  incumbency  of  Lewis 
Cass,  sought  to  define  the  duties  of  ordnance  officers 
and  regulate  their  operations.  Hitherto  the  loosely 
organized  system  had  relied  solely  upon  civilian  con 
tractors  for  the  supply  of  material,  but  definite  regula 
tions  were  now  prescribed  for  its  production,  and  it  was 
provided  that  there  should  be  established  as  many 


26  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

arsenals  of  construction  as  the  public  service  might  re 
quire,  not  exceeding  six  in  number.  It  was  directed  that 
four  of  the  arsenals  should  be  erected  at  Washington, 
Watervliet,  Pittsburg,  and  Fort  Monroe,  respectively, 
and  upon  their  completion  the  fabrication  and  issue  of 
ordnance  stores  should  commence  under  the  direction  of 
the  Colonel  or  Chief  of  Ordnance  with  headquarters  at 
the  national  capital.  In  addition  to  the  corps  of  ord 
nance  officers  proper,  it  was  provided  that  lieutenants 
of  artillery  should  be  detailed  to  the  Ordnance  Depart 
ment,  for  not  more  than  four  years,  to  engage  in  the 
manufacture  of  gun  carriages  and  artillery  equipment. 

The  regulations  published  in  1834  were  followed  in 
1841  by  a  manual  prepared  by  Col.  George  Bomford, 
Chief  of  Ordnance,  and  again  by  a  similar  work  in  1850, 
revised  in  1861  under  the  immediate  direction  of  Maj. 
Laidley.  Meanwhile  the  regulations  for  the  department 
were  being  amplified  and  enforced,  in  which  work 
Capt.  Alfred  Mordecai,  of  Virginia,  and  Col.  Benjamin 
Huger,  of  South  Carolina,  took  an  important  part  as 
assistants  of  Col.  Talcott,  the  Chief. 

By  the  year  1852  there  had  been  established  twenty- 
seven  ordnance  stations  in  the  United  States,  of  which 
number  there  were  three  in  Virginia, — one  being  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  one  at  Old  Point  Comfort,  and  the 
Bellona  Arsenal  in  Chesterfield  County,  near  Richmond. 

The  labor  of  Southern  officers  had  largely  contributed 
to  the  development  of  the  Ordnance  Department,  and 
upon  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  Confederacy  secured 
the  services  of  many  efficient  men,  who  created  much  out 
of  little.  Under  the  direction  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
C.  S.  A.,  a  manual  was  immediately  prepared  fully 
setting  forth  the  material  and  equipment  adopted  for 
use  by  the  Confederacy.  Practically  no  differences 
existed  between  that  of  the  two  services,  except  as  to  the 
shape  of  certain  pieces  of  ordnance,  more  particularly 
with  respect  to  rifled  field  guns,  columbiads,  and  the 
rifled  mountain  pieces. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  27 

The  various  regulations  and  manuals  published  dur 
ing  the  period  1834-1860  contain  the  history  of  the 
development  of  ordnance  up  to  the  Civil  War  and  set 
forth  fully  the  character  of  the  artillery  material  in  use 
in  this  country  in  1860.  These  works  are  also  referred 
to  because  they  are  descriptive  of  the  school  of  training 
through  which  many  of  the  Confederate  officers  had 
passed.  The  foregoing  paragraphs  briefly  describe  the 
foundation  upon  which  the  Confederate  Bureau  of 
Ordnance  was  based,  and  in  the  upbuilding  of  which  a 
number  of  former  United  States  officers  took  important 
parts.  And  now,  before  going  further  in  our  investiga 
tion,  it  will  be  well  to  examine  the  stage  of  development 
of  field  ordnance  in  1861. 

The  classification  of  ordnance  shown  in  the  manual 
of  1861  includes  no  field  pieces  except  6-  and  12-pounder 
bronze  guns,  12-pounder  bronze  mountain  howitzers, 
and  12-,  24-,  and  32-pounder  bronze  field  howitzers, 
which  were  all  smooth-bore  pieces.  The  new  system  of 
rifling  is  not  referred  to  in  the  work  and  it  will  be  shown 
later  that  its  status  in  the  United  States  Army  was 
entirely  unofficial  until  late  in  1861.  There  had  been 
much  experimenting  going  on  since  1850,  but  the  fact 
remains  that  field  ordnance  as  prescribed  in  the  official 
manuals  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  decade  was 
identical.  With  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  however,  iron 
field  ordnance  was  cast,  and  in  1862  there  were  in  use 
3-inch  iron  rifled  guns,  the  old  bronze  pieces,  12-pounder 
bronze  Napoleons,  the  various  old  types  of  bronze 
howitzers,  and  12-pounder  iron  howitzers,  the  last- 
named  having  been  added  in  1861.  The  32-pounder 
bronze  howitzer  had  become  obsolete  for  use  in  the  field. 
Both  armies  purchased  foreign  guns  of  various  types, 
but  although  they  were  used  they  were  not  prescribed 
as  regulation  ordnance  for  manufacture  in  this  country. 
The  Confederates  had  developed  by  1862  a  2.25-inch 
bronze  mountain  rifle  which  does  not  appear  to  have 
been  in  use  in  the  Northern  Army. 


28  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

It  would  be  impracticable  to  discuss  here  the  great 
variety  of  ordnance  that  was  used  during  the  war. 
Officially,  at  least,  a  great  deal  of  it  was  unknown  to  the 
Ordnance  Department  and  formed  no  part,  as  has  been 
said  before,  of  the  regulation  material.  The  develop 
ment  of  ordnance  in  the  United  States  Army,  with  the 
exception  of  a  3-inch  rifle,  seems  to  have  been  left 
entirely  in  the  hands  of  private  persons,  the  war  giving 
an  impetus  to  the  manufacture  of  all  kinds  of  artillery 
material.  Some  conception  of  the  armament  of  the  time 
may  be  had  from  a  report  of  the  field  artillery  material 
of  Rosecrans'  army  in  1863,  in  which  it  is  stated  there 
were  thirty-two  6-pounder  smooth-bores,  twenty-four 
12-pounder  howitzers,  eight  12-pounder  light  Napo 
leons,  twenty-one  James  rifles,  thirty-four  10-pounder 
Parrotts,  two  12-pounder  and  two  6-pounder  Wiard 
steel  guns,  two  1 6-pounder  Parrotts,  and  four  3-inch 
rifled  ordnance  guns.  This  assortment  is  typical  of  the 
Confederate  material  of  the  time. 

Rifling  as  adapted  to  the  use  of  field  ordnance  was 
little  known  to  our  ordnance  experts  at  the  time  and 
was  scarcely  more  familiar  to  those  of  Europe. 

William  Greener,  C.  E.,  in  a  treatise  on  Rifles,  Can 
non,  and  Sporting  Arms,  published  in  London  in  1858, 
points  out  that  gun  barrels  were  grooved  first  in  Vienna 
about  1498  for  the  purpose  of  providing  space  for  the 
foul  residue  produced  by  discharge,  thus  diminishing 
friction  in  reloading.  Within  twenty  years  of  this  time 
the  grooves  were  given  a  twist,  and  some  of  the  bullets 
had  projections  to  fit  the  grooves.  This  was  not 
practicable,  however,  so  the  shape  of  the  bullets  was 
changed,  and  it  passed  through  various  stages  from  be 
ing  egg-shaped  to  practically  the  present  form.  These 
rifles  were  unsuccessful,  due  to  the  fact  that  there  was 
too  much  of  what  was  then  called  windage, — gas  escap 
ing  by  the  bullet.  In  1836  Greener  produced  the  per 
fect  expansive  bullet, — that  is,  a  bullet  which  upon 
discharge  would  expand  and  fill  the  rifling, — although 
Capt.  Norton,  an  English  officer,  had  invented  an  ex- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  29 

plosive  detonating  lead  shell  in  1822,  which  incidentally 
only  partly  accomplished  the  same  purpose  on  account  of 
its  inability  to  resist  the  compression  due  to  the  ex 
plosion.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  principles  of 
the  invention  of  Greener  were  adopted  by  the  English 
about  1848  under  the  name  of  Minie  rifle,  Capt.  Minie 
having  proposed  practically  the  same  things  that  were 
previously  rejected  when  proposed  by  Greener. 

Scoffern,  in  his  New  Recourses  of  Warfare,  published 
in  London,  in  1859,  discusses  rifling  of  small  arms  and 
cannon.  He  credits  Sir  William  Armstrong  with  the 
development  of  the  English  gun  which  bore  his  name, 
into  a  rifled,  breech-loading  piece,  and  he  gives  details 
of  its  construction.  He  also  describes  the  Swedish  or 
Wahrendorff  breech-loading  rifled  cannon  which  was 
displayed  in  the  Crystal  Palace  Exhibition  of  1851. 
This  model  was  never  successful,  however,  because  the 
cross  section  at  the  breech  was  not  strong  enough  to 
withstand  the  shock  of  the  explosion.  In  addition  to 
these  he  mentions  the  fact  that  Cavalli,  of  the 
Sardinian  service,  accomplished  the  act  of  breech-load 
ing,  but  he  does  not  give  details. 

Just  as  our  ordnance  officers  paid  little  heed  to  what 
was  transpiring  in  military  circles  abroad,  so  the 
Europeans  ignored  our  development  of  the  new  system 
until  after  the  Seven  Weeks'  War  of  1866.  Napoleon 
and  the  Prussians  had  both  been  experimenting  with 
rifling  as  early  as  1857,  but  in  the  case  of  the  latter  the 
novelty  found  much  opposition.  In  England  the  Lan 
caster  gun,  with  two  grooves,  was  considered  by  many 
decidedly  unsatisfactory,  if  not  a  failure,  and  the  Arm 
strong  gun  was  but  in  the  experimental  stage  at  the 
time,  though  its  invention  had  attracted  much  notice. 
The  Cavalli  breech-loading  rifle  gun  was  not  well 
adapted  to  use  in  the  field  and  was  considered  entirely 
too  complicated  for  service. 

The  views  of  American  experts  concerning  these  guns 
are  fully  set  forth  in  Gibbon's  "Artillerist's  Manual," 


30  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

published  August  14,  1859,  in  which  the  author,  though 
stationed  at  West  Point,  fails  to  refer  to  Parrott. 

Napoleon  went  so  far,  however,  in  1858,  as  to  order 
his  S.  B.  guns  rifled,  under  the  bastard  system  known 
as  the  "Lahitte  System,"  which  continued  in  general 
use  in  France  until  1870.  The  French  had  also  de 
veloped  a  rifled  30-pounder,  more  or  less  unsuited  to 
field  use,  although  it  was  employed  in  Italy  in  1859 
with  results  as  to  range  and  accuracy  which  gave  great 
impetus  to  the  system  on  the  continent.  This  seems  to 
be  the  first  instance  of  the  use  of  a  rifled  gun  on  the 
field  of  battle.  Hohenlohe  tells  us  that  before  the 
termination  of  the  War  between  France  and  Germany 
the  Prussian  authorities  had  given  orders  to  construct 
three  hundred  rifled  6-pounders  and  a  number  of  4- 
pounders.  But  no  convincing  results  were  obtained  by 
the  Prussians  with  their  new  field  guns  in  the  war  with 
the  Danes  in  1864,  though  some  satisfaction  was  ob 
tained  with  rifled  siege  guns  at  Diippel.  The  prevail 
ing  opinion  in  Prussia  in  1866  as  to  rifled  field  pieces  is 
evidenced  by  the  fact  that,  despite  the  American  ex 
periences  during  the  preceding  five  years,  one-fourth  of 
the  Prussian  guns  were  smooth-bores,  this  number  be 
ing  considered  necessary  on  account  of  their  supposed 
superiority  with  case  and  shrapnel  for  close  fighting. 
The  satisfaction  obtained  with  their  rifled  guns  in  the 
Austrian  War  was  by  no  means  universal  among  the 
Prussians.  In  fact,  there  was  much  disappointment,  a 
result  due  more  to  the  poor  tactical  handling  of  the 
artillery  than  to  the  material,  though  this  fact  had  not 
then  been  generally  perceived.  One  soldier  at  least 
there  was  in  Prussia,  who,  like  Jackson,  as  we  shall 
see,  never  faltered  in  his  conviction  that  rifled  field 
pieces  had  come  to  stay.  The  sturdy  Von  Hindersen, 
Inspector  General  of  Artillery,  made  up  his  mind  as  to 
their  superiority  and  by  that  persistence  for  which  he 
was  noted  gradually  overbore  all  opposition  to  a  com 
plete  armament  with  the  new  piece,  a  condition,  how- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  31 

ever,  which  did  not  obtain  until  1870.  In  the  meantime, 
England  had  obtained  results  with  a  rifled  gun  in  China 
in  1860. 

In  America,  as  early  as  1855  experiments  were  made 
at  Fortress  Monroe  with  a  grooved  gun,  but  no  satis 
factory  results  had  been  obtained.  This,  in  brief,  was 
the  status  of  rifled  ordnance  just  prior  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  war. 

The  smooth-bore  system  which  prevailed  in  this 
country  was  of  its  kind  unexcelled  elsewhere.  The 
Rodman  heavy  guns  were  marvels  of  their  day  and  the 
process  developed  by  the  inventor  for  the  manipulation 
of  the  iron  in  their  casting  placed  American  ordnance 
experts  well  to  the  front  in  the  estimation  of  the  military 
world.  As  to  field  material,  the  increased  use  and  im 
provement  of  the  3-inch  rifle  sustained  the  reputation 
of  the  American  Artillery  acquired  by  reason  of  its  ad 
vances  in  heavy  armament,  though  Europe  has  been 
loath  to  accord  to  America  the  credit  due  the  latter  for 
the  development  of  the  rifled  piece,  a  development  which 
was  eminently  practical  as  opposed  to  the  theoretical  or 
experimental  state  of  the  various  foreign  systems  of 
rifling  of  the  time. 

The  introduction  of  rifled  field  pieces  in  this  country 
and  the  events  and  influences  leading  up  thereto  will 
be  considered  later  at  length. 

The  claims  to  important  inventions  and  discoveries 
are  generally  conflicting,  and  this  is  eminently  true  of 
revolutionary  ones.  In  a  discussion  of  the  artillery  ma 
terial  of  the  Civil  War  it  is  proper  that  the  Confeder 
acy  should  be  given  credit  for  its  part  in  the  invention 
of  machine  guns  and  breech-loaders.  Before  entering 
upon  the  general  treatment  of  Confederate  ordnance 
operations  the  subject  of  these  guns  will  be  briefly  dis 
posed  of. 

Attempts  to  construct  multiple  firing  guns  may  be 
traced  back  to  the  earlier  part  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  and  small  complicated  guns  of  this  character 
made  by  the  Chinese  have  been  found  bearing  dates  as 


32  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

early  as  1607.  It  was  not  until  the  introduction  of  fixed 
ammunition  about  1860,  however,  that  their  successful 
construction  was  realized.  Dr.  Reed  of  Alabama  per 
fected  a  shell  for  rifled  guns  about  this  time.  During 
the  Civil  War  a  great  variety  of  breech-loaders  and  ma 
chine  guns,  generally  ineffective,  made  their  appear 
ance,  the  invention  of  the  first  practicable  machine  gun 
being  commonly  attributed  to  Dr.  R.  J.  Gatling,  of 
Hartford  County,  North  Carolina.  During  the  war  he 
perfected  the  revolving  gun  which  now  bears  his  name. 
The  first  six  which  he  made  were  destroyed  in  his 
factory  by  fire.  Afterward  he  had  twelve  made  which 
were  first  used  in  actual  service  by  Gen  Butler  on  the 
James  River.  It  was  not  until  1866  that  the  improved 
Gatling  gun  was  adopted  by  the  United  States 
Ordnance  Department.  The  use  of  this  gun  on  the 
battlefield  was  antedated  by  that  of  a  machine  gun 
manufactured  at  the  Richmond  Tredegar  Works,  the 
first  year  of  the  war,  the  inventor  being  Capt.  R.  S. 
Williams,  C.  S.  A.,  of  Covington,  Ky.  The  gun 
was  a  1 -pounder  steel  breech-loader  with  a  barrel  about 
four  feet  long,  and  a  bore  of  two  inches.  It  was 
mounted  on  a  two-wheeled  carriage  similar  to  that  of  a 
boat  howitzer  and  was  drawn  by  one  horse  in  shafts. 
It  was  operated  by  a  lever  attached  to  a  revolving  cam 
shaft  which  rotated  a  cylinder,  above  which  was  an 
ammunition  hopper.  The  cartridges  were  fired  by  a 
sliding  hammer  which  automatically  struck  the  percus 
sion  caps  at  each  revolution  of  the  cylinder.  The  gun 
had  a  range  of  about  2,000  yards.  Its  first  test  in  action 
was  on  May  31,  1862,  at  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines 
under  the  direction  of  the  inventor  himself,  who  accom 
panied  Pickett's  Brigade.  The  results  obtained  were 
so  satisfactory  that  the  Confederate  Government  had 
six  of  the  guns  made  which  comprised  the  material  of 
Williams',  later  Schoolfield's  Battery,  of  the  Western 
Army.  A  graphic  account  of  their  effect  in  the  battle  of 
Blue  Springs,  East  Tennessee,  October  10,  1863,  is 
given  by  Capt.  T.  T.  Allen  of  the  7th  Ohio  Cavalry.* 

*Confederate  Veteran,  November,   1908,  p.   581.     Also  Ibid.,   February,   1909, 
p.  65. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    JOSIAII    GOKGAS 
CHIEF  OF  ORDNANCE,  ('.  S.  A. 


TH.E  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  33 

These  breech-loading  machine  guns,  probably  the  first 
used  in  war,  were  discarded  according  to  Capt.  T.  M. 
Freeman,  of  Houston,  Tex.,  Giltner's  Brigade,  because 
when  firing  the  breech  expanded  and  failed  to  relock. 

Officers  captured  by  Pickett's  Division  at  Gettys 
burg  asked  many  questions  about  the  strange  rapid-fire 
gun  used  by  the  Confederates  at  Seven  Pines,  showing 
that  not  only  was  the  use  of  such  a  gun  novel  to  them, 
but  that  it  had  made  a  lasting  impression  by  its  noise 
and  the  uncanny  screech  of  its  spike-like  bolts.  The 
subsequent  reputation  acquired  by  Williams'  Battery 
in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  undoubtedly  attracted  the 
attention  of  Dr.  Gatling,  who  lived  nearby  in  Cincin 
nati,  Ohio,  then  a  man  beyond  military  age,  and  already 
distinguished  as  the  inventor  of  a  steamplow  and  many 
other  valuable  machines.  It  is  not  at  all  impossible 
that  the  Gatling  gun  is  the  outgrowth  of  Capt. 
Williams'  revolving  gun,  which  certainly  made  its  ap 
pearance  on  the  battlefield  before  the  former  did.  One 
of  the  Williams'  guns  is  now  in  possession  of  the  United 
States  War  Department  and  has  been  extensively  ex 
hibited. 


CHAPTER  II 

ORGANIZATION    OF    THE    BUREAU    OF    ORDNANCE   AND    ITS 
EARLY  OPERATIONS 

ONE  of  the  most  serious  problems  confronting  Mr. 
Davis  upon  assuming  office  as  Chief  Executive  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  America,  was  the  supply  of 
arms  and  munitions  of  war,  and  for  this  reason  it  was 
one  of  the  first  to  receive  his  attention.  In  no  branch 
of  the  new  service  were  the  needs  so  pressing  and  the 
means  relatively  so  inadequate  to  supply  them,  as  in 
the  matter  of  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores.  Thou 
sands  were  clammering  in  vain  for  arms  wherewith  to 
defend  their  country. 

The  selection  of  an  officer  to  organize  the  Bureau  of 
Ordnance  was  a  wise  one,  the  choice  falling  upon  Capt. 
Josiah  Gorgas,  but  recently  resigned  from  the  Ordnance 
Department  of  the  United  States  Army,  in  response  to 
the  call  of  the  South,  though  he  himself  was  a  native  of 
Pennsylvania.  The  record  which  this  man  made  as 
Chief  of  Ordnance,  C.  S.  A.,*  is  indeed  a  remarkable 
one,  and  had  it  not  been  for  such  ability  and  energy  as 
he  displayed  in  the  administration  of  his  department, 
the  Confederacy  could  never  have  maintained  armies  in 
the  field  as  long  as  it  did.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
General  Gorgas  was  himself  in  large  measure  the 
ordnance  department,  and  for  this  reason  a  brief  sketch 
of  his  career  is  not  thought  to  be  inappropriate. t 

Born  in  Dauphin  County,  Pa.,  July  1,  1818,  he  was 
graduated  at  West  Point  sixth  in  the  Class  of  1841,  and 
was  assigned  to  the  Ordnance  Department,  in  which  he 
served  until  April,  1861.  Soon  after  entering  the 
Army,  he  secured  leave  of  absence  for  the  purpose  of 
studying  his  profession  abroad,  returning  for  more 

*  Appointed.  Special  Orders  No.  17,  A.  G.  O.,  April  8,  1861,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I, 
Rebellion  Records,  p.  211. 

tile  created  the  Ordnance  Department  of  nothing. — Joseph  E.  Johnston. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  35 

active  service  in  the  Mexican  War  and  distinguishing 
himself  in  the  siege  of  Vera  Cruz.  During  the  years 
following,  he  was  assigned  to  duty  at  various  arsenals 
throughout  the  country,  among  them  the  Mt.  Vernon 
arsenal  in  Alabama,  where  in  1853  he  married  the 
daughter  of  ex-Governor  Gayle  of  Mobile.  Promoted 
captain  in  1855,  he  was  transferred  to  Maine  and  again 
to  Charleston,  S.  C.,  in  1860,  but  was  on  duty  in  Penn 
sylvania  at  the  time  of  his  resignation.  There  seems  to 
be  little  doubt  that  the  Department  recognized  his 
great  abilities,  and  sought  to  retain  his  services  by  order 
ing  him  from  Charleston  to  his  native  State  at  the 
critical  hour,  for  the  influence  of  his  Southern  wife  and 
associates  had  done  much  to  fix  his  allegiance  to  the 
South. 

When  Col.  Gorgas  was  appointed  Chief  of  the 
Bureau  of  Ordnance  he  at  once  looked  to  the  several 
sources  of  supply  for  the  ordnance  material  demanded 
of  him  from  all  sides.  First  the  supply  in  possession  of 
the  various  States,  whether  purchased  or  seized  by 
them,  must  be  husbanded  and  immediate  steps  taken  in 
order  to  prevent  its  waste  and  loss,  forming  as  it  did  the 
sole  reliance  of  the  Confederacy  at  the  outset.  Second, 
while  ordnance  plants  were  being  created  to  supply 
future  needs,  prompt  purchases  would  have  to  be  made 
abroad  to  supplement  the  present  supply  of  the  States. 
From  these  sources  the  troops  of  the  South  must  secure 
their  armament. 

Fully  appreciating  the  material  poverty  of  the 
country,  Col.  Gorgas  at  once  sent  an  efficient  officer  to 
Europe,  in  order  to  avail  himself  of  that  source  of  sup 
ply,  having  become  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  foreign 
markets  during  a  year  of  travel  abroad. 

He  next  set  about  locating  arsenals,  powder  mills, 
lead  and  copper  mines,  and  preparing  elaborate  and 
skillful  plans  for  the  collection  and  distribution  of  the 
armament  of  the  Confederacy.  Not  only  did  he  de 
vise  and  secure  the  creation  of  the  Bureau  of  Foreign 
Supplies,  and  the  Mining  and  Niter  Bureau,  but  he 


36  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

did  much  for  the  establishment  of  a  blockade-running 
service.  His  insistent  views  in  regard  to  the  govern 
mental  control  of  the  cotton  and  tobacco  crops,  if 
adopted  in  time,  would  no  doubt  have  prevented  the 
early  dissolution  of  the  Confederate  currency  system. 
The  power  to  select  officers  of  ability  as  assistants  was  a 
striking  characteristic  of  this  energetic,  modest  man,  so 
little  known  to  the  general  public.* 

When  Gen.  Gorgas  assumed  office  in  April,  1861,  the 
Confederacy  was  without  a  single  arsenal,  laboratory  or 
powder  mill  of  any  capacity,  the  United  States  War 
Department  having  depleted  rather  than  over-stocked 
the  small  depots  located  in  the  South.  In  the  entire 
South,  there  was  but  one  plant  available  as  a  cannon 
foundry  and  rolling  mill.  Fortunately  for  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  that  one,  The  Richmond  Trede- 
gar  Works,  was  located  in  Virginia. f 

By  an  act  approved  March  16,  1861,  the  Confederate 
Government  appropriated  $110,000.00  for  the  purchase 
of  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores,  followed  in  May  by 
a  larger  appropriation  amounting  to  $4,440,000.00, 
directing  that  out  of  the  latter  sum  were  to  be  purchased 
16  field  batteries  of  6  pieces  each,  with  harness  imple 
ments  and  ammunition.  Of  the  general  appropriation 
of  $5,700,000.00  for  the  public  defense  made  in  August, 
an  apportionment  of  $3,500,000.00  was  made  to  the 
Bureau  of  Ordnance,  all  available  funds  thereof  having 

*In  the  spring  of  1865,  Gen.  Gorgas  returned  to  his  adopted  state,  Alabama, 
and  became  Superintendent  of  the  Briarfield  Iron  Works,  soon  after  accepting 
appointment  as  Vice-Chancellor  University  of  the  South,  at  Sewanee,  Tenn.,  and 
becoming  President  of  the  University  of  Alabama  in  1877.  He  died  May  15, 
1883,  having  resigned  his  high  office  after  a  brief  tenure,  on  account  of  ill 
health,  serving  until  his  death  as  Librarian  of  the  University.  Mr.  Davis  pays 
no  higher  tribute  to  any  of  his  officers  than  to  this  unimpeachable  man. 

It  is  interesting  to  know  that  the  son  of  this  distinguished  Confederate 
officer  is  Col.  W.  C.  Gorgas,  U.  S.  Medical  Corps,  whose  work  as  Chief  Sanitary 
Officer  of  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  has  attracted  the  attention  of  the  world. 

fThe  Tredegar  Works  possessed  at  this  time  the  maximum  capacity  for  the 
production  of  rails  of  8,000  tons  a  year. 

The  noble  manner  in  which  the  South  accepted  defeat  and  set  about  the  up 
building  of  its  institutions  was  in  a  great  measure  due  to  the  influence  of  a 
very  large  number  of  ex-officers,  who  connected  themselves  with  schools  and 
colleges,  and  to  a  host  of  others  who  set  an  example  from  the  pulpit.  Nearly 
every  Southern  institution  of  learning  was  headed  by  gallant  Confederates  who 
commanded  the  highest  respect,  and  the  church  was  largely  in  the  hands  of  ex- 
soldiers,  who  led  their  people  to  accept  with  humility  the  outcome  of  the  war  as 
the  decree  of  the  Almighty.  Lee,  Pendleton,  Alexander,  Maury,  Brooke,  Randolph, 
McKim,  Gorgas,  Mallet,  Carter,  and  McCabe  are  but  a  few  soldiers  who  occupied 
prominent  positions  in  the  educational  and  ecclesiastical  walks  of  life  after 
the  war. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  37 

been  exhausted  before  the  following  December.  The 
necessity  of  a  new  appropriation  of  $2,340,000  that 
month  and  of  $2,660,000,00  the  following  February,  at 
the  instance  of  Gen.  Gorgas,  gives  some  idea  of  the 
activity  of  his  department.  There  were  further  ap 
propriations  on  April  3  and  17  of  $11,000,000,00  and 
$200,000.00,  respectively. 

In  September,  1861,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  reported 
that  in  addition  to  a  small  number  of  12-pounder  iron 
howitzers  in  storage,  outstanding  contracts  existed  for 
the  supply  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  6-pounder 
gun  carriages  and  caissons,  one  hundred  and  thirty-one 
3-inch  rifled  guns,  eighty-one  12-pounder  and  forty 
24-pounder  iron  howitzers,  a  number  of  howitzer  car 
riages,  and  a  few  6-pounder  brass  guns.  There  was 
only  one  government  plant  engaged  in  the  manufacture 
of  field  gun  carriages  at  this  time,  and  that  had  a 
capacity  of  but  one  carriage  a  week,  though  arrange 
ments  for  the  enlargement  of  this,  the  Baton  Rouge 
arsenal,  were  being  completed. 

Upon  the  formation  of  the  Confederate  Government, 
Mr.  Davis  had  placed  Caleb  Huse  as  Foreign  Purchas 
ing  Agent,  under  the  direction  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance. 
Visiting  England  at  once,  this  agent  met  the  inventors 
of  the  Armstrong  and  Blakely  guns,  but,  failing  to 
secure  any  material  there,  repaired  to  the  continent 
where  he  purchased  in  Austria  12  field  batteries  and  4 
batteries  of  S.  B.  guns,  which  he  ordered  to  be  con 
verted.  This  material  together  with  a  small  quantity 
of  French  harness,  shell,  powder,  friction-tubes,  and 
some  forge  and  battery  wagons,  was  shipped  from  Ham 
burg,  but  not  until  March,  1862. 

In  April,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  reported  a  total  of 
35  field  pieces  of  all  descriptions,  as  taken  over  with 
the  forts  which  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederacy, 
stating  that  only  four  6-pounders,  two  12-pounder 
howitzers,  and  six  6-pounder  steel  rifled  pieces,  had  been 
ordered  in  addition  to  27,518  rounds  of  field  artillery 
ammunition. 


38  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

A  report  of  May,  1861,  shows  that  practically  no 
field  artillery  material  had  been  seized  with  the  govern 
ment  depots,  though  ammunition  sufficient  for  60  field 
guns  was  found  in  the  Baton  Rouge  arsenal.* 

From  the  foregoing  facts,  we  must  conclude  that 
such  ordnance  as  was  issued  to  the  field  artillery  up  to 
the  fall  of  1861  was  on  hand  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  with  the  possible  exception  of  a  few  small  pur 
chases  in  Mexico  immediately  thereafter,  and  it  is  not 
conceivable  that  the  armies  in  Virginia  received  any 
great  amount  from  outside  of  the  State  until  the  regular 
manufacture  of  ordnance  began  the  following  year. 

Before  examining  the  resources  of  Virginia,  however, 
let  us  see  what  was  done  to  organize  the  Bureau  of 
Ordnance  of  the  Confederacy. 

The  Act  of  March  6,  1861,  providing  for  the  estab 
lishment  and  organization  of  the  Army,  charged  the 
Artillery  Corps  with  all  ordnance  duties,  but,  in  ad 
dition,  authorized  such  staff  departments  to  be  con 
tinued  as  were  already  established. 

The  Act  of  February  21  created  the  War  Depart 
ment,  as  a  bureau  of  which,  though  attached  to  the 
Artillery  Corps,  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  was  formed, 
it,  with  the  Engineer  Bureau,  being  originally  in  charge 
of  Gen.  Gorgas  as  Acting  Chief,  with  the  rank  of  Major 
of  Artillery .f 

Under  this  organization  of  the  bureau,  in  connection 
with  the  Artillery,  its  operations  were  not  satisfactory, 
since  the  artillery  officers  performing  ordnance  duties 
were  not  directly  subject  to  the  control  of  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance,  leading  to  the  recommendation  on  the 
latter's  part  the  following  March  that  a  new  organiza 
tion  be  given  the  department,  to  be  styled  the  Bureau 
of  Artillery  and  Ordnance  and  to  consist  of  1  colonel, 
1  lieutenant-colonel,  4  majors  and  12  captains  (to  be 
nominated  by  the  President),  and  as  many  lieutenants 

*The  Washington  Artillery  secured  6  old  S.  B.  guns  and  a  considerable 
amount  of  obsolete  ordnance  equipment  from  the  Baton  Rouge  arsenal. 

tRelieved  from  duty  as  Chief  of  Engineer  Bureau,  and  superseded  by  Maj. 
Daniel  Leadbetter,  S.  O.,  No.  134,  A.  G.  O.,  August  3,  1861. 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  39 

detailed  from  the  Army  for  such  time  as  the  service 
might  require.* 

The  views  of  the  Chief  were  partially  adopted,  and 
definite  regulations  for  the  new  organization  prescribed 
soon  after. f 

It  was  now  provided  that  all  officers  assigned  to 
ordnance  duty  with  troops  in  the  field  should  report 
direct  to  the  head  of  the  Bureau,  and  in  the  case  where 
an  ordnance  officer  was  not  assigned  by  the  Bureau, 
corps,  division  and  brigade  commanders  were  to 
designate  their  own  ordnance  officers,  to  be  known  as 
Chiefs  of  Ordnance,  Division  and  Brigade  Ordnance 
Officers,  respectively.  The  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  an 
army,  or  of  a  corps,  held  the  rank  of  major,  and  the 
division  and  brigade  officers,  the  rank  of  captain  of 
artillery  in  the  regular  army.  These  officers  were 
ordered  to  be  selected  by  a  test  for  special  fitness,  were 
attached  to  the  staffs  of  their  respective  commands,  and 
when  once  appointed,  were  forbidden  to  be  changed 
without  authority  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance.  The 
Division  and  Brigade  Ordnance  Officers  made  monthly 
returns  to  the  Chief  Ordnance  Officer  of  their  corps  or 
army,  and  only  in  extraordinary  cases  were  they 
authorized  to  contract  for  supplies.  Every  regimental 
commander  was  required  to  appoint  an  ordnance 
sergeant.  Full  instructions  for  ordnance  officers  in  the 
field  were  issued  by  the  Secretary  of  War  May  20, 
1862,J  the  collection  of  captured  arms  being  dealt  with 
in  detail. 

The  exertions  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  during  the 
first  year  overcame  difficulties  thought  to  be  insuper 
able.  "During  the  harassments  of  war,  while  holding 
our  own  in  the  field  defiantly  and  successfully  against 
a  powerful  enemy;  crippled  by  a  depreciated  currency; 
throttled  by  a  blockade  that  deprived  us  of  nearly  all 
the  means  of  getting  material  or  workmen;  obliged  to 

*See  letter,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  990, 
March  12,  1862. 

tG.  O.  No.  24,  A.  G.  O.,  April  16,  1862,   Ibid.,  p.   1065. 
$ltel)eUion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.   1124. 


40  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

send  almost  every  able-bodied  man  to  the  field;  unable 
to  use  the  slave  labor,  with  which  we  were  abundantly 
supplied,  except  in  the  most  unskilled  departments  of 
production;  hampered  by  want  of  transportation  even 
of  the  commonest  supplies  of  food;  with  no  stock  on 
hand,  even  of  articles  such  as  steel,  copper,  leather, 
iron,  which  we  must  have  to  build  up  our  establish 
ments — against  all  these  obstacles,  in  spite  of  all  these 
deficiencies,  we  persevered  at  home  as  determinedly  as 
did  our  troops  in  the  field,  against  a  more  tangible  op 
position;  and  in  that  short  period  created  (first  two 
years  of  the  war),  almost  literally  out  of  the  ground, 
foundries  and  rolling  mills  at  Selma,  Richmond,  At 
lanta,  and  Macon;  smelting  works  at  Petersburg, 
chemical  works  at  Charlotte,  N.  C.;  a  powder  mill  far 
superior  to  any  in  the  United  States  and  unsurpassed 
by  any  across  the  ocean;  and  a  chain  of  arsenals, 
armories,  and  laboratories  equal  in  their  capacity  and 
their  improved  appointments  to  the  best  of  those  in 
the  United  States,  stretching  link  by  link  from  Virginia 
to  Alabama." 

The  foregoing  words  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  do 
not  exaggerate,  and  give  a  vivid  impression  of  the  con 
ditions  in  the  South  at  the  opening  of  the  war.  It  is 
all  but  impossible  to  believe  so  much  could  be  accom 
plished  in  a  purely  agricultural  region,  almost  wholly 
devoid  of  factories,  industrial  machinery,  manufactur 
ing  materials  and  skilled  labor.  The  fact  remains,  how 
ever,  that  in  the  spring  of  1862,  one  year  after  the  fall 
of  Sumter,  the  following  plants  were  in  operation: 

Fayetteville  Arsenal  and  Armory,  Fayetteville, 
N.  C.;  Richmond  Armory  and  Richmond  Arsenal, 
Richmond,  Va. ;  Charleston  Arsenal,  Charleston,  S.  C.; 
Augusta  Arsenal,  Augusta,  Ga. ;  Confederate  Powder 
Mills,  Augusta,  Ga. ;  Savannah  Depot,  Savannah,  Ga. ; 
Montgomery  Depot,  Montgomery,  Ala.;  Mount 
Vernon  Arsenal,  Mount  Vernon,  Ala.;  Baton  Rouge 
Arsenal,  Baton  Rouge,  La.;  Texas  Arsenal,  San  An 
tonio,  Texas;  Little  Rock  Arsenal,  Little  Rock,  Ark.; 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  41 

Memphis  Depot,  Memphis,  Tenn. ;  Nashville  Arsenal, 
Nashville,  Tenn.;  New  Orleans  Depot,  New  Orleans, 
La.  Eight  of  these  were  in  successful  operation  before 
the  first  summer  of  the  war. 

The  idea  is  prevalent  that  the  Confederacy  acquired 
by  seizure  from  the  United  States  Government  the  ma 
chinery  and  plants  with  which  the  manufacture  of  arms 
was  undertaken,  in  addition  to  an  enormous  supply  of 
ordnance  and  ordnance  stores.  This  is  a  most  erroneous 
belief.  On  the  contrary,  practically  no  serviceable 
artillery  material  or  ammunition  was  thus  acquired,  as 
shown  by  the  reports  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance.  What 
little  powder  was  stored  in  the  Southern  States  before 
the  war  was  a  relic  of  Mexican  days,  except  about  60,000 
pounds  of  old  cannon  powder  captured  at  Norfolk  and 
several  other  points.  There  were  absolutely  no  bat 
teries  of  field  artillery  at  the  arsenals  and  forts,  only  a 
few  old  iron  guns  mounted  on  Gribeauval  carriages 
fabricated  in  1762.  The  volunteer  batteries  of  the 
States,  however,  did  possess  some  serviceable  guns,  but 
practically  no  harness,  saddles,  bridles,  blankets,  or 
other  artillery  equipment. 

The  United  States  arsenals  within  the  limits  of  the 
Confederacy  had  for  years  been  employed  as  mere  de 
pots,  the  only  one  possessing  machines  other  than  foot 
lathes  being  that  at  Fayetteville,  N.  C.  Not  a  gun  nor 
a  gun  carriage,  and  except  during  the  Mexican  war, 
scarcely  a  round  of  ammunition,  had  for  50  years  been 
manufactured  in  the  South.  The  only  foundry  at  which 
a  cannon  had  ever  been  cast  was  the  Richmond  Trede- 
gar  Works,  and  copper,  so  necessary  for  field  artillery 
purposes,  was  just  being  obtained  in  East  Tennessee. 
Not  a  single  rolling-mill  for  bar  iron  existed  south  of 
Richmond,  and  the  few  small  blast  furnaces  in  opera 
tion  were  located  in  the  border  States  of  Virginia  and 
Tennessee. 

The  manufacture  of  field  guns  was  from  the  first  con 
fined  almost  entirely  to  the  Richmond  Tredegar  Works, 
a  few  pieces  only  being  cast  in  New  Orleans  and  Nash- 


42  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

ville,  while  in  Rome,  Ga.,  a  very  limited  number  of 
three-inch  iron  rifled  guns  were  made. 

Gun  carriages  and  field  artillery  equipment  for  the 
army  in  Virginia  were  also  wholly  supplied  by  the 
Richmond  arsenal,  while  that  at  Augusta  produced 
much  of  the  same  material  for  the  troops  in  the  South 
and  West. 

It  has  been  shown  that  not  only  was  there  no  powder 
for  the  field  artillery  on  hand  in  the  South  before  the 
war,  but  that  no  mills  of  any  but  the  smallest  capacity 
existed  in  the  South  for  its  manufacture,  notwithstand 
ing  the  original  plans  for  the  armament  of  that  arm 
contemplated  the  placing  in  the  field  of  300  guns,  with 
200  rounds  of  ammunition  for  each  piece.  It  became 
immediately  necessary,  therefore,  to  provide  not  less 
than  175,000  pounds  of  powder  for  the  batteries  alone. 
Efforts  to  satisfy  this  demand  were  first  made  by 
agents  in  the  North,  but  only  a  few  orders  were  filled 
before  the  attack  on  Sumter,  when  all  shipments  ceased. 
It  then  became  necessary  to  undertake  the  erection  of 
government  powder  mills. 

Before  June  1,  1861,  niter  had  been  secured  in  North 
ern  Alabama,  and  in  Tennessee,  and  sulphur  in 
Louisiana,  into  which  state  a  considerable  supply  had 
been  imported  for  use  in  the  manufacture  of  sugar. 
This  supply  was  supplemented  by  that  furnished  under 
a  contract  with  Doctor  Ullmann,  of  Talapoosa,  Ala., 
who  undertook  to  deliver  from  1,000  to  2,000  pounds  a 
day.  Efforts  were  also  made  to  secure  the  product 
from  the  reduction  of  iron  pyrites  by  private  contractors 
in  Alabama  and  Louisiana,  and  in  the  end  this  was  the 
source  from  which  the  necessary  sulphur  was  obtained. 

For  the  third  ingredient  of  powder,  viz.,  charcoal, 
recourse  was  had  chiefly  to  cotton-wood  from  the  banks 
of  the  Savannah  River,  in  which  locality  it  was  abundant 
and  gave  an  excellent  product. 

There  were  2  small  private  powder  mills  in  Tennes 
see,  2  in  South  Carolina,  1  in  North  Carolina,  and  a 
little  stamping-mill  in  New  Orleans.  Contracts  were 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  43 

immediately  made  to  take  over  all  the  powder  these 
plants  could  produce  and  they  were  offered  every  en 
couragement  to  continue  and  increase  their  outputs. 
Messrs.  Bowen  &  Co.,  of  Pendleton,  S.  C.,  and  J.  M. 
Ostendorff  &  Co.,  of  Walhalla,  S,  C.,  together,  accepted 
contracts  for  300  pounds  of  powder  a  day.  S.  D. 
Morgan,  of  Nashville,  Tenn.,  also  immediately  under 
took  to  furnish  a  considerable  supply.  An  order  for 
250  tons  was  accepted  by  C.  D.  Yale,  of  Virginia,  the 
price  named  being  forty  cents  per  pound.  Foreign 
orders  were  placed  for  2,500,000  pounds,  and  negotia 
tions  were  opened  for  the  immediate  purchase  of  650,- 
000  pounds  in  Mexico.  Gen.  Davis,  who  in  the  mean 
time  had  secured  a  small  supply  of  sulphur  and  salt 
petre,  began  the  manufacture  of  powder  near  Lewis- 
burg,  Va.,  for  the  immediate  use  of  the  troops.*  Such 
was  the  condition  up  to  August,  1861. 

In  the  meantime,  Georgia  had  imported  about  250,- 
000  pounds  of  niter,  and  before  the  battle  of  Bull  Run 
the  Government  had  gathered  from  all  sources  a  supply 
of  about  200,000  pounds  of  artillery  powder.  The 
construction  of  a  great  government  powder  mill  at 
Augusta,  Ga.,  was  placed  in  charge  of  Gen.  G.  W. 
Rains,  a  North  Carolinian,  at  the  time  engaged  in  the 
manufacture  of  machinery  in  New  York,  in  which  in 
dustry  he  possessed  wide  experience. t  Only  inquiring 
how  he  could  serve  the  Confederacy  best,  this  officer 
immediately  repaired  to  Augusta  and  undertook  the 
seemingly  impossible  task  assigned  him,  soon  producing 
a  supply  of  powder  of  unexcelled  quality,  due  to  the 
skill  with  which  the  niter,  secured  from  various  sources, 
was  purified. 

The  immediate  demands  for  saltpetre  were  satisfied 
by  contracts.  In  May,  Messrs.  Leonard  and  Riddle,  of 
Montgomery,  Ala.,  undertook  to  furnish  60,000 
pounds  from  local  sources.  Colonel  Hindman,  of 

*Rcbcllion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  555. 

tGeorge  Washington  Rains,  of  North  Carolina,  graduated  from  the  II.  S. 
M.  A.  in  1838,  was  first  assigned  to  the  Engineers  and  then  transferred  to  the 
Artillery.  He  served  with  distinguished  gallantry  in  the  Mexican  War.  and 
received  various  brevets,  resigning  from  the  Army  in  185(5. 


44  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Arkansas,  contracted  to  furnish  100,000  pounds,  and 
Richard  Ross,  of  Memphis,  agreed  to  secure  a  like 
amount  from  the  caves  in  East  Tennessee.  In  Northern 
Alabama,  a  section  rich  in  saltpetre,  Messrs.  Nelson  and 
Davis,  S.  D.  Bowen  &  Co.,  and  William  Worley,  were 
the  principal  contractors,  and  they  controlled  an  output 
of  about  1,000  pounds  per  day,  the  weekly  yield  of  the 
East  Tennessee  beds  being  about  four  tons,  a  supply 
of  8,000  to  10,000  pounds  being  already  on  hand  for 
sale  there.  The  contract  price  offered  by  the  Bureau 
of  Ordnance  for  saltpetre  at  this  time  was  twenty-five 
cents  per  pound,  the  market  price  ranging  from  twenty- 
two  to  thirty  cents.* 

Later  on,  after  the  supply  of  saltpetre  in  the  caves 
was  exhausted,  resort  was  had  to  tobacco  houses,  damp 
cellars  and  to  artificial  beds  in  which  human  urine  was 
largely  used  for  the  lixiviation  of  the  earth.  The  princi 
pal  beds  were  established  in  Columbia,  S.  C.,  Charles 
ton,  Savannah,  Augusta,  Mobile,  Selma,  and  Rich 
mond.  Thus  the  inferior  imported  powder,  in  the  manu 
facture  of  which  a  poor  grade  of  niter  was  generally 
used,  the  quality  depending  upon  the  not  too  scrupulous 
honesty  of  the  foreign  shippers,  had  no  longer  to  be 
relied  upon  as  at  first. 

Upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
the  Mining  and  Niter  Bureau  was  created  early  in 
1862.  The  corps  of  officers  authorized  for  the  Niter 
Bureau  consisted  of  one  Superintendent  of  the  rank  of 
a  major  of  artillery,  and  four  assistants  and  eight  sub 
ordinates,  with  the  rank  of  captains  and  lieutenants 
of  artillery,  respectively,  t  The  officers  of  the  corps 
were  authorized  to  impress  free  negroes  to  work  the 
caves. 

Some  idea  of  the  efficiency  of  the  Niter  Bureau  may 
be  derived  from  the  fact  that  before  the  close  of  1864, 
a  supply  of  2,800,000  feet  of  nitrous  earth  was  on  hand, 
of  which  a  large  proportion  was  capable  of  yielding  l^/o 
pounds  of  niter  per  foot.  Within  a  year  after  the  pro- 

*  Rebellion  Records.  Series  IV,  Vol.  II,  p.  55«. 

tAct  approved  April  11,  1862.     Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  1054. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  45 

duction  of  the  niter  was  undertaken,  the  government 
resources  supplied  more  than  half  the  annual  con 
sumption,  and  at  the  close  of  the  war,  the  central 
laboratory,  then  about  completed  at  Macon,  Ga.,  in 
charge  of  the  Superintendent  of  Laboratories,  Col. 
Jno.  W.  Mallet,  a  celebrated  chemist  and  an  officer  of 
remarkable  energy  and  ability,  cooperating  with  the 
Augusta  Mills,  would  have  been  able  to  supply  the  am 
munition  for  an  army  of  300,000  combatants.*  This 
fact  seems  almost  beyond  belief,  yet  it  must  be  added 
that  the  complete  mechanical  equipment  of  the  powder 
mills,  including  the  enormous  rollers,  was  made  in  the 
South  in  spite  of  the  almost  entire  absence  of  machine 
shops  and  factories  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Due 
entirely  to  Generals  Gorgas  and  Rains,  Colonels  St. 
John  and  Mallet,  after  the  fall  of  1862,  when  the 
powder  mills  were  completed,  no  requisition  of  an  army 
in  the  field  was  ever  dishonored.  What  higher  tribute 
can  be  paid  these  men  than  the  statement  of  this  fact? 
So  extensive  and  complete  were  the  Augusta 
Powder  Mills  and  the  Macon  Laboratories,  that  more 
than  mere  mention  of  them  should  be  made.  The  site 
selected  for  the  former  was  a  large  piece  of  land  on  the 

*As  I  write  these  lines,  November  8,  1912,  the  news  of  Col.  Mallet's  death 
yesterday,  at  the  University  of  Virginia,  where  he  lived  in  retirement,  is  received. 
Born  in  Dublin,  Ireland,  in  1832,  of  English  parents,  Dr.  Mallet  obtained  his 
doctorate  at  the  University  of  Gottingen,  and  after  graduating  from  the  Uni 
versity  of  Dublin,  in  1853,  came  to  this  country  in  the  same  year,  becoming 
professor  of  chemistry  at  the  University  of  Alabama  in  1855.  There  he  accom 
plished,  in  1856,  the  first  important  work  in  physical  chemistry  performed  in 
this  country,  the  determination  of  the  atomic  weight  of  lithium,  the  lightest 
metallic  element  known.  This  work  firmly  established  his  reputation  as  a 
chemist  of  the  first  rank ;  and  when,  during  the  civil  war,  the  Confederate 
Government  found  need  for  chemists  to  direct  the  manufacture  of  explosives, 
Dr.  Mallet,  at  that  time  a  member  of  Gen.  Rodes'  staff,  was  transferred  to  the 
artillery  arm  of  the  service  and  placed  in  supervision  of  the  manufacture  of 
ammunition.  His  distinguished  service  to  the  cause  led  the  government  to 
promote  him  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel. 

After  the  war  Dr.  Mallet  went  back  to  the  classroom  as  professor  of 
chemistry  in  the  medical  department  of  the  University  of  Louisiana.  In  1868 
he  came  to  the  University  of  Virginia.  In  1880  he  was  chosen  by  the  National 
Board  of  Health  to  consider  and  report  upon  the  proper  analytical  methods  to 
be  used  in  the  analysis  of  drinking  waters.  So  well  was  this  work  done  that  it 
introduced  him  to  a  new  field  of  usefulness.  He  became  famous  as  an  expert 
upon  sanitary  water  supply.  Not  only  was  his  advice  eagerly  sought  far  and 
wide  in  the  planning  of  such  supplies,  but  he  was  very  frequently  called  upon  as 
an  expert  witness  in  legal  cases  involving  chemical  questions,  in  all  parts  of 
the  country.  Indeed,  his  reputation  as  an  expert  witness  was  but  little  less 
extensive  than  his  fame  as  a  scientist. 

In  1885  Dr.  Mallet  went  to  the  University  of  Texas  as  Chairman  of  the 
Faculty,  and  then  to  Jefferson  Medical  College,  in  Philadelphia,  but  returned  to 
the  University  of  Virginia  in  1885  as  head  of  the  School  of  Chemistry.  He 
was  retired  on  the  Carnegie  Foundation  four  years  ago. 


46  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

canal  near  Augusta,  work  on  the  plant  commencing  irt 
September,  1861.  The  largest  pieces  of  the  machinery, 
including  the  heavy  incorporating  rollers  and  pans, 
were  made  at  the  Richmond  Tredegar  Works,  while 
the  innumerable  small  parts  were  made  wherever  the 
necessary  equipment  for  their  fabrication  could  be 
found. 

Powder  was  actually  turned  out  as  early  as  April, 
1862.  "The  statement  may  seem  startling  in  view  of 
the  difficulties  under  which  this  establishment  was  built 
up,  but  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  it  was  amongst 
the  finest  and  most  efficient  powder  mills  in  the  world 
at  the  time,  if  not  the  very  best  in  existence."* 

The  erection  of  a  central  ordnance  laboratory  for  the 
production  of  standard  ammunition,  including  that  for 
the  field  artillery,  was  decided  upon  in  September,  1862. 
A  tract  of  about  145  acres,  near  the  city  of  Macon,  was 
immediately  purchased  and  enclosed,  a  branch  track  run 
out  from  the  Macon  and  Western  Railroad,  and  the 
erection  of  the  plant  begun  by  Col.  Mallet.  The  line 
of  the  three  main  buildings,  connected  with  each  other, 
had  a  frontage  of  about  1,200  feet,  the  middle  building 
being  about  600  feet  long.  In  addition  to  this  great 
structure,  there  were  over  40  other  buildings.  All  of 
the  bricks  for  their  construction  were  made  in  a  great 
yard  near  Macon,  opened  and  conducted  by  the  ordnance 
officers  in  charge  of  the  work.  Orders  were  sent  to 
England  for  a  large  and  various  assortment  of  special 
machinery,  including  several  large  steam  engines,  to 
furnish  the  motive  power,  much  of  which  had  reached 
Bermuda  when  the  blockade  service  was  practically 
destroyed  near  the  close  of  the  war. 

Not  only  were  these  plants  able  to  contribute  their 
outputs  to  the  armies  in  the  field,  but  the  ordnance 
officers  conducting  them  were  able,  in  spite  of  the  great 
est  difficulties,  to  make  many  improvements  in  the 
various  machines  and  processes.  One  of  the  most  not 
able  of  these  was  the  method  of  steaming  the  mixed 

*See  article  in  University  of  Virginia  Alumni  Bulletin,  April,  1910,  on  "Work 
of  Confederate  Bureau  of  Ordnance,"  by  Col.  T.  W.  Mallet. 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  47 

materials  for  gunpowder  just  before  incorporation  in 
the  cylinder  mills,  which  was  invented  and  introduced 
by  Col.  Rains,  not  only  very  largely  increasing  the 
capacity  of  the  plants,  but  greatly  improving  the 
quality  of  the  powder.  As  another  example  of  the 
skill  of  the  officers  of  the  ammunition  laboratories,  may 
be  mentioned  the  casting  of  shells  with  polygonal 
cavities,  securing  the  bursting  of  the  projectile  into  a 
determinate  number  of  pieces.  It  was  in  these  labora 
tories  that  the  Reed  shell  with  the  soft  metal  base  cup 
for  taking  the  rifling  was  brought  to  so  practical  a  state 
of  perfection  that  it  has  been  little  improved  upon  since, 
being  the  very  first  satisfactory  projectile  for  rifled 
guns.  Many  ingenious  devices  for  the  ignition  of  time 
fuzes  for  use  in  rifled  guns  were  also  invented  in  these 
shops. 

From  the  saltpetre  secured  as  before  described,  nitric 
acid  could  be  made,  which,  with  mercury  and  copper, 
was  necessary  in  the  manufacture  of  percussion  caps 
and  friction  primers.  The  mercury  was  imported  from 
Mexico,  but  after  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  no  adequate 
supply  was  available.  The  ordnance  chemists,  how 
ever,  discovered  a  mixture  of  chloral  potash  and  sul- 
phuret  of  antimony  which  they  used  in  place  of 
fulminate  of  mercury,  the  necessary  supply  of  copper 
being  obtained  by  collecting  all  the  turpentine  and 
apple  brandy  stills  in  the  country,  which  were  shipped 
to  Richmond,  there  to  be  cut  up  and  rolled  into  strips. 

There  had  been  established  at  Ducktown,  Tenn.,  be 
fore  the  close  of  the  war,  a  small  plant  for  the  smelting 
and  rolling  of  copper,  though  on  no  great  scale.  A 
moderate  amount  of  sheet  copper  was  found  at  Cleve 
land,  Tenn.,  already  manufactured  from  the  Duck- 
town  ores. 

Great  trouble  from  the  first  was  experienced  in  se 
curing  the  necessary  leather  for  artillery  saddles,  har 
ness,  and  equipment.  A  comparatively  small  amount 
could  be  purchased  abroad,  and  the  principal  govern 
ment  leather  shops  at  Montgomery  were  unable  to  pro- 


48  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

cure  a  sufficient  supply  of  raw  material  to  fill  the  tre 
mendous  demands  of  the  various  armies.  The  pro 
duction  of  this  and  the  Richmond  factory  was  supple 
mented  by  means  of  small  contracts  placed  in  the  rural 
districts,  especially  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  where  old 
men  were  induced  to  devote  their  energies  to  the 
fabrication  of  harness,  and  other  horse  equipment.  In 
order  to  economize  the  insufficient  quantity  of  leather 
available,  due  to  the  early  elimination  of  the  Texas  and 
Mexican  supplies,  bridle  reins  and  saddle  skirts  were 
made  of  cotton  cloth  stitched  in  three  or  four  layers. 
The  tannery  industry  was  encouraged  by  exemptions 
from  military  duty  in  the  field,  and  a  premium  was  put 
upon  the  saving  and  curing  of  hides  throughout  the 
South. 

The  friction  resulting  from  the  scramble  for  leather 
by  the  Quartermaster  Department,  and  the  ordnance 
agents  was,  as  might  have  been  expected  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  the  cause  of  frequent  War  Department 
orders,  endeavoring  to  regulate  the  activities  of  the  two 
interests. 

The  home  resources  were  supplemented  by  extensive 
foreign  purchases  of  leather  from  time  to  time.  Be 
fore  the  close  of  the  year  1863  harness  shops  had  been 
established  in  Clarksville,  Va. 

In  view  of  the  scarcity  of  leather  and  the  absolute 
lack  of  india-rubber,  a  process  was  developed  for  the 
treatment  of  the  cotton  cloth  used  in  the  fabrication  of 
blankets,  equipments,  etc.  Linseed  oil  answered  best 
for  making  the  drying  oil,  and  when  the  necessary  sup 
ply  could  no  longer  be  imported,  a  fishery  was  estab 
lished  on  the  Cape  Fear  River  where  it  was  made. 

Country  blacksmiths,  wheelwrights  and  carriage 
builders  were  perforce  generally  exempted  and  sub 
sidized  to  make  horseshoes,  gun  carriages,  transport 
wagons,  etc.,  The  metal  for  the  smiths  was  pre 
cariously  obtained,  the  small  individual  outputs  of  these 
wayside  mechanics  being  gathered  by  districts.  During 
the  year  ending  September  30,  1863,  tremendous  efforts 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  49 

were  made  by  the  government  to  supplement  the  sup 
ply  of  horseshoes  procurable  through  contracts,  and  of 
the  266,951  pounds  of  shoes  issued  during  the  forego 
ing  period,  nearly  half  were  fabricated  in  the  arsenals. 

To  provide  the  metals  required  in  the  manufacture  of 
cannon,  projectiles,  and  metallic  articles,  was  a  task  of 
tremendous  proportions.  To  supervise  and  direct  this 
work  the  Mining  Bureau  was  created,  conjointly  with 
the  Niter  Bureau;  Col.  St.  John,  being  assigned  to  the 
administration  of  this  important  organization,  assist 
ed  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  with  distinguished  ability. 

At  the  outset,  lead  had  been  purchased  abroad,  much 
in  Mexico,  and  early  in  the  spring  a  contract  was  made 
for  the  delivery  of  500  tons  at  Columbia,  and  a  like 
amount  at  San  Antonio,  Tex.,  the  price  being  seven 
cents  per  pound.  But  this  supply  was  by  no  means 
sufficient. 

One  of  the  first  steps  taken  by  the  Chief  had  been  the 
erection  of  a  small  smelting  plant  in  Petersburg,  which 
was  in  full  operation  before  the  summer  of  1862. 

Every  encouragement  was  now  given  by  government 
contracts  to  stimulate  the  mining  and  smelting  of  ores, 
and  much  ingenuity  and  great  labor  were  expended  in 
providing  the  necessary  metals.  The  Virginia  lead 
mines  at  Wytheville  supplied  the  bulk  of  the  lead,  hav 
ing  an  output  of  from  thirty  to  forty  tons  a  month. 
There  was  also  a  small  lead  mine  operated  in  Davidson, 
N.  C.  To  supplement  this  inadequate  supply,  the 
country  was  literally  scoured  from  end  to  end,  piping, 
window  weights,  roofs,  cistern  linings  and  utensils  of 
all  kinds  contributing  to  meet  the  demand.  Lead  and 
tin  in  small  quantities  were  also  imported  from  abroad, 
especially  from  the  West  Indies.  Under  the  able 
direction  of  Dr.  Pigott,  formerly  of  Baltimore,  the  lead 
from  Wytheville  and  several  other  points,  as  well  as 
the  promiscuous  supply  of  scrap,  was  reduced  in  the 
Petersburg  plant  where  some  progress  in  desilverization 
by  the  Pattison  process  was  made.  The  several  tons 
of  enriched  lead  set  aside,  however,  had  to  be  melted  up 
for  bullets  before  cupellation. 


50  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Most  important  of  all  were  the  results  obtained  in  the 
development  of  the  iron  ores  of  the  South  in  1862,  and 
the  following  year,  especially  in  Alabama  where  the 
foundation  for  the  present  vast  iron  industry  was  laid. 
The  Mining  Bureau  both  by  the  labor  of  its  own  officers 
and  subsidized  contractors  opened  mines,  erected 
furnaces  and  rolling-mills,  and  turned  out  an  immense 
quantity  of  iron  of  superior  quality.  Scrap  was  col 
lected  from  all  available  sources,  and  battlefields  were 
carefully  gleaned  for  metals  which  commanded  a  price 
at  any  of  the  arsenals.* 

This  sketch  of  the  Confederate  Bureau  of  Ordnance, 
however  brief,  would  be  utterly  incomplete  without 
fuller  reference  to  the  Richmond  Tredegar  Works  than 
has  hitherto  been  made.  Prominent  in  the  surrounding 
landscape  of  Virginia's  Capital  City,  to-day  as  in  1861, 
are  the  slated  roofs  and  tall  chimneys  of  this  plant,  ris 
ing  above  the  white  foam  of  the  rapids.  The  ominous 
clouds  of  smoke  by  day  and  the  lurid  flashes  of  fire  by 
night,  which  shoot  upward  from  this  island  haunt  of 
Vulcan,  comport  well  with  the  turbulence  of  the  James 
at  this  point,  the  restless  waters  bounding  among  the 
great  boulders  in  the  river  bed  to  the  very  furnace  doors. 
And,  as  one  gazes  downward  from  the  height  of  Gam 
ble's  Hill,  the  site  of  the  great  Confederate  Hospitals, 
upon  the  massive  plant,  hissing  and  seething  in  mid 
stream  ;  the  great  Dunlop  Flour  Mills  of  war-time  fame 
silhouetted  against  the  horizon  beyond;  Hollywood,  the 
magnificent  city  of  the  dead,  nearer  at  hand,  an  awful 
consciousness  clutches  the  mind  that  here  indeed  life, 
strife,  woe,  and  death  met  together,  here  where  the  heart 
of  the  Confederacy  beat  the  strongest  and  is  now  en 
shrined. 

So  potent  a  factor  was  the  firm  of  Jos.  R.  Ander 
son  &  Co.,  the  proprietors  of  the  Tredegar  Works,  in 
the  aggressive  power  of  the  Southern  armies,  that  it 
acknowledged  no  superior  among  the  government 
plants.  When  the  war  began,  its  foundry  was  the  only 

*For  early  measures  to  provide  supplies  of  powder,  lead,  sulphur,  saltpetre, 
etc.,  see  Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  pp.  555,  557. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  51 

one  capable  of  casting  heavy  guns,  and  its  shops  con 
tinued  the  only  rolling-mill  of  great  capacity,  in  the 
South.  Initiated  into  ordnance  work  as  an  adjunct  of 
the  nearby  Bellona  Arsenal  of  the  United  States 
Government,  its  experience  was  at  once  turned  to  ac 
count  by  the  Confederate  authorities,  and  even  to  this 
day,  large  projectiles  are  there  manufactured  for  the 
united  country.  Adding  to  its  utility  by  enlarging  its 
plant,  and  by  importations  of  costly  machinery  through 
the  blockade,  for  which  purpose  it  employed  its  own 
ship,  in  spite  of  great  loss  by  fire,  Jos.  R.  Anderson  & 
Co.  continued  operations  throughout  the  war  as  the 
strong  arm  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  while  the  senior 
partner  led  his  brigade  in  the  field.  It  was  here  that 
the  famous  7-inch  rifled  Brooke  gun  was  first  cast, 
tested  and  perfected;  that  most  of  the  heavy  guns  for 
coast  defense,  with  their  projectiles,  were  made;  that 
the  plates  for  the  first  iron  clads  were  rolled  and  the 
shells  for  the  first  torpedoes  were  made.  Operating 
mines,  mills,  and  pork  packeries,  in  various  sections  of 
the  South;  obtaining  coal  and  metal  at  a  time  when  in 
dustry  was  almost  at  a  standstill  elsewhere;  with  a  bri 
gade  of  its  own  employees,  in  spite  of  the  closest  con 
scription,  organized,  armed,  and  drilled  by  its  own  of 
ficers,  and,  on  several  occasions  led  against  the  common 
enemy  to  repel  raids;  no  wonder  when  provisions  be 
came  scarce  the  agents  of  the  "Works"  proceeded  with 
those  of  the  Government  commissary,  pari-passu* 

*An  interesting  anecdote  illustrative  of  the  importance  of  the  Tredegar 
Works  is  here  borrowed  from  Mr.  T.  C.  DeLeon,  author  of  "Belles,  Beaux,  and 
Brains  of  the  '60's,"  and  "Four  Years  in  Rebel  Capitals." 

A  special  train  was  crossing  the  bridge  en  route  for  Petersburg  at  a  time 
when  transportation  was  rare.  A  huge  negro,  blacker  than  the  soot  upon  his 
face,  sat  placidly  upon  the  platform  of  the  rear  car. 

'What  are  you  doing  here?"  was  asked  by  the  officer  in  charge. 

'Ridin'  t'  Petersburg,"  was  the  placid  reply. 

'Have  you  paid  your  fare?" 

'Don'  got  none  to  pay,  boss.     Rides  on'r  pass,  I  does  !" 

'Work  for  the  government?"  this  rather  impatiently. 

Ebo  rolled  his  eyes,  with  an  expression  of  deep  disgust,  as  he  responded 
grandly  : 

"No — sah  !     Fur  t'uther  consarn  !" 


CHAPTER  III 

ORGANIZATION  AND  OPERATIONS 

HAVING  familiarized  ourselves  somewhat  with  its  ma 
terial  development,  let  us  now  examine  the  conditions 
with  respect  to  the  personnel  and  organization  of  the 
Bureau  of  Ordnance,  which  continued  to  be  merely  a 
bureau  of  the  War  Department  instead  of  possessing 
the  character  of  a  distinct  department  of  the  Army. 
There  were,  of  course,  grave  disadvantages  incident  to 
such  an  organization;  yet,  in  spite  of  this  defect  and  a 
great  deficiency  in  the  number  of  ordnance  officers,  the 
work  had  been  efficiently  conducted  during  the  early 
part  of  the  war,  far  more  so  with  the  available  resources 
than  could  reasonably  have  been  expected. 

As  soon  as  Congress  was  thoroughly  awake  to  the 
seriousness  of  the  war  it  became  far  easier  to  secure  the 
needed  appropriations  for  ordnance  material,  and 
increases  in  the  corps  of  officers,  whose  staff  duties  were 
no  longer  viewed  in  the  light  of  departmental  sinecures. 

By  Act  of  April  21,  1862,  Congress  authorized  the 
appointment  of  80  officers  of  artillery  in  the  Provisional 
Army  for  ordnance  duties,  prescribing  that  from  this 
number  there  should  be  one  lieutenant-colonel  appointed 
for  each  command  composed  of  more  than  one  army 
corps;  a  major  for  each  army  corps  composed  of  more 
than  one  division ;  the  others  to  have  the  rank  of  captain 
and  first  lieutenant  in  such  proportion  as  the  President 
might  prescribe.  This  increase  proving  inadequate  the 
corps  was  again  enlarged  by  Act  of  September  16,  1862, 
authorizing  the  President  to  appoint  70  officers  of 
artillery  in  the  Provisional  Army  for  ordnance  duties. 
Having  secured  this  increase  the  Adjutant-General,  in 
order  that  capable  men  only  might  be  detailed  to  the 
Corps,  announced  certain  educational  requisites  to  their 
appointment  and  created  an  examining  board  com 
posed  of  Col.  T.  S.  Rhett,  Col.  W.  LeRoy  Broun, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  53 

Maj.  S.  Stansbury,  and  Capt.  Benj.  Sloan,  who  were 
directed  to  visit  the  various  armies  in  the  field,  and  ex 
amine  candidates  who  had  made  application  for  ap 
pointment  to  the  army  commanders  through  their 
chiefs  of  ordnance.  Notice  of  examinations  was  re 
quired  to  be  published  in  the  Richmond  Enquirer.  It 
was  provided  that  no  candidate  could  be  commissioned 
captain  unless  proficient  in  the  subjects  of  algebra, 
trigonometry,  mechanics,  and  chemistry.  Meantime, 
Brig.-Gen.  Benj.  Huger,  formerly  of  the  United  States 
Ordnance  Corps,  had  been  appointed  Inspector  Gen 
eral  of  Artillery  and  Ordnance,  and  enjoined  to  en 
force  the  regulations  of  the  branches  of  the  service 
subject  to  his  inspections.  Orders  were  also  published 
providing  for  a  waiting  list  of  those  who  might  pass  the 
examinations  for  whom  no  vacancy  existed,  the  success 
ful  candidates  to  be  given  rank  according  to  merit  when 
finally  appointed,  and  examination  for  promotion  was 
also  prescribed.  Notice  of  examinations  to  be  held  were 
to  be  printed  in  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  and  applica 
tions  to  stand  the  same  were  directed  to  be  made  to  army 
commanders  through  their  chiefs  of  ordnance.*  The 
test  applied  to  candidates  proved  so  exacting  that  the 
Corps  contained  many  vacancies  as  late  as  January, 
1863.  The  artillery  officers  authorized  to  be  appointed 
in  the  Provisional  Army  were  in  addition  to  those  of 
the  Regular  Army  detailed  to  ordnance  duty  by  the 
War  Department  and  those  in  the  Provisional  Army 
and  Volunteer  Corps  so  detailed,  and  those  of  the  Min 
ing  and  Niter  Bureau,  appointed  by  Congress. t 

In  August,  1863,  the  officers  appointed  from  the 
Provisional  Army  were  distributed  as  follows:  4 
lieutenant-colonels,  9  majors,  65  captains,  40  first 
lieutenants  and  32  second  lieutenants,  there  being  150 
commissions  authorized,  two  assistants  not  above  the 
rank  of  captain  being  allowed  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  of 

*G.  O.  Nos.  68,  70,  71,  A.  &  I.  G.  O.,  September  17,  September  23,  September 
26,  1862.  The  general  educational  requirements  were  a  good  English  education, 
knowledge  of  elementary  mathematics,  and  familiarity  with  the  Ordnance 
Manual  published  by  the  Bureau. 

tG.  O.  No.   71,  A.  &  I.  G.  O.,   September  26,   1862. 


54  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

an  army,  and  one  not  above  the  rank  of  first  lieutenant 
the  chief  of  ordnance  of  a  department.  Ordnance  of 
ficers  on  duty  in  the  field  were  now  assigned,  lieutenant- 
colonels  to  armies,  majors  to  army  corps,  captains  to 
departments  and  divisions,  and  lieutenants  to  brigades.* 

Shortly  after  this  redistribution,  it  was  held  by  the 
Ad  jut  ant- General  that  "Chiefs  of  Ordnance"  of 
armies  and  departments  were  to  be  assigned  by  the 
department  only,  and  that  they  no  longer  formed  a  part 
of  the  personal  staffs  of  commanding  generals,  t  sub 
ject  to  appointment  by  them,  when  no  officer  was 
designated  for  ordnance  duties  with  their  commands  as 
had  hitherto  been  authorized. 

The  Chief  of  the  Bureau  now  holding  the  rank  of 
lieutenant-colonel,  recommended  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  November  15,  1863,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
officers  of  the  Regular  Confederate  Army  on  ordnance 
duty,  with  temporary  rank  dependent  upon  the  duties 
assigned  them  from  time  to  time,  were  entirely  distinct 
from  the  provisional  organization,  the  rank  of  the 
officers  of  which  was  fixed  by  law,  that  a  law  creating  a 
permanent  ordnance  department  be  enacted.  Not  only 
did  this  long-neglected  measure  seem  necessary  to  him 
for  the  proper  administration  of  ordnance  affairs,  but  it 
would,  he  very  rightly  claimed,  give  character  and 
recognition  to  ordnance  officers  as  belonging  to  a  dis 
tinct  branch  of  the  service,  the  members  of  the  Corps  be 
ing  promoted  in  their  own  branch  in  accordance  with 
seniority  and  efficiency. 

Becoming  curious  as  to  the  expenditure  of  the 
ordnance  appropriations,  Congress  passed  a  resolution 
September  10,  1862,  calling  upon  the  President  for  full 
information  with  respect  to  the  disbursements  of  the 
War  Department  for  arms,  etc.  In  the  report  of  the 
Chief  of  the  Bureau,  of  January  7,  1863,  in  reply  to 
this  resolution,  a  complete  and  interesting  statement  of 
the  number  and  character  of  the  small  arms  and  equip- 

"Compare  this  reassignment  with   the  distribution   originally  made. 
tG.  O.  No.  84,  A.  &  I.  G.  O.,  June  15,  1863. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  55 

ments  fabricated,  issued,  and  on  hand,  up  to  September 
1,  1862,  showing  the  cost  of  production  thereof,  is  given. 
In  this  report,  however,  nothing  concerning  artillery 
material  appears.  Up  to  this  time  practically  all  such 
material  had  been  purchased  abroad,  but  very  little  as 
has  been  shown,  before  the  summer  of  1862.*  Major 
Huse  of  the  Artillery,  commissioned  in  April,  1861,  to 
purchase  abroad  on  account  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance, 
had  been  more  successful  in  assisting  the  Quartermaster 
Department  than  the  former,  and  for  his  trouble  be 
came  involved  in  difficulties  with  the  latter.  On  his  own 
responsibility  he  had  purchased  and  shipped  to  the 
Quartermaster-General  large  supplies  of  blankets, 
clothing,  shoes,  and  cloth,  prompted,  as  he  said,  by  a 
knowledge  of  the  nakedness  of  the  Confederate  soldiers. 
His  strenuous  efforts  to  secure  ordnance  material  were 
rewarded  during  the  winter  of  1862  and  1863,  and  be 
fore  February  of  the  latter  year  he  had  purchased  129 
pieces  of  ordnance,  as  follows:  fifty- four  6-pounder 
S.  B.  bronze  guns;  18  S.  B.  bronze  howitzers;  carriages 
and  caissons  for  same;  6  rifled  2.10-inch  Blakely  guns 
complete  with  18,000  rounds  of  ammunition  therefor; 
2,000  fuses ;  3  rifled  8-inch  Blakely  guns  with  680  shells 
for  same;  twelve  12-pounder  rifled  steel  guns  with  a 
large  supply  of  ammunition  therefor;  32  bronze  rifled 
Austrian  pieces,  or  4  batteries  complete  with  10,000 
rounds  of  shrapnel;  2  bronze  rifles  with  200  shells 
therefor;  756  rounds  of  shrapnel;  9,820  wooden  fuses; 
4  steel  9-pounder  rifles  with  1,008  shell  and  fuses;  220 
sets  of  harness  with  spare  parts,  at  a  total  cost  of  nearly 
half  a  million  dollars.  In  addition  to  the  foregoing,  he 
had  secured  a  large  quantity  of  leather,  57,000  pounds 
of  saltpetre,  80,900  friction  tubes,  286  ingots  of  tin, 
and  931  pigs  of  lead.  Other  purchases  before  Novem 
ber,  1863,  brought  the  number  of  foreign  field  pieces 
issued  to  date  up  to  193,  the  field  artillery  ordnance  hav 
ing  been  produced  with  these  exceptions  in  the  arsenals 
and  workshops  of  the  Confederacy. 

"Letter  of  Maj.  Huse,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  II,  p.  227. 


56  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

In  a  paper  written  after  the  war,  Gen.  Gorgas  states 
that  the  principal  issues  of  the  Richmond  Arsenal  alone, 
during  the  period  from  July  1,  1861,  to  January  1, 
1865,  including  the  work  done  for  this  plant  by  the 
Richmond  Tredegar  Works,  embraced  the  following 
field  artillery  material  and  equipment:* 

1,396  field  pieces   (including  captured  guns  re 
paired), 

1,375  gun  carriages, 
875  caissons, 
152  forges, 

6,852  sets  artillery  harness, 

921,441  rounds  of  field,  seige  and  sea  coast  am 
munition. 

1,456,190  friction  primers, 
1,110,966  fuses, 
17,423  port  fires, 

3,985  rockets, 

69,418  saddles,  artillery  and  cavalry, 
85,139  bridles, 
75,639  halters, 
56,624  pairs  of  spurs, 
42,285  horse  brushes, 
56,903  curry  combs. 

The  casual  reader  may  weary  with  such  figures  as 
have  been  here  given,  but  it  is  the  knowledge  of  such  de 
tails  that  gives  the  serious  investigator  food  for  re 
flection  and  a  true  grasp  of  his  subject. 

Such  importations  as  were  made  by  the  Bureau  were 
transported  by  its  own  fleet  of  four  steamers,  and  a 
number  of  smaller  vessels  subsidized  for  blockade 
running.  The  blockade  service,  in  charge  of  Maj.  T.  L. 
Bayne,  assumed  great  importance  at  the  very  beginning 
of  the  war.  Agencies  were  established  at  Bermuda, 
Nassau,  and  Havana,  and  gradually  the  purchase  was 
made  of  a  number  of  steamers  specially  suited  to 
blockade  running.  The  fleet  proper,  consisting  of  the 
JR.  E.  Lee,  Lady  Davis,  Eugenia,  and  Stag,  all  fine 

*Report  Chief  of  Ordnance,  November  15,  1863, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  57 

vessels  for  their  day,  carried  out  the  cotton  apportioned 
the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  in  lieu  of  drafts  or  specie,  to 
be  sold  in  foreign  markets,  the  proceeds  being  applied 
to  the  account  of  purchases  from  foreign  houses.  Such 
was  the  method  enforced  by  the  depreciation  of  the 
currency,  adding  finance  on  a  large  scale  to  the  cares 
and  duties  of  the  ordnance  officers. 

In  November,  1863,  there  were  5,090  persons,  of 
whom  two-thirds  were  non-conscripts,  disabled  soldiers, 
boys,  women,  or  slaves,  employed  in  the  arsenals  and 
shops  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  the  various  establish 
ments,  and  their  superintendents  being  as  follows: 

Richmond  Arsenal,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  L.  Brown; 
Richmond  Armory,  and  Clarksville  Harness  Shops, 

Supt.  W.  S.  Downer; 
Danville  Depot,  Capt.  E.  S.  Hutter; 
Lynchburg  Depot,  Capt.  C.  T.  Getty; 
Fayetteville    Arsenal    and    Armory,    Maj.    F.    L. 

Childs; 

Salisbury  Foundry,  Capt.  A.  C.  Brenizer; 
Charleston  Arsenal,  Maj.  T.  J.  Trezevant; 
Augusta    Arsenal,    Foundry    and    Powder    Mills, 

Col.  G.  W.  Rains; 

Atlanta  Arsenal,  Col.  M.  H.  Wright; 
Macon  Arsenal,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  M.  Cuyler; 
Macon  Laboratory,  Col.  J.  W.  Mallet; 
Macon  Armory,  Supt.  J.  H.  Burton; 
Montgomery  Arsenal,  Maj.  C.  G.  Wagner; 
Columbus  Arsenal,  Maj.  F.  C.  Humphreys; 
Selma  Arsenal,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  L.  White. 

Their  capacity  was  so  augmented  that  during  the 
year  ending  September  30,  1863,  677  field  pieces,  with 
carriages,  caissons,  and  battery  equipment  complete* 
251  extra  carriages,  caissons,  store  and  forge  wagons, 
4,221  sets  of  harness  and  318,197  rounds  of  field 
artillery  ammunition  were  issued  to  the  troops  in  the 
field.* 


*  Superintendents  of  Armories,  with  pay  and  allowances  of  a  major  of 
artillery,  were  authorized  by  Act  of  Congress  of  August  21,  1861.  So,  also,  a 
number  of  storekeepers  of  ordnance,  by  acts  of  May  10  and  August  21,  1861,  the 
same  to  have  pay  and  allowance  of  captain  of  infantry. 


58  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Each  of  these  plants  met  with  peculiar  problems  de 
manding  ready  solution,  the  labor  question  being  gener 
ally  foremost.  Careful  search  had  to  be  made  for 
trained  mechanics  among  the  troops  in  the  field,  de 
tails  for  ordnance  service  being  made  only  on  proper 
evidence  that  the  applicant  was  really  a  mechanic,  in 
order  that  mere  evasion  of  active  duty  in  the  field  might 
not  be  encouraged.  Some  attempts  were  made  to  im 
port  mechanics  from  Europe,  but  with  practically  no 
success.  Every  effort  was  made  to  convert  unskilled 
into  skilled  labor  by  teaching  on  the  part  of  the  few 
who  were  already  themselves  trained.  Some  of  the 
more  competent  operators  accomplished  remarkable 
results  in  constructing  with  but  poor  appliances  special 
machinery  for  ordnance  purposes.  Then  there  was  the 
grave  danger  of  unfaithful  servants  who  by  their 
treachery  might  wreck  the  plants  or  cause  irreparable 
loss. 

To  guard  the  larger  mills  and  arsenals,  the  operators 
were  generally  organized  for  purposes  of  defense.  The 
battalion  of  the  Tredegar  Works  has  been  mentioned. 
The  powder  mills  in  Augusta  were  also  able  to  muster 
a  battalion  and  a  field  battery  as  well.  At  the  Macon 
plants  there  were  two  companies  of  infantry  and  a  sec 
tion  of  guns  ready  at  all  times,  being  called  out  on  three 
occasions  to  repel  attacks.  These  forces  were  quite 
efficient,  including  among  their  men  many  detailed 
soldiers.  Thus,  on  a  number  of  occasions,  they  were 
able  to  save  the  plants  for  which  they  were  the  sole 
guard,  and  which  were  naturally  a  much  coveted  prize 
for  the  raiding  parties  of  the  enemy. 

Many  discouragements  in  the  way  of  irreparable 
losses  of  plants  with  costly  machinery,  both  by  capture 
and  fire  were  experienced  by  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance 
during  the  period  of  its  phenomenal  upbuilding.  The 
arsenals  and  shops  which  it  had  first  commanded  in 
Missouri,  Arkansas,  Texas,  Mississippi,  Kentucky, 
Tennessee,  Louisiana,  and  Florida,  had  not  only  been 
gradually  cut  off  by  the  encroachments  of  the  enemy, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  59 

but  the  supplies  of  raw  material  from  these  States  had 
in  large  measure  become  unavailable,  and  in  no  depart 
ment  of  government  activity  could  the  slow  but  steady 
contraction  of  Confederate  territory  have  been  more 
forcefully  realized.  Yet,  to  the  end,  the  loss  of  a  mam 
moth  plant,  erected — created,  it  might  better  be  said— 
with  so  much  toil,  and  in  spite  of  infinite  difficulties, 
only  served  to  inspire  the  ordnance  officers  to  greater 
exertions,  building,  ever  rebuilding,  as  they  were,  a 
house  of  cards  upon  a  foundation  of  hope.  Time  and 
destiny  put  a  period  to  hope,  it  is  true,  but  not  before 
the  Confederate  Bureau  of  Ordnance  had  written  into 
history  the  story  of  the  unexcelled  genius  of  its  officers. 
The  Confederate  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  however,  did 
not  depend  solely  upon  foreign  credits  and  the 
creative  genius  of  its  own  officers,  for  throughout  the 
war  the  Federal  Ordnance  Department  proved  a  pro 
lific  source  of  supply.  Seldom  has  one  belligerent  so 
extensively  equipped  itself,  with  arms  and  munitions 
of  war  at  the  expense  of  its  adversary,  as  did  the  South 
in  the  War  of  Secession.  Nor  is  this  fact  in  any  way  dis 
creditable  to  the  Federal  Army.  It  was  the  outgrowth 
of  that  strange  inventor,  Necessity.  Opportunity  for 
the  capture  of  ordnance  materials  and  military  stores 
frequently  dictated  and  controlled  campaigns  to  a  de 
gree  unknown  to  pure  strategy.  Risks,  which  would 
have  ordinarily  appeared  foolhardy,  were  taken  be 
cause  of  the  possible  reward,  which  success  held  out  in 
the  shape  of  warm  clothing,  full  haversacks,  and  new 
arms.  In  fact,  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  Con 
federate  military  policy  was  essentially  one  of  material 
necessity.  Of  this  fact,  the  unusual  frequency  of 
orders  concerning,  and  the  completeness  of  the  system 
for,  the  collection,  preservation  and  repair  of  captured 
arms  and  munitions,  are  sufficient  evidence.  The 
premium  set  upon  captured  property  accounts  for  the 
large  amount  of  such  material  thus  obtained  and  re 
issued  to  the  Confederate  troops.  Towards  the  close  of 
the  war,  the  Northern  armies  practically  disarmed  the 


60  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

South,  yet  the  material  taken  was  no  better  then,  and 
generally  not  so  good  as  their  own;  hence  there  was  no 
reason  for  its  distribution  for  use  among  the  captors. 

To  follow  the  history  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance 
through  the  declining  days  of  the  Confederacy  would 
be  unfruitful.  It  would  be  an  account  of  lack  of  funds, 
material  poverty,  absolute  bankruptcy  in  fact,  when 
every  possible  makeshift  was  employed  to  keep  arms 
and  ammunition  in  the  hands  of  the  fighting  line.  Yet, 
at  no  time,  however  pressing  the  want  of  food,  clothes, 
forage,  harness,  and  equipment,  was  there  ever  a  lack 
of  field  guns  and  powder.  The  roads  from  Petersburg 
to  Appomattox  were  blocked  with  guns,  which  the 
available  teams  could  scarcely  draw.  One  thing  no 
carper  could  well  say — "The  army  surrendered  for  lack 
of  ordnance." 


CHAPTER  IV 

ORIGINAL  ARMAMENT  OF  THE  ARMY  OF 
NORTHERN  VIRGINIA 

WERE  the  account  of  the  Confederate  ordnance  re 
sources  to  close  here,  well  might  it  be  said  that  no  light 
has  been  thrown  upon  the  initial  armament  of  the 
troops  in  Virginia.  "Whence  came  the  guns  at  Bull 
Run,  at  Malvern  Hill,"  the  reader  naturally  inquires. 
And  the  answer  lies  in  the  preparedness  of  Virginia, 
such  as  her  armament  was.  To  the  Old  Dominion,  the. 
mother  of  states  and  of  presidents,  who  though 
struggling  to  the  last  to  render  secession  unnecessary, 
yet,  through  the  foresight  of  her  statesmen  was  armed 
against  a  contingency  which  to  many  appeared  inevita 
ble,  is  almost  entirely  due  the  credit.  And,  so,  when 
the  flood-tide  of  circumstances,  of  political  rancor,  of 
sectional  bitterness,  or  to  whatever  may  be  attributed 
the  fateful  plunge,  washed  Virginia  up  against  the 
bulwarks  of  the  Union,  she  was  able  to  place  in  the 
hands  of  her  sons  and  those  who  flocked  to  her  borders, 
arms  with  which  to  strike  for  the  principles  to  which, 
in  the  fullness  of  her  conscience,  she  had  finally  elected 
to  adhere. 

An  examination  of  the  early  Codes  of  Virginia  will 
show  that  the  militia  of  the  State  received  constant  at 
tention  from  the  Legislature,  having  a  very  complete 
organization  on  paper.  As  early  as  1792,  the  force  was 
declared  to  consist  of  5  divisions  and  26  brigades,  the 
entire  territory  being  divided  into  regimental  districts.* 
While  the  militia  existed  merely  in  the  law,  volunteer 
companies  were  encouraged  by  ample  provisions  as  to 
arms,  equipment,  pay,  and  quarters,  being  attached  to 
and  forming  a  part  of  the  district  commands  existing 
on  paper.  The  volunteer  artillery  companies  were  as 
signed  to  the  paper  regiments  of  artillery,  there  being 

*The  number  of  brigades  was  later  increased  to  twenty-eight. 


62  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

one  for  each  division.  Hence  the  law  contemplated  the 
organization  of  5  regiments  of  artillery  in  the  event  of 
the  militia  being  called  into  actual  service.  In  1849, 
the  governor  was  authorized  to  issue  4  guns  to  the 
volunteer  artillery  companies  in  Richmond,  Norfolk, 
Petersburg,  Fredericksburg,  Portsmouth,  Wheeling, 
Alexandria,  Lynchburg,  and  Winchester,  these  being 
light  batteries;  but  not  more  than  2  guns  were  to  be 
furnished  or  provided  for  issue  to  other  companies, 
presumably  heavy  batteries,  which  were  liable  to  serv 
ice  as  light  artillery  under  the  Act  of  1833-34.  The 
organization,  discipline,  and  equipment  of  the  artillery 
were  required  to  conform  to  that  of  the  United  States. 
That  the  volunteers  had  no  effective  organization,  even 
as  late  as  1859,  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the  State 
appropriations  for  its  maintenance,  including  the 
salary  of  the  Ad  jut  ant- General  ($1,500.00) ,  aggregated 
only  $5,800.00,  a  small  company  known  as  the  public 
guard  and  employed  as  a  garrison  for  the  State  arsenal 
and  penitentiary  being  maintained  at  an  additional  ex 
pense  of  about  $25,000.00.  For  the  rapid  and  efficient 
organization  of  its  troops,  the  State  depended  upon  the 
Military  Institute  which  it  maintained  at  Lexington,  as 
at  present,  for  the  careful  and  thorough  training  of  its 
future  officers. 

While  little  was  done  for  the  armament  of  the  State, 
the  serious  aspect  of  the  impending  storm  in  1859  made 
its  impression  upon  the  Legislature,  and,  on  January  21, 
an  elaborate  measure  was  passed  carrying  an  appropria 
tion  of  $500,000.00  for  the  purchase  of  arms,  equipment, 
etc.,  and  authorizing  the  appointment  of  3  commis 
sioners  to  secure  the  same  as  quickly  as  possible. 

So  active  was  the  commission  appointed  by  the  Gov 
ernor,  that  additional  appropriations  aggregating  $106,- 
000.00  were  made  in  March,  the  armory  in  Richmond 
having  already  been  put  in  thorough  condition,  and 
steps  taken  to  secure  the  newest  machinery,  implements 
and  material  for  its  operation.  The  commission  was 
furthermore  directed  to  purchase  the  patent  rights  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  63 

"newly  invented  arms,"  wherever  the  same  could  be 
secured,  and  the  armament  procured  was  to  be  dis 
tributed  for  the  immediate  use  in  the  more  exposed 
parts  of  the  State.  These  were  drastic  measures  and 
clearly  show  what  was  in  the  minds  of  the  people  of 
Virginia,  the  anticipation  having  been  forced  upon  them 
by  the  country's  attitude  towards  the  Harper's  Ferry 
incident.* 

The  Commission  for  the  Public  Defense  consisted  of 
Col.  Philip  St.  George  Cocke,  Capt.  George  W. 
Randolph,  and  Col.  Francis  H.  Smith,  the  first  and 
third  being  graduates  of  West  Point,  and  the  second 
of  Annapolis.  Col.  Cocke,  afterwards  a  Confederate 
general,  was  at  the  time  president  of  the  Board  of 
Visitors,  and  Colonel,  afterwards  Gen.  Smith,  was  the 
Superintendent  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute. 
These  able  men,  whose  military  training  qualified  them 
to  grasp  the  true  situation,  at  once  determined  to  visit 
the  various  arsenals  of  the  country,  and  open  negotia 
tions  with  the  foremost  manufacturers  of  arms  in 
America  and  abroad.  They  were  accompanied  by  the 
Chief  Executive  of  the  State,  John  Letcher,  after 
wards  famous  as  the  energetic  war  governor.  Their 
tour  embraced  visits  to  Springfield,  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  the  West  Point  Foundry,  at  Cold  Spring,  on  the 
Hudson.  While  at  the  last-named  place,  they  were 
invited  by  Capt.  R.  P.  Parrott,  one  of  the  proprietors, 
a  retired  army  officer  and  personal  friend  of  Gen. 
Smith,  to  witness  a  series  of  experiments  he  was  con 
ducting  with  his  new  rifled  field  piece.  The  Ordnance 
Department  of  the  Army  had  been  slow  to  grasp  the 
importance  of  Parrott's  invention,  just  as  it  had  de 
clared  the  percussion  cap  interesting,  but  only  as  a  toy, 
not  many  years  before,  and  Parrott  had,  up  to  this 
time,  failed  to  secure  the  adoption  of  his  gun.f 

But  the  Virginians  did  not  hesitate.  The  effect  of 
the  fire  of  Parrott's  ordnance  witnessed  from  behind 

*See  Act  passed  March  28,   1860,  Chap.   29,  Acts  of  Assembly,   1859-60. 

tit  was  not  until  November  1,  1860,  that  an  experimental  board  recommended 
the  conversion  of  fifty  per  cent  of  the  guns  at  the  forts  and  arsenals,  but  even 
then  little  attention  was  paid  to  rifled  field  pieces. 


64  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

epaulments,  convinced  the  commission  of  its  superiority 
over  anything  they  had  seen,  and  Gen.  Smith  was  in 
structed  to  invite  the  inventor  to  send  1  gun  and  100 
shells  to  the  Virginia  Military  Institute  to  be  tested  by 
Maj.  Thomas  J.  Jackson,  Instructor  of  Artillery.* 
The  suggestion  was  promptly  complied  with,  the  gun 
was  given  a  fair  trial  in  July  by  the  artillery  class,  and 
the  results  obtained  by  the  cadets,  as  embodied  in  Maj. 
Jackson's  report,  led  to  the  purchase  by  the  commission 
of  12  rifled  field  pieces,  with  a  large  supply  of  shells 
therefor.  These  guns  were  first  used,  and  with  great 
effect,  at  the  Battle  of  Bethel,  and  the  reputation  they 
there  acquired  led  to  the  general  introduction  of  the 
Parrott  field  piece  into  the  artillery  of  both  armies. f 

Jackson  had  at  once  grasped  the  situation.  Being  an 
artillery  expert,  he  appreciated  the  great  possibility  of 
rifled  field  pieces.  The  results  he  had  obtained  with 
the  Parrott  gun  on  the  Institute  range  were  startling, 
to  him  as  well  as  to  all  those  who  had  been  accustomed 
to  smooth-bore  guns,  the  greatest  range  of  which  was 
from  1,800  to  2,000  paces.  Even  when  firing  at  1,000 
paces,  the  results  with  the  old  guns  had  been  so  doubt 
ful  that  gunners  generally,  as  Hohenlohe  said,  acted 
on  the  proverb,  "The  first  shot  is  for  the  devil,  the 
second  for  God,  and  only  the  third  for  the  King," — that 
is  to  say,  that  at  such  a  range  only  one  shot  in  three 
would  hit  a  target  6  feet  high  and  50  yards  wide. 

Jackson  could  have  been  little  influenced  by  such 
rumors  concerning  rifled  ordnance  as  may  have  sifted 
across  the  Atlantic  before  his  own  trial  of  the  Parrott 
gun.  His  nature  was  not  one  which  allowed  him  to  be 
influenced  by  less  than  the  most  tangible  knowledge 
or  experience.  That  the  Americans  knew  little  of 
European  progress  with  rifling  is  again  borne  out  by 
the  fact  that  Gen.  Johnston,  though  frantic  in  his  ef 
forts  to  secure  ordnance  for  his  field  artillery,  wrote  his 
Chief  of  Artillery,  in  Richmond,!  after  the  battle  of 

*The  famous  "Stonewall"'  Jackson.     The  gun  was  received  July  5,  1860. 
tDuring  the  Civil  War  the  West  Point  foundry  furnished  the  United  States 
Government  with  1,200  guns  and   3,000,000  projectiles. 

JCol.  William  N.  Pendleton,  later  Chief  of  Artillery,  A.  N.  V. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    WILLIAM    NELSON    I'KNDLKTON 
CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY,  A.  N.  V. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  65 

Bull  Run,  "Do  not  fail  to  urge  the  making  of  12- 
pounder  howitzers.  I  have  faith  in  them.  Let  them 
send  guns  and  equipments  and  leave  us  to  organize.  I 
enclose  a  requisition  for  equipment  of  a  battery  of 
rifles,  which  cannot  be  filled  here  ( Manassas ) .  Will 
you  see  if  the  authorities  in  Richmond  can  do  it?  Do 
not,  however ,  let  them  prefer  it  to  the  fitting  out  of 
field  batteries  of  smooth-bore  guns.33  And  on  the  10th 
of  August,  he  wrote  to  President  Davis  urging  an  in 
crease  of  the  artillery  arm,  to  be  armed  and  equipped 
by  borrowing  material  from  the  States,  or  by  casting 
guns,  especially  in  Richmond,  adding  a  particular  re 
quest  for  12-pounder  howitzers.  Though  thoroughly 
aware  of  the  value  of  artillery,  attributing  the  success 
of  the  great  Napoleon  to  its  proper  use,  Gen.  Johnston 
had  not  yet  realized  the  value  of  rifled  ordnance. 

In  the  light  of  the  present  day,  it  seems  strange  that 
so  great  a  soldier,  especially  distinguished  for  his  ability 
as  an  organizer,  and  for  his  military  learning,  should 
have  failed  to  appreciate  the  lessons  of  Bethel,  empha 
sized  by  current  report.  Masked  batteries  and  rifled 
guns  were  subjects  of  common  talk  among  the  soldiery, 
and  especially  in  the  press  of  the  time.  McDowell's 
men  had  heard  so  much  of  these  terrible  things,  that 
they  marched  into  Virginia  imagining  them  to  crown 
every  crest.  The  explanation  lies  in  the  fact  that 
Johnston's  experience  had  not  so  far  brought  him  into 
personal  familiarity  with  the  new  invention,  already 
well  known  to  Jackson  and  Pendleton,  both  of  whom 
had  first-hand  knowledge  of  the  new  gun  through  per 
sonal  experience  with  it  in  Lexington  the  previous 
year.  Having  staked  his  professional  reputation,  as  it 
were,  in  his  favorable  report  of  the  Parrott  invention, 
Jackson  was,  of  course,  only  confirmed  in  his  views  by 
the  events  of  Bethel,  and  when  Pendleton  became  Chief 
of  Artillery  of  Johnston's  army,  he  was  soon  able  to 
enforce  his  views  as  to  the  new  arm  and  overcome  the 
prejudices  of  his  commanding  general. 


66  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  United  States  War  Department  was  not  ig 
norant  of  the  tests  made  of  Parrott's  gun  in  Lexing 
ton,  and  the  subsequent  report  of  its  own  board  of 
ordnance  and  artillery  officers  was  in  its  hands.  Al 
ready  it  had  received  exaggerated  accounts  of  the  effect 
of  rifled  pieces  at  Bethel.  Now  came  to  its  ears  the 
story  of  Hainesville,  confirming  the  sudden  reversal 
of  opinion  and  reassuring  the  authorities  that  no  mis 
take  had  been  made  in  providing  McDowell  with  a 
large  number  of  rifled  pieces  for  his  impending  invasion 
of  Virginia. 

As  to  the  sudden  popularity  of  the  new  gun  in  the 
Confederate  Army,  it  is  only  necessary  to  refer,  by 
way  of  explanation,  to  the  fact  that  the  influence  of 
Jackson  extended  throughout  the  South,  hundreds  of 
his  pupils  holding  important  offices  in  the  Confederate 
armies,  each  one  of  them,  we  may  be  sure,  hanging  upon 
the  words  of  their  former  tutor  in  arms,  by  this  time  be 
come  a  "martial  divinity"  in  their  eyes. 

Though  not  a  field  gun,  the  story  of  the  200-pounder 
Parrott  rifle,  known  as  the  "Swamp  Angel,"  used  by 
the  Federals  during  the  bombardment  of  Sumter,  had 
gone  the  rounds,  being  eagerly  devoured  by  all,  as  was 
every  incident  connected  with  this  first  act  of  the  war.* 
Then,  too,  Col.  Olmstead  in  his  defense  of  Fort 
Pulaski,  had  used  two  4.5-inch  Blakely  rifles  imported 
from  England  by  the  State  of  Georgia,  their  employ 
ment  having  attracted  much  attention. 

Before  dismissing  the  subject  of  rifled  guns,  one  more 
fact  may  be  cited  as  evidence  that  American  develop 
ment  of  the  system  was  substantially  independent  of 
foreign  experience.  While  all  powers,  whether  the  fact 
was  known  to  each  other  or  not,  were  experiencing  the 
utmost  difficulty  in  securing  a  satisfactory  shell  for 
rifled  ordnance,  due  to  the  uncertainty  of  motion  of  the 
projectile,  and  the  consequent  jamming  in  the  bore, 
Dr.  Reed,  of  Alabama,  invented  a  projectile  which 

"The  "Swamp  Angel"  is  now  mounted  as  a  monument  in  Trenton,  N.  J.  See 
•account  of  its  use,  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  '<2,  73,  74. 
Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  9,  10,  11. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  67 

solved  the  problem.  His  method  was  the  attachment 
of  a  wrought  iron  band  to  the  base  of  an  elongated  pro 
jectile,  the  explosion  of  the  powder  forcing  the  soft 
metal  into  the  grooves,  a  device  which  is  still  universally 
employed.  The  effect  of  such  an  invention  was  far- 
reaching  and  led  directly  to  the  subsequent  improve 
ment  in  the  rifling  itself.  The  Confederate  ordnance 
officers  rapidly  perfected  the  Reed  projectile,  practi 
cally  unknown  until  1860,  and  soon  thereafter  followed 
the  making  of  the  first  Brooke  gun,  the  invention  of 
Capt.  John  Mercer  Brooke,  Chief  of  Ordnance  and 
Hydrography,  C.  S.  N.,  this  distinguished  scientist  hav 
ing  resigned  his  commission  in  the  United  States  Navy 
in  answer  to  the  call  of  his  native  State.* 

In  a  report  rendered  by  the  Ad  jut  ant- General  of 
Virginia,  to  the  Governor,  dated  December  15,  1860,  it 
is  stated  that  in  addition  to  the  5  divisional  artillery  regi 
ments  of  the  militia,  there  were  26  companies  of  volun 
teer  artillery  fully  recruited  and  organized.  Of  this 
number  11  were  armed  with  6-pounder  field  guns,  there 
being  24  pieces  in  all,  with  full  equipment,  including 
artillery  sabers,  and  one  with  six  12-pounder  howitzers, 
with  horse  artillery  sabers,  the  12  field  batteries  thus 
armed  being  fully  horsed,  the  personnel  of  the  artillery 
aggregating  1,066.  In  addition  to  the  field  material 
issued  to  the  volunteer  batteries,  there  were  the  follow 
ing  pieces  of  ordnance  on  hand :  issued  to  militia,  44 ;  in 
depot  for  immediate  issue,  8;  at  the  Virginia  Military 
Institute,  15;  in  the  Richmond  Armory,  229;  or  a  total 
of  296,  of  which  number  77  were  bronze,  and  219  iron 
field  guns  or  howitzers.  There  were  62  gun  carriages, 
40  caissons,  38  sets  of  harness,  703  artillery  swords,  90 
musketoons,  and  50,000  pounds  of  artillery  powder  on 
hand  in  the  State  depots.  The  foregoing,  with  a  few 

*John  M.  Brooke,  a  graduate  of  Annapolis,  had  accompanied  Perry  on  his 
initial  visit  to  Japan.  Not  only  did  he  invent  the  gun  which  to-day  retains  his 
name,  but  he  designed  and  built  the  iron-clad  Mcrrimac.  He  also  had  charge  of 
the  Confederate  experiments,  with  submarine  boats,  and  contributed  much  to  the 
development  of  the  torpedo,  first  employed  in  war  under  his  direction.  He  was 
also  noted  for  many  valuable  inventions  of  deep-sea  sounding  apparatus.  He 
contributed  much  to  science,  especially,  as  a  Confederate  officer,  to  the  science 
of  war.  From  1866  to  1899  he  occupied  the  chair  of  Physics  and  Astronomy  at 
the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  where  he  died  in  1904,  at  a  very  advanced  age, 
as  Professor  Emeritus. 


68  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

additional  small  items,  may  fairly  be  taken  to  represent 
the  resources  of  the  field  artillery  of  Virginia  at  the  out 
break  of  the  war,  a  large  portion  of  which  had  been  pur 
chased  by  the  commissioners  whose  expenditures  up  to 
June,  1861,  had  been  $1,737,950.49  for  the  Army,  and 
$100,748.49  for  the  Naval  force  of  the  State.* 

We  have  seen  to  what  extent  the  Confederacy  as  a 
whole  enriched  itself  at  the  expense  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  in  arms  and  munitions  of  war.  Now  let  us  in 
quire  what  Virginia's  record  was  in  this  respect. 

While  the  State  Convention  was  in  session,  debating 
whether  or  not  Virginia  should  secede  from  the  Union, 
it  was  rumored  abroad  that  the  United  States  Ordnance 
Department  contemplated  the  immediate  removal  of  a 
large  number  of  heavy  guns  from  the  Bellona  Foundry, 
near  Richmond,  to  Fortress  Monroe.  The  guns  were 
made  by  Dr.  Junius  L.  Archer,  under  a  contract  with 
the  Federal  Government,  the  consideration  being  $20,- 
896.47.  A  joint  resolution  was  passed  by  the  Con 
vention  directing  the  seizure  of  the  guns,  and  it  was 
ordered  that  Archer  should  be  paid  out  of  the  State 
Treasury  the  unpaid  balance  on  his  contract  of  about 
$8,000.00,  and  the  United  States  the  remaining  part  of 
the  consideration  or  about  $12,000.00,  which  had  al 
ready  been  paid  to  the  contractor.  This  action  on  the 
part  of  Virginia  could  hardly  be  characterized  as  other 
than  commendable;  if  anything,  it  was  overcon- 
scientious. 

Early  in  April,  the  Commandant  of  the  Harper's 
Ferry  Arsenal,  in  the  belief  that  Virginia  troops  were 
approaching  to  seize  it,  destroyed  the  plant  with  its  en 
tire  contents.  Writing  to  army  headquarters  in  Wash 
ington,  Lieut.  Jones,  who  applied  the  torch,  April  18, 
stated:  "The  steps  I  have  taken  to  destroy  the  arsenal, 
which  contains  nearly  15,000  stand  of  arms,  are  so  com 
plete  that  I  can  conceive  of  nothing  that  will  prevent 
their  entire  destruction."  Again  on  the  19th— -"In  three 

*Between  the  date  of  secession  and  the  following  November,  the  State  appro 
priations  for  defense  aggregated  .$6,000,000.00.  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  038, 
Rebellion  Records;  also  see  p.  391. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  69 

minutes,  or  less,  both  the  arsenal  buildings  containing 
nearly  15,000  arms,  together  with  the  carpenter's  shop, 
which  was  at  the  end  of  a  long  and  connected  series  of 
workshops  of  the  Armory  proper,  were  in  a  complete 
blaze.  There  is  every  reason  for  believing  that  the 
destruction  was  complete."  And  on  the  22d,  he  again 
wrote:  "They  also  report  that  the  fire  in  the  work 
shops  was  arrested,  but  that  the  arsenal  building  con 
taining  the  arms,  together  with  their  contents,  were 
[^*c]  completely  demolished,  and  that  it  is  probable  not 
a  single  gun  was  saved  from  them."  That  the  demo 
lition  was  more  or  less  complete  is  amply  testified  to 
by  the  congratulatory  letter  of  even  date  from  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  Lieut.  Jones,  for  the  success  of 
his  work.*  Yet,  the  State  troops  arrested  the  conflagra 
tion  in  time  to  save  much  of  the  machinery  for  the  manu 
facture  of  small  arms,  which  was  later  removed  to  the 
Fayetteville  Arsenal,  in  North  Carolina. t 

Coincident  with  the  partial  destruction  of  the 
Harper's  Ferry  Arsenal  was  the  evacuation  of  the 
Norfolk  Navy  Yard  attended  with  a  similar  attempt 
at  destruction,  the  value  of  the  property  lost  being  esti 
mated  at  several  millions  of  dollars.  From  the  charred 
remains  of  the  government  plants  within  her  boundaries, 
Virginia  was  able  to  glean  little  of  value.  The  only 
Federal  property  she  succeeded  in  seizing  intact,  before 
becoming  a  belligerent  with  belligerent  rights,  she  under 
took  to  pay  for. 

In  January,  1861,  nearly  a  million  dollars  were  ap 
propriated  by  the  Legislature  for  the  purchase  of  arms, 
in  addition  to  the  sums  previously  placed  at  the  dis 
posal  of  the  commission. 

Charles  Dimmock,  of  Massachusetts,  a  graduate  of 
West  Point  in  the  Class  of  1817,  and  a  former  artillery 
officer,  was  appointed  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  Virginia, 
with  the  rank  of  colonel,  and  immediately  set  about  the 
work  of  securing  arms  and  equipment  for  the  State 
troops.  1 

*The  total   appraised  value  of  arsenal  and  stores,   $1,207,668  to   $1,470,513. 
tTurned  over  to  the  Confederate  States  Government  for  use  elsewhere. 
JCol.  Dimmock  died  in  October.  1863. 


70  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Col.  Dimmock  at  once  undertook  the  erection  of 
plants,  for  the  manufacture  of  ammunition,  and  by 
June  was  able  to  turn  over  to  the  Confederate  States 
a  small  amount  of  powder  and  a  laboratory  with  ma 
chines,  fixtures,  and  workmen,  of  a  daily  capacity  of 
75,000  rounds  of  ammunition.  Gen.  Lee  in  command 
of  the  Virginia  forces,  had  foreseen  from  the  first  that 
the  resources  of  the  State  would  be  called  upon  for  the 
arming  and  equipment  of  the  troops  sent  to  Virginia 
from  other  quarters,  and  had  done  all  in  his  power  to 
assist  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  in  preparing  to  meet  the 
demand.  As  early  as  May,  Virginia  was  called  upon  by 
the  central  government  to  supply  its  troops  with  arms, 
ammunition,  and  every  variety  of  equipment.  Before 
the  middle  of  June,  over  20  field  batteries  had  been 
armed,  mounted  and  equipped,  and  a  total  of  115  field 
guns  provided  for  the  troops  of  Virginia  and  of  other 
States.  Field  ordnance  had  even  been  sent  to  Missouri. 
Of  heavy  ordnance,  40  guns,  including  32-pounders,  12- 
and  6-pounder  howitzers,  and  8-inch  and  9-inch  colum- 
biads,  had  been  mounted  in  permanent  batteries  for  the 
defense  of  the  James  River;  30  similar  guns  were  in 
position  at  the  mouth  of  the  York;  12  on  Aquia  Creek; 
4  on  the  Rappahannock ;  85  in  and  about  Norfolk;  19 
on  the  Nansemond  River;  19  in  Hampton  Roads,  and 
arrangements  had  been  completed  for  mounting  60 
heavy  guns  in  the  lines  about  Richmond,  and  a  large 
number  in  the  chains  of  works  extending  around  Nor 
folk,  across  the  Peninusula  at  Yorktown,  at  Drewry's 
Bluff,  and  at  Jamestown  Island.* 

Between  June  and  November  of  1861,  an  immense 
amount  of  material  was  issued  to  Confederate  troops  by 
the  State  Ordnance  Officer,  including  15,000  muskets 
with  bayonets,  1,700  sabers,  147  field  pieces,  including 
both  guns  and  howitzers,  82  caissons,  harness,  shells, 
percussion  caps,  fuses,  miscellaneous  supplies,  and  97,- 
450  pounds  of  powder.  In  July  the  Harper's  Ferry 
Arsenal  as  reconstructed  by  the  State,  with  all  its  ma- 

*Re-bellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  pp.  928,  929. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  71 

chinery,  was  transferred  to  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,  the  State  forces  having  been  mustered  into  the 
Confederate  service  in  June. 

About  this  time,  Gov.  Brown  of  Georgia,  originally 
having  secured  a  supply  of  about  100,000  pounds  of 
powder,  was  pressing  the  Confederate  Government  for 
the  return  of  the  39,000  pounds  previously  loaned  for 
use  at  Savannah  and  Fort  Pulaski,  defenses  within  the 
borders  of  his  own  State.* 

Other  than  the  guns  brought  to  Virginia  by  the  gal 
lant  battalion  of  four  companies  from  Louisiana,  the 
Washington  Artillery,  the  most  minute  investigation 
fails  to  disclose  that  the  State  was  assisted  in  any 
respect,  in  the  armament  of  the  artillery  with  the  troops 
who  met  the  first  and  second  invasions  of  the  common 
enemy  and  hurled  them  back.f  Fortunate  indeed  it 
was  for  her  sisters  that  Virginia  held  the  most  advanced 
post. 

In  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  8  light  batteries  available  on  the  field,  with  a  total 
armament  of  27  guns,  or  an  average  of  about  3  guns  to 
the  battery.  But  17  of  these  guns  were  engaged.  The 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah  had  5  batteries,  each  with  4 
guns  engaged.  Therefore,  the  Confederates  had  a 
total  of  47  guns  available,  most  of  which  were  old 
smooth-bore  6-pounders.  Some  guns  of  this  pattern 
had  been  reamed  out  to  give  a  larger  bore  and  rifled 
with  three  grooves  after  the  manner  of  Parrott  by  Col. 
Dimmock,  but  the  real  Parrott  rifles  which  had  been 
purchased  by  the  State  were  at  the  time  with  Magruder 
at  Yorktown.  After  the  battle  the  Confederate  batter 
ies  were  able  to  equip  with  the  captured  material,  which 
is  stated  by  Gen.  Johnston  to  have  consisted  of  28 
pieces  of  artillery,  with  64  artillery  horses  and  harness. 
According  to  an  itemized  account  made  at  the  time  by 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  pp.  368,  406. 

fThe  battalion  arrived  in  Virginia  with  six  6-pounder  guns,  two  12-pounder 
howitzers,  and  one  6-pounder  rifled  gun,  its  armament  being  completed  in  Rich 
mond.  It  was  superbly  appointed  as  to  equipment,  but  possessed  material  for 
only  about  2  batteries  on  its  arrival.  The  battalion  had  six  6-pounder,  four 
12-pounder  howitzers,  and  three  6-pounder  rifles  at  Manassas. 


72  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Col.   Pendleton,    Chief   of   Artillery,   he   received   the 
following  captured  material  July  23,  1861: 

1  30-pounder  Parrott  rifled  gun, 
9  10-pounder  Parrott  rifled  guns, 
9  12-pounder  brass  rifled  guns, 

3  12-pounder  brass  howitzers, 

2  12-pounder  boat  howitzers, 

3  6-pounder  brass  smooth-bore  guns, 

34  caissons,  more  or  less  complete  with  spare  parts, 

4  battery  wagons, 
6  battery  forges, 

24  horses, 

34  sets  harness  and  spare  pieces. 

In  a  return  of  captures  made  by  the  ordnance  officer 
of  Johnston's  Staff,  Capt.  E.  P.  Alexander,  the  field 
artillery  material,  etc.,  captured  at  Bull  Run  is 
itemized  as  follows: 

1  30-pounder  Parrott,  with  300  rounds, 
9  10-pounder  Parrotts,  with  900  rounds, 

3     6-pounder  brass  guns,  with  600  rounds, 

3  12-pounder  brass  howitzers,  with  300  rounds, 

2  12-pounder  boat  howitzers,  with  200  rounds, 
9  James  rifles,  with  900  rounds, 

37  caissons,  6  forges,  4  battery  wagons,  splendidly 
equipped,  64  artillery  horses  with  harness. 

McDowell's  11  batteries  had  a  total  of  49  guns,  a  fact 
which  shows  an  average  battery  armament  of  more  than 
4  pieces.  Five  Federal  batteries,  with  25  guns,  crossed 
Bull  Run.  Most  of  these  guns  were  rifled  pieces,  and 
none  escaped,  at  least  2  additional  ones  being  captured 
after  the  battle. 

The  guns  captured  at  Manassas  were  promptly  re 
fitted  by  Col.  Pendleton,  Johnston's  Chief  of  Artillery, 
and  Col.  E.  P.  Alexander,  who  the  day  after  the  battle 
had  been  appointed  Chief  of  Ordnance,  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  the  armies  of  the  Shenandoah  and  the  Po- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  73 

tomac  being  later  consolidated  under  the  name  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  in  command  of  Gen. 
Jos.  E.  Johnston. 

Col.  Alexander  was  a  wise  choice  for  the  position 
assigned  him.  A  graduate  of  the  United  States  Mili 
tary  Academy  of  the  Class  of  1857,  he  had  served 
with  distinction  in  the  Corps  of  Engineers  until  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  when  he  resigned  his  commission 
as  second  lieutenant,  having  served  under  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  in  the  Mormon  war,  in  the  Indian 
campaigns  of  Oregon,  and  at  West  Point,  where  he 
was  on  duty  for  a  year  as  Commandant  of  the  Corps, 
and  Assistant  Instructor  of  Engineering.  In  1859  he 
was  placed  in  charge  of  artillery  target  practice  at  the 
Academy.  While  there,  he  also  assisted  Capt.  Myer 
in  the  development  of  his  wig-wag  signal  system  with 
torches  and  flags.  He  had  also  been  a  member  of  a 
board  of  officers,  who  conducted  experiments  with  the 
new  breech-loading  rifles,  a  number  of  which  were  be 
ing  offered  the  War  Department.  He,  therefore, 
brought  to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  a  knowledge 
of  the  new  ordnance  possessed  by  few  others  in  the 
country.  Arriving  in  Richmond,  June  1,  1861,  after 
a  long  and  eventful  journey  from  Washington  Terri 
tory,  where  he  had  been  on  duty,  he  was  at  once  ap 
pointed  Captain  of  Engineers  by  President  Davis,  who 
recalled  the  young  officer's  appearance  before  the  com 
mittee  of  the  Senate,  to  which  he  had  demonstrated  the 
Myer  system  the  previous  year,  and  was  directed  to 
start  a  factory  in  Richmond  for  the  manufacture  of 
signal  apparatus  and  to  perfect  plans  for  introducing 
into  the  Army  the  system  with  which  he  was  so  familiar. 
While  on  this  duty  at  the  Capital  Capt.  Alexander  was 
directed  to  organize  5  batteries  of  artillery  into  a  bat 
talion  and  to  prepare  them  for  the  field.  This  work  he 
undertook  with  marked  ability,  being  himself  responsi 
ble  for  the  battalion  formation,  hitherto  unknown  to  the 
service.  His  whole  training  and  experience  had  been 
along  the  lines  of  organization,  and  as  he  subsequently 


74  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

stated,  "It  would  have  been  a  decided  step  in  advance 
had  we  inaugurated,  so  soon,  a  battalion  organization 
of  several  batteries.  We  came  to  it  about  a  year  later, 
but  meanwhile  our  batteries  had  been  isolated  and  at 
tached  to  infantry  brigades.  So  they  fought  singly, 
and  in  such  small  units  artillery  can  do  little."* 

While  accomplishing  great  results  in  the  task  as 
signed  him,  early  in  July  Capt.  Alexander  was  attached 
to  the  staff  of  Gen.  Beauregard,  and  ordered  to  install 
the  signal  system  for  use  in  the  great  battle,  then  fore 
seen  by  all.  Capt.  Alexander's  system  of  communica 
tions  during  the  battle  and  the  days  preceding  it,  was 
of  great  value  to  the  generals  in  command,  he  himself 
transmitting  the  first  definite  intelligence  of  Mc 
Dowell's  line  of  advance,  f 

The  absence  of  such  a  staff  officer  was  sorely  felt  on 
the  Peninsula  in  the  subsequent  campaign,  where  all 
worked  in  the  dark.  What  might  have  been  the  out 
come  had  the  abilities  of  Alexander  been  employed  by 
Lee  and  Jackson  in  that  campaign  is  interestingly  prob 
lematical.  But  this  is  true  of  the  whole  war  in  which 
military  information  was  precariously  obtained,  staff 
duties  being  illy  defined,  and  in  which  no  efficient  sys 
tem  of  gaining  intelligence  was  generally  made  use  of. 

The  foregoing  remarks  concerning  this  officer,  some 
what  lengthy  it  may  seem,  have  been  indulged  in,  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  what  manner  of  men  had  to  do  with 
the  early  equipment  and  organization  of  the  Confed 
erate  artillery.  Each  one  with  whom  we  meet,  whether 
Gorgas,  St.  John,  Mallet,  Jackson,  Pendleton,  or 
Alexander,  possesses  character  and  abilities  of  high 
order,  a  fact  which  is  a  tribute  to  the  directing  hands. 
Remarkable  results  were  obtained  simply  because  ex 
traordinary  men  produced  them. 

Reverting  to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  it  will 
be  recalled  that  the  Chief  of  Artillery  was  sent  to  Rich- 

*Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.  14.  We  shall  see  later  that  Gen. 
Alexander  had  been  the  first  in  the  Confederacy  to  grasp  this  great  fact.  True, 
the  Washington  Artillery  had  a  battalion  organization,  but  it  was  employed  in 
battery  formation  at  first. 

tAlexander  had  familiarized  himself  with  the  terrain  of  a  large  territory  in 
a  manner  quite  unknown  to  the  military  service  at  the  time. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  75 

mond,  after  Bull  Run,  to  "rustle"  material,  as  the  say 
ing  is  in  the  service.  The  efforts  of  Johnston,  aided  by 
Pendleton  and  Alexander,  to  increase  and  equip  the 
artillery  were  unremitting.  In  a  letter  to  his  wife, 
dated  July  22,  Pendleton  wrote  from  Richmond,  "Have 
had  a  great  deal  to  do  here  pushing  up  artillery  prepara 
tions.  Will  have  several  batteries  at  Manassas  next 
week,  and  several  others  the  week  after,  etc.  Several 
difficulties  obstruct  the  way.  Want  of  tin  to  make 
brass;  only  one  good  foundry  here,  deficiency  of  hands, 
etc.;  and  not  least  of  all,  no  suitable  head  in  the  War 
Department.  Still,  by  hook  or  by  crook,  we  get  along. 
And,  I  trust  our  force,  artillery  and  all,  will  be  strong 
for  the  work  to  be  done.  The  Lincoln  dynasty  will 
press  the  war,  I  am  persuaded,  to  the  bitter  end.  .  .  . 
My  duties  about  harness,  etc.,  may  take  me  to  Staunton 
and  Lynchburg.  ...  I  long  to  be  back  in  the 
brigade  again.  All  this  equipping  work  is  the  plague 
of  my  life,  but  it  must  be  done,  however  disagreeable." 
Gen.  Johnston  wrote  to  him  about  this  time: 

"COLONEL — I  received  duly  your  note  in  relation  to  additional 
artillery  for  this  army.,  and  asking  if  you  should  continue  to  attend 
to  that  service  or  return. 

"The  duty  to  which  you  have  been  attending  is,  I  think,  the  most 
important  to  which  you  can  attend.  I  beg  you,  therefore,  to  devote 
yourself  to  it  until  we  have  reason  to  believe  another  action  immi 
nent  when,  of  course,  you  will  be  necessary  in  the  field.  Do  not 
fail  to  urge  the  making  of  12-pounder  howitzers,  etc.  .  .  ."* 

Pendleton's  duties  at  this  time  were  not  enviable  ones 
and  it  was  fortunate  for  the  artillery  that  a  minister  of 
the  gospel,  with  the  patience  of  his  calling,  was  as 
signed  to  the  task  allotted  him.  Equipments  for  the 
batteries  were  almost  more  difficult  to  supply  than  guns. 
So  many  skilled  mechanics  had  gone  into  active  service 
that  workmen  enough  to  operate  the  larger  establish 
ments  were  scarcely  to  be  found.  These  establishments 
were,  therefore,  unable  to  undertake  large  contracts  for 
furnishing  the  needed  artillery  supplies. 

*Remainder  of  this  letter  calling  for  S.  B.  guns  in  preference  to  rifled  pieces, 
has  been  hereinbefore  quoted,  p.  65. 


76  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

To  contract  for  them  by  the  dozen  or  score  wherever 
blacksmiths,  wheelwrights,  harness  makers,  and  tinners 
could  be  found,  was  the  only  solution.  This  was  accord 
ingly  done  throughout  the  small  towns  and  villages  of 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  Piedmont  country.  From 
them,  with  the  aid  of  capable  workmen  here  and  there, 
relieved  from  active  service  for  the  purpose,  the  neces 
sary  equipments  were  procured.  Col.  Pendleton,  whose 
influence  in  the  pulpit  was  very  great,  even  preached 
sermons  arousing  the  people  to  redouble  their  efforts  in 
behalf  of  the  army,  stirring  the  spirit  of  the  people  to 
assist  as  best  they  might.  Old  men  and  boys  wrought 
at  the  forge  and  carpenter's  bench,  while  women  made 
tents,  uniforms,  knapsacks,  blankets,  bandages,  and 
similar  articles. 

To  visit  the  small  contractors  and  encourage  them  in 
their  work,  and,  wherever  it  was  possible,  enlist  the  ef 
forts  of  others,  was  also  part  of  Col.  Pendleton's  busi 
ness.  For  this  purpose,  it  was  necessary  to  see  the  can 
non  founders  and  other  operators  in  Lynchburg,  and 
the  harness  makers  in  Staunton.  Passing  from  one 
place  to  another  in  September,  from  the  pulpit,  he  per 
suaded  his  neighbors  in  Lexington  to  make  for  him 
harness,  canteens,  and  other  small  but  necessary  articles. 

The  want  of  ammunition  for  the  artillery  was  even 
more  pressing  than  that  of  larger  and  better  guns. 
Such,  indeed,  was  the  absolute  scarcity  of  it  in  the  army 
at  Manassas,  that  had  McClellan  been  allowed  to  ad 
vance  during  the  late  summer  and  autumn,  no  sus 
tained  resistance  could  have  been  made  by  Johnston. 
Referring  to  his  deficiencies  in  respect  to  ammunition, 
the  latter  has  stated  that  until  about  the  middle  of 
August,  he  had  only  half  enough  for  a  battle,*  and  on 
August  24,  the  ordnance  officer  of  his  army  telegraphed 
Pendleton:  "Our  cannon  ammunition  is  all  exhausted 
except  6-pounder."  Again  on  August  27,  "Most  of 
the  very  small  stock  of  ammunition  on  hand  when  you 
left  has  been  issued,  and,  in  fact,  I  may  say  that  the 

^Johnston's  Narrative,  pp.  60,  61. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  77 

stock  is  entirely  exhausted.  .  .  .  If  the  Army  had 
to  take  the  field  just  now,  the  scarcity  of  ammunition 
would  be  alarming."  As  late  as  September  14,  Pendle- 
ton  was  informed  by  the  ordnance  officer  with  the  Army 
that  the  necessary  shrapnel,  shell,  and  cartridges  for 
the  artillery  had  not  been  received.*  Yet,  the  failure 
of  Gen.  Johnston  to  advance  upon  and  seize  Washing 
ton  during  the  summer  of  1861  has  been  frequently 
charged  against  him  as  an  inexcusable  blunder.  All 
through  the  summer  he  had  continued  with  the  utmost 
persistence  to  urge  the  forwarding  of  the  necessary 
artillery  material  and  equipment,  the  government  mak 
ing  strenuous  efforts,  spurred  by  Pendleton's  presence, 
to  fulfill  the  ordnance  requisitions. 

On  September  5,  Mr.  Davis  wrote  Gen.  Johnston: 
"Every  effort  shall  be  made  to  furnish  you  the  howitzers 
you  want.  Col.  Pendleton  will  give  you  details.  .  .  . 
My  means  are  short  of  the  wants  of  each  division  of  the 
wide  frontier  I  am  laboring  to  protect. "f 

But,  in  spite  of  all  efforts,  the  exigencies  continued 
great  and  pressing.  On  October  27,  the  Acting- Secre 
tary  of  War,|  writing  to  Gov.  Letcher  of  Virginia, 
mentioned  the  fact  that  Gen.  Johnston  was  constantly 
asking  for  powder  and  howitzers,  and  requested  the 
State  to  turn  over  to  the  Army  all  of  both  in  its  pos 
session. 

Pendleton's  range  of  duties  constantly  increased  as 
his  efficiency  became  more  apparent.  Before  his  re 
turn  to  the  Army  early  in  October,  he  had  even  been 
called  upon  to  provide  men  as  well  as  guns  for  the 
batteries,  and  for  the  cavalry.  Confidence  in  his  ability 
to  comply  with  any  demands  made  upon  him  seems  to 
have  been  almost  unlimited.  At  last,  however,  his 
trying  labors  in  Richmond  came  to  an  end  and  he  re 
turned  to  Manassas,  where  he  took  up  the  more  con 
genial  work  of  perfecting  the  organization  of  his  com 
mand,  assisted  and  advised  by  his  old  friend,  Gen. 

*See  Memoirs  of  William  Nelson  Pendleton,  p.  158. 
^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  V,  p.  830. 
$Hon.  ,T.  P.  Benjamin. 


78  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Jackson,  whose  tent  he  shared,  and  preaching  to  his 
men  while  he  worked.  On  October  19,  he  wrote  that 
his  artillery  corps  consisted  of  600  men,  450  horses,  and 
28  pieces  of  ordnance,  more  guns  being  expected* 

Some  idea  of  the  labor  performed  by  the  Chief  of 
Artillery  and  the  ordnance  officers  with  the  Army  may 
be  had  from  the  results  obtained  by  the  end  of  Novem 
ber.  At  this  time,  there  were  15  batteries  assigned  to 
brigades,  in  addition  to  the  reserve  artillery,  of  which 
8  batteries  with  about  40  pieces  were  in  command  of 
Maj.  Walton,  and  9  under  the  direct  command  of  the 
Chief  of  Artillery,  with  44  pieces  and  more  batteries  on 
the  way  to  join.f 

Whence  had  come  the  vast  amount  of  material,  not 
less  than  150  pieces  of  ordnance  alone,  required  for  this 
force?  The  total  number  of  guns  in  the  hands  of  the 
army  after  Bull  Run,  including  those  captured,  was 
less  than  60.  The  following  statement  of  material 
secured  by  him,  made  out  August  17,  by  Col.  Pendleton, 
before  his  return  to  the  Army,  answers  the  question,  a 
statement  from  which  we  see  again  that  the  Bureau  of 
Ordnance,  C.  S.  A.,  had  not  as  yet  begun  to  supply  the 
armament. :(: 

"STATEMENT   OF   GUNS,  CARRIAGES,,   CAISSONS,   ETC.,  ORDERED 
CARRIAGES   AND   CAISSONS 

Talbott  &  Bro.,  Richmond,  Va.,  thirty  6-pounder  carriages ;  no 
caissons.  Ten  will  be  completed  in  a  few  days,  and  10  each  three 
months  till  the  order  is  finished. 

Philip  Rham,  Richmond,  Va.,  fourteen  6-pounder  carriages,  and 
caissons.  Four  of  each  delivered,  4  will  be  ready  in  10  days,  and 
the  remaining  6  in  three  weeks. 

J.  R.  Cato,  three  6-pounder  carriages,  and  caissons. 

I.  &  J.  Van  Pelt,  Petersburg,  Va.,  twenty-five  6-pounder 
carriages,  and  caissons. 

Tappy  &  Lumsden,  Petersburg,  Va.,  twenty-five  6-pounder 
carriages,  and  caissons,  and  five  24-pounder  carriages. 

*Pendleton's  son,  A.  S.  Pendleton  (Sandie),  later  one  of  Jackson's  aides,  and 
his  nephew,  John  Page,  were  on  his  own  personal  staff. 

•^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  V,  pp.  1029,  1032.  Memoirs  of  W.  N. 
Pendleton,  pp.  165,  168,  169. 

^Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  pp.  168,  169. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  79 

Ettenger  &  Edmond,  Richmond  Va.,  sixteen  6-pounder  carriages,, 
and  caissons.  Deliveries  of  4  of  each  will  be  made  every  two  weeks. 

H.  M.  Smith.,  Richmond,  Va.,,  ten  6-pounder  carriages,  and 
caissons. 

B.  F.  Harris,  Charlottesville,  Va.,  six  6-pounder  carriages,  and 
caissons. 

J.  R.  Anderson  &  Co.,  Richmond,  Va.,  twenty-four  12-pounder 
carriages,  and  caissons. 

Philip  Rham.  six  12-pounder  carriages,  and  caissons,  completed 
in  six  weeks. 

Rice  &  Wright,  Florence,  Ala.,  forty  24-pounder  carriages,  and 
caissons. 

J.  R.  Anderson  &  Co.,  sixty  24-pounder  carriages,  and  caissons. 
No  limbers. 

GUNS 

Anderson  &  Co.,  thirty-four  12-pounder  howitzers,  forty-eight 
3-inch  iron  rifled  guns,  sixty  6-pounder  carriages,  and  caissons, 
twenty-four  6-pounder  iron  guns. 

Noble  Bros.  &  Co.,  Rome,  Ga.,  six  6-pounder  brass  guns,  fifty 
3-inch  iron  rifled  guns. 

Rice  &  Wright,  Florence,  Ala.,  forty  24-pounder  howitzers. 

J.  L.  Archer,  Black  Heath,  Chesterfield  County,  Va.,  forty  12- 
pounder  howitzers. 

F.  B.  Deane,  Jr.,  &  Son,  Lynchburg,  Va.,  forty  12-pounder 
howitzers. 

J.  L.  Archer,  eighty  3-inch  iron  rifled  guns. 

RECAPITULATION 

6-pounder  brass  guns 6 

6-pounder  iron  guns 24          30 

3-inch  iron  rifled  guns 178 

12-pounder  howitzers 104        312 

6-pounder  carriages 219 

6-pounder  caissons 189 

24-pounder  carriages,  complete 45 

24-pounder  carriages,  no  limbers 40 

HARNESS 

Messrs.  Cottrell  &  Co.,  Richmond,  unlimited  order.  Contracted 
through  Maj.  Smith,  New  Orleans,  400  sets  of  harness." 

The  foregoing  detailed  statement  is  given  in  full  be 
cause  it  illustrates  better  than  anything  else  could  what 
were  the  material  resources  from  which  the  artillery 


80  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

equipment  in  1861  was  drawn.  It  also  evidences  the 
tremendous  energy  of  Johnston's  Chief  of  Artillery. 
When  it  is  contemplated  that  many  of  the  manu 
facturers  had  probably  never  seen  a  gun  before  they 
were  called  upon  to  make  them,  that  before  undertak 
ing  the  fabrication  of  these  strange  articles  it  was  neces 
sary  to  install  machinery  and  equipment  for  their 
making,  that  detailed  drawings  of  all  the  parts  had  to 
be  carefully  prepared  and  furnished  them,  the  accom 
plishment  seems  all  the  more  remarkable.  It  also 
serves  to  call  our  attention  to  the  changes  in  material 
and  equipment  of  recent  years.  Many  of  the  old  firms 
enumerated  above  are  still  in  successful  operation. 
Long  may  they  continue  so.  But  the  fact  remains  that 
they  could  no  more  turn  out  modern  quick  firing  guns 
with  their  intricate  steel  carriages,  and  caissons,  than 
they  could  manufacture  heavenly  bodies. 

In  November,  1860,  we  have  seen  that  the  United 
States  Board  of  Ordnance  officers  recommended  the 
conversion  of  half  the  heavy  ordnance  after  the  James 
system  into  rifled  pieces.*  But  the  attempt  proved  a 
failure,  and  was  soon  abandoned.  The  United  States 
bought  various  types  of  rifled  pieces  when  war  became 
imminent,  having  unlimited  means  at  its  disposal.  Less 
than  one  year  after  the  receipt  of  Parrott's  trial  gun 
by  Jackson  at  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  we  find 
Pendleton  actually  manufacturing  178  of  them,  at  three 
different  plants,  and  these  in  two  different  States. 
Johnston  had  surely  been  converted. 

This  brings  us  down  to  the  winter  of  1861  and  1862, 
when  the  organization  of  the  Confederate  Ordnance 
Department  had  become  effective  and  when  artillery 
men  no  longer  had  to  "rustle"  for  themselves,  except 
for  horses  and  harness.  The  Artillery,  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  has  been  armed  and  equipped.  Hence 
forth  its  requisitions  are  filled  either  by  the  proper 
department  to  the  best  of  its  ability,  or  upon  the  field 

*Report  of  this  board  submitted  November  1,  1860,  pursuant  to  S.  O.  No.  144. 
A.  G.  O.,  1860. 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  81 

of  battle  from  the  plunder  of  the  enemy.  Though  it 
was  at  all  times  inferior  in  the  quantity  and  quality  of 
its  material  and  lighter  in  metal,  yet  the  brains  and  the 
industry  of  the  men  behind  the  guns,  whether  begrimed 
with  the  soot  of  the  foundry  or  the  smoke  of  the  battle 
field,  enabled  it  to  maintain  for  four  terrible  years  of 
almost  constant  warfare  a  contest  then  unparalleled  in 
history. 

The  weapon  we  have  examined.  Now  let  us  pass  on 
to  the  men  who  wielded  it,  first  inquiring  who  they 
were,  and  then  how  they  bore  themselves. 


PART  II 

THE  FIELD  ARTILLERY  or  THE  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN 

VIRGINIA 

ITS  FOUNDATION,  ORGANIZATION,  PERSONNEL, 
AND  TACTICS 


CHAPTER  I 

THE   ARTILLERY   OF   THE   EARLY   DAYS 

IN  the  first  part  of  this  work,  an  endeavor  has  been 
made  to  give  the  student  of  the  Civil  War  a  conception 
of  the  means  which  enabled  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  to  place  artillery  in  the  field.  In  the  treatment 
of  ordnance  operations  it  was  not  always  easy,  nor  in 
many  instances  possible,  for  the  writer  to  refrain  from 
infringing  upon  the  present  subject.  The  line  of  de- 
markation  between  ordnance  operations  and  material 
is  at  best  indefinite,  and  the  patience  of  the  reader  is 
craved  when  repetition  perforce  occurs,  the  excuse  be 
ing  offered  that  historical  continuity  will  be  preserved, 
even  though  at  times  its  attainment  may  entail  the 
tedium  incident  to  a  seeming  literary  defect. 

Again,  it  seems  necessary,  in  order  to  establish  the 
status  of  field  artillery  in  the  United  States  and  its 
development  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  to 
begin  with  the  Revolutionary  Period.* 

Although  American  artillery  dates  from  the  French 
and  Indian  Wars,  at  which  time  colonial  companies 
were  formed  in  a  number  of  the  large  cities,  the  only 
artillery  organization  which  seems  to  have  existed  in  the 
South,  prior  to  the  Revolutionary  War,  was  that  of 
Charleston,  S.  C.  The  organization  of  the  early 
colonial  Artillery  naturally  followed  very  closely  that 
of  the  Royal  Artillery,  with  which  it  was  associated. 

The  first  regiment  arrayed  against  the  Crown  was 
raised  by  the  Colony  of  Massachusetts,  and  adopted 
by  the  Continental  Congress.  It  consisted  of  10  com 
panies,  with  a  greater  number  of  field  officers  than  was 

*The  facts  given  in  the  following  brief  outline  of  the  Artillery,  from.  1775  to 
1859,  were  extracted  almost  entirely  from  Lieut.  William  E.  Birkhimer's 
Historical  Sketch  of  the  United  States  Artillery;  the  first  four  volumes  of 
United  States  Ordnance  Reports,  kindly  presented  the  writer  by  the  present 
Ordnance  Office,  through  Capt.  Oliver  L.  Spaulding,  U.  S.  V.  A.  ;  Military  Policy 
of  the  United  StateSj  Upton ;  Historical  Register  United  States  Army,  etc. ;  and 
The  Late  War,  Thompson.  Citations  will  not  be  given  from  these,  as  the  sources 
are  available  to  all. 


86  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

prescribed  by  the  British  regulations,  and  was  com 
manded  by  Col.  Richard  Gridley,  a  retired  British 
officer,  under  whose  advice  it  was  organized.  Passing 
through  various  reorganizations,  this  regiment,  together 
with  a  Rhode  Island  battery  and  two  batteries  from 
New  York,  constituted  the  entire  artillery  force  of  the 
colonial  army  until  after  the  disastrous  Long  Island 
campaign  in  the  summer  of  1776.  At  this  time  the 
Corps  of  Artillery  consisted  of  about  600  officers  and 
men,  of  which  a  large  number  were  with  the  army  in 
the  North,  there  being  88  authorized  battalions  of  infan 
try.  From  the  latter,  Washington  and  Gates  had  each 
been  forced  to  draft  about  600  men  for  the  service  of 
the  guns. 

When  Congress  resolved  to  reorganize  the  Army,  the 
committee  in  charge  called  upon  the  senior  artillery  of 
ficer,  Col.  Knox,  to  submit  his  recommendations.  Lay 
ing  great  stress  upon  the  gross  disproportion  of  artillery 
to  infantry,  and  the  almost  utter  lack  of  the  former, 
amongst  other  things  that  this  able  officer  urged  was  the 
creation  of  arsenals  and  cannon-foundries,  an  ordnance 
bureau  for  their  conduct,  and  an  academy  on  the  same 
plan  as  that  at  Woolwich,  where  the  whole  theory  and 
practice  of  fortification  and  gunnery  might  be  taught; 
claiming  that  to  the  British  school  the  enemy  was  in 
debted  for  their  superiority  in  artillery  to  all  who  had 
opposed  them.  Knox,  then,  we  are  justified  in  be 
lieving,  was  the  first  American  artillerist  to  advocate 
the  scientific  study  of  gunnery,  and  was  in  a  sense  the 
father  of  the  present  excellent  system  of  theoretical 
and  practical  instruction,  though  it  has  taken  over  a 
century  to  grasp  the  full  meaning  of  his  recom 
mendation. 

"There  ought  to  be  a  respectable  body  of  artillery 
established  which  shall  be  equal  to  all  the  services  of  the 
war.  In  proportion  to  every  1,000  men  of  the  marching 
regiments,  there  ought  to  be  one  company  of  60  men, 
including  officers.  This  number  will  be  found  to  be 
small  when  the  various  contingencies  of  the  artillery 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  87 

shall  be  considered.  Supposing,  then,  the  army  consist 
of  80  battalions  of  726  men  each,  making  nearly  60,000 
men,  the  number  of  artillery  requisite  will  be  3,360. 
These  may  be  thrown  into  two  or  three  battalions,  as 
may  be  thought  best." 

The  foregoing  words  were  written  by  Knox  near  a 
century  and  a  half  ago !  Well  might  they  be  pondered 
to-day  by  Congress!  These  recommendations  made 
more  impression  upon  the  Government  at  that  time  than 
similar  ones  do  now,  and  it  was  at  once  decided  to  raise 
5  battalions  of  artillery,  and  the  British — not  the 
French  system,  as  is  thought  by  some — was  adhered  to 
by  Knox  in  their  organization.  Many  French  officers 
trained  in  the  school  of  Gribeauval,  it  is  true,  sought 
service  in  the  American  Artillery,  but  they  found  at  its 
head  a  man  whose  views  obtained  in  preference  to  their 
own.* 

The  artillery  force  contemplated  was  intended  to 
supply  artillery  to  all  the  armies  in  the  field,  and  the  5 
battalions  authorized  were  quickly  raised,  one  of  them 
being  converted  into  an  artificer  regiment,  the  fore 
runner  of  an  ordnance  organization,  t  Pursuant  to  the 
resolution  of  Congress,  November  26,  1776,  one  of  the 
artillery  battalions  embracing  2  companies  or  batteries 
was  raised  by  Gen.  Charles  Lee,  in  Virginia,  the  field 
officers  being  Col.  Charles  Harrison,  Lieut.-Col.  Ed 
ward  Carrington,  and  Maj.  Christian  Holman. 

While  the  5  battalions  raised  by  Knox  were  con 
sidered  to  constitute  the  regular  artillery,  the  colonies 
had  begun  to  organize  companies,  as  a  rule,  however, 
for  State  defense  only,  most  of  them  being  heavy  or 
coast  artillery.  The  Provincial  Congress  of  South 
Carolina,  in  November,  1775,  put  on  foot  an  artillery 
battalion  of  3  companies  of  100  men  each,  and  this 
organization,  in  command  of  Lieut.-Col.  Owen  Roberts, 
was  taken  into  continental  pay.  And,  in  1777,  a  num 
ber  of  Georgia  batteries,  in  command  of  a  French  of 
ficer,  Maj.  Roman  de  Lisle,  were  turned  over  to  the 

*See  Military  Policy  of  United  States,  p.  29. 

tThe  terms  regiment  and  battalion  were  used  synonymously. 


88  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Federal  government.*  These  southern  batteries  were 
not  subject  to  service,  however,  beyond  the  limits  of 
their  States.  They  were  paid  by  Congress  for  the  sole 
reason  that  the  States  were  unable  to  maintain  them; 
over  them  the  Chief  of  Artillery  exercised  no  control. 

In  November,  1778,  another  reorganization  of  the 
Army  followed  while  Washington  lay  at  Valley  Forge. 
For  the  first  time  the  organization  of  the  various 
artillery  regiments  was  placed  on  a  uniform  basis,  the 
same  number  of  officers  and  men  being  assigned  to  each. 
The  Virginia  regiment,  now  designated  the  First,  was 
thus  increased  to  12  batteries  by  attaching  to  it  two  com 
panies  from  Maryland,  f  Due  to  the  reduction  in  the 
number  of  its  officers,  and  to  inexperienced  hands,  the 
Artillery,  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  Army,  did  not 
thrive  during  the  next  few  years.  Consequently  again 
in  1780  its  reorganization  was  undertaken.  It  was 
finally  decided  to  retain  the  4  line  regiments  but  to  re 
duce  them  to  10  companies  of  65  enlisted  men  and  6 
officers  each,  the  regimental  field  and  staff  consisting  of 
7  officers.  J  In  accordance  with  the  original  plan,  the 
First  Regiment  was  again  assigned  to  Virginia.  Soon 
being  placed  under  Gates,  it  suffered  severely  at 
Camden,  and  in  consequence  never  rejoined  the  main 
army,  the  fragments  of  the  organization  remaining  in 
Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  until  the  end  of  the  war.  It 
was  not,  therefore,  at  Yorktown;  the  Second,  or  New 
York  regiment,  and  the  Fourth,  or  Pennsylvania  regi 
ment,  composed  the  entire  force  of  artillery  at  that 
memorable  siege.  § 

Promotion  in  the  continental  Artillery  was  regi 
mental,  the  power  of  appointing  officers  being  retained 
by  the  States.  During  the  period  after  peace  had  been 
declared,  when  Congress  was  making  every  effort  to  re- 

*The  famous  Chatham  Artillery  of  Savannah  had  its  origin  in  one  of  these 
batteries. 

tBefore  the  reorganization  the  regiment  had  already  been  increased  to  10 
companies. 

JSee  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  48. 

§The  Fourth  Regiment  served  a  short  time  in  the  South  with  the  First 
Except  this  and  the  service  at  Yorktown,  the  Second  and  Third  served  wholly 
in  the  North. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  89 

duce  the  Army  to  a  peace  footing,  the  Artillery  as  it  had 
existed  practically  dissolved  by  reason  of  the  expiration 
of  enlistments,  etc.  Certain  duties,  however,  connected 
with  the  incompleted  transfer  of  property  by  the 
British  in  the  Northwest,  necessitated  the  retention  in 
service  of  a  battalion  consisting  of  138  officers  and  men 
drawn  entirely  from  the  old  Second  and  Third  Regi 
ments.  With  this  exception,  the  old  organizations  were 
disbanded  as  Federal  troops,  many  of  the  batteries  con 
tinuing  to  exist  as  State  militia.  In  1784,  even  the 
small  battalion  which  had  been  continued  in  the  serv 
ice  was  discharged,  leaving  one  New  York  and  one 
Pennsylvania  battery  as  the  only  artillery  force  in  the 
Federal  Army,  it  being  united  with  some  Maryland 
infantry  of  the  line  to  form  a  mondescript  regiment, 
known  as  the  "First  American." 

It  was  not  until  October  20,  1786,  when  the  Army  was 
increased  to  2,040  enlisted  men,  including  those  of  the 
"First  American,"  that  Knox,  then  become  Secretary 
of  War,  was  able  to  organize  a  separate  battalion 
of  artillery  under  a  major  in  which  the  present  artillery 
organization  as  a  separate  arm  of  the  service  originated. 
The  personnel  of  the  new  artillery  battalion  was  en 
tirely  Northern.  After  frequent  changes  in  its  organiza 
tion,  including  one  merging  it  with  the  Engineer  Corps, 
the  Artillery  as  a  separate  corps  of  3  battalions  was  in 
creased  in  1808  (one  being  a  light  regiment  of  10 
batteries.)  Many  distinguished  Frenchmen  had  served 
of  late  in  the  Engineer  and  Artillery  Corps,  but  a 
distinctly  American  character  was  now  enforced  upon 
the  Artillery.  It  was  some  time  before  the  regiment 
could  be  properly  equipped  as  light  artillery,  due  to  the 
extremes  of  the  economists,  but  finally  the  result  was  ac 
complished.  Winfield  Scott,  afterwards  commander- 
in-chief,  and  a  Virginian,  stood  second  on  the  list  of 
captains  of  this  the  first  properly-equipped  American 
regiment  of  light  artillery.  Among  its  original  officers 
were  other  Southern  men,  afterwards  distinguished. 
The  several  batteries  of  the  regiment  recruited  in  the 


90  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

South  were  soon  after  their  formation  concentrated  at 
New  Orleans,  pending  the  settlement  of  the  difficulties 
with  Great  Britain.  But  instead  of  trouble  being 
averted,  war  became  a  fact,  and  January  11,  1812,  two 
provisional  artillery  regiments  were  authorized  by  the 
measure  increasing  the  Army,  each  regiment  having  10 
companies,  to  be  known  as  the  Second  and  Third  Regi 
ments,  respectively,  the  old  or  regular  regiment,  being 
designated  the  First. 

Capt.  George  Izard,  of  South  Carolina,  formerly  of 
the  older  regiment,  became  Colonel,  and  Capt.  Winfield 
Scott,  and  Francis  K.  Huger,  of  South  Carolina,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonels  of  the  Second  Regiment.  Like  Scott, 
Izard  rose  to  be  a  general  officer.  Educated  in  the  best 
military  schools  of  France,  he  had  no  superior  as  an 
educated  and  practical  officer  in  America,  being  much 
relied  upon  as  an  organizer  by  the  War  Department. 
When  he  was  promoted  in  1813,  he  was  succeeded  by 
Lieut.-Col.  Scott  in  command  of  the  Second.  Capt. 
George  Armistead,  of  Virginia,  had  been  made  a  major 
in  the  Third.  In  1814,  Scott  also  became  a  brigadier- 
general. 

The  status  of  the  Artillery  as  fixed  by  the  Act  of  1814, 
was  that  of  a  corps  of  12  battalions,  in  the  formation  of 
which  Izard  had  been  most  influential.  The  light 
artillery  was  left  as  organized  in  1808,  however,  and  so 
also  by  the  Act  of  1815,  fixing  the  military  peace  es 
tablishment.  In  the  latter  year,  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  was  divided  into  military  departments, 
five  in  the  North  and  four  in  the  South,  the  line  of  divi 
sion  being  roughly  that  passing  east  and  west  through 
the  capital.  In  the  attempt  to  maintain  an  artillery 
equipoise  in  the  two  great  divisions,  the  light  artillery 
and  4  battalions  or  half  of  the  Corps  of  Artillery  was  as 
signed  to  the  North,  and  the  other  4  battalions  to  the 
South.  This  distribution  obtained  until  the  artillery 
organization  as  a  corps  was  abolished  in  1821,  when  4 
regiments  of  artillery  were  created,  of  9  companies  each, 
only  one  company  of  each  being  designated  to  be 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  91 

equipped  as  light  artillery,  the  old  light  regiment  being 
broken  up  with  the  Corps.  This  organization  continued 
until  the  exigencies  of  the  Seminole  War,  in  1837,  caused 
an  increase  of  one  company  in  each  regiment,  and  in  the 
company  strength  from  42  to  58  men.  The  Mexican 
War  again  brought  an  increase  of  2  companies  to  a 
regiment,  4  additional  companies  to  be  equipped  as 
light  batteries,  the  latter  provision  resulting  from  the 
brilliant  service  of  the  field  batteries  in  the  Rio  Grande 
campaign,  where  they  astonished  not  only  the  country, 
but  the  Army  itself,  by  their  power  and  efficiency. 

The  artillery  organization  of  1847  was  maintained 
substantially  unchanged  until  the  Civil  War,  in  spite 
of  many  efforts  to  alter  it.  Failing  to  overcome  Gen. 
Scott's  opposition  to  changes  in  organization,  although 
such  men  as  Bomford,  Talcott,  and  Mordecai  had 
favored  them,  it  was  next  sought,  and  successfully,  to 
establish  systematic  courses  of  instruction  for  the 
Artillery,  among  them  a  School  of  Fire  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  which  has  continued  to  this  day. 

Such  had  been  the  career  of  the  American  Artillery 
up  to  the  year  1861.  To  be  found  in  its  personnel  dur 
ing  the  period  from  the  Mexican  to  the  Civil  War  were 
an  entirely  disproportionate  number  of  Southern  of 
ficers,  who  had  not  only  received  professional  training 
in  the  service  of  the  Regular  Artillery,  but  many  of 
whom  had  received  extensive  experience  in  the  Ordnance 
Department.* 

It  must  not  be  thought,  however,  that  the  militia  had 
played  no  part  in  the  education  of  artillery  officers  dur 
ing  the  wars  of  the  Republic,  for  the  Continental  troops 
during  the  Revolution  and  the  Regulars  subsequent 
thereto  were  largely  supplemented  by  the  militia  on  all 
occasions. t  In  1792,  Congress,  seeking  to  organize  the 
militia,  provided  that  each  State  should  maintain  at 
least  one  company  of  artillery,  and  a  number  of  South- 

*Artlllery  officers  of  the  line  were  regularly  detailed  to  the  Ordnance  Depart 
ment  in  the  old  service,  as  in  the  Confederate  Army.  As  shown  in  Part  I,  Gen. 
Gorgas,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  C.  S.  A.,  came  from  the  United  States  Ordnance 
Department. 

tTo  what  extent,  see  Military  Policy  of  United  States,  Upton. 


92  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

ern  artillery  organizations  gained  experience  in  the 
War  of  1812.*  Included  in  the  force  of  10,000  militia, 
which  assembled  on  the  Virginia  coast  to  defend  Nor 
folk  against  Cockburn  and  Warren,  in  1814,  was  the 
Portsmouth  Light  Artillery,  a  previously  organized 
battery,  t  The  Chatham  Artillery,  of  Georgia,  also 
saw  service  in  the  War  of  1812,  in  the  more  Southern 
quarter,  as  did  the  Charleston  Battery.  In  1828,  two 
other  famous  militia  batteries,  the  Norfolk  Light 
Artillery  Blues,  and  the  Fayette  Artillery,  of  Rich 
mond,  were  organized  in  Virginia.^  Out  of  their  early 
experiences  arose  traditions  which  still  permeate  the 
spirit  of  these  corps,  while  they  have  ever  been  valuable 
military  assets  to  the  Commonwealths  boasting  their 
allegiance.  The  esprit  de  corps  of  these  old  batteries 
was  not  only  a  military  but  a  social  factor  during  the 
critical  period  of  our  country.  The  proud  records 
which  they  had  established,  and  their  traditions,  gen 
erated  in  many  a  youthful  Southern  breast  the  martial 
spirit  and  the  love  of  the  service  which,  in  large  measure, 
made  the  Confederacy  possible.  Who  that  has  mingled 
with  the  men  of  these  gallant  commands  can  put  a 
period  to  the  influence  which  their  ante-bellum  ex 
istence  exerted  upon  the  naturally  martial  spirit  of  the 
South? 

The  popularity  of  the  artillery  service  in  the  South 
from  the  earliest  times  is  well  attested  by  the  fact  that 
of  the  25,295  volunteer  and  militia  artillerymen  who 
were  called  out  to  supplement  the  corps  of  12  depleted 
regular  battalions  of  artillery,  in  the  War  of  1812,  an 
overwhelming  proportion  of  the  officers  and  men  came 
from  that  territory  which  afterwards  comprised  the 
Confederate  and  the  border  States.  § 

*Of  the  49,187  militia  called  into  service  at  the  beginning  of  this  war, 
Massachusetts  furnished  208  men  and  Connecticut  none,  these  States  declining 
to  assist  in  the  general  defense.  Maryland,  Virginia,  Delaware,  and  North 
Carolina  furnished  66,376  militia  in  1813. 

tin  1861  this  was  the  oldest  artillery  company  in  the  South,  and  took  the 
field  under  command  of  Capt.  Cary  F.  Grimes,  winning  great  distinction. 

JThe  Norfolk  Blues  Battery  was  known  as  Vickery's  or  Grandy's  Battery  in 
the  Civil  War.  From  it  was  organized  Huger's  Battery. 

^Military  Policy  of  United  States,  Upton,  p.  138 ;  and  Historical  Register 
United  States  Army,  Ileitman. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  93 

While  the  volunteers  and  militia  which  served  in  the 
Mexican  War  were  largely  drawn  from  southern  terri 
tory,  the  only  artillery  organizations  from  that  quarter 
which  served  as  such,  were  the  "Native  American  Ar 
tillery,"  and  a  French  battery  of  New  Orleans,  known 
as  the  "Orleans  Artillery."  Organized  in  1838,  the 
"Native  American  Artillery"  was  commanded  by  Capt., 
afterwards  Gen.,  E.  L.  Tracy,  being  attached  to  the 
Washington  regiment  of  New  Orleans  in  1841.  This 
regiment  was  a  mixed  command  modeled  after  the 
"First  American,"  being  composed  of  infantry,  cavalry, 
and  artillery.  In  command  of  Col.  Persifer  F.  Smith, 
the  Washington  Regiment  became  the  crack  corps  of 
the  State.  The  army  of  occupation  dispatched  to 
Corpus  Christi,  July  26,  1845,  was  entirely  lacking  in 
artillery,  the  regular  mounted  batteries  not  having  yet 
arrived  from  the  North.  Gen.  Taylor,  therefore,  called 
upon  Gen.  Gaines,  commanding  the  Department  of  the 
South,  for  a  force  of  "skilled  volunteer  artillerists."  All 
the  volunteer  batteries  in  the  South  responded  with 
alacrity,  but  two  were  deemed  sufficient,  and  the 
"Native  American,"  with  its  six  6-pounder  bronze  guns, 
and  Capt.  Bercier's  Orleans  (French)  Battery,  were 
selected.  These  two  batteries  were  placed  under  com 
mand  of  Maj.  Golly  of  the  "Orleans  Artillery,"  and 
embarked  at  Jackson  Barracks,  New  Orleans,  August 
22,  1845,  for  the  front.  At  the  expiration  of  three 
months'  service  on  the  Texas  frontier,  the  regular 
mounted  batteries  having  arrived  in  the  meantime,  the 
Louisiana  batteries  were  ordered  home.  When  on  May 
9,  1846,  Gen.  Gaines  made  another  call  upon  the  State 
for  volunteer  infantry,  Capt.  Henry  Forno,  having  be 
come  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the  Washington  Regiment, 
the  Native  American  again  responded  under  its  new 
Captain,  Isaac  F.  Stockton,  serving  as  Company  A 
(infantry).  The  regiment,  now  in  command  of 
Col.  J.  B.  Walton,  was  the  first  of  the  six  Louisiana 
infantry  regiments  to  volunteer,  all  of  which  were  dis- 


94  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

charged  from  the  United  States  service  July  21,  1846, 
their  services  having  been  accepted  only  for  six  months. 

Reorganized  in  1852,  the  "Native  American" 
Battery  became  the  Washington  Artillery,  Col.  J.  B. 
Walton  becoming  its  Captain  in  1857.*  At  the  out 
break  of  the  Civil  War  there  was  not  a  finer  organiza 
tion  of  citizen  soldiery  in  America.  So  great  was  its 
prestige  and  influence  in  the  South  that,  immediately 
expanding  to  a  battalion  of  4  companies,  one  equipped 
as  a  battery,  it  was  ordered  to  Richmond  in  time  to  be 
fully  armed  and  to  participate  in  the  first  great  en 
counter  of  the  Civil  War.f 

So  much  for  the  status  of  artillery  in  the  South  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  outlook,  while  not  bright, 
was,  as  has  been  shown,  comparatively  satisfactory.  It 
would  have  been  quite  impossible  to  begin  the  study  of 
the  Confederate  Artillery  without  at  least  the  foregoing 
knowledge  of  its  resources  of  personnel,  of  the  school 
of  experience  in  which  many  of  its  officers  had  been 
trained,  and  of  the  model  after  which  it  was  organized. 

*In  Camp  and  Battle  with  the  Washington  Artillery,  Owen.  Also  see  his 
torical  sketch  in  the  Washington  Artillery  Souvenir,  p.  30. 

fMuch  of  the  equipment  of  the  battery,  including  six  6-pounder  guns,  with 
ammunition  for  same,  was  obtained  by  the  command  when  it  seized  the  Baton 
Rouge  Arsenal,  April  11,  1861. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  VIRGINIA  MILITARY  INSTITUTE  AS  A  SCHOOL  OF  ARMS 

EVEN  before  officers  of  the  Old  Army  were  invited  by 
the  various  States  to  resign  and  enter  their  service,  and 
before  the  Confederate  States  government  offered  them 
offices  in  the  new  military  establishment,  resignations 
had  begun  to  pour  in  upon  the  War  Department  in 
Washington.  Exactly  how  many  of  these  officers  en 
tered  the  Southern  Artillery  it  is  difficult  to  determine. 
Of  the  821  graduates  of  West  Point  in  the  United  States 
Army  at  the  close  of  1860,  184  resigned  and  entered  the 
armies  of  the  South,  and  of  the  313  graduates  in  civil 
life  at  the  time  99  did  the  same.  The  Confederacy  thus 
obtained  a  total  of  283  trained  officers,  8  of  whom  at 
tained  the  rank  of  general,  15  that  of  lieutenant-general, 
48  that  of  major-general,  and  11  that  of  brigadier-gen 
eral  in  the  Confederacy,  leaving  but  101  who  were  given 
lower  rank,  and  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  most  of  these 
became  field  or  staff  officers.  We  know  that  there  were 
but  4  officers  with  rank  above  that  of  colonel  in  Lee's 
Artillery — Pendleton,  Alexander,  Walker,  and  Long — - 
three  of  whom  were  West  Pointers,  but  few  of  his 
artillery  field  officers  and  battery  commanders  were 
graduates  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy.  All 
the  more,  then,  since  the  Artillery  was  not  largely  of 
ficered  by  former  United  States  officers,  are  we 
astounded  at  the  comparative  efficiency  of  its  personnel, 
and  constrained  to  inquire  whence  came  that  gallant 
corps  which  handled  the  guns. 

The  answer  is  plain,  though  no  historian  as  yet  has 
ever  sought  it.  The  results  obtained  by  Lee's  Artillery 
were  not  accidental,  nor  did  they  flow  from  the  inherent 
quality  of  Southerners  as  artillerymen.  Artillery  is  a 
science,  as  pointed  out  by  Gen.  Knox  during  the  Revolu 
tion,  as  understood  by  the  founders  of  Woolwich,  and 
as  perceived  by  the  "Grand  Monarch"  centuries  ago. 


96  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

War  may  produce,  now  and  then,  a  great  natural  soldier. 
Such  men  as  Forrest  are  exceptions,  however.  They 
become  noted,  not  because  they  have  had  no  military 
training,  but  for  the  very  reason  that  they  are  born  with 
qualities  for  the  development  of  which  in  others  study 
and  experience  are  required.  Too  often  we  hear  the 
Southern  orator  refer  in  eloquent  words  to  the  leaders 
of  that  division  which  recoiled  only  after  reaching  the 
fire-wreathed  muzzles  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  as  typify 
ing  the  inherent  martial  character  of  Virginia's  sons. 
At  heart,  it  is  true,  they  were  soldiers,  but  by  no  means 
adventitiously  so.  They  were  trained  soldiers,  educated 
in  advance  for  the  service  of  their  country,  in  a  school 
of  arms  second  to  none  in  this  country,  that  which  stood 
upon  the  Hudson  not  excepted.  Nearly  every  field 
officer  who  participated  in  Pickett's  charge  was  an 
elev e  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  and  a  former 
pupil  of  the  distinguished  soldier  William  Gilham,  and 
of  the  immortal  Jackson  himself.  In  order  to  grasp  the 
full  meaning  of  this  assertion,  it  is  necessary  to  examine 
the  character  of  that  school. 

In  1836,  J.  T.  L.  Preston,  Esq.,  conceived  the  idea 
of  substituting  for  the  company  maintained  by  the 
State  for  garrisoning  the  western  arsenal  in  Lexington, 
a  corps  of  cadets,  who  in  addition  to  the  duties  of  an 
armed  guard  should  pursue  a  course  of  scientific  and 
military  instruction.  Pursuant  to  this  proposal,  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute,  since  generally  styled  "The 
West  Point  of  the  Confederacy,"  was  established  by 
Act  of  the  General  Assembly,  March,  1839,  the  first 
corps  being  mustered  into  the  State  service  the  follow 
ing  November.  The  President  of  the  first  Board  of 
Visitors,  one  who  had  much  to  do  with  the  original 
organization  of  the  school,  was  Col.  Claudius  Crozet,  a 
Frenchman  by  birth,  a  graduate  of  the  great  Poly 
technic  School  of  Paris,  and  a  distinguished  veteran  of 
Napoleon's  Grand  Army.  Before  accepting  the  ap 
pointment  as  Chief  Engineer  of  Virginia,  in  which 
office  he  designed,  and  put  into  effect  the  scheme  of  her 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL  AKMISTEAD   LINDSAY   LONG 
CHIEF   OF   ARTILLERY,    SECOND   ("ORrs 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  97 

physical  development,  he  had  for  some  years  occupied 
the  chair  of  Engineering  at  the  Unites  States  Military 
Academy.  With  scientific  attainments  of  the  highest 
order,  and  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  distinctive 
organization  of  West  Point,  to  the  upbuilding  of  which 
in  company  with  Bernard  he  had  contributed  much,  he 
was  well  fitted  to  assist  in  the  organization  of  a  school 
of  arms  in  Virginia.  Other  members  of  the  Board  with 
military  experience  were  Capt.  John  F.  Wiley,  a 
maimed  veteran  of  the  Canadian  campaign  of  1812, 
Gen.  Bernard  Peyton,  Gen.  Peter  C.  Johnston,  Gen. 
Thomas  H.  Botts,  and  James  McDowell,  afterwards 
Governor  of  Virginia.  To  these  must  be  added  Col. 
John  T.  L.  Preston,  who  had  originated  the  enterprise, 
and  who  for  thirty  years  was  one  of  the  professors  of 
the  school.  Soon  followed  the  appointment  of 
Gen.  W.  H.  Richardson,  Ad  jut  ant- General  of  Vir 
ginia  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  and  the  veteran 
soldier  William  Ligon,  vice  Peyton  and  Wiley. 

At  the  outset,  it  was  provided  that  a  certain  number 
of  cadets  should  be  appointed  by  State  authority,  and 
the  number  has  since  been  increased  to  about  60.  Fre 
quent  visits  were  paid  the  school  in  its  early  days  by 
such  distinguished  scholars  as  Professors  Bartlett, 
Church,  Mahan,  and  Hardie,  of  the  United  States 
Military  Academy.  Thus  it  was  moulded  closely  after 
the  national  school.  Some  idea  of  its  character  from  the 
first  may  be  had  from  a  knowledge  of  the  careers  of  the 
sixteen  cadets  who  composed  the  first  class  to  graduate.* 
Of  these,  John  B.  Strange,  after  a  distinguished  career 
as  Principal  of  the  Norfolk  Academy,  was  killed  at 
Boonsboro,  Md.,  while  in  command  of  a  Virginia 
regiment.  William  Forbes,  a  professor  in  a  college  in 
Texas,  was  killed  at  Second  Manassas  while  command 
ing  a  Tennessee  regiment.  J.  H.  Jameson  died  with 
the  rank  of  Captain  C.  S.  A.,  while  a  prisoner  of  war. 
Col.  Edmund  Pendleton  was  wounded  while  in 
command  of  a  Louisiana  regiment;  Gen.  Wyatt 

"July  4,  1842. 


98  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Elliott  commanded  a  Virginia  regiment  in  the  War, 
served  in  the  State  Legislature,  and  became  Rector  of 
the  University  of  Virginia;  C.  P.  Dyerle  died  before 
the  war  while  an  Assistant  Surgeon,  U.  S.  A.;  O.  M. 
Knight  held  the  rank  of  Surgeon  in  the  Confederate 
Army;  William  D.  Fair  became  a  member  of  the  Senate 
of  California;  and  Capt.  James  Marshall  commanded 
a  cavalry  troop  in  the  Confederate  Army. 

The  military  instruction  of  the  school  during  the  first 
few  years  of  its  existence  had  been  solely  in  the  hands 
of  its  Superintendent,  Col.  Francis  H.  Smith,  a  dis 
tinguished  graduate  of  West  Point.  With  the  advice 
and  assistance  of  the  brilliant  Crozet,  his  was  the  master 
mind  which  laid  the  foundation  upon  which  all  its  suc 
cess  was  based,  and  by  him  the  school  in  its  formative 
period  was  given  its  character  as  a  real  school  of  arms. 
Its  educational  aims  were  never  lost  sight  of  by  this 
illustrious  man,  nor  were  the  distinctive  purposes  to 
which  it  owed  its  origin.  First,  last,  and  all  the  time, 
a  cadet  must  be  a  soldier,  which  in  the  Superintendent's 
mind  was  not  a  requisite  in  conflict  with  the  education 
of  useful  citizens. 

We  hear  much  of  Jackson  as  the  military  genius  of 
the  school.  Undoubtedly  he  did  much  in  the  prepara 
tion  of  a  corps  of  officers  for  the  Confederacy,  but  he 
was  not  appointed  Professor  of  Natural  and  Experi 
mental  Philosophy  until  March  21,  1851,  and  his  mili 
tary  duties  were  restricted  to  artillery  instruction.  Long 
before  this  great  soldier  took  up  his  work  in  Lexington, 
Lieut.  William  Gilham,  a  distinguished  graduate  of 
West  Point,  who  had  gained  distinction  in  the  army  of 
Gen.  Taylor,  in  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto,  and  Resaca  de 
la  Palma,  had  been  appointed  Commandant.* 

As  a  military  instructor  and  drillmaster,  Maj.  Gil- 
ham  had  no  superior.  Quick,  accurate,  and  self-pos 
sessed,  he  had  a  magnetic  power  of  command,  which  in 
the  opinion  of  many  made  the  drill  of  his  battalion  of 
cadets  superior  even  to  that  of  the  West  Point  corps. 

*Appointed  in  1846  as  Major  and  Commandant,  and  head  of  the  Department 
of  Physical  Science. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  99 

He  also  excelled  as  a  teacher,  having  been  three  years 
assistant  to  Prof.  Bartlett  at  the  National  Academy. 
So  celebrated  had  Gilham  become  as  an  organizer  and 
tactician  that  his  manual  of  instruction  for  the  volun 
teers  and  militia,  including  the  three  arms,  was  adopted 
by  the  Confederate  Government  in  preference  to  all 
other  works  of  the  kind. 

Before  1861,  the  Corps  numbered  over  200  cadets, 
and  in  April  of  that  year  it  was  ordered  to  Richmond 
in  command  of  Maj.  Jackson,  its  members  to  be  as 
signed  to  duty  as  drillmasters  for  the  volunteers  then 
assembling  at  Camp  Lee.  Soon  the  Corps  dissolved 
by  the  appointment  of  the  cadets  as  officers  throughout 
the  Army.  But  their  work  had  been  well  done  and  their 
drill  squads  formed  the  army  which  overthrew  Mc 
Dowell  at  Bull  Run.  The  cadets  not  only  drilled  the 
green  companies  of  volunteers,  but  they  were  largely 
responsible  for  the  equipment  and  organization  of  the 
troops,  including  the  batteries,  furnishing  a  large  pro 
portion  of  the  staff  officers  for  the  Army,  a  number  of 
them  taking  part  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  before  they 
were  commissioned.*  Though  their  work  has  not  at 
tracted  due  notice  from  the  historian,  it  was  well  ap 
preciated  by  Lincoln,  who,  when  asked  by  a  United 
States  Senator  in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  why  he  had 
not  put  an  end  to  the  rebellion,  is  said  to  have  answered 
that  there  was  a  certain  military  school  in  Virginia  which 
made  it  impossible.  Certainly  no  one  can  estimate  the 
value  of  the  service  which  the  school  rendered  the  Con 
federacy  at  this  time  in  welding  the  raw  levies  into 
shape,  and  furnishing  to  the  Army  as  a  whole  a  nucleus 
of  trained  and  educated  young  officers. 

But  so  apparent  to  the  Confederacy  was  the  need  of 
the  institution  as  a  training  school  for  its  officers  that 
immediate  steps  were  taken  by  the  State  to  reopen  it 
after  the  first  crisis  had  passed,  and  in  1862  its  regular 
work  was  resumed.  Upon  its  parade  ground  were  mar 
shalled  the  scions  of  nearly  every  distinguished  family 

"Three  were  killed  in  this  battle  :    Moore,  Moffiett,  and  Norris. 


100  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

of  the  South,  from  Texas  to  Maryland,  from  Missouri 
to  Florida,  then  as  to-day;  nor  were  these  youths  con 
tent  to  bide  the  time  of  graduation.  The  wounded  of 
ficers  ordered  back  to  the  Institute  to  drill  and  instruct 
the  Corps  filled  their  boyish  breasts  with  such  ardor,  and 
such  a  longing  for  active  service,  that  the  problem  arose 
how  to  keep  them  in  hand.  Many  deserted  to  face  the 
enemy.  Hundreds  who  never  graduated  flocked  to  the 
combatant  forces  in  the  field.  Nor  were  those  who  re 
mained  deprived  of  all  chance  of  seeing  active  service, 
the  Corps  being  repeatedly  called  upon  for  duty  in  the 
Valley  of  Virginia,  and  on  the  various  defensive  lines 
of  the  State.  Already,  in  1859,  the  Corps  had  been 
ordered  by  Gov.  Wise  to  Harper's  Ferry,  as  a  part  of 
the  State  force  present  at  the  execution  of  John 
Brown.*  After  the  reorganization  of  the  Corps  in  1862, 
it  was  sent  to  the  support  of  Jackson  at  McDowell,  and 
took  part  in  the  pursuit  of  Fremont's  Army  as  far  as 
Franklin.  Then  came  in  1864  the  battle  of  New 
Market,  in  which  the  cadets  saved  the  day  for  Breckin- 
ridge  by  a  superb  charge,  unsurpassed  for  gallantry  in 
the  annals  of  war,  losing  57  of  their  number,  includ 
ing  9  killed,  a  loss  of  20  per  cent  of  those  engaged,  t 

The  Institute  was  completely  demolished  by 
Gen.  D.  H.  Hunter,  the  following  month,  June,  1864, 
when  the  Corps  was  assigned  to  duty  with  the  cavalry 
command  of  Gen.  John  McCausland,  who  fell  back  be 
fore  the  invader  upon  Lynchburg,  at  which  point  the 
Federal  force  was  checked  and  driven  off.  Ordered  to 
Richmond,  the  Corps  soon  found  itself  on  the  Richmond 
lines  before  Grant,  being  dispersed  only  when  the 
Capital  of  the  Confederacy  was  evacuated,  not  to  be 
assembled  until  the  fall  of  1865.  The  Corps  organiza 
tion  had  been  throughout  that  of  a  battalion  of  infantry 
of  4  companies,  and  a  battery  of  artillery.^ 

*For  a  graphic  description  of  the  event,  by  Col.  Preston,  see  History  of  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute,  Wise. 

fin  addition  to  the  5  cadets  killed  on  the  field  of  battle,  4  died  within  a 
month  from  wounds  received. 

JOnly  1  section  of  cadet  artillery  took  part  in  the  Battle  of  New  Market. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  101 

Besides  the  most  thorough  instruction  in  the  art  of 
war,  embracing  all  arms,  practical  artillery  instruction 
under  Jackson  had  been  given  for  nearly  a  decade,  not 
less  than  600  cadets  having  been  instructed  in  this  time 
in  the  theory  and  practice  of  gunnery. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  every  inducement  was 
offered  graduates  of  West  Point  to  enter  the  Con 
federate  Army,  182  attaining  the  rank  of  general  officer 
during  the  first  year  of  their  service.  Up  to  June,  1861, 
there  had  been  554  graduates  of  the  Institute,  and  1,210 
matriculates  who  had  served  one  year  or  more  as  cadets. 
Of  this  number,  there  were  not  more  than  1,100  avail 
able  for  military  service,  and  three-fourths  of  these 
were  under  30  and  half  under  25  years  of  age,  for  the 
school  had  been  in  existence  but  22  years.*  West 
Pointers  were  naturally  preferred  to  Institute  men  by 
the  authorities  in  order  to  reward  them  for  resigning 
from  the  United  States  Army.  But  at  the  time  of  the 
reorganization  of  the  Army,  Institute  men  won  the 
recognition  due  them,  the  efficient  military  organization 
of  the  school  with  its  distinctive  scientific  courses  of  in 
struction  being  then  fully  appreciated. 

We  have  seen  that  West  Point  sent  a  total  of  but  283 
officers  to  the  Southern  armies.  Statistics  are  instruc 
tive,  if  dry  at  times,  but  in  this  case  they  will  enable  us 
to  estimate  the  comparative  influence  of  the  two  schools 
upon  the  military  career  of  the  Confederacy.  While 
the  records  of  the  Institute  are  not  complete  as  to 
the  matriculates  up  to  1861,  they  show  that  the  school 
produced  3  major-generals,  17  brigadier-generals, 
92  colonels,  64  lieutenant-colonels,  107  majors,  and 
over  300  captains,  besides  a  host  of  junior  officers.  This 
list,  incomplete  as  it  is,  comprises  a  total  of  20  general 
officers,  and  263  field  officers,  an  overwhelming  pro 
portion  of  whom  served  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia.  Among  the  generals  were  such  men  as  Mahone, 
Rodes,  Wharton,  Echols,  R.  L.  Walker,  Colston,  J.  R. 
Jones,  Garland,  Lane,  McCausland,  and  Munford, 

*The  number  of  graduates  during  the  decade  1851-1861  was  double  that  of 
the  preceding  10  years  ;  the  proportion  of  matriculates  much  larger. 


102  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

most  of  whom  were  mere  youths.*  Among  the  field- 
officers  were  Col.  Walter  H.  Taylor,  Gen.  Lee's  Ad 
jutant-General,  Col.  Edwin  J.  Harvie,  Gen.  Johnston's 
Inspector-General,  Col.  Briscoe  G.  Baldwin,  who  suc 
ceeded  Gen.  Alexander  as  Chief  of  Ordnance,  A.  N.  V., 
Cols.  Thomas  H.  Carter,  Stapleton  Crutchfield,  and 
R.  Preston  Chew,  Chiefs  of  Artillery  of  Jackson's, 
Early's,  and  Stuart's  commands,  respectively,  and 
Col.  A.  R.  H.  Ranson,  Assistant  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
C.  S.  A.  Gen.  R.  Lindsay  Walker,  of  the  Class  of  1845, 
was  Chief  of  Artillery  of  Hill's  Corps. 

The  Institute  furnished  1  brigadier-general,  Carring- 
ton,  1  colonel,  2  lieutenant-colonels,  3  majors,  and  2 
lieutenants  to  the  Northern  Army,  all  save  one  of  the 
officers  being  from  the  western  part  of  the  State,  now 
West  Virginia. 

In  the  Mexican  War,  an  incomplete  list  shows  that 
one  of  her  graduates  was  a  major,  2  were  captains,  and 
15  or  more  were  lieutenants,  3  of  whom  were  killed  in 
action.  The  school  had  then  been  in  existence  but  seven 
years. 

Since  1865,  the  school  has  furnished  nearly  200 
officers  to  the  United  States  Army,  Navy,  and  Marine 
Corps,  there  being  in  1912  over  100  holding  commissions 
in  the  Army  alone.  The  average  number  commissioned 
each  year  since  1898  is  12. 

In  the  Spanish- American  War,  the  Southern  volun 
teers  included  many  Institute  men,  a  very  incomplete 
list  showing  6  colonels,  2  lieutenant-colonels,  9  majors, 
and  more  than  100  officers  of  junior  rank. 

In  the  National  Guard  of  the  country,  imperfect 
records  show  that  there  have  been  2  major-generals,  7 
brigadier-generals,  20  colonels,  10  lieutenant-colonels, 
12  majors,  more  than  100  captains,  12  State  adjutant- 
generals,  2  inspector-generals,  1  surgeon-general,  and 
1  judge-advocate-general.  These  figures  are  up  to 

*Among  the  other  generals  were  Payne,  Terry,  Terrill,  J.  A.  Walker,. 
Slaughter,  Rives,  Fry,  Elliott,  Bass,  Vaughan,  Penn,  and  A.  C.  Jones. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  103 

1909.  An  immense  number  have  since  joined  the 
organized  militia,  due  to  the  increasing  interest  of  the 
country  therein. 

From  the  foregoing  we  see  that  whether  the  remark 
attributed  to  Lincoln  is  authentic  or  not,  well  might  it 
have  been  founded  upon  fact.  We  are  also  able  to  see 
the  gross  fallacy  of  the  current  belief  that  West 
Pointers  and  untrained  civilians,  with  a  few  exceptions, 
led  the  men  of  Lee's  Army.  While  the  enlisted  men 
were  citizen  soldiers,  the  Confederacy  owed  more  than 
can  ever  be  determined  to  the  Virginia  Military  Insti- 
stitute,  and  the  pupils  of  Smith,  Crozet,  Gilham,  and 
Jackson.*  Particularly  was  this  true  of  the  artillery 
of  that  army  in  which  Carter,  Crutchfield,  Latimer, 
Chew,  Nelson,  Barton,  Shields,  Rouse,  Baldwin, 
Ranson,  Thomson,  Carpenter,  Ford,  Harman,  Keiter, 
Ker,  Macon,  Otey,  Rogers,  Selden,  Porter,  Truehart, 
Thornton,  Waddey,  Stanard,  Moorman,  Flowerree, 
Hutter,  Lynch,  Oliver,  Cutshaw,  Paris,  Cunningham, 
Reverley,  the  Browns,  Smiths,  and  Johnstons  were  a 
few  of  the  field  officers  and  battery  commanders  among 
the  graduates  of  the  school,  who  attained  distinction  in 
the  service  of  the  guns. 

Before  dismissing  the  subject  of  the  influence  of  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute  upon  the  success  of  the  Con 
federate  arms,  it  would  seem  proper  here  to  mention 
what,  to  the  writer,  has  always  explained,  in  great  meas 
ure  at  least,  the  wonderful  performances  of  Jackson's 
troops.  One  frequently  finds  the  historian  alluding  to 
the  ability  of  Jackson  to  exact  greater  sacrifices  from 
his  officers  and  men  than  is  customary,  and  endeavoring 
to  analyze  the  character  of  the  man  in  order  to  arrive 
at  the  reason  for  this  exceptional  power  on  his  part. 
That  he  possessed  a  remarkable  character  and  unusual 
ability  to  command  is  unquestioned.  Indirectly  these 
traits  explain  his  success,  but  there  is  a  more  direct  ex- 

*In  the  Superintendent's  Report  of  1863,  an  incomplete  list  of  losses  in 
service  among  the  Alumni  of  the  Institute  appears  as  follows  :  Officers  killed. 
86 ;  wounded  85 ;  total.  171,  including  4  general  officers,  36  colonels,  22 
lieutenant-colonels,  41  majors,  and  94  officers  of  lesser  rank.  Can  West  Point 
show  such  a  record  up  to  this  time? 


104  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

planation.  Stonewall  Jackson,  besides  being  inherently 
great,  had  the  good  fortune  to  exercise  command  over, 
and  to  be  associated  with  armies  the  very  backbone  of 
which  consisted  of  young  men  who  had  but  recently 
borne  the  relation  to  him  of  the  pupil  to  a  beloved  tutor. 
The  full  import  of  this  fact  becomes  more  apparent 
when  it  is  recalled  that  nearly  300  field  officers  alone  in 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  distributed  among  the 
three  arms,  besides  not  less  than  an  equal  number  of 
junior  officers,  had  for  varying  periods  been  closely  as 
sociated  with  him,  and  subjected  to  the  influence  of  his 
personality  before  they  were  called  upon  to  follow  or 
cooperate  with  him  upon  the  field  of  war.  They  were 
his  children,  his  wards,  and  knew  each  and  every  whim 
of  the  leader,  for  whom  only  the  highest  respect  was 
entertained.  In  him  they  reposed  that  sublime  confi 
dence  which  knows  not  reservation,  content  to  rely  upon 
the  judgment  of  one  who  in  the  closest  relations  of  life 
had  never  failed  them  in  the  past.  Unconsciously,  per 
haps,  but  if  so,  then  all  the  more  thoroughly,  they  had 
absorbed  his  teachings,  and  become  able  to  follow  the 
habit  of  his  mind.  When  his  first  successes  crowned 
him  with  a  halo  of  military  glory  they,  who  had  already 
accorded  him  the  fullest  measure  of  confidence,  en 
throned  him  as  the  special  object  of  their  pride.  From 
the  very  first  Jackson's  success  was  redolent  of  glory 
for  a  host  of  followers  who  held  him  up  to  the  admiring 
world  as  their  own  tutelary  genius.  So  far  as  they  were 
concerned  it  was  not  an  unfamiliar  general  whose 
orders  bade  them  follow  and  suffer  and  die  upon  the 
field  of  battle.  Their  leader  was  Maj.  Jackson,  and 
they  were  cadets  as  of  yesterday,  each  vying  with  the 
others  to  merit  the  favor  of  his  approving  eye.  The 
stern,  and  occasionally  harsh,  drillmaster  of  former  days 
had  become  a  leader  of  acknowledged  ability,  and  they 
had  become  the  company,  the  battery,  the  battalion,  the 
regimental,  yea,  the  brigade  leaders  in  such  numbers  as 
to  leaven  the  entire  army,  and  to  transmit  to  the  whole, 
receptive  as  it  was,  their  own  spirit  of  pride  and  de- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  105 

votion.  Not  only  was  this  true,  but  to  no  one  was  it  so 
well  known  as  to  Jackson  himself.  Conscious  of  the  sin 
cerity  of  his  own  purpose,  confident  of  the  power  he 
held,  and  that  no  demand  he  might  make  would  fail  to 
elicit  the  fullest  possible  response  from  his  men,  in  this 
spirit  it  was  that  at  Chancellorsville,  the  supreme  hour 
of  his  life,  having  given  his  commands,  he  viewed  with 
pride  the  army  which  swept  before  him  to  execute  his 
bidding,  and,  in  the  joy  of  a  commander  who  felt  the 
responsive  throb  of  his  army's  pulse,  exclaimed,  "The 
Virginia  Military  Institute  will  be  heard  from  to-day." 
The  remark  is  capable  of  but  one  reasonable  interpreta 
tion.  Other  constructions  may  be  placed  upon  it,  but 
the  true  one  is  that  Jackson,  surrounded  by  Rodes, 
Colston,  Crutchfield,  and  Munford,  all  of  whom  had 
been  his  associates  at  the  Institute,  and  closely  scrutiniz 
ing  the  countenances  of  his  men  as  they  filed  past  him, 
saw  in  the  faces  of  his  youthful  but  seasoned  field- 
officers  something  portentous  of  more  than  the  usual 
elan  of  his  troops;  yes,  from  the  eyes  of  the  regi 
mental,  battalion,  and  company  leaders,  a  host  of 
whom  he  had  guided  to  manhood's  estate,  bearing  as 
they  were  the  burden  of  his  fame,  flashed  a  mute  assur 
ance  that  nothing  save  death  would  deter  them  in  exe 
cuting  his  behest.  And  so,  when  smitten  by  fate  at  the 
hour  of  his  greatest  glory,  it  was  not  his  officers  alone 
who  lamented  his  loss,  but  a  multitude  of  his  children, 
whose  hearts  were  wrung  with  anguish  as  they  gazed 
upon  his  fallen  form.  No  mere  loss  of  an  heroic  leader 
was  this  to  an  army,  but  a  wound  which  tore  the  very 
heart  strings  of  its  men,  many  of  them  regarding  the 
blow  as  prescient  of  the  future. 

Without  desiring  in  any  respect  to  detract  from 
the  fame  of  the  man  who,  deprecating  the  advent  of 
fratricidal  strife,  yet  could  throw  away  his  scabbard,  let 
us  ask  where  in  all  the  history  of  war  was  there  another 
so  fortunately  circumstanced  as  was  Jackson?* 

*The  following  incident,  illustrating  the  character  of  Jackson,  is  related  on 
the  authority  of  Gen.  Henry  T.  Douglas  :  "After  Lincoln's  election,  the  papers 
were  filled  with  discussions  as  to  the  probable  outcome  and  the  possibility  of 


106  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

It  has  been  reiterated  by  such  military  philosophers 
as  Bulow,  Jomini,  Willisen,  Clausewitz,  Moltke,  Von 
der  Goltz,  Henderson,  and  Balck,  that  the  moral  force, 
is  the  preponderant  one  in  war.  The  moral  force  which 
gives  men  the  will-power  to  overcome  all  obstacles,  to 
shrink  from  no  danger,  and  to  strive  for  victory  at  any 
cost,  emanates  in  those  sentiments  which  inspirit  men  to 
become  courageous  soldiers.  "In  a  general  way,  these 
sentiments  are,  religious  fanaticism,  patriotism,  en 
thusiasm  for  a  commander,  discipline,  and,  most  of  all, 
confidence  resulting  from  experience."*  The  prestige 
of  Jackson  gave  him  complete  moral  ascendancy  over 
his  men,  and  that  prestige  was  decidedly  the  outgrowth 
of  an  experience  which  many  of  his  subordinates  had 
gained  with  him,  his  officers  comprising  the  psycho 
logical  or  suggestive  medium  by  which  the  spirit  of  con 
fidence  in  and  enthusiasm  for  the  commander  was  gen 
erated  in  his  army.  "The  best  obeyed  commanders  are 
neither  the  best  instructed,  the  most  intelligent,  the  most 
paternal,  nor  the  most  severe,  but  are  those  who  have 
innate  or  acquired  prestige.  .  .  .  It  is  because  of 
it  that  his  suggestions  take  on  an  irresistible  power,  that 
he  is  able  to  throw  his  soldiers  against  the  enemy  in  an 
enthusiastic  assault,  and  that  he  can  stop  with  a  gesture 
the  first  fugitives,  transforming  them  into  heroes. "t 
The  suggestions  contained  in  the  foregoing  remarks 
about  the  personal  power  of  Jackson  as  a  soldier  may 
be  followed  up  with  benefit  by  the  military  student. 
His  circumstances  as  a  leader  were  in  a  psychological 
sense  fortuitous. 

war  between  the  sections,  and  the  New  York  Herald  was  read  with  great  interest. 
Ned  Cunningham  was  an  assistant  professor  to  Maj.  Jackson  at  the  Institute, 
and  he  told  me  that  one  night  he  and  Maj.  Jackson  were  sitting  in  his  section 
room  absorbed  in  reading  the  papers.  Neither  had  spoken  for  some  time,  when 
Ned  put  to  Maj.  Jackson  this  question:  'Major,  would  you  like  to  see  war?' 
He  said  Jackson  stopped  reading  the  paper  and  for  five  minutes  hung  down  his 
head  before  replying.  He  then  looked  up,  and,  in  a  low  and  deliberate  tone, 
said  :  'Capt.  Cunningham,  as  a  Christian  I  wouldn't  like  to  see  war,'  and  then 
raising  his  voice  until  it  rang  out  like  a  bugle  call,  with  eye  flashing  and  every 
fiber  of  his  body  filled  with  excitement,  added,  'but  as  a  soldier,  sir,  I  would  like 
to  see  war.'  " 

*  Psychology  of  War,  Eltinge,  p.  64. 

tlbid.,  p.  70.  For  Psychology  of  War  see  iStudes  sur  le  Combat,  Dupicq ; 
Psychology  du  Combat  de  I'lnfantere,  Louque ;  Les  Realitcs  du  Combat, 
Daudignac  ;  Actual  Experiences  in  Warfare,  Solaviev. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   FIELD   ARTILLERY   OF   THE   CONFEDERATE   STATES   OF 

AMERICA 

HAVING  examined  the  experience  which  the  South 
had  had  in  the  service  of  artillery,  and  what  material 
there  was  for  its  officers,  it  is  time  to  consider  the  steps 
taken  by  the  Confederate  authorities  for  the  organiza 
tion  of  the  artillery  of  the  army  in  Virginia. 

On  December  28,  1860,  the  State  of  South  Carolina 
seceded  from  the  United  States  of  America,  followed 
in  January,  1861,  by  Mississippi,  Florida,  Alabama, 
Georgia,  and  Louisiana.  The  Congress  of  these  States 
assembled  in  Montgomery,  Ala.,  February  4,  1861,  and 
ratified  the  Constitution  of  the  Confederate  States  of 
America  four  days  later. 

The  only  material  of  war  possessed  by  this  new 
government  was  that  held  by  the  various  States  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  immediate  military  measures  were 
taken  to  provide  for  the  public  defense.  On  February 
20  and  21  acts  were  passed  providing  for  munitions  of 
war  and  establishing  a  War  Department,  respectively, 
and  on  the  28th,  one  creating  the  Provisional  Army, 
C.  S.  A.  This  last  Act  authorized  the  President  to  take 
charge  of  all  military  operations  in  the  various  States,  to 
provide  for  their  common  defense,  to  receive  from  the 
States  the  arms  and  munitions,  the  forts,  arsenals,  etc., 
which  they  had  seized  from  the  United  States,  and  such 
other  arms  and  munitions  as  they  might  desire  to  turn 
over  and  make  chargeable  to  the  central  government, 
and  to  muster  into  the  Confederate  service  such  State 
forces  as  might  be  tendered,  or  which  might  volunteer, 
with  the  consent  of  their  States,  for  a  period  of  not  less 
than  a  year,  unless  sooner  discharged.  State  forces  ac 
cepted  by  the  President  were  to  be  received  with  their 
own  officers,  vacancies  occurring  thereafter  to  be  filled  by 
appointment  of  the  President,  and  the  pay  and  allow- 


108  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

ances  of  all  were  to  be  as  prescribed  for  the  Army  of 
the  Confederacy.  March  6,  another  Act  for  the  estab 
lishment  and  organization  of  the  Confederate  States  of 
America  was  passed,  declaring  the  military  establish 
ment  to  consist  of  a  corps  of  artillery,  6  regiments 
of  infantry,  1  regiment  of  cavalry  and  the  staff  de 
partments  already  established  by  law. 

The  Corps  of  Artillery  which,  as  in  the  old  service,  was 
charged  with  ordnance  duties,  was  to  consist  of  1 
colonel,  1  lieutenant-colonel,  10  majors,  and  40  com 
panies  of  artillery.*  The  company  organization  was 
1  captain,  2  first  lieutenants,  1  second  lieutenant,  4 
sergeants,  4  corporals,  2  musicians,  and  70  privates,  or 
a  total  personnel  of  3,072  for  the  Corps.  Such  portion 
of  the  force  as  the  President  deemed  expedient  was 
authorized  to  be  equipped  as  light  artillery  with  6  pieces 
to  a  battery. 

The  monthly  pay  of  the  Artillery  was  fixed  as  fol 
lows:  colonel,  $210.00;  lieutenant-colonel,  $185.00; 
major,  $150.00;  captain,  $130.00;  first  lieutenant, 
$90.00;  second  lieutenant,  $80.00;  adjutant  (detailed 
from  among  first  lieutenants) ,  $10.00  in  addition  to  pay 
of  his  grade.  Officers  of  artillery  serving  in  the  light 
artillery,  or  performing  ordnance  duties,  were  to  re 
ceive  the  pay  of  cavalry  officers,  which  was  the  same 
as  that  of  the  Artillery  for  field-officers,  but  for  captains, 
$140.00;  first  lieutenants,  $100.00;  and  second  lieu 
tenants,  $90.00.  The  monthly  pay  of  enlisted  men  in 
the  light  artillery  was  declared  to  be  the  same  as  that 
for  the  cavalry,  namely:  sergeant-majors,  $21.00;  first 
sergeants,  $20.00;  sergeants,  $17.00;  corporals,  mu 
sicians,  farriers,  artificers,  blacksmiths,  $13.00;  privates, 
$12.00.  The  President  was  authorized  to  enlist  as 
many  master  armorers,  master  carriage  makers,  master 
blacksmiths,  artificers,  and  laborers  for  ordnance  serv 
ice  as  he  might  deem  necessary,  not  exceeding  100  men 
in  number,  all  of  whom  were  to  be  attached  to  the  Corps 
of  Artillery.  The  master  workmen  were  to  receive 

*Some  of  these  were  to  be  artificer  companies. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  109 

$34.00  and  the  others  $20.00,  except  artificers  and 
ordinary  laborers  whose  pay  was  fixed  at  $17.00  and 
$13.00  per  month,  respectively. 

The  Articles  of  War  and  Regulations  for  the  Army 
of  the  United  States  were  adopted  in  toto,  with  the  ex 
ception  that  two  slight  changes  were  made  in  the  former. 

The  following  August  an  Act  was  passed  increasing 
the  Corps  of  Artillery  to  the  extent  of  1  lieutenant- 
colonel  and  2  majors.  But  even  this  increase  proved 
inadequate,  for  the  limitations  which  had  been  imposed 
by  law  upon  the  number  of  field-officers  in  the  Artillery 
rendered  it  impossible  to  reward  conspicuous  service 
by  promotion  or  to  take  advantage  of  the  abilities  of 
certain  artillery  officers  by  placing  them  in  positions  of 
important  command.  While  the  act  creating  the  Corps 
did  not  contemplate  the  organization  of  field  batteries 
into  battalions  and  regiments,  which  had  not  up  to  that 
time  been  united  to  form  such  large  units,  the  regular 
practice  being  to  assign  individual  batteries  to  brigades, 
yet,  the  President  was  empowered  to  so  unite  light 
batteries  when  tendered  in  separate  companies,  should 
he  deem  it  advisable.  This  power  on  the  part  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  was  appealed  to  by  the  Secretary 
of  War,  in  November,  1861,*  and  in  order  to  remedy 
the  defect  arising  out  of  the  lack  of  authority  for  the 
appointment  of  officers  to  command  the  larger  units, 
it  was  recommended  that  Congress  should  immediately 
pass  an  act  providing  for  additional  artillery  officers  in 
the  Provisional  Army,  and  the  volunteer  corps,  not  to 
exceed  in  number  1  brigadier-general  for  every  20 
batteries,  1  colonel  for  every  10  batteries,  1  lieutenant- 
colonel  for  every  6  batteries,  and  1  major  for  every  4 
batteries,  without  reference  to  the  number  of  batteries 
under  the  actual  command  of  the  officers  so  appointed. 
This  wise  recommendation  was  carefully  considered, 
and  soon  the  increase  was  authorized. t  Again,  the 
following  spring,  the  Artillery  Corps  was  increased  by 

*J.  P.  Benjamin  to  the  President,  November  30,  1861,  Rebellion  Records, 
Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  761. 

fAct  approved  January  22,  1862.     Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  867. 


110  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

an  act  authorizing  the  appointment  of  80  captains  and 
first  lieutenants  in  the  Provisional  Army  for  ordnance 
duties,  a  measure,  which  had  great  effect  upon  the  line 
by  relieving  it  of  a  burden  of  details.*  But  so  exten 
sive  were  the  operations  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  in 
its  various  branches  of  activity,  that  even  this  increase 
did  not  relieve  the  line  of  the  onus  of  ordnance  work, 
and  the  following  fall  the  appointment  of  70  additional 
artillery  officers  in  the  Provisional  Army  for  ordnance 
duty  was  authorized,  t 

The  fact  that  the  appointment  of  brigadier-generals 
and  additional  field-officers  in  the  Artillery  Corps  was 
authorized  in  January,  1862,  does  not  mean  that  the 
field  artillery  was  organized  at  that  time  into  battalions, 
regiments,  and  brigades.  This  was  not  to  come  until 
after  the  disastrous  lesson  yet  to  be  learned  at  Malvern 
Hill.  Until  that  time  batteries  acted  more  or  less  inde 
pendently  with  their  brigades. 

In  1861,  a  battery  of  light  artillery  of  6  guns  con 
sisted  of  1  captain,  2  first  lieutenants,  2  second  lieuten 
ants,  1  sergeant-major,  or  first  sergeant,  1  quarter 
master-sergeant,  6  sergeants,  12  corporals,  2  buglers, 
1  guidon,  2  artificers,  and  from  64  to  125  privates.  The 
organization  of  a  battery  of  4  guns  was  the  same  except 
that  but  1  first  lieutenant,  4  sergeants,  and  8  corporals 
were  prescribed  therefor 4  From  the  foregoing,  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  personnel  of  a  light  battery  in  1862  was 
not  dissimilar  to  that  of  the  present  day. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  war,  the  material  of  a  battery 
consisted  of  as  many  as  8  pieces,  the  company  being  di 
vided  into  as  many  platoons  as  there  were  guns.  Six 
pieces  were  considered  to  constitute  the  most  desirable 
armament,  four  of  which  were  ordinarily  6-pounder  S. 
B.  guns,  and  two  of  which  were  12-pounder  howitzers. 
As  the  3-inch  iron  rifle  made  its  appearance  it  was  gen 
erally  substituted  for  the  6-pounder  guns.  The  regu- 

*Act  approved  April  21,  1862.     Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  1080. 
tAct   approved   September   16,    1862.      Rebellion   Records,   Series   IV,   Vol.    II, 

$G.'  O.  No.  81,  A.  &  I.  G.  O.,  November  1,  1862,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV, 
Vol.  II,  p.  153. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  111 

lations  as  to  the  material  of  a  battery,  however,  were 
perforce  departed  from  and  batteries  possessing  from 
2  to  8  pieces  were  employed.*  Each  piece  of  a  battery 
had  its  own  caisson,  which  together  constituted  a  platoon, 
and  2  platoons  formed  a  section,  the  reverse  of  the 
present  organization.  To  fully  mount  a  light  battery 
of  6  pieces  with  six-horse  teams,  84  animals  were  re 
quired.  The  cannoneers  being  mounted,  149  horses 
were  required  to  mount  a  horse  artillery  battery.  These 
figures  do  not  include  the  teams  for  forges  and  battery 
wagons. 

It  should  be  said  here  that  the  regulation  complement 
of  horses  was  seldom  possessed  by  a  battery,  especially 
towards  the  close  of  the  war  when  draught  animals 
were  no  longer  to  be  found  on  the  farms.  There  was, 
of  course,  no  adequate  remount  system  in  effect,  and 
horses  and  mules  for  the  mounted  and  transport  serv 
ices  had  to  be  impressed  wherever  found.  Nothing  be 
came  so  tempting  a  prize  to  the  Confederate  artillery 
men  as  the  sleek  teams  of  the  enemy.  With  their  capture 
in  view,  and  in  order  to  prevent  their  withdrawal  from 
the  field  in  the  event  of  a  successful  issue  of  the  fight, 
certain  teams  of  a  Confederate  battery  were  so  disposed 
in  advance  as  to  be  available  for  the  purpose  of  dashing 
with  their  riders  in  among  the  hostile  teams,  and  secur 
ing  them  during  the  excitement. t  This  method  was 
often  successful,  and  caused  the  drivers  of  a  battery  to 
become  as  active  in  a  combat  as  their  gunners. 

*In  1861  Carter's  Battery  was  equipped  with  2  S.  B.  bronze  6-pounders, 
one  12-pounder  bronze  howitzer,  and  one  3-inch  iron  rifle.  The  Washington 
Artillery  when  it  arrived  in  Virginia,  composed  of  4  companies,  was  armed  with 
6  bronze  6-pounders,  2  bronze  12-pounder  howitzers,  and  1  iron  8-pounder 
rifle.  The  Letcher  Artillery,  a  battery,  fought  until  after  Antietam  with  2 
bronze  6-pounder  guns. 

tG.  O.  No.  90,  A.  &  I.  G.  O.,  November  11,  1862,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV, 
Vol.  II,  p.  194. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  VIRGINIA  VOLUNTEERS 

WE  have  examined  the  organization  contemplated  by 
the  Confederate  States  Government.  In  the  meantime 
the  State  of  Virginia  had  not  been  idle  in  the  organiza 
tion  of  her  field  artillery. 

Until  April  21,  1861,  the  personnel  of  the  volunteer 
artillery  of  Virginia  which  had  been  armed  consisted  of 
but  780  men,  a  large  portion  of  whom  comprised  heavy 
batteries  without  guns.*  The  personnel  of  the  militia 
regiments  prescribed  by  law  had  not  been  mustered  into 
the  service.  The  organizations  existed  merely  on  paper, 
except  as  to  the  few  volunteer  companies  which  under 
the  militia  acts  automatically  attached  to  one  of  the 
five  territorial  or  divisional  artillery  regiments.  In  the 
Fourth  Regiment,  for  instance,  the  Fayette  Artillery, 
of  Richmond,  was  the  only  battery  actually  armed  and 
equipped,  t 

In  the  First  Regiment  were  two  batteries,  not  how 
ever  fully  equipped  as  light  batteries,  the  Portsmouth 
Light  Artillery  and  the  Norfolk  Light  Artillery  Blues. 
These  two  batteries,  the  former  with  4  S.  B.  iron  6- 
pounders,  and  the  latter  with  4  brass  12-pounder 
howitzers,  were  ordered  out  by  the  Governor  April  19, 
1861,  and  were  therefore  the  first  batteries  in  the  field. 
The  Portsmouth  Battery,  in  command  of  Capt.  Cary  F. 
Grimes,  was  stationed  at  the  Naval  Hospital  during  the 
evacuation  and  burning  of  the  Gosport  Navy  Yard  by 
the  Federal  authorities,  being  sent  to  Hoffler's  Creek 
in  May  as  part  of  the  Confederate  force  guarding  the 
line  from  Craney  Island  to  the  mouth  of  the  Nansemond 
River.  The  Norfolk  Battery,  in  command  of  Capt. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  p.  940.  There  were  also  at  this  time 
but  3,350  cavalry  and  7,920  infantry  troops  armed  in  the  State,  making  a  total 
armed  force  of  12,050. 

tLetter  of  Col.  T.  H.  Ellis  to  Gov.  Letcher,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  300,  301. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  113 

Jacob  Vickery,  was  sent  down  the  harbor  to  Craney 
Island  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  to  apprehend  the 
Baltimore  boat  supposed  to  have  on  board  a  number  of 
Federal  marines  for  the  Navy  Yard.  From  this  battery 
were  created  Huger's  Battery,  and  Company  H  16th 
Virginia  Infantry,  the  latter  being  reorganized  as  a 
light  battery  March  26,  1862.  In  May  of  that  year, 
when  Norfolk  was  evacuated,  these  batteries  were 
ordered  to  Petersburg,  where  they  were  rearmed,  and 
then  joined  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  having  had 
a  number  of  experiences  with  Federal  gunboats  while 
on  duty  about  Norfolk.* 

On  April  23,  Robert  E.  Lee  was  appointed  Major- 
General,  Virginia  Volunteers,  and  in  General  Orders 
No.  1  of  that  date,  assumed  command  of  the  military 
and  naval  forces  of  Virginia.  On  April  26,  Maj.-Gen. 
Jos.  E.  Johnston,  Virginia  Volunteers,  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  forces  gathering  about  Richmond, 
Maj.-Gen.  Walter  Gwynn,  to  the  command  of  those 
about  Norfolk,  and  on  the  28th,  Col.  Thomas  J.  Jackson 
relieved  Maj.-Gen.  Kenton  Harper,  in  command  of  the 
mobilization  camp  at  Harper's  Ferry. t  These  officers 
were  directed  to  receive,  and  to  muster  into  the  service 
such  organizations  as  might  volunteer.  Lieut. -Col. 
John  McCausland  was  also  sent  to  the  Kanawha  Valley, 
and  specially  directed  to  organize  a  light  battery,  for 
which  the  guns  would  be  forthcoming. 

At  this  time  there  was  but  one  light  battery,  mounted 
and  equipped  as  such,  in  the  field,  the  Governor  having 
ordered  the  newly  raised  Purcell  Battery  of  Richmond, 
in  command  of  Capt.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker,  with 
its  four  3-inch  Parrott  rifles,  to  Aquia  Creek,  early  in  the 
month.  This  battery  was  named  after  Mr.  Purcell  of 
Richmond  who,  when  hostilities  became  imminent,  had 
out  of  his  own  pocket  equipped  the  battery.  Its  first 

*Grimes'  Battery  was  given  2  iron  rifles,  making  6  pieces  in  all,  and  the 
Norfolk  Blues,  now  become  Grandy's  Battery,  was  given  2  3-inch  iron  rifles, 
2  12-pounder  brass  howitzers,  and  2  Napoleons. 

For  facts  about  Norfolk  Light  Artillery  Blues,  and  Portsmouth  Light 
Artillery,  see  History  of  Norfolk  County,  Virginia,  1861-65,  Porter,  pp.  38-247 

tSee  G.  O.  No.  3,  S.  O.  Nos.  2  and  7,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
783,  787.  Ibid.,  p.  788. 


114  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

captain  afterwards  became  Chief  of  Artillery,  Hill's 
Corps,  with  rank  of  brigadier-general.  Not  having 
been  formally  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  State,  it 
was  now  ordered  back  to  Richmond  to  refit  and  recruit, 
its  total  personnel  numbering  but  40  men. 

There  were  at  this  time  three  other  light  batteries 
being  drilled  and  equipped  in  Richmond.  The  old 
Fayette  Artillery  of  Richmond,  with  its  4  pieces,  (it 
was  named  in  honor  of  LaFayette,  having  had  its  origin 
about  the  time  of  his  visit  to  America),  was  fully  re 
cruited  by  its  Capt.  H.  C.  Cabell.*  The  Richmond 
Howitzers,  commanded  by  Capt.  Geo.  W.  Randolph, 
a  battery  which  had  been  raised  and  sent  to  Harper's 
Ferry  just  after  the  John  Brown  raid  in  1859,  had  on 
its  rolls  225  men,  and  Latham's  Lynchburg  Battery, 
with  4  pieces,  had  also  reported  for  duty  at  the  instruc 
tion  grounds  at  Richmond. 

Upon  the  suggestion  of  Capt.  Alexander,  Capt. 
Randolph  took  steps  to  organize  a  battalion  with  his 
surplus  men,  and  on  April  21,  the  First,  Second,  and 
Third  Companies  of  Richmond  Howitzers  were 
mustered  into  the  service  of  the  State  as  a  battalion, 
Randolph  being  appointed  its  major.  The  batteries 
were  commanded  by  Capts.  J.  C.  Shields,  J.  Thompson 
Brown,  and  R.  C.  Stanard,  respectively. 

There  were  now  in  the  State  6  light  batteries,  in  ad 
dition  to  the  Cadet  Battery,  which  had  arrived  in  Rich 
mond  with  the  Corps  from  Lexington ;  the  organization 
and  instruction  of  these  was  assigned  to  Col.  J.  B. 
Magruder,  but  recently  resigned  from  the  old  service. 
This  officer  had  commanded  the  regular  battery  at  the 
battle  of  Chapultapec,  in  which  Jackson  had  served 
with  such  gallantry  as  a  lieutenant.  He  was  an  accom 
plished  artilleryman  in  every  sense  of  the  word,  and 
well  qualified  to  perform  the  duty  assigned  him.  Im 
mediate  steps  were  taken  by  him  to  secure  the  356  horses 
necessary  to  complete  the  complement  of  the  light 
batteries,  and  the  saddles,  bridles,  halters,  picket  ropes, 

*He  subsequently  became  colonel,  and  commanded  a  battalion  of  artillery  in 
Longstreet's  Corps. 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  115 

girths,  blankets,  horseshoes,  and  forage,  which  the 
exigencies  of  the  moment  demanded.  He  also  urged  that 
10  cadets  be  detailed  to  drill  and  instruct  the  batteries, 
and  that  as  many  former  artillery  officers  of  the  service 
as  could  be  spared  should  be  ordered  to  report  to  him.* 
In  response  to  the  latter  request,  Capt.  E.  P.  Alex 
ander,  of  Georgia,  who  had  been  in  the  United  States 
Engineer  corps,  was  assigned  to  him  for  duty,  and  as 
sisted  by  a  large  detail  of  cadets  took  charge  of  the 
drilling  of  the  batteries. 

Early  in  May,  the  Second  and  Third  Companies  of 
Richmond  Howitzers,  under  Maj.  Randolph,  and 
Cabell's  Battery,  were  ordered  off  to  Yorktown  with 
Magruder,  leaving  the  entire  work  of  organization  to 
Alexander  and  the  cadets. 

There  were  at  this  time  enough  field  pieces  in  the 
State,  including  thirteen  3-inch  Parrott  rifles,  one  of 
which  was  in  possession  of  the  cadet  battery,  to  provide 
material  for  20  batteries,  though  the  necessary  harness, 
caissons,  and  equipment  were  entirely  lacking.  A  mini 
mum  of  1,000  horses  was  therefore  needed  in  addition 
to  those  already  provided  in  order  to  put  the  available 
guns  in  the  field. 

The  Ordinance  of  Secession  was  passed  April  17, 
1861.  Before  May  1,  not  only  had  the  Convention 
authorized  a  Provisional  Army  of  10,000  men,  but  ar 
rangements  were  made  to  call  out  50,000  volunteers  if 
necessary,  and  on  May  3  the  call  was  made  by  procla 
mation  of  the  Governor,  t 

That  the  Commander-in-Chief  intended  to  take  full 
advantage  of  the  available  field  artillery  material  is  evi 
denced  by  the  fact  that  on  the  day  this  proclamation  was 
issued  he  directed  Gen.  P.  St.  George  Cocke,  in  com 
mand  of  the  district  comprised  of  the  eighteen  Piedmont 
counties,  to  raise  8  light  batteries,  urging  Gen.  Ruggles, 
in  command  of  the  Northern  Neck  section,  to  raise  two4 

*Magruder  to  Adjutant-General,  April  29,  1861,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  789,  790. 

•^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  p.  797. 

JLetter  of  Gen.  Lee  to  Gen.  P.  St.  George  Cocke,  May  3,  1861,  Rebellion 
Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  p.  797,  and  letter  to  Gen.  Ruggles,  May  4,  1861,  Ibid., 
p.  803. 


116  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Col.  Jackson,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  had  already 
mustered  into  the  service  the  Rockbridge  Artillery,  a 
battery  armed  with  the  four  6-pounder  bronze  cadet 
guns,  from  Lexington,  but  possessing  no  regular 
caissons  or  equipment.*  He  had  also  raised  2  com 
panies  of  artillery  for  which  he  urged  that  horses,  ma 
terial,  and  equipment  be  sent,  as  well  as  2  extra  12- 
pounder  howitzers  and  caissons  for  the  Rockbridge 
battery,  t  Occupying  the  heights  along  the  Potomac, 
opposite  the  Point  of  Rocks,  Berlin,  and  Shepherds- 
town,  he  was  energetically  endeavoring  to  secure  heavy 
ordnance  to  defend  his  line,  convinced  that  the  enemy 
would  be  well  provided  therewith  in  addition  to  their 
field  guns,  some  of  which  he  thought  would  be  long 
range  rifled  pieces.^  Jackson's  frequent  references  to 
rifled  guns  and  his  constant  endeavor  to  secure  them 
show  plainly  what  his  estimate  of  their  value  was  even 
at  this  time.§ 

On  May  7,  the  Inspector- General,  Col.  J.  B. 
Baldwin,  was  authorized  and  directed  to  raise  6  batter 
ies  of  light  artillery,  of  4  guns  each,  from  among  the 
Southside  and  James  River  Valley  counties.  Thus, 
at  the  very  outset,  provision  was  made  for  the  raising 
and  equipping  of  25  or  more  light  batteries. 

Such  ability  had  Gen.  Lee  shown  in  the  organization 
and  arming  of  the  Virginia  troops,  and  so  confused  had 
the  Confederate  War  Department  become  with  its 
various  commanders,  that  on  May  10,  Gen.  Lee  was 
authorized  to  assume  control  of  all  Confederate  States 
troops  in  Virginia.lF  Up  to  this  time  the  contingents 
from  the  South,  arriving  in  the  State,  had  been  under 
the  sole  command  of  their  own  individual  leaders.  Some 
of  these  troops  had  to  be  partly  armed  by  the  State  of 
Virginia.  This  was  true  of  the  Washington  Artillery, 
the  gallant  battalion  of  4  companies  from  New  Orleans, 
which  arrived  in  Richmond  June  4,  with  but  six  6- 

"These  had  not  been  taken  to  Richmond  by  the  Cadet  Battery,  which  now 
had  iron  pieces. 

•^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  pp.  793-809. 

JIbid.,   pp.   823,   836. 

§See  references  in  Part  I. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  p.  827. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  117 

pounder  bronze  guns,  two  12-pounder  howitzers,  and 
one  8-pounder  rifled  piece,  and  with  a  personnel  of 
nearly  300  men  in  command  of  Maj.  J.  B.  Walton,  a 
veteran  of  the  Mexican  War. 

The  Act  of  May  10,  1861,  authorized  the  President 
to  muster  into  the  service  of  the  Confederate  States  any 
companies  of  light  artillery,  with  such  complement  of 
officers  as  he  might  see  fit,  and  encouragement  of  every 
kind  was  given  the  raising  of  batteries,  for  up  to  this 
time  little  had  been  accomplished  in  the  organization 
of  the  light  artillery.*  There  were  but  6  light  batteries 
actually  mounted  and  on  duty  in  the  field,  the  two 
batteries  of  the  Howitzer  Battalion  and  Cabell's 
Battery,  which  had  been  sent  to  Yorktown;  Walker's; 
Pendleton's,  and  Imboden's  batteries  which  were  with 
Jackson  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Most  of  the  batteries  which 
had  been  raised  were  yet  without  material,  horses,  and 
equipment,  t  Yet,  the  men  were  being  well  drilled  and 
disciplined.  Within  the  next  30  days,  however,  the  army 
of  40,000  men  which  Virginia  had  placed  in  the  field  in 
cluded  20  light  batteries  fully  equipped  and  mounted, 
with  4  guns  each,  and  a  total  personnel  of  near  2,500 
men.J  Up  to  this  time,  including  a  number  sent  to 
Missouri,  and  issued  to  troops  from  other  States,  Vir 
ginia  had  provided  115  pieces  of  field  ordnance. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  understand  to  some  extent 
what  Virginia  actually  turned  over  to  the  Confederacy 
in  the  way  of  artillery  material,  equipment  and  per 
sonnel  on  June  8,  1861,  when,  by  proclamation  of  the 
Governor,  her  entire  force  was  legally  transferred. 

*Report  of  Inspector  General,  May  23,  1861,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I, 
Vol.  II,  p.  808. 

tEven  the  Richmond  Howitzers  were  much  disorganized  by  the  necessity  of 
using  their  horses  for  videttes,  there  being  little  cavalry  with  Magruder. 

JIbid.,  pp.  885,  893. 


CHAPTER  V 

ACTIVE   OPERATIONS   COMMENCE:      BIG   BETHEL   AND 
HAINESVILLE 

ALREADY,  on  the  14th  of  May,  at  Gloucester  Point, 
a  section  of  Brown's  Battery  of  the  Howitzer  Battalion, 
in  an  affair  with  the  Federal  gunboat  "Yankee,"  had 
fired  the  first  shot  of  the  field  artillery  in  Virginia.  And, 
now,  on  the  very  day  on  which  the  Virginia  troops  were 
transferred  to  the  Confederacy,  it  was  to  engage  in  a 
brush  with  the  enemy  on  land.  Being  informed  that  a 
marauding  party  was  operating  along  Back  River, 
Magruder  ordered  a  small  detachment  of  infantry  and 
one  gun  of  Maj.  Randolph's  Battalion  from  the  lines 
to  drive  the  raiders  off,  a  single  howitzer  shell  sufficing 
to  disperse  the  plunderers.  Two  days  later,  June  10,  oc 
curred  the  battle  of  Big  Bethel,  in  which  the  artillery, 
armed  with  a  3-inch  Parrott  rifle  and  a  number  of  12- 
pounder  howitzers,  received  its  real  baptism. 

The  Union  force,  consisting  of  between  2,500  and 
3,500  men  actually  engaged,  included  a  section  of  a 
regular  battery  with  two  6-pounder  S.  B.  guns,  com 
manded  by  Lieut.  John  T.  Greble.*  The  Confederate 
force  engaged  numbered  about  1,200  men  with  5  guns. 
Advancing  boldly  against  the  position  which  Maj. 
Randolph  had  prepared  for  his  guns,  the  enemy  were 
fired  upon  at  9:15  A.  M.^  the  fight  opening  with  the  dis 
charge  of  a  Parrott  rifle.  Greble  promptly  replied  with 
his  guns,  but  his  fire  was  wild  and  ineffective,  and  was 
soon  silenced  by  the  more  accurate  rifles  of  the  Confed 
erates.  About  11  o'clock  a  fresh  Federal  regiment  ar 
rived  on  the  field,  having  dragged  another  gun  with 
great  labor  from  Hampton.  With  this  piece  Lieut. 
Greble  heroically  sought  to  stem  the  pursuit,  but  had 
fired  not  more  than  a  dozen  shots  when  he  was  killed  and 

*Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  II,  p.  148,  and  Report  of  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  in  "The 
Confederate  Soldier  in  the  Civil  War,"  p.  36. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  119 

the  gun  abandoned,  both  it  and  the  body  of  the  young 
officer  being  gallantly  rescued  by  Capt.  Wilson  and  his 
company  of  the  Second  New  York. 

In  this  affair  the  effect  of  Randolph's  guns  was  more 
startling,  perhaps,  than  destructive,  the  Federal  loss 
being  only  18  killed  and  53  wounded.  But  greatly  ex 
aggerated  reports  were  at  once  circulated  about  the  ac 
curacy  and  power  of  the  new  Parrott  rifle,  which  led  to 
its  more  general  introduction  in  the  two  armies.  The 
fact  remains,  however,  that  Randolph's  guns  were  well 
served,  and  whether  by  superiority  in  number  or  in  other 
respects,  had  completely  overwhelmed  the  regular 
battery  opposed  to  them.  This  fact  brought  great 
prestige  to  the  Confederate  field  artillery,  and  did  much 
to  arouse  enthusiasm  for,  and  create  interest  in,  the 
"long  arm." 

The  report  of  Maj.  Randolph  of  the  part  played  by 
his  command  in  this  engagement  is  so  intensely  interest 
ing,  and  so  full  of  information  as  to  the  defects  of 
his  artillery  material,  and  so  conclusive  of  the  manner 
of  handling  the  guns,  as  well  as  of  the  real  effect  of  the 
fire  of  the  new  rifled  field  pieces,  employed  for  the  first 
time  at  Bethel,  that  it  is  given  almost  in  full,  especially 
as  it  was  written  almost  immediately  after  the  affair  and 
before  the  facts  could  be  unconsciously  perverted  by  the 
trickery  of  time.  To  an  artilleryman,  nothing  could  be 
more  interesting. 

"YORKTOWN,  June   12,   1861. 

"COLONEL — I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  in  the  action  of  the 
10th  instant,  the  Howitzer  battalion  under  my  command  fired  18 
solid  shot  and  80  shells,  spherical,  case,  and  canister,  and  was 
injured  in  the  following  particulars:  A  lieutenant  and  2  privates 
were  wounded,  one  severely  and  2  slightly;  5  horses  and  3  mules 
were  killed  or  disabled;  the  Parrott  gun  (iron  rifled)  had  its 
linstock  splintered,  and  a  musket  ball  passed  through  the  felloe  of 
the  left  wheel;  a  musket  ball  pierced  the  corner  plate  and  the 
partition  of  the  limber  chest  of  one  of  the  howitzers,  and  lodged 
against  a  shell;  two  poles  of  caissons,  one  set  of  swinglebars,  one 
large  pointing  ring,  a  chain  for  a  rammer,  and  several  priming  wires 
were  broken,  and  one  of  the  howitzers  was  spiked  by  the  breaking 
of  a  priming  wire  in  its  vent. 


120  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

"As  the  position  of  the  pieces  was  under  your  own  observation, 
it  is  only  necessary  to  state  that  the  Parrott  gun  and  one  howitzer 
were  posted  in  the  battery  immediately  on  the  right  of  the  road 
leading  to  Hampton;  that  a  howitzer  was  placed  in  the  battery 
erected  on  the  right  beyond  the  ravine,  through  which  a  passway 
was  made  for  the  purpose  of  withdrawing  the  piece  if  necessary; 
a  howitzer  was  posted  near  the  bridge;  the  rifled  howitzer  was 
placed  on  the  left  of  the  road  behind  the  right  of  a  redoubt  erected 
by  the  North  Carolina  Regiment,,  and  a  howitzer  was  posted  in  the 
rear  of  the  road  leading  from  Halfway  House,  a  howitzer  having 
been  previously  sent  to  the  Halfway  House  under  the  command  of 
Lieut.  Moseley. 

"Early  in  the  action,  the  howitzer  in  the  battery  on  the  right, 
having  been  spiked  by  the  breaking  of  the  priming  wire,  was  with 
drawn  from  the  position,  and  the  infantry  supporting  it  fell  back 
upon  the  church;  but  it  was  subsequently  replaced  by  the  howitzer 
of  Lieut.  Moseley,  which  arrived  at  a  later  period  of  the  action. 

"The  ford  on  the  left  being  threatened,  the  howitzer  at  the  bridge 
was  withdrawn  and  sent  to  that  point,  and  the  rifled  howitzer  was 
withdrawn  from  the  left  of  the  road  and  sent  to  assist  in  the 
protection  of  the  rear.  The  same  disposition  was  subsequently 
made  of  the  howitzer  at  the  main  battery,  situated  immediately  on 
the  right  of  the  road. 

"The  enemy  came  in  sight  on  the  road  leading  from  Hampton  a 
few  minutes  before  9  o'clock  A.  M.,  and  their  advance  guard  halted 
at  a  house  on  the  roadside  about  600  yards  in  front  of  our  main 
battery.  Fire,  however,  was  not  opened  upon  them  for  10  or  15 
minutes,  when,  from  the  number  of  bayonets  visible  in  the  road,  we 
judged  that  a  heavy  column  was  within  range.  The  action  then 
commenced  by  a  shot  from  the  Parrott  gun,  aimed  by  myself,  which 
struck  the  center  of  the  road  a  short  distance  in  front  of  their 
column,  and  probably  did  good  execution  in  its  ricochet.  At  no  time 
could  we  see  the  bodies  of  the  men  in  the  column,  and  our  fire  was 
directed  at  their  bayonets,  their  position  being  obscured  by  the 
shade  of  the  woods  on  their  right,  and  two  small  houses  on  their 
left  and  somewhat  in  advance  of  them.  Our  fire  was  immediately 
returned  by  a  battery  near  the  head  of  their  column,  but  concealed 
by  the  woods  and  the  houses  so  effectually  that  we  only  ascer 
tained  its  position  by  the  flash  of  the  pieces.  The  fire  was  main 
tained  on  our  side  for  some  time  by  the  5  pieces  posted  in  front 
of  our  position;  but,  as  already  stated,  one  of  them  being  spiked 
and  another  withdrawn  to  protect  the  ford  early  in  the  action,  the 
fire  was  continued  with  the  3  pieces,  and  at  no  time  did  we  after 
wards  have  more  than  3  pieces  playing  upon  the  enemy.  The  fire 
on  our  part  was  deliberate,  and  was  suspended  whenever  masses 
of  the  enemy  were  not  within  range,  and  the  execution  was  good, 
as  I  afterwards  ascertained  by  a  personal  inspection  of  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  121 

principal  position  of  the  enemy.  The  cannonade  lasted  with 
intervals  of  suspension  from  a  few  minutes  before  9  o'clock  A.  M., 
until  1 :30  o'clock  p.  M.,  and  the  fact  that  during  this  time  but  98 
shot  were  fired  by  us  tends  to  show  that  the  firing  was  not  too 
rapid.  The  earthworks  thrown  up  by  the  battalion  were  struck 
several  times  by  the  cannon  shot  of  the  enemy,  but  no  injury  was 
sustained.  They  fired  upon  us  with  shot,  shell,  spherical  case, 
canister,  and  grape  from  6-  to  12-pounders,  at  a  distance  of  about 
600  yards,  but  the  only  injury  received  from  their  artillery  was 
the  loss  of  one  mule. 

"We  found  in  front  of  our  main  battery,  in  and  near  the  yard 
of  the  small  house  already  mentioned,  5  killed  and  one  mortally 
wounded  by  the  fire  of  our  artillery.  We  heard  of  2  others  killed 
at  Crandall's,  about  a  mile  from  us,  and  have  reason  to  believe 
there  were  many  others.  The  injury  done  to  our  artillery  was  from 
the  fire  of  musketry  on  our  left  flank,  the  ground  on  that  side 
between  us  and  the  enemy  sinking  down  so  as  to  expose  us  over  the 
top  of  the  breastwork  erected  by  the  North  Carolina  Regiment. 

"After  some  intermission  of  the  assault  in  front,  apparently  a 
reenforcement  or  reserve  made  its  appearance  on  the  Hampton 
road,  and  pressed  forward  towards  the  bridge  carrying  the  United 
States  flag  near  the  head  of  the  column.  As  the  road  had  been 
clear  for  some  time,  and  our  flanks  and  rear  had  been  threatened, 
the  howitzer  in  the  main  battery  had  been  sent  to  the  rear,  and  our 
fire  did  not  at  first  check  them.  I  hurried  a  howitzer  forward  from 
the  rear,  loaded  it  with  canister,  and  prepared  to  sweep  the  ap 
proach  to  the  bridge,  but  the  fire  of  the  Parrott  gun  again  drove 
them  back.  The  howitzer  brought  from  the  Halfway  House  by 
Lieut.  Moseley  arriving  most  opportunely,  I  carried  it  to  the 
battery  on  the  right  to  replace  the  disabled  piece.  On  getting 
there,  I  learned  from  the  infantry  that  a  small  house  in  front  was 
occupied  by  sharpshooters,  and  saw  the  body  of  a  Carolinian  lying 
30  yards  in  front  of  the  battery,  who  had  been  killed  in  a  most 
gallant  attempt  to  burn  the  house. 

"I  opened  upon  the  house  with  shell  for  the  purpose  of  burning 
it,  and  the  battery  of  the  enemy  in  the  Hampton  road,  being  on  the 
line  with  it,  and  supposing  probably  that  the  fire  was  at  them, 
immediately  returned  it  with  solid  shot.  This  disclosed  their  posi 
tion  and  enabled  me  to  fire  at  the  house  and  at  their  battery  at  the 
same  time.  After  an  exchange  of  5  or  6  shots,  a  shell  entered  a 
window  of  the  house,  increased  the  fire  already  kindled  until  it 
soon  broke  out  into  a  light  blaze,  and,  as  I  have  reason  to  believe, 
disabled  one  of  the  enemy's  pieces.  This  was  the  last  shot  fired. 
They  soon  afterward  retreated,  and  we  saw  no  more  of  them. 

"The  action  disclosed  some  serious  defects  in  our  ammunition 
and  equipment,  for  which  I  earnestly  recommend  an  immediate 
remedy.  The  shell  of  the  Parrott  gun  have  a  fixed  wooden  fuse 


122  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

which  cannot  be  extricated,,  the  shortest  being  cut  for  four  seconds. 
The  consequence  was  that  the  shells  burst  far  in  the  rear  of  the 
enemy  and  served  merely  as  solid  shot.  Had  they  been  plugged 
and  uncut  fuses  furnished,  I  think  that  our  fire  would  have  been 
much  more  effective.  The  power  and  precision  of  the  piece, 
demonstrated  by  the  30  rounds  fired  from  it,  render  it  very 
desirable  that  all  of  its  advantages  should  be  made  available.  I, 
therefore,  respectfully  suggest  that  the  shell  be  hereafter  furnished 
plugged  and  the  fuses  left  uncut. 

"It  is  reported  to  me  that  the  Borman  fuses  used  by  one  of  the 
howitzers  were  defective,  the  shells  cut  for  5  seconds  exploding  as 
soon  as  those  cut  for  2. 

"The  caissons  of  the  Navy  howitzers  were  made  by  placing 
ammunition  chests  upon  the  running  gear  of  common  wagons,  and 
the  play  of  the  front  axles  is  so  limited  that  the  caisson  cannot  be 
turned  in  the  ordinary  roads  of  this  part  of  the  country,  and 
wherever  the  road  is  ditched,  or  the  woods  impassable,  it  cannot 
be  reversed.  There  is  also  great  danger  of  breaking  the  poles  in 
turning  the  caisson  quickly,  as  was  shown  in  the  action  of  the  10th 
inst.  I  am  aware  that  the  expedient  of  using  wagon  bodies  was 
resorted  to  in  order  to  save  time,  but,  as  it  might  lead  to  great 
disaster,  I  recommend  that  their  places  be  supplied  as  speedily  as 
possible  with  those  made  in  the  usual  way. 

"The  small  size  of  the  limber  of  the  howitzer  (Navy)  renders 
it  impossible  to  mount  the  men,  and  the  pieces  cannot  move  faster 
than  the  cannoneers  can  walk.  In  a  recent  skirmish  with  the 
enemy,  in  which  we  pursued  them  rapidly,  we  could  only  carry 
2  men,  and  having  gotten  far  ahead  of  the  others  we  had  to  un- 
limber  and  fire  with  only  2  cannoneers  at  the  piece.  The  piece 
having  only  2  horses,  and  the  carriages  being  very  light,  it  is 
hazardous  to  mount  any  person  on  the  limber.  I,  therefore,  recom 
mend  that  4  horses  be  furnished  to  each  Navy  howitzer,  one  for  the 
chief  and  the  other  three  for  the  men  usually  mounted  on  the  limber. 

"We  have  succeeded  since  the  action  in  unspiking  the  howitzer 
disabled  by  the  breaking  of  the  priming  wire,  but,  from  the 
inferior  metal  used  in  making  our  priming  wires,  we  shall  have  to 
lay  them  aside  altogether,  and  I  must  request  that  better  ones  be 
furnished.  At  present  I  can  say  nothing  more  of  the  conduct  of 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  battalion  than  to  express  the  high  grati 
fication  afforded  me  by  their  courage,  coolness,  and  precision,  and 
to  ask  permission  at  a  future  time  to  call  your  attention  to 
individual  instances  of  gallantry  and  good  conduct.  I  have  re 
quested  the  commandants  of  companies  to  furnish  me  with  the 
names  of  such  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates  as  they  think 
especially  worthy  of  notice. 

"I  am  happy  at  having  an  opportunity  to  render  my  acknowl 
edgment  to  Col.  Hill,  the  commandant  of  the  North  Carolina 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  123 

Regiment,  for  the  useful  suggestions  which  his  experience  as  an 
artillery  officer  enabled  him  to  make  to  me  during  the  action,  and 
to  bear  testimony  to  the  gallantry  and  discipline  of  that  portion  of 
his  command  with  which  I  was  associated  The  untiring  industry 
of  his  regiment  in  intrenching  our  position  enabled  us  to  defeat 
the  enemy,  with  a  nominal  loss  on  our  side."* 

In  his  report  of  the  engagement,  Gen.  Magruder 
wrote:  "Whilst  it  might  appear  invidious  to  speak 
particularly  of  any  regiment  or  corps  where  all  behaved 
so  well,  I  am  compelled  to  express  my  great  apprecia 
tion  of  the  skill  and  gallantry  of  Maj.  Randolph  and 
his  Howitzer  batteries,"  and  D.  H.  Hill  wrote:  "I  can 
not  close  this  too  elaborate  report  without  speaking  in 
the  highest  terms  of  admiration  of  the  Howitzer 
batteries,  and  their  most  accomplished  commander, 
Maj.  Randolph.  He  has  no  superior  as  an  artillerist  in 
any  country,  and  his  men  displayed  the  utmost  skill  and 
coolness. "f  Neither  Magruder  nor  Hill  were  ordinarily 
given  to  such  expressions,  both  being  officers  of  ex 
perience  in  the  old  service. 

Before  the  first  of  July,  the  various  forces  assembled 
at  Norfolk,  Yorktown,  Richmond,  Harper's  Ferry,  and 
other  points,  had  begun  to  show  the  results  of  the 
strenuous  efforts  which  had  been  made  to  organize,  arm 
and  equip  them,  and  some  of  the  commands  were  at 
taining  to  a  degree  of  mobility  approaching  effective 
ness. 

May  23,  Col.  Jackson  was  superseded  in  command  at 
Harper's  Ferry  by  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston. 
The  force  there  gathered,  consisting  of  troops  from 
many  sections  of  the  South,  was  promptly  reorganized 
into  brigades,  as  nearly  as  possible  according  to  States, 
the  whole  assuming  the  name  of  the  Army  of  the  Shen- 
andoah.J  Col.  Jackson,  who  was  soon  promoted  to 
brigadier-general,  was  assigned  November  4  to  the 
command  of  the  Virginia  Brigade.  To  this  brigade  was 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  pp.  98-101. 

fMajor  George  W.  Randolph  was  a  graduate  of  Annapolis,  and  had  served 
in  the  U.  S.  Navy.  He  was  soon  appointed  Colonel  and  Chief  of  Artillery  on 
Magruder's  staff ;  and  later  became  Secretary  of  War,  C.  S.  A. 

JThe  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  was  really  the  Second  Corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac. 


124  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

very  naturally  attached  the  Rockbridge  Artillery  from 
Lexington,  in  command  of  Capt.  Pendleton,  a  graduate 
of  West  Point,  who  had  for  years  been  the  Episcopal 
minister  of  his  town,  and  an  intimate  friend  of  Jackson 
while  the  latter  was  a  professor  at  the  Virginia  Military 
Institute. 

About  the  time  the  Cadet  Corps  was  ordered  to  Rich 
mond  to  drill  the  troops  gathering  there,  the  Rockbridge 
Battery  was  raised  and  soon  ordered  to  Harper's  Ferry, 
being  given  the  old  bronze  6-pounder  guns  of  the  cadet 
battery,  the  Corps  having  taken  with  it  other  pieces,  in 
cluding  the  3-inch  Parrott  rifle,  with  which  Jackson  had 
obtained  such  surprising  results  in  Lexington  the  year 
before.*  For  caissons,  the  Rockbridge  Battery  con 
structed  large  chests  on  the  running  parts  of  hay 
wagons,  the  cadets  having  taken  all  the  material  of  their 
battery  except  the  guns. 

The  history  of  the  cadet  battery  which  had  afforded 
instruction  to  so  many  artillery  officers  of  the  Confeder 
ate  Army,  and  the  guns  which  were  now  to  be  used  in 
battle,  is  so  full  of  interest  that  it  should  be  given  here. 

In  1850,  the  Ad  jut  ant- General  of  the  State  ordered 
the  Corps  of  Cadets  to  Richmond  as  the  personal  escort 
of  President  Taylor  on  the  occasion  of  the  laying  of  the 
corner-stone  of  the  Washington  Monument.  So  im 
pressed  was  the  old  soldier  with  the  bearing  of  the 
cadets,  that  he  ordered  a  field  battery  of  four  6-pounder 
guns  and  two  12-pounder  howitzers  to  be  cast  of  bronze, 
somewhat  lighter  than  ordinary  service  pieces,  with  the 
arms  of  the  State  of  Virginia  thereon,  and  to  be  pre 
sented  to  the  Cadet  Corps.  This  beautiful  battery, 
known  as  the  "Cadet  Battery,"  is  still  used  for  artillery 
instruction  at  the  Institute.  With  it  a  large  number  of 
the  Confederate  artillery  officers  of  note  were  trained 
between  1851  and  1861. 

After  Bull  Run,  the  Rockbridge  Artillery  was  issued 
rifled  pieces  captured  in  the  battle,  and  the  cadet  guns 
were  returned  to  Lexington.  In  the  meantime,  how- 

*See  Part  I. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  125 

ever,  the  two  12-pounder  howitzers  of  the  battery  had 
been  issued  to  Milledge's  Battery,  one  of  which  was 
later  lost  in  the  Potomac*  on  the  retreat  from  An- 
tietam.  The  remaining  5  pieces  were  captured  by 
Gen.  D.  H.  Hunter  in  June,  1864,  when  he  destroyed 
the  Institute,  and  were  carried  off  by  him  as  trophies  of 
war,  but  were  returned  to  the  Corps  completely  re 
mounted  and  refitted  by  Secretary  Stanton,  in  1865, 
upon  the  ardent  solicitation  of  Gen.  Smith,  the  Superin 
tendent.  This  battery  is  now  undoubtedly  the  oldest 
in  actual  use  in  the  United  States. 

When  on  June  15,  Johnston  withdrew  from  Harper's 
Ferry  to  Winchester,  he  left  Jackson  at  the  front 
along  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  to  observe  Patter 
son's  preparations.  It  was  not  long  before  the  opposing 
forces  came  into  contact  near  Martinsburg,  and  at 
Hainesville,  a  fight  occurred  on  July  2.  So  well  did 
Capt.  Pendleton  handle  one  of  the  old  cadet  guns  that 
the  reputation  which  had  been  acquired  by  the  field 
batteries  at  Bethel,  at  once  attached  to  the  Rockbridge 
Artillery.  In  a  letter  to  a  home  paper  describing  the 
affair,  Pendleton  wrote: 

"Col.  Jackson,  with  his  staff,  rode  back  to  the  point  in  the  road 
occupied  by  my  gun,,  and  directed  me  to  withdraw  it  further  back 
to  the  rear,  to  a  point  better  situated.  Meantime,  the  enemy  began 
to  ply  their  artillery  with  vigor,  firing  around  our  little  force  a 
number  of  balls  and  shells.  We,  however,  quietly  took  our  posi 
tion  and  awaited  the  best  moment  for  opening  fire  with  our  single 
gun  (the  only  one  present).  That  moment  arrived  when  I  saw  a 
body  of  horse,  which  seemed  to  be  a  squadron  of  cavalry  about  to 
charge  on  the  turnpike  about  a  half  mile  in  front  of  our  position. 
At  that  body  I  instantly  had  the  gun  directed,  with  careful  in 
structions  how  it  should  be  aimed.  In  another  instant  the  messenger 
of  death  was  speeding  on  its  way.  The  effect  was  obvious  and 
decided.  Not  a  man  or  a  horse  remained  standing  in  the  road,  nor 
did  we  see  them  again.  .  .  .  Our  next  shot  was  aimed  with 
equal  care  at  one  of  their  cannon,  in  a  field  on  the  left  of  the  road. 
The  effect  was  scarcely  less.  The  gunners  scattered,  and  I  am  sure 
that  gun  fired  no  more.  David  Moore,  of  Lexington,  fired  our 
first  gun,  and  J.  I..  Massie  loaded  it.  The  order  from  Richmond 

*Its  mate  has  been  used  as  the  evening  gun  at  the  Institute  since  1865.  For 
loss  of  the  howitzer  see  Gen.  Pendleton's  report  to  Gen.  Lee,  September  24,  1862, 
Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  p.  223.  Also  Rebellion  Records. 


126  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

promoting  Col.  Jackson  to  a  brigadiership  has  just  arrived.  He 
richly  deserves  it.  His  part  the  day  of  the  fight,,  as  heretofore, 
was  admirably  performed.  The  enemy  speak  admiringly  of  our 
artillery  firing  of  that  morning;  they  ascribe  it  all  to  4  rifled 
cannon,  although  we  fired  8  shot  from  a  common  (smooth-bore) 
6-pounder." 

Thus  it  is  seen  that  one  of  the  cadet  guns  fired  the 
first  shot  in  the  Valley,  and,  that  the  Federal  troops 
were  looking  for  the  terrible  rifled  guns,  of  which  they 
had  recently  heard  so  much,  as  well  as  for  masked 
batteries,  on  every  hillside,  the  press  of  the  country 
echoing  with  terrifying  accounts  of  these  objects  of  the 
popular  imagination. 


CHAPTER  VI 

BLACKBURN'S  FORD  AND  FIRST  MANASSAS 

IN  the  meantime  the  troops  which  had  been  assembled 
and  drilled  at  Richmond  were  ordered  to  Manassas 
Junction.  At  this  point  they  were  organized,  June  20, 
into  a  corps  of  6  brigades,  and  placed  under  Beauregard 
as  commander  of  the  1st  Corps  or  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  independent  of  the  2d  Corps  or  Army  of  the 
Shenandoah,  in  the  Valley. 

July  13  Capt.  Pendleton  was  appointed  Chief  of 
Artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  with  rank  of 
colonel,  under  authority  of  the  original  act  creating  the 
Artillery  Corps  of  the  Confederacy.  He  was  thus  from 
this  time  the  senior  artillery  officer  of  the  Army.  His 
abilities  as  an  organizer  were  well  known  to  Gens. 
Johnston  and  Lee,  and  Mr.  Davis,  with  all  of  whom  he 
had  been  a  cadet  for  several  years  at  West  Point.*  His 
appointment,  however,  since  he  had  held  only  the  rank 
of  captain,  was  not  made  without  misgivings,  for  the 
gallant  Maj.  J.  B.  Walton,  of  Louisiana,  had  been 
mustered  into  the  service  with  his  battalion  with  the 
rank  given  him  by  his  State,  and  it  was  feared  lest  this 
officer  and  his  command  might  consider  the  elevation  of 
Pendleton  as  a  slight  upon  themf  As  stated  before, 
this  led  to  the  recommendation  on  the  part  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  that  additional  field-officers  in  the  Corps  of 
Artillery  be  authorized  by  Congress,  which  was  done 
the  following  January. 

Upon  being  made  Chief  of  Artillery,  Col.  Pendleton 
at  once  assigned  the  batteries  of  his  corps  to  brigades 
as  follows: 

Pendleton's,  or  the  Rockbridge  Battery,  4  pieces,  re 
mained  with  the  1st  or  Jackson's  Brigade;  Alburtis' 

*Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  Lee,  pp.  146,  147. 

tSee  letter  of  Secretary  of  War  to  the  President,  November  30,  1861,  Rebellion 
Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  761. 


128  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Wise  Battery,  4  pieces,  to  the  2d  or  Bartow's  Brigade ; 
Imboden's  Staunton  Battery,  4  pieces,  to  the  3d  or 
Bee's  Brigade;  and  Groves'  Culpeper  Battery,  4 
pieces,  commanded  by  Lieut.  Beckham,  to  the  4th  or 
Elzey's  Brigade.  Later  Stanard's  Thomas  Battery 
joined  the  2d  Corps. 

The  Artillery  was  not  to  wait  long  for  a  chance 
to  test  its  metal,  for  on  the  18th  of  July  the  Federal 
force  resumed  its  slow  advance,  reaching  Blackburn's 
Ford,  where  2  guns  of  the  Washington  Artillery  were 
brought  into  action  against  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which 
promptly  withdrew.  In  the  meantime,  Richardson's 
Brigade  had  gained  close  contact  with  Longstreet,  who 
occupied  the  opposite  bank  of  the  stream.  Both  bri 
gades  withdrew  in  more  or  less  disorder,  and  were 
rallied  and  led  back  with  some  difficulty,  a  few  of  Long- 
street's  men,  after  much  wavering,  finally  crossing  the 
stream  and  gaining  a  slight  advantage  over  the  enemy, 
who  endeavored  to  withdraw.  At  this  point  a  sharp 
artillery  duel,  lasting  about  forty-five  minutes,  occurred. 
The  Federals  engaged  8  guns,  two  20-pounder  and  two 
10-pounder  Parrott  rifles,  two  6-pounder  guns  and  two 
12-pounder  howitzers,  which  fired  415  rounds.  Long- 
street  brought  up  7  guns,  four  6-pounders,  and  three  of 
the  converted  rifles,  which  fired  310  rounds  of  the  new 
Burton  and  Archer  projectiles,  all  these  pieces  being 
from  the  Washington  Artillery.*  One  of  the  brass  6- 
pounders  soon  became  useless  on  account  of  an  enlarged 
vent,  and  the  new  ammunition  used  by  the  rifles  was 
entirely  ineffective,  although  most  favorable  reports 
were  made  about  it  at  the  time  by  the  inexperienced 
officers  who  conducted  the  fire.f  During  the  first  part 
of  the  duel  both  sides  fired  wildly,  almost  at  random, 
neither  being  able  to  see  much  of  the  other  on  account 
of  the  screens  of  trees  which  the  opposing  guns  had 
sought.  But,  after  a  pause,  the  Federal  guns  reopened 

*In  Camp  and  Battle  ivith  the  Washington  Artillery,  Owen,  pp.  27-28. 
Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.  24. 

tThe  first  competent  test  of  these  projectiles  a  few  weeks  later  showed  them 
to  be  worthless,  and  their  manufacture  was  discontinued.  They  would  not  fly 
point  foremost,  but  tumbled  and  had  no  range. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    EDWARD    PORTER   ALEXANDER 
CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY,  FIRST  CORPS 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  129 

with  better  effect,  having  taken  advantage  of  the  lull  to 
better  determine  the  position  and  range  of  Longstreet's 
guns,  and  soon  practically  silenced  them.  Capt.  Eshle- 
man,  commanding  one  of  the  batteries,  was  wounded 
along  with  4  enlisted  men,  another  being  killed,  where 
upon  Capt.  Squires,  calling  for  reinforcements,  was 
ordered  by  Longstreet,  who  had  no  more  artillery,  to 
withdraw  the  guns  gradually,  one  at  a  time,  covering 
the  movement  by  the  fire  of  the  pieces  remaining  in 
position. 

The  Confederate  Artillery  was  undoubtedly  over 
matched  in  this  affair,  yet,  at  the  very  moment  of  its 
withdrawal,  the  Federal  batteries,  which  had  suffered 
a  loss  of  but  2  killed  and  2  wounded,  ceased  firing,  al 
lowing  Capt.  Squires  the  honor  of  the  last  shot.  It  was 
this  fact,  perhaps,  which  gave  credence  to  the  report 
that  Longstreet's  guns  had  prevailed  and  upon  such  a 
belief  Beauregard  wrote  in  his  official  account  of  the 
affair : 

"Our  artillery  was  manned  and  officered  by  those  who,  but 
yesterday,  were  called  from  the  civil  avocations  of  a  busy  city. 
They  were  matched  with  the  picked  artillery  of  the  Federal 
regular  army,, — Company  E,  Third  Artillery,  under  Capt.  Ayres, 
with  an  armament,  as  their  own  chief  of  artillery  admits,  of  two 
10-pounder  rifled  Parrott  guns,  two  12-pounder  Parrott  rifled  guns, 
two  12-pounder  howitzers,  and  two  6-pounder  pieces,  aided  by  two 
20-pounder  Parrott  rifled  guns  of  Company  G,  Fifth  Artillery, 
under  Lieut.  Benjamin.  Thus  matched,  they  drove  their  veteran 
adversaries  from  the  field,  giving  confidence  in  and  promise  of  the 
coming  efficiency  of  this  brilliant  arm  of  the  service." 

From  Beauregard' s  account  one  would  hardly  derive 
a  proper  understanding  of  the  comparative  effect  of  the 
fire  of  the  batteries  engaged  in  this  opening  duel,  and  it 
is  no  disparagement  to  the  Washington  Artillery  to  say 
that  the  report  is  an  exaggeration,  conscientious  though 
it  may  have  been.  Against  such  an  armament  as  the 
enemy  possessed,  the  actual  result  was  to  be  expected. 
But  Beauregard  was  quite  correct  in  saying,  "The 
skill,  the  conduct  and  soldierly  qualities  of  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery  engaged  were  all  that  could  be  desired. 


130  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  officers  and  men  attached  to  the  7  pieces  already 
specified  won  for  their  battalion  a  distinction  which,  I 
feel  assured,  will  never  be  tarnished,  and  which  will 
ever  serve  to  urge  them  and  their  corps  to  high  en 
deavor." 

In  the  1st  Corps,  Maj.  Walton,  Acting  Chief  of 
Artillery,  assigned  his  batteries  on  July  21  as  follows, 
in  which  order  they  served  at  Bull  Run: 

First,  or  Bonham's  Brigade,  Shields'  1st  Co.  Rich 
mond  Howitzers,  and  Kemper's  Alexandria  Battery,  of 
4  and  2  pieces,  respectively;  2d,  or  Swell's  Brigade,  1 
battery  of  Washington  Artillery,  4  pieces;  3d,  or 
Jones'  Brigade,  1  section  Washington  Artillery,  2 
pieces;  4th,  or  Longstreet's  Brigade,  1  section  of 
Washington  Artillery,  2  pieces;  5th,  or  Cocke's  Bri 
gade,  Latham's  Lynchburg  Battery,  4  pieces;  6th,  or 
Early's  Brigade,  1  battery  Washington  Artillery,  3 
pieces;  7th,  or  Evans'  demi-brigade,  Rogers'  Loudoun 
Battery,  4  pieces;  1  battery  of  Washington  Artillery 
held  in  reserve,  a  total  of  27  pieces.* 

In  order  to  describe  the  part  of  the  Confederate 
Artillery  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  discuss  the  movements  of  the  two  armies  leading  up 
to  the  affair,  but  only  to  show  in  what  manner  the  guns 
were  employed.  About  6  A.  M.,  July  21,  Tyler's  Fed 
eral  Division  approached  Evans'  force  holding  the 
Stone  Bridge,  and  opened  fire  with  a  30-pounder 
Parrott  rifle,  soon  followed  by  that  of  several  other 
pieces  from  the  hills  about  a  half-mile  north  of  the  run, 
to  which  Evans  made  no  reply.  It  not  appearing  that 
Tyler  intended  to  advance  immediately,  Gens.  Johnston 
and  Beauregard,  with  their  staffs,  made  a  reconnaissance 
to  the  right  in  the  direction  of  Mitchell's  Ford  about 
8  A.  M.  About  8:45  A.  M.  Capt.  Alexander,  the  signal 
officer,  discovered  by  the  reflection  of  the  sun  from  a 
brass  field  gun  the  advance  of  a  heavy  flanking  column 
on  the  left,  at  Sudley,  8  miles  from  his  station,  on  the 

*Beauregard's  Report,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  pp.  440,  441,  but 
see  p.  480. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  131 

right  of  the  Confederate  line  near  McLean's  Ford,  and 
immediately  informed  Evans  that  his  left  was  being 
turned  about  two  miles  from  the  bridge,  and  sent  a 
prompt  warning  to  Beauregard.*  Leaving  4  compa 
nies  in  front  of  Tyler's  Division  behind  the  bridge, 
Evans  immediately  dispatched  his  remaining  6  com 
panies  to  his  left  to  oppose  the  flanking  column  of  the 
enemy,  and  check  it  until  reinforcements  could  be 
brought  up,  informing  Gen.  Cocke  on  his  right  of  the 
movement.  Bee's  four  regiments,  Hampton's  one,  Jack 
son's  five,  with  an  average  distance  of  three  miles  to  go, 
were  ordered  from  near  the  center  of  the  line  to  proceed 
rapidly  to  the  left  in  support  of  Evans.  For  the  next 
half-hour  while  the  turning  column  was  resting  at 
Sudley,  Tyler  merely  endeavored  to  occupy  the  at 
tention  of  Evans'  pitifully  weak  force  with  a  desultory 
cannonade.  By  10  A.  M.  the  column  had  entirely  crossed 
the  stream  at  Sudley,  and  soon  its  batteries  opened  a 
heavy  fire  on  Evans'  men,  who,  extending  to  their  left, 
had  come  in  contact  with  the  Federal  advance.  The 
Federal  batteries  were  briskly  replied  to  by  two  guns  of 
Rogers'  Loudoun  Battery,  which  Evans  had  sent  for 
ward,  and  with  them  the  six  companies  of  infantry  suc 
ceeded  in  delaying  the  enemy  for  over  an  hour,  whose 
first  attack  was  made  by  a  single  regiment,  thus  giving 
the  reinforcements  time  to  cover  the  larger  portion  of 
the  three  miles.  Had  McDowell  rushed  forward  even 
one  of  his  brigades,  and  several  of  his  fine  regular 
batteries,  his  movement  would  undoubtedly  have  suc 
ceeded,  for  just  at  this  junction  the  right  of  Evans' 
line  which  he  had  pushed  out  to  the  left  to  meet  the 
column  from  Sudley,  formed  almost  at  right  angles  to 
the  stream,  was  taken  in  flank  by  Sherman's  and 
Keyes'  brigades  of  Tyler's  Division,  assisted  by  their 
batteries.  When  this  movement  became  apparent 
Holmes'  and  Early's  brigades,  with  two  regiments  of 
Bonham's  Brigade,  and  Walker's  and  Kemper's  batter- 

*See  Beauregard's  and  Johnston's  reports.     Also  see  reference  to  Alexander's 
signal  and  ordnance  work  in  Part  I. 


132  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

ies  were  at  once  put  in  motion  towards  the  left.*  The 
fire  of  Tyler's  batteries  upon  Evans  and  Bee  increased, 
and  after  a  gallant  stand  the  small  force  under  their 
command  fell  back  upon  the  Warrenton  Pike,  parallel 
to  and  about  a  mile  in  rear  of  their  advanced  line,  where 
it  was  partly  rallied  about  Hampton's  Regiment  which 
had  reached  that  point.  Here  the  remnants  of  Evans' 
command,  thus  reenforced  by  the  Hampton  Legion, 
with  Kemper's  two  guns  and  Imboden's  Battery,  main 
tained  the  position  along  the  Warrenton  Pike,  against 
great  odds,  for  two  hours,  finally  being  driven  back  to 
the  Henry  House  Hill,  a  short  distance  to  the  rear, 
where  another  rally  was  made  upon  Jackson's  Brigade, 
which  had  just  arrived  and  taken  an  excellent  position 
on  the  protected  inner  edge  of  the  ridge,  which  had  a 
plateau-like  top.  Jackson  had  with  ready  perception 
seen  the  advantage  of  such  a  position.  In  the  mean 
time  the  remainder  of  Johnston's  Army  was  arriving 
from  Winchester,  and  the  two  batteries  brought  upon 
the  field  at  this  instant  after  tremendous  exertion  by  Col. 
Pendleton,  Alburtis'  and  his  own,  were  thrown  into 
position  by  Jackson  on  the  line  established  by  his 
infantry  to  oppose  the  five  regular  batteries  and  the  four 
brigades  of  the  enemy,  which  were  rapidly  advancing. 
Thus,  Jackson,  with  eight  old  6-pounders,  was  face  to 
face  with  three  regular  and  two  finely  equipped  volun 
teer  batteries,  with  24  pieces,  mostly  heavy  rifled  guns.f 
Imboden's  Staunton  Battery,  the  first  of  Pendleton's 
Artillery  to  arrive  upon  the  scene,  having  made  an  heroic 
march  from  Winchester,  and  previously  having  gone 
forward  to  the  support  of  Evans  and  Bee,  had  been 
terribly  punished  by  the  Federal  Infantry,  as  well  as 
by  the  hostile  batteries,  and,  rallying  for  a  time  on  Jack 
son's  line,  had  been  ordered  to  the  rear  when  its  remain 
ing  few  rounds  were  expended.^ 

"Holmes'  Brigade  with  Walker's  Battery  had  joined  the  1st  Corps  from 
their  previous  positions  east  of  Manassas  Junction. 

fRicketts',  Griffin's,  Arnold's,  R.  I.  Battery,  and  71st  New  York  Regiment 
Battery.  See  Pendleton's  reports  to  Johnston  and  Jackson,  Rebellion  Records, 
Series  I,  Vol.  II,  Part  I,  pp.  35,  36,  37. 

•^Battles  and  Leaders,  Imboden's  account,  Vol.  I,  p.  233. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  133 

While  McDowell  continued  to  bump  his  head  against 
Jackson's  stone-wall,  on  the  Henry  House  Ridge,  send 
ing  regiment  after  regiment  to  the  assault,  supported 
by  the  fire  of  Griffin's  and  Ricketts'  batteries,  the  Con 
federate  reinforcements  were  arriving  in  ever-increas 
ing  numbers,  going  into  action  always  on  the  left  of 
those  which  had  preceded  them,  thus  extending  Jack 
son's  original  line.  Failing  to  make  a  lodgment  on  the 
plateau  with  his  infantry,  McDowell  now  sent  Griffin's 
and  Ricketts'  batteries  in  closer  to  take  up  the  task  of 
battering  a  way  through  at  a  decisive  range.  Nothing 
in  war  was  ever  more  gallant  than  the  efforts  of  these 
magnificent  batteries,  which,  fearlessly  advancing  to 
within  canister  range  of  the  Confederate  lines,  poured 
round  after  round  into  the  enemy.  Their  infantry  sup 
ports  having  been  driven  off  by  the  freshly  arrived  regi 
ments  of  Johnston's  Army,  the  Federal  batteries  even 
then  continued  their  fight. 

This  particular  artillery  fight,  commencing  about  3 
p.  M.,  had  lasted  for  perhaps  half  an  hour,  when  the  33d 
Virginia  Regiment,  commanded  by  Col.  A.  C.  Cum- 
mings,  boldly  advanced  from  Jackson's  left  to  take  the 
guns.  Griffin,  in  the  act  of  opening  upon  it  with  a 
blizzard  of  canister  at  short  range,  was  persuaded  by 
Maj.  Barry,  Chief  of  McDowell's  artillery,  that  the 
advancing  men  were  Federal  troops.  Cummings' 
Regiment  deliberately  halted,  and  from  a  distance  of 
but  seventy  yards  fired  a  volley  into  Griffin's  Battery, 
killing  and  wounding  40  of  his  men  and  75  of  his  horses. 
Ricketts,  whose  battery  was  next  to  that  of  Griffin,  was 
also  wounded  and  captured,  and  one  of  his  officers 
killed.  Griffin  managed  to  drag  off  three  of  his  guns,  but 
the  other  nine  of  the  two  batteries  were  left  isolated  be 
tween  the  two  infantry  lines.  A  terrific  struggle  now 
ensued,  finally  resulting  in  favor  of  the  Confederates 
who  turned  a  number  of  the  captured  guns  against  the 
retreating  Federals.* 

'Barry's  Report,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.   II,  p.  345. 


134  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Meanwhile,  Stanard's  and  Beckham's  batteries  had 
been  coming  up  on  the  left  of  the  guns  with  Pendleton, 
and  assisted  in  hurling  back  the  enemy.  Upon  the  ar 
rival  of  Kirby  Smith's  Brigade  on  the  extreme  Con 
federate  left,  the  Federal  lines  began  to  waver,  arid 
when  Beckham's  Battery  changed  position,  and  opened 
a  most  demoralizing  enfilade  fire  upon  their  flank  from 
a  well-chosen  position,  the  resistance  of  the  Federal 
Infantry,  with  which  there  were  no  longer  any  guns 
on  their  right  to  reply  to  Beckham,  dissolved  into  a 
rout.  Thus  not  only  did  Jackson  and  Pendleton  exer 
cise  a  great  influence  upon  the  battle  at  a  most  critical 
juncture,  by  the  skillful  disposition  of  the  latter's  bat 
teries,  in  a  position  which  nature  herself  could  hardly 
have  improved  upon,  but  whether  accidentally  so  or  not, 
the  fire  of  Beckham's  guns,  in  the  most  effective  man 
ner  possible — that  is,  from  the  immediate  flank — was 
delivered  upon  the  enemy  at  the  psychological  instant 
of  the  uncertainty  incident  to  a  check.  Again  evi 
dence  was  given  of  a  proper  appreciation  of  field  ar 
tillery  when  Kemper's  and  Walker's  batteries,  the 
latter  just  arrived  with  six  3-inch  rifles,  were  ordered 
forward  after  the  flight  of  the  enemy  set  in  to  open 
upon  the  disordered  masses  retreating  across  Cub  Run. 
The  fire  of  Kemper's  guns  almost  immediately  wrecked 
a  team  on  the  bridge,  causing  an  inextricable  jam  of 
guns,  caissons,  wagons,  and  ambulances,  from  which 
the  panic-stricken  drivers  cut  many  of  the  teams.  No 
guns  could  ever  have  been  employed  in  a  pursuit  to 
better  advantage,  for  at  this  point  alone,  17  guns,  in 
cluding  the  immense  30-pounder  Parrott  rifle,  with  over 
20  caissons,  were  captured  and  brought  in  by  the  Con 
federate  Cavalry.  Had  the  batteries  on  the  Con 
federate  right,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  been  pushed 
forward  to  Centreville  with  proper  infantry  supports 
when  the  retreat  commenced,  and  followed  Kemper's 
example,  there  would  be  little  indeed  to  criticise  in  the 
manner  in  which  the  Artillery  as  a  whole  was  handled. 
Yet,  this  was  not  to  be.  Batteries  in  those  days  were 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  135 

tied  to  the  apron  strings  of  brigade  commanders,  and 
possessed  little  or  no  independence  until  after  they  had 
been  set  in  motion.  If  Walton  with  his  guns  scattered 
to  the  four  quarters,  and  for  the  most  part  idle,  behind 
Ball's,  Mitchell's,  Blackburn's,  and  McLean's  Fords, 
had  but  been  a  Hohenlohe  with  the  organization  and 
independence  permitted  the  latter  on  such  occasions, 
Centreville  would  have  been  the  scene  of  glorious 
achievements  for  the  Artillery,  since  rarely  has  a  retreat 
presented  such  a  helpless  mass  of  humanity  to  the 
tender  mercies  of  the  pursuers,  as  blocked  the  roads  at 
Centreville  the  evening  of  July  21,  1861.  A  Hohen 
lohe  might  have  known  of  the  true  condition.  It  is  quite 
certain,  however,  that  the  brigade  commanders  to  whom 
Walton's  guns  were  assigned  did  not  know  until  too 
late  to  send  their  guns  forward.  Writing  after  the 
event,  it  is  quite  easy  to  point  out  how  Walton  should 
have  assembled  his  fresh  batteries,  and  galloped  along 
one  of  the  two  available  roads  leading  from  the  Con 
federate  right  to  intercept  the  Federal  retreat  at 
Centreville.  But  a  study  of  the  conditions  which 
actually  existed  the  evening  of  July  21  will  disclose 
the  fact  that  not  only  was  it  impossible  for  him  to  do  so 
because  of  the  wide  dispersion  of  his  guns,  but  that  far 
away  from  the  actual  scene  of  the  conflict,  he  was  even 
more  ignorant  of  the  opportunity  than  Johnston  and 
Beauregard  were. 

The  total  personnel  of  the  Artillery  of  the  2d  Corps 
numbered  350,  an  average  of  70  officers  and  men  for 
each  of  the  5  batteries,  and  of  Beauregard's  army  533,  or 
an  average  for  each  of  his  8  batteries  of  about  67  of 
ficers  and  men.  All  of  Johnston's  batteries  were  en 
gaged  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  but  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  or  the  1st  Corps,  part  of  Rogers'  Loudoun 
Battery,  and  some  of  the  guns  of  the  Washington  Ar 
tillery,  10  in  all,  were  not  engaged;  thus,  there  were 
engaged  a  total  of  638  officers  and  men  of  the  Artillery, 
with  a  total  of  47  guns.  With  Beauregard's  army  were 
several  companies  of  Pickens'  heavy  artillery,  number- 


136  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

ing  293  officers  and  men,  who  were  also  not  engaged. 
The  losses  in  Beauregard's  artillery  were:  killed  2, 
wounded  8,  total  10,  and  probably  about  the  same  for 
Johnston's  batteries,  or  a  grand  total  of  losses  for  the 
Confederate  Artillery  of  not  more  than  20. 

The  Federal  batteries  which  crossed  Bull  Run  were 
Ricketts',  Griffin's,  and  Arnold's  regular  batteries,  a 
Rhode  Island  and  a  New  York  Battery,  with  ten  10- 
pounder  and  eight  13-pounder  rifled  guns,  four  12- 
pounder  howitzers,  and  two  6-pounder  smooth-bore 
guns,  or  a  total  of  24  pieces.  In  addition  to  these,  Mc 
Dowell  had  Hunt's,  Carlisle's,  Tidball's,  Greene's, 
Ayres',  and  Edwards'  regular  batteries,  or  a  grand 
total  of  49  pieces,  most  of  which  were  heavy  rifled 
guns.*  Of  the  Union  guns,  27  in  all  were  captured, 
with  37  caissons,  6  forges,  4  battery  wagons,  64  artillery 
horses,  with  much  harness,  and  nearly  5,000  rounds  of 
field  artillery  ammunition.! 

In  his  account  of  the  battle  Gen.  E.  P.  Alexander 
states,  with  some  degree  of  sarcasm,  that  McDowell 
should  have  had  at  least  100  guns,  for,  says  he,  "Ar 
tillery  is  the  best  arm  against  raw  troops."  But,  if  with 
49  pieces  only  24  could  be  brought  up  into  effective 
range,  it  is  not  clear  what  Gen.  Alexander's  meaning 
is  unless  he  was  not  satisfied  with  the  number  of  guns 
captured.  By  such  an  increased  train  McDowell's 
road  to  Washington  could  have  only  been  more  ef 
fectually  blocked,  for  he  certainly  could  not  have  gotten 
so  many  guns  on  the  field. 

Most  of  the  Confederate  guns  were  6-pounder  S.  B. 
pieces,  or  12-pounder  howitzers.  There  were  a  few  old 
6-pounders,  which  had  been  reamed  out  and  rifled  with 
three  grooves  after  the  Parrott  system.:]: 

Thus,  although  the  number  of  available  guns  in  the 
two  armies  were  about  the  same,  Federal,  49;  Con- 


*Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  I,  p.  195,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II, 
p.  345. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  p.  571.  Report  of  Capt.  E.  P.  Alexander, 
Acting  Ordnance  Officer. 

$The  3-inch  Parrott  rifled  guns,  which  had  been  purchased  by  the  State  of 
Virginia,  were  at  Yorktown,  with  Magruder. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  137 

federate,  47 ;  and  although  37  of  the  latter  were  engaged 
at  close  range,  as  opposed  to  24  of  the  former,  the 
Federal  Artillery  had  the  advantage  in  weight  of  metal 
in  the  proportion  of  at  least  three  to  one,  besides  a  great 
superiority  in  range.  Yet,  it  was  the  general  belief  in 
the  Army  that  the  Confederate  Artillery  had  again 
more  than  proved  a  match  for  the  regular  batteries  of 
the  United  States. 

"The  efficiency  of  our  infantry  and  cavalry  might 
have  been  expected  from  a  patriotic  people  accustomed, 
like  ours,  to  the  management  of  arms  and  horses,  but 
that  of  the  artillery  was  little  less  than  wonderful.  They 
were  opposed  to  batteries  far  superior  in  the  number, 
range,  and  equipment  of  their  guns,  with  educated  of 
ficers  and  thoroughly  instructed  soldiers.  We  had  but 
one  educated  artillerist,  Col.  Pendleton, — that  model  of 
a  Christian  soldier, — yet  they  exhibited  as  much 
superiority  to  the  enemy  in  skill  as  in  courage.  Their 
fire  was  superior  both  in  rapidity  and  precision."  Thus 
wrote  Gen.  Johnston  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  and 
Gen.  Beauregard  wrote  that  all  the  batteries  displayed 
"that  marvellous  capacity  of  our  people  as  artillerists 
which  has  made  them,  it  would  appear,  at  once  the  terror 
and  the  admiration  of  the  enemy."*  In  his  report  of 
the  battle  Jackson  wrote:  "Nobly  did  the  artillery 
maintain  its  position  for  hours  against  the  enemy's  ad 
miring  thousands.  Great  praise  is  due  Col.  Pendleton 
and  the  officers  and  men."t  Longstreet,  in  writing  of 
that  portion  of  the  Washington  Artillery  under  his 
command,  said:  "I  am  pleased  to  say  that  our  young 
artillerists  proved  themselves  equal,  if  not  superior,  to 
the  boasted  artillerists  of  the  enemy."^:  Capt.  Arnold 
of  McDowell's  army  stated  in  his  report,  in  regard  to 
the  part  played  by  his  battery:  "During  all  this  time 
the  battery  was  exposed  to  a  severe  and  most  accurate 
artillery  fire."§  And  this  officer's  testimony  with  re- 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.   II,  p.  404. 
fJackson's  Report,  Ibid.,  p.  481. 
ILongstreet's   Report,   Ibid.,   p.   462. 
§See  his  report,  Ibid.,  p.  416. 


138  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

gard  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  fire  of  the  Confederate 
guns  is  supported  by  all  the  Federal  officers  who  partici 
pated  in  the  fight.*  But  the  Federal  accounts  of  the 
artillery  fire  of  the  enemy  are  not  over-trustworthy,  for 
McDowell  had  himself  instilled  in  them,  as  if  by  pre 
meditation,  a  fear  of  the  "long  arm,"  altogether  un 
warranted  by  its  actual  power.  Yet  one  of  the  greatest 
effects  exerted  by  artillery  in  any  battle  is,  after  all,  its 
moral  effect,  and  in  this  particular  manner  it  exercised 
a  tremendous  influence  upon  the  Northern  troops  in 
the  battle  of  Bull  Run.  McDowell's  order  of  march 
was  excellent  with  respect  to  the  disposition  of  his 
troops  but,  as  frequently  pointed  out,  he  spoiled  the 
high  morale  he  had  created  in  his  army  by  unwise 
caution  which  only  sufficed  to  fill  the  minds  of  his  men 
with  fears.  It  "would  not  be  pardonable  in  any  com 
mander  to  come  upon  a  battery  or  breastwork  without 
a  knowledge  of  its  position,"  cautioned  the  misled  Mc 
Dowell.  These  words  were  sufficient,  and  the  mischief 
was  done.  His  officers  as  well  as  his  men  advanced 
slowly,  step  by  step,  peering  at  each  distant  crest,  and 
poking  in  every  wayside  thicket  to  locate  the  awful  bug 
bear  of  the  Press  and  of  their  own  leader — "masked 
batteries."  This  direful  term  had  originated  in  the 
Sumter  episode — a  battery  having  been  constructed  on 
the  mainland  behind  a  house  which  was  demolished  when 
the  fire  was  ordered  to  be  opened,  t  After  that  a 
masked  battery  figured  in  every  affair  even  though  but 
a  skirmish.  According  to  the  pestilential  swarm  of 
press  agents,  which  infested  the  safer  places  near  the 
front,  it  was  a  masked  battery  which  caused  Butler's 
reverse  at  Big  Bethel ;  and  it  was  masked  batteries  which 
brought  misfortune  upon  the  Federal  troops  in  various 
other  instances. 

The   psychological  effect   upon   his   army   resulting 
from  McDowell's  words  was  at  best  most  adverse. 

"^•Particularly   interesting  is   Franklin's   account,   Rebellion  Records,   Series   I, 

Vol    II.,  P-  4°G- 

t  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.   21. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  139 

It  has  frequently  been  averred  by  military  critics,  and 
even  by  officers  of  professional  repute  who  took  part  in 
the  Bull  Run  campaign,  both  Confederate  and  Federal, 
that  Johnston  should  have  at  once  advanced  and  seized 
Washington  after  the  overthrow  of  McDowell.  The 
writer  does  not  propose  to  discuss  the  general  merits  of 
this  contention,  but  in  so  far  as  the  Artillery  is  con 
cerned,  it  seems  necessary  only  to  refer  those  support 
ing  such  a  view  to  the  records  and  correspondence  of 
the  hour.*  Nor  do  I  refer  to  the  reports  and  statements 
of  the  generals  in  command,  but  to  those  of  the  ordnance 
officers  occupying  subordinate  positions,  and  without 
responsibility  for  the  movements  of  the  Army  as  a 
whole.  It  would  seem  that  if  Johnston's  guns  were 
practically  without  ammunition  as  late  as  the  middle  of 
September  he  was  hardly  in  position  the  night  of  July 
21  to  order  an  advance  upon  Washington,  with  a  view 
to  forcing  his  way  through  the  outlying  defenses,  and 
laying  siege  to  the  National  Capital. 

*See  Part  I,  as  to  armament  and  condition  of  artillery  at  this  time. 


CHAPTER  VII 

WINTER  OF   1861-62 

DURING  the  weeks  immediately  succeeding  the 
victory  at  Manassas,  Col  Pendleton,  who  as  Chief  of 
Artillery  of  Johnston's  army  had  displayed  great 
ability  as  an  artillerist,  was  temporarily  appointed 
Chief  of  Ordnance  to  distribute  the  captured  material 
and  refit  his  batteries.  But  so  destitute  of  ammunition 
and  equipment  was  the  Artillery  found  to  be  that  it  be 
came  necessary  for  him  to  repair  to  Richmond  to  beg, 
borrow,  or  secure  in  any  way  possible,  the  barest  neces 
sities  for  the  batteries.*  During  his  enforced  absence 
Capt.  E.  P.  Alexander,  a  most  efficient  officer,  who 
had  resigned  from  the  Engineer  Corps  of  the  Old  Army, 
and  who  had  rendered  splendid  service  as  signal  officer 
in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  was  assigned  to  duty  as  act 
ing  Chief  of  Artillery,  t  Thus,  while  Pendleton  with 
all  but  superhuman  energy  urged  on  the  manufacture 
of  material,  ammunition,  equipment  and  artillery  stores 
of  every  kind  in  Richmond,  and  throughout  the  State, 
Alexander  devoted  his  efforts  to  the  better  organization 
and  discipline  of  the  batteries  already  in  the  field,  and 
to  those  which  arrived  from  day  to  day 4  The  task  as 
signed  Pendleton  was  neither  a  simple  nor  a  pleasant 
one,  but  before  the  end  of  October  he  was  able  to  rejoin 
his  command  with  the  satisfaction  of  having  ac 
complished  the  seemingly  impossible.  § 

When  Pendleton  rejoined  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
the  artillery  personnel  consisted  of  129  officers  and 
2,416  men,  and  with  Loring  in  the  Army  of  the  North 
west,  operating  along  the  western  frontier  of  Virginia, 
were  12  officers  and  302  men  besides  a  smaller  number 


*For  the  success  of  his  efforts  and  the  absolute  lack  of  ammunition  after  the 
battle,  see  Part  I. 

fFor  sketch  of  Alexander,  see  Part  I. 

t  Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  Lee,  p.  154. 

§For  an  intimate  account  of  his  labors  in  Richmond  and  elsewhere  at  this 
time,  see  Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  Lee,  pp.  154-167,  and  also  Part  I. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  141 

with  Holmes  in  the  Aquia  District.*  The  personnel 
of  the  main  army  was  distributed  as  follows:  1st,  or 
Beauregard's  Corps,  63  officers  and  1,273  men;  2d,  or 
G.  W.  Smith's  Corps,  27  officers  and  480  men ;  artillery 
reserve,  39  officers  and  663  men.f 

Before  being  assigned  to  duty  as  signal  officer  with 
the  Army  in  the  field,  Capt.  Alexander  had  been  en 
gaged  in  the  organization  and  drilling  of  the  batteries  in 
Richmond  in  April,  and  had  persistently  advocated  the 
formation  of  battalions  of  light  artillery  of  three  or  more 
batteries,  a  suggestion  entirely  novel  at  the  time.  Had 
he  been  allowed  to  remain  on  this  duty  longer,  it  is  quite 
probable  his  views  would  have  obtained,  but  as  it  was, 
he  did  succeed  in  inducing  Magruder  and  Randolph  to 
create  the  Richmond  Howitzer  Battalion,  of  three  com 
panies.  His  influence  being  withdrawn,  however,  even 
that  battalion  was  divided,  two  of  its  batteries  being  as 
signed  to  the  force  at  Yorktown,  and  one,  Shields',  to 
Beauregard's  Army.  Thus,  it  was  never  employed  as  a 
unit  in  accordance  with  Alexander's  views.  The  Wash 
ington  Artillery  had  arrived  in  Virginia  with  a  battalion 
formation  of  4  batteries  but  it  was  at  the  very  outset,  as 
has  been  shown,  persistently  split  up  into  small,  and 
comparatively  ineffective,  detachments,  conformable 
with  the  prevailing  custom  of  the  time.  The  success 
which  had  attended  Pendleton  in  handling  the  Rock- 
bridge,  Alburtis',  Imboden's,  and  Stanard's  batteries, 
in  the  movement  from  Winchester  to  Bull  Run,  and  the 
ability  he  had  displayed  to  direct  and  control  the  massed 
fire  of  at  least  three  of  these  batteries  in  action,  only 
sufficed  to  call  attention  to  the  practicability  of  Alex 
ander's  ideas,  and  convinced  Johnston  that  an  artillery 
reserve  should  be  formed,  though  it  was  not  for  some 
time  that  tne  true  value  of  artillery  masses  was  per 
ceived. 

When  the  winter  of  1861-62  set  in,  Johnston  with 
drew  his  army  to  Centreville,  and  before  January  had 

*Abstracts  from  Field  Returns,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  V,  pp. 
932-933 

fFor  return  dated  December  1,  see  Series  I,  Vol.  V,  p.  974.  There  had  been 
little  change. 


142  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

reorganized  his  increased  force  into  4  divisions,  two  of  4 
brigades  each,  and  two  of  5  each.  These  18  brigades 
averaged  about  4  regiments  of  500  men  each.  Besides 
the  main  army,  Jackson  had  a  force  in  the  Valley,  and 
Holmes  lay  in  observation  behind  Aquia  Creek.  The 
total  effective  strength  of  the  Confederate  forces, 
February  28,  1862,  was  47,617,  with  175  guns.  The 
distribution  of  the  batteries  was,  approximately,  as 
follows : 

FIRST   DIVISION    (Van   Dora) 

Kemper's  Alexandria  (Va.)  Battery,  1st  or  Bonham's  Brigade. 
Bondurant's  Jeff  Davis  (Ala.)  Battery,  2d  or  Early's  Brigade. 
Carter's  King  William  (Va.)  Battery,,  3d  or  Rodes'  Brigade. 

SECOND  DIVISON   (G.  W.  Smith) 

Alburtis'  Wise  (Va.)  Battery.,  1st  or  S.  Jones'  Brigade. 
Thomas  (Va.)  Battery,  2d  or  Wilcox's  Brigade. 
Blodget's  (Ga.)  Battery,  3d  or  Toombs'  Brigade. 

THIRD  DIVISION   (Longstreet) 

Rogers'  Loudoun   (Va.)   Battery,  1st  or  Swell's  Brigade. 
Stribling's  Fauquier  (Va.)  Battery,  2d  or  D.  R.  Jones'  Brigade. 
Latham's  Lynchburg  (Va.)   Battery,  3d  or  Cocke's  Brigade. 

FOURTH  DIVISION  (E.  Kirby  Smith) 

Baltimore  Light  Artillery   (Md.)   Battery,  1st  or  Elzey's  Brigade. 
Courtney's  Henrico   (Va.)   Battery,  2d  or  Trimble's  Brigade. 
Bowyer's  Bedford  (Va.)  Battery,  3d  or  Taylor's  Brigade. 

WHITING'S  DIVISION  AT  DUMFRIES 

Imboden's  Staunton   (Va.)   Battery,  1st  or  -  -  Brigade. 

Reilly's  fN.  C.)  Detachment.  2d  or  Wigfall's  Brigade. 
Rives'  (S.  C.)  Battery,  2d  or  Wigfall's  Brigade. 

HILL'S  FORCE  AT  LEESBURG 
Shields'  Richmond  Howitzer   (Va.)   Detachment,  Griffin's  Brigade. 

HOLMES'  FORCE  AT  AQUIA 

Braxton's  Fredericksburg  (Va.)   Battery,  1st  or  French's  Brigade. 
Cooke's  Stafford   (Va.)   Battery,  2d  o/J.  G.  Walker's  Brigade. 
Walker's  Purcell  (Va.)  Battery,  2d  or  J.  G.  Walker's  Brigade. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  143 

JACKSON'S  FORCE  IN  THE  VALLEY 

McLaughlin's  Rockbridge  (Va.)  Battery,  1st  or  Garnett's  Brigade. 
Carpenter's  Alleghany  (Va.)  Battery,  2d  or  Crittenden's  Brigade. 
Chew's  Horse  Artillery  (Va.)  Battery,  Ashby's  Cavalry. 

RESERVE   ARTILLERY  WITH   MAIN   ARMY 
(Col.   Pendleton,  Commanding) 

Woolfolk's  Ashland  (Va.)   Battery. 
Cocke's  Fluvanna  (Va.)   Battery. 
Coleman's  Morris  Louisa   (Va.)   Battery. 
Cutts'  Sumter  (Ga.)  Battery. 
Dance's  Powhatan   (Va.)    Battery. 
Hamilton's    (Ga.)    Battery. 
Holman's  Fluvanna  (Va.)   Battery. 
Kirkpatrick's  Amherst   (Va.)    Battery. 
Lane's  (Ga.)  Battery. 

(Maj.  Walton,  Commanding) 

Squires'  (La.)  Battery,  1st  Company,  Washington  Artillery. 
Rosser's  (La.)  Battery,  2d  Company,  Washington  Artillery. 
Miller's  (La.)  Battery,  3d  Company,  Washington  Artillery. 
Eshleman's  (La.)  Battery,  4th  Company,  Washington  Artillery. 

From  the  foregoing  schedule  of  assignments  it  will 
be  seen  that  there  were,  before  the  close  of  1861,  not 
fewer  than  35  batteries  with  the  troops  along  the  Po 
tomac  alone,  24  of  which  were  raised  in  Virginia,  and 
that  13  of  these  had  been  assigned  to  a  reserve  in  two 
sections,  commanded  by  Pendleton  and  Walton, 
respectively.* 

About  the  first  of  March  the  aggregate  present  for 
duty  of  the  field  artillery  personnel,  was  2,967,  includ 
ing  146  officers,  which  gives  an  average  strength  for  the 
35  batteries  present  of  about  85  men. 

Just  at  this  time  the  Federal  Army  had  been  re 
organized  by  McClellan,  his  5  corps  together  aggre 
gating  185,420  men,  with  465  field  guns.  Thus  it  is 
seen  that  the  Federal  Army  had  available  nearly  3  guns 
for  each  one  with  Johnston's  force,  the  disparity  in  per- 

*RcbeUion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  V,  p.  1086. 


144  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

sonnel,  horses,  character  of  armament,  ammunition  and 
equipment  being  even  greater.  Indeed  the  odds  in  the 
latter  respects  were  overwhelming,  particularly  as  to 
ammunition,  the  Confederate  Ordnance  Department 
lacking  throughout  the  war  the  material  and  skilled 
labor  with  which  to  make  really  reliable  fuses  and  pro 
jectiles. 

Before  the  close  of  1861  Gen.  Johnston  had  been 
much  annoyed  by  the  interference  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  with  matters  affecting  the  organization  of  the 
Army.  Mr.  Benjamin  had  granted  indiscriminately  to 
officers,  private  soldiers,  and  even  to  civilians,  authority 
to  raise  troops  of  cavalry  and  batteries  of  artillery.* 
Many  of  the  batteries  thus  raised  were  recruited  from 
amongst  the  men  of  the  infantry  regiments,  and  while 
Johnston's  objection  on  the  ground  that  the  field  ar 
tillery  arm  already  exceeded  the  European  proportion 
was  perhaps  ill  founded,  yet,  the  creation  of  heavy  bat 
teries  for  local  service  away  from  the  actual  field  of 
campaign,  and  to  the  detriment  of  the  infantry,  was 
a  most  injurious  practice.  "Fortunately,"  says  John 
ston,  "the  Ordnance  Department  was  unable  to  arm 
and  equip  them;  otherwise  the  Army  would  have  been 
deprived  of  several  regiments  of  excellent  infantry,  and 
encumbered  with  artillery  that  could  not  have  been 
taken  into  battle  without  danger  of  capture,  for  want 
of  infantry  to  protect  it."  The  interference  of  the 
Secretary,  so  bitterly  resented  and  complained  of  by 
Gen.  Johnston,  led  to  the  organization  of  many  light 
batteries  which  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  create 
later,  if  not  at  the  time  they  actually  were  created.  Yet, 
Gen.  Johnston  was  much  perplexed  over  the  condition 
of  the  batteries  already  in  the  field,  many  of  which  still 
had  four-horse  teams,  and,  realizing  their  immobility,  it 
is  not  strange  that  he  desired  the  addition  of  no  more  to 
his  army,  in  spite  of  the  preponderance  of  the  Federal 
guns. 

*Johnston'8  Narrative^  pp.  90,  91. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  145 

By  special  order  the  strength  of  the  light  artillery 
companies  of  Virginia  militia  was  fixed  in  March  at  150 
men,  rank  and  file,  those  containing  over  120  men  being 
entitled  to  an  extra  second  lieutenant.* 

We  have  seen  that  the  Act  of  January  22,  1862, 
authorized  the  appointment  of  brigadier-generals,  and 
additional  field-officers  in  the  field  artillery  arm. 
On  the  27th  the  Secretary  of  War  addressed  the  follow 
ing  letter  to  Gen.  Johnston  at  Centreville: 

"Sm — Congress  has  provided  by  law  for  the  appointment  of 
field  officers  of  artillery  in  the  provisional  army  in  proportion  to 
the  number  of  guns  in  each  command.  You  are  respectfully  re 
quested  to  report  as  early  as  convenient  the  number  of  guns  in 
each  of  the  three  armies  under  your  command,  and  a  list  of  the 
artillery  officers  in  each  army,  in  the  order  of  their  merit,  so  as  to 
assist  the  President  in  doing  justice  to  your  meritorious  subordi 
nates  by  proper  promotion.  It  would  be  agreeable  to  us  to  have 
a  like  list  prepared  separately  by  the  commanders  of  each  of  the 
three  armies  in  relation  to  the  officers  under  his  command,  so  as 
to  compare  the  estimate  made  of  their  respective  merits,  and  thus 
increase  the  probability  of  doing  justice  to  all." 

This  communication  evidences  a  worthy  desire  on 
the  part  of  the  appointing  authority  to  increase  the  of 
ficers  of  the  Artillery  by  judicious  appointments  in  such 
numbers  as  to  give  the  arm  not  only  those  needed,  but 
officers  of  approved  ability.  Immediate  steps  were 
taken  to  make  the  appointments  contemplated  by  Con 
gress. 

Early  in  March,  it  became  certain  that  McClellan 
was  preparing  for  a  forward  movement  either  by 
Fredericksburg  or  the  Peninsula,  and  Johnston  with 
drew  his  army  behind  the  Rappahannock,  along  which 
a  line  had  been  fortified. 

The  Artillery  had  been  in  cantonments  about 
Culpeper  during  the  winter,  and  the  horses  had  been 
given  a  long  rest,  the  men  being  drilled  and  in 
structed  whenever  the  weather  permitted.  For  the 

*S.  O.  No.  2,  A.  G.  O.,  Virginia,  March  21,  1862,  Rebellion  Records,  Series 
IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  1011. 


10 


146  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

better  mobilizing  of  the  Army,  Col.  Pendleton's  reserve 
corps  was  now  ordered  to  abandon  its  cabins,  and  moved 
with  the  division  of  G.  W.  Smith  to  Warrenton,  leav 
ing  the  winter  quarters  March  8.  The  Artillery  was  in 
fine  spirits  when  it  reached  Warrenton  four  days  later 
where  it  lay  for  about  a  month,  at  the  end  of  which  time 
it  was  called  upon  to  make  various  changes  of  position 
in  the  worst  imaginable  weather,  finally  arriving  at 
Louisa  Courthouse  with  Longstreet's  Division.  Here  it 
was  a  serious  problem  to  secure  provender  for  the  750 
animals  of  the  Reserve  Artillery. 

April  10,  Col.  Pendleton  received  his  well-earned  pro 
motion,  his  commission  of  brigadier-general  of  ar 
tillery  bearing  date  of  March  26.  The  news  of  this 
appointment  was  received  with  great  favor  throughout 
the  Army,  but  there  was  undoubtedly  jealously  in  some 
quarters.*  Pendleton  had  entertained  serious  misgiv 
ings  about  his  promotion  over  the  gallant  Maj.  Walton 
who,  himself,  was  too  high  and  patriotic  a  soldier  to  be 
piqued  by  the  advancement  of  the  Virginian.  Yet,  a 
feeling  existed  among  the  men  of  the  far  South  that 
favoritism  had  been  too  generally  shown  Virginians, 
though  their  resentment  was  in  no  sense  directed  against 
Pendleton. 

To  guard  against  the  possibility  of  friction,  it  will 
be  observed  that  the  portion  of  the  Reserve  Artillery 
placed  under  Pendleton  as  Chief  of  Artillery,  when  he 
had  previously  been  promoted  from  a  captain  to  the 
rank  of  colonel,  did  not  include  the  battalion  of  Maj. 
Walton. 

The  Reserve  Artillery  was  now  ordered  to  Richmond, 
where  it  arrived  April  14,  whence  it  was  ordered  to  pro 
ceed  two  days  later  to  Yorktown,  Gen.  Pendleton  being 
sent  on  in  advance  by  Gen.  Johnston  to  confer  with 
Gen.  D.  H.  Hill  in  command,  and  to  inspect  the  de 
fences  of  the  place.  He  reported  at  once  that  the 

*Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  p.  173.  Also  see  Benjamin's  letter  to  the 
President,  November  30,  1861,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  p.  761. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  147 

country  was  entirely  unsuited  for  the  use  of  field 
artillery,  or  large  masses  of  men,  and  that  with  its 
armament  it  was  impossible  to  hold  Yorktown  against 
the  heavy  rifled  ordnance  of  the  enemy.*  On  April  30, 
he  wrote  that  Johnston's  army  would  have  to  fall  back 
to  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond  before  a  land  battle 
could  be  thought  of.  Pendleton,  at  the  time,  must  have 
contemplated  with  misgivings  the  tremendous  superi 
ority  of  McClellan's  artillery  in  numbers,  material  and 
general  efficiency,  yet  his  energies,  in  common  with  those 
of  all  his  subordinates,  were  bent  to  the  task  of  prepar 
ing  his  arm  to  meet  its  antagonist  upon  the  best  footing 
possible.  New  batteries  continued  to  be  added  to  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  to  the  equipment  of  which 
the  Confederate  Bureau  of  Ordnance  was  now  con 
tributing,  and  there  were  other  conditions  in  favor  of 
the  Confederate  Artillery.  Not  only  was  Jackson  so 
playing  upon  the  fears  of  Lincoln  and  Stanton  that  Mc- 
Clellan  was  continually  being  crippled,  but  the  country 
through  which  the  invader  must  pass  was  such  that  it 
would  surely  reduce  the  immense  force  of  his  artillery 
in  large  measure  to  the  status  of  a  train,  which,  blocking 
every  road,  would  only  add  to  the  difficulties  of  his 
maneuvers.  Pendleton  at  once  perceived  that  for  these 
reasons  the  numbers  of  the  enemy,  in  so  far  as  his 
artillery  was  concerned,  would  by  the  very  nature  of  the 
field  of  operations  be  largely  discounted. 

To  Lincoln  and  his  cabinet,  McClellan's  movement 
to  the  Peninsula,  in  view  of  Jackson's  activity  in  the 
Valley,  seemed  to  uncover  Washington.  They  feared 
an  irruption  of  the  Confederates,  just  as  Lee's  defensive 
strategy  contemplated  they  would,  which  might  expose 
the  Federal  Capital  to  capture.  McClellan  was,  there 
fore,  commanded  to  leave  a  force  so  disposed  as  to  cover 
Washington  and  to  protect  it  in  any  emergency.  This 
he  thought  he  had  done  when  he  left  63,000  men  and  85 
pieces  of  artillery  distributed  between  the  Valley,  War- 
renton,  Manassas,  and  the  lines  about  Washington.  In 

*Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  Lee,  p.  181. 


148  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

addition  to  this  force  he  had  detached  Blenker's  Divi 
sion  of  10,000  men  and  24  guns  to  join  Fremont.  But 
with  fears  greatly  aroused  by  Jackson's  attack  at  Kerns- 
town,  augmented  by  lack  of  confidence  in  McClellan, 
75,000  men  and  109  guns  were  not  deemed  sufficient  to 
guard  the  Capital  against  the  Army  of  the  Valley,  and 
McDowell's  Corps  of  between  30,000  and  40,000  men 
was  taken  from  McClellan  and  held  between  Washing 
ton  and  Richmond.*  Thus  McClellan  was  deprived  of 
about  200  of  his  465  guns. 

Valley  Campaign,  Allan,  pp.  84-85. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

TACTICS  AND  EARLY  INSTRUCTION 

UP  to  this  time  little  has  been  said  about  the  tactics 
of  the  Confederate  Artillery,  except  to  refer  to  Alex 
ander's  early  conception  of  the  organization  of  bat 
talions.  But  the  organization  of  the  artillery  reserve  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  marks  an  event  in  its 
career  which  requires  notice.  Up  to  that  point,  there 
had  been  little  attention  bestowed  upon  the  tactics  of 
the  arm,  other  than  upon  the  mere  drill  of  the  battery 
and  the  evolutions  of  several  when  maneuvering  to 
gether.  Such  was  the  scope  of  the  treatise  prepared  by 
Capt.  Stevens  in  1792,  the  author  having  been  an 
artillery  officer  in  Lamb's  continental  regiment.  Then 
appeared  in  1809  a  work  called  "The  American 
Artillerist's  Companion,  or  Elements  of  Artillery,"  by 
Col.  Louis  de  Tousard,  formerly  of  the  British  service, 
and  later  Colonel  of  the  Second  Continental  Regiment 
of  Artillery,  and  inspector  of  the  Artillery  of  the  United 
States.  In  1800,  Alexander  Hamilton,  Inspector- 
General,  and  Gen.  Pinckney,  had  endeavored  to  formu 
late  drill  regulations  for  the  Artillery,  followed  by  Gen. 
James  Wilkinson,  in  1808,  but  nothing  of  permanent 
character  had  resulted  from  their  efforts,  so  that  other 
than  a  simple  drill  manual  for  horse,  or  flying  artillery, 
as  it  was  then  called,  written  by  Gen.  Kosciusko,  in 
Paris  in  1800,  and  Tousard's  work,  there  were  no 
definite  regulations  for  the  arm  when  the  War  of  1812 
was  declared. 

France  at  this  time  was  generally  recognized  to  be  the 
school  of  highest  artillery  development,  and  in  1809, 
Capt.  Winfield  Scott  had  sought  authority  to  repair 
thither  for  a  study  of  its  system  upon  which  to  base  a 
comprehensive  work,  but  his  application  was  refused 
and  no  manual  of  instruction  was  adopted  in  the  United 
States,  until  1821,  at  which  time  a  work  by  H.  Lalle- 
mand,  formerly  a  general  in  Napoleon's  Imperial 


150  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Guard,  known  as  a  "Treatise  on  Artillery,"  was 
adopted.  As  the  spirit  of  both  Tousard's  and  Lalle- 
mand's  works  was  essentially  French,  it  will  be  well  to 
gain  some  knowledge  of  the  status  of  artillery  and 
artillery  tactics  of  the  time  in  France. 

The  soldiers  of  the  French  Revolution  had  initiated 
many  improvements  in  ordnance  and  artillery  generally. 
The  casting  and  boring  of  guns,  the  cleaning  of  salt 
petre,  and  the  preparation  of  powder,  were  much  im 
proved  by  the  clever  chemists  and  men  of  science  of  the 
Republic.  The  campaigns  in  the  Alps  led  to  the  intro 
duction  of  mountain  guns,  portable  enough  to  be  of  real 
use  in  rough  country,  and  Gribeauval's  heavy  gun  car 
riages,  and  ammunition  wagons  were  much  simplified 
and  improved  for  ordinary  field  use.  On  the  whole, 
light  and  horse  artillery  material  was  brought  up  to  a 
stage  of  perfection  proportionate  to  that  of  the  other 
arms  of  the  service  in  which  radical  advances  had  been 
made  since  the  days  of  Frederick  the  Great.  Regi 
mental  guns  were  taken  from  the  battalions  and  col 
lected  in  batteries,  and  particular  attention  was  paid  to 
the  artillery  as  a  separate  and  not  as  a  mere  auxiliary 
arm.  Prior  to  1789,  the  French  Artillery  consisted  of 
7  regiments  of  foot  artillery,  with  6  companies  of  miners 
and  artificers,  but  although  Austria,  Prussia  and  some 
other  nations  had  introduced  the  horse  batteries  so  dear 
to  Frederick,  the  French  had  not  done  so.*  The  ma 
terial  of  the  field  batteries  consisted  of  6-,  8-,  and  12- 
pounder  guns,  and  6-  and  8-pounder  siege  pieces.  The 
whole  field  artillery  arm  was  divided  into  regiments  and 
companies.  The  guns  of  the  foot  regiments  were  mostly 
4-pounders,  and  of  these  there  were  1,200,  which  with 
the  battery  artillery  made  a  disproportionate  number  of 
guns.  But  the  object  in  this  was  to  back  up  the  courage 
of  the  ill-drilled  and  inexperienced  conscripts  by  means 

*The  creation  of  horse  artillery  is  generally  attributed  to  Frederick  the 
Great,  a  claim  asserted  by  many  countries  ;  but,  in  an  interesting  article  which 
appeared  in  the  Voyennui  Sbornik,  translated  for  the  Journal  of  the  Royal 
Artillery,  by  Lieut.  H.  D.  Ashby,  R.  F.  A.,  and  reprinted  in  the  Journal  of  the 
Military  Service  Institution  (American)  ,  July-August,  1912,  p.  120,  much 
evidence  is  adduced  to  prove  that  it  was  the  conception  of  Peter  the  Great,  of 
Russia. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  151 

of  a  heavy  artillery  fire.  The  creation  of  a  large  body  of 
light  infantry  led  to  the  production  of  lighter  batteries, 
which  might  keep  pace  with  the  men;  and  in  1791,  there 
were  already  two  companies  of  this  light  artillery,  each 
with  two  8-pounder  guns  and  two  6-inch  howitzers,  the 
men  serving  with  them  being  carried  along  in  wagons  of 
peculiar  construction.  But  soon  the  gunners  were 
mounted,  and  thus  the  arm  grew  into  horse  artillery,  an 
arm  so  well  suited  to  the  quick-acting  French  tempera 
ment  that  it  at  once  assumed  undue  proportions. 

When  in  1793-94,  the  Army  was  reorganized,  each 
half -brigade  was  given  a  battery  of  6  guns,  that  is,  the 
same  number  of  two  pieces  to  each  battalion  was  re 
tained.  As,  however,  it  was  soon  discovered  that  too 
much  artillery  on  account  of  its  comparative  immobility 
retarded  the  movements  of  the  Army  without  actual  cor 
responding  gain,  the  allowance  was  cut  down  to  one  gun 
for  each  brigade — a  better  proportion.  The  battalions 
were  no  longer  hampered  by  each  dragging  its  own  gun, 
as  had  been  largely  done  by  the  American  troops  in  the 
War  of  Independence,  since  the  guns  were  now  con 
solidated  into  batteries  capable  of  following  the  maneu 
vers  of  their  respective  brigades.  Thus  regimental  guns 
gradually  disappeared  and  batteries  came  into  use,  con 
sisting  of  foot  and  horse  artillery.  In  1794,  the  French 
field  artillery  comprised  8  regiments  of  foot,  and  8  regi 
ments  of  horse  artillery,  12  companies  of  artificers,  and  a 
battalion  of  pontoniers.  The  regiment  of  foot  artillery 
had  a  staff  and  20  companies;  each  company  with  a 
battery  of  6  guns  with  8  men  per  gun,  having,  also, 
supernumeraries  for  general  service,  a  company  thus 
aggregating  93  men.  The  mounted  artillery  regiment 
had  a  staff  and  6  companies;  each  company  was  a  bat 
tery  of  6  guns,  with  10  men  per  gun;  a  total  of  60.  This 
made  960  guns  and  15,000  artillerymen  in  the  foot,  280 
guns  and  3,000  artillerymen  in  the  mounted  artillery;  a 
total  of  1,248  guns  and  18,000  men.  In  charge  of  the 
corps  artillery  were  228  general,  staff,  and  superior  of 
ficers,  including  those  assigned  to  duty  as  inspectors. 


152  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  artillery  had  its  own  regulations  and  tactics,  and 
in  maneuver  the  field  batteries  possessed  great  mobility. 
Gunnery  was  scientifically  studied  and  the  schools,  for 
which  the  foundation  had  been  laid  by  Louis  XIV,  were 
greatly  improved.  With  its  many  polytechnic  schools, 
its  military  school  at  Chalons,  and  its  regimental  schools 
at  La  Fere,  Besancon,  Grenoble,  Metz,  Strasburg, 
Douay,  Auxonne  and  Toulouse,  where  the  several 
artillery  regiments  were  stationed,  the  French  system 
of  instruction  was  advanced  and  thorough,  ahead  of  that 
of  any  other  country  at  the  time. 

But,  it  remained  for  the  great  master  to  teach  the 
world  the  meaning  of  artillery,  and  how  to  employ  it  in 
battle.  "A  good  infantry,"  said  Napoleon,  "is  without 
doubt  the  backbone  of  the  army,  but  if  it  had  to  fight 
long  against  superior  artillery,  it  would  be  discouraged 
and  disorganized."*  And,  so,  possessing  an  unequalled 
ability  to  direct  and  control  masses  of  men,  he  applied 
his  principles  to  the  tactical  employment  of  his  artillery, 
perceiving  the  great  power  of  field  guns,  when  the  fire 
of  a  large  number  were  used  in  combination.  He  had 
also  learned  that  with  the  short  range  of  the  smooth-bore 
guns,  it  was  practically  impossible  to  change  their 
position  when  once  they  had  become  engaged  under  fire, 
because  of  the  vulnerability  of  a  mounted  battery,  and 
the  large  target  it  presented  while  in  motion. 

He  therefore  created  divisional  artillery,  thus  secur 
ing  his  masses,  and  a  reserve  artillery  which  he  was  able 
to  withhold  until  it  could  be  thrown  into  action  at  the 
crisis  to  decide  the  issue.  Writing  to  Eugene,  he  de 
clared  that  "the  artillery,  like  the  other  arms,  must  be 
collected  in  mass,  if  one  wishes  to  attain  a  decisive  re- 
sult."f 

Addressing  Clarke  in  1809  concerning  the  latter' s 
green  troops,  he  gave  expression  to  his  great  belief  in 
the  artillery  arm  when  he  wrote:  "Troops  such  as  you 
have  are  just  the  kind  which  need  most  entrenchments, 

*Dixhuit  Notes,  etc.,  XXXI,  p.   395. 

fC.  N.  to  Eugene,  Schonbrunn,  16  June,  1809,  5  p.  M. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  153 

earthworks  and  artillery.  The  more  inferior  the  quality 
of  a  body  of  troops,  the  more  artillery  it  requires.  There 
are  some  army  corps  with  which  I  should  require  only 
one-third  of  the  artillery  which  I  need  for  other  corps."* 

After  Liitzen  and  Bautzen,  he  wrote,  "It  is  the 
artillery  of  my  guard  which  generally  decides  my 
battles,  for  as  I  have  it  always  at  hand,  I  can  bring  it  to 
bear,  whenever  it  becomes  necessary. t 

And,  after  the  end  of  the  campaign,  he  wrote,  "Great 
battles  are  won  by  artillery. "J 

Previous  to  the  time  of  Gustavus,  and  his  great 
artillery  general,  Torstenson,  the  number  of  guns  per 
thousand  men  had  varied  from  1  to  5.  Gustavus  gen 
erally  had  3,  but  at  one  time  6.  In  the  Seven  Years 
War,  the  average  number  was  4,  though  Frederick  once 
increased  it  to  10  per  thousand,  endeavoring  to  com 
pensate  with  additional  guns  for  his  losses  in  infantry. 
Napoleon  rarely  got  more  than  5  or  6  per  thousand, 
though  he  possessed  at  one  time  the  enormous  total  of 
1,300  guns. 

At  Friedland,  the  French  general,  Senarmont,  ad 
vanced  his  great  line  of  guns  to  within  300  yards  of  the 
Russian  Infantry  and  broke  its  front  with  a  murderous 
storm  of  canister,  and  at  Austerlitz,  Wagram,  and 
Gross-Gorshen,  the  issue  had  been  decided  by  Na 
poleon's  masses  of  guns.  Yet,  it  took  the  allies  many 
years  to  perceive  the  cause  of  Napoleon's  successes,  em 
ploying  as  they  did,  against  his  great  masses  of  artillery, 
individual  batteries  or  small  groups.  It  was  not  until 
1813  that  Bliicher  gave  voice  to  the  need  of  more  guns 
with  which  to  combat  him.  But  while  it  took  the  allies 
time  to  learn  the  game,  finally  Napoleon  was  forced  to 
exclaim  angrily,  when  he  saw  their  great  masses  on  the 
field  of  Leipzig  open  fire  upon  him,  "At  last  they  have 
learned  something.  "§ 

But,  just  as  in  the  course  of  years  the  Napoleonic  art 
had  been  learned  by  the  world,  so  in  a  short  time  was 

*C.  N.,  Schb'nbrunn,  18  August. 

tC.  N.  to  Clarke,  New  Markt,  2  June. 

JC.  N.  to  Eugene,  St.  Cloud,  20  November,  1813. 

§Jomini's  Napoleon's  Campaigns. 


154  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

it  forgotten,  and  other  than  a  knowledge  of  the  minor 
tactics  contained  in  the  "Manual  for  the  Artillery  of  the 
Garde  Roy  ale,"  little  information  as  to  the  employment 
of  field  guns  was  possessed  in  America.  This  work  had 
in  1826  been  recommended  to  the  Secretary  of  War  by 
a  board  of  officers  of  which  Gen.  Scott  was  president, 
being  subsequently  published  under  the  title  of  "A  Sys 
tem  of  Exercise  and  Instruction  of  Field  Artillery,  in 
cluding  Maneuvers  of  Light  or  Horse  Artillery."  By 
Act  of  Congress  5,000  copies  of  this  work  were 
authorized  to  be  purchased  and  distributed  for  the  use 
of  the  militia,  the  regular  batteries  retaining  Lalle- 
mand's  treatise  as  their  manual.  The  next  step  was  to 
send  Lieut.  Tyler  of  the  regular  service  to  Metz,  in 
1828,  to  translate  the  existing  French  manuals,  but 
the  old  Gribeauval  system  becoming  obsolete,  Capt. 
Robert  Anderson's  translation  of  the  French  "Instruc 
tion  for  Field  Artillery,  Horse  and  Foot"  appeared  in 
1839,  and  superseded  all  previously  adopted  works.* 
The  manual  of  instruction  employed  during  the  Mexi 
can  War  was  that  contained  in  Anderson's  translation 
as  revised  by  Maj.  Ringold,  in  1843,  and  adopted  in 
1845.  These  instructions,  although  excellent  so  far  as 
they  went,  embraced  little  more  than  the  manual  of  the 
piece  and  the  maneuvers  of  a  battery.  The  proper 
organization  of  artillery  for,  and  its  management  in  the 
field  were  merely  touched  upon.  A  new  set  of  instruc 
tions  going  somewhat  into  the  tactical  employment  of 
the  arm,  and  also  another  translation  from  the  French 
by  Maj.  Robert  Anderson,  entitled  the  "Evolutions  of 
Field  Batteries,"  and  comprehending  the  school  of  a 
battalion  of  3  or  4  batteries,  appeared  in  1860.  This 
book  was  adopted  by  the  Army  and  adhered  to  by  the 
Federals  during  the  entire  Civil  War.  The  Confederate 
States  to  a  certain  extent  adhered  to  the  same  work,  but 
a  treatise  entitled,  "Manual  of  Instruction  for  the  Vol 
unteers  and  Militia  of  the  Confederate  States,"  by  Col. 
William  Gilham,  Instructor  of  Tactics  and  Com- 

*Major  Anderson  of  Fort  Sumter  fame. 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  155 

mandant  of  Cadets  at  the  Virginia  Military  Institute, 
was  given  precedence  over  all  others  in  so  far  as  the 
school  of  the  battery  was  concerned.  This  work  was  a 
most  comprehensive  manual  of  drill  for  the  three  arms, 
containing  also  the  Articles  of  War  of  the  Confederacy, 
and  the  regulations  for  military  courts.* 

But,  as  has  been  said  before,  in  1861  artillery  was  an 
arm  consisting  of  so  many  individual  batteries.  The 
conception  of  field  artillery  at  this  time  embraced  noth 
ing  more  than  the  evolutions  of  several  battery  units 
maneuvering  together.  Its  tactical  employment  in  ac 
cordance  with  Napoleonic  principles  was  entirely  for 
gotten,  and  indeed  artillery  tactics  had  reverted  to  the 
pre-Napoleonic  stage  of  batteries,  distributed  through 
out  the  army  to  brigades  and  even  sections  to  regi 
ments,  simply  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  there  had  never 
been  enough  artillery  in  this  country  at  one  time  to  at 
tract  the  attention  of  our  officers  to  the  Napoleonic 
methods  of  employing  large  masses.  This  was  not 
strange,  but  most  natural.  Indeed,  the  Prussians  evi 
denced  the  same  neglect  in  1864,  during  their  war  with 
Denmark,  and  had  to  relearn  the  great  principles  of 
artillery  masses  from  Austria,  in  1866,  Austria  having 
been  reminded  of  them  in  the  French  War  of  1859.  The 
Prussian  lapse  is  far  more  inexplicable  than  that  of  the 
Americans  in  their  civil  conflict,  for  Prussia  had  main 
tained  a  large  artillery  arm  for  years. 

We  are  now  in  position  to  grasp  the  true  meaning  of 
the  formation  of  reserve  artillery  under  Pendleton  and 
Walton,  and  to  appreciate  the  stand  which  Capt.  Alex 
ander  had  made  early  in  1861  for  the  organization  of 
field  artillery  battalions  to  act  as  combat  units.  It  was 
yet  to  be  some  time  before  the  knowledge  of  "the  way  it 
should  be  done"  was  to  enable  the  Confederate  generals 
"to  do  it,"  and  many  hard  knocks  were  to  be  received  by 
the  loosely  organized  and  poorly  handled  Confederate 
field  artillery  until  experience  prevailed  and  added  its 
dearly  bought  lessons. 

*It  had  appeared  in  1861  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  as  a  semi-official 
publication  of  the  United  States  Army. 


CHAPTER  IX 

FEDERAL   ORGANIZATION   AND   TACTICAL   CONCEPTS 

IT  will  be  well  now  to  look  more  minutely  at  the  ar 
tillery  of  McClellan's  Army,  so  vastly  superior  in  num 
bers,  material  and  organization,  in  order  that  the 
inequality  of  the  two  armies  in  respect  to  this  arm  may 
be  appreciated  from  the  first. 

Many  of  the  Federal  regiments  which  took  the  field 
in  the  spring  of  1861  had  batteries  attached  to  them, 
true  to  the  system  of  Gustavus  and  Frederick.  As  was 
to  be  expected,  these  batteries  were  found  to  be  useless. 
When  the  Union  Army  marched  to  Manassas,  the  bat 
teries  not  belonging  to  regiments,  most  of  which  were 
regular  batteries,  were  assigned  to  brigades  in  accord 
ance  with  the  custom  of  the  day.  But,  when  McClellan 
undertook  the  reorganization  of  the  defeated  army  in 
July,  he  inaugurated  numerous  imperative  changes, 
many  of  which  were  innovations.  Among  the  latter  was 
his  organization  of  the  artillery.  Perceiving  the  utter 
lack  of  artillery  reserves,  and  that  brigade  commanders 
were  not  capable  of  supervising  and  directing  artillery, 
of  which  they  were  generally  quite  ignorant,  he  set 
about  the  task  before  him  of  bringing  order  out  of 
chaos.  The  force  turned  over  to  him  July  27,  1861, 
consisted  of  50,000  infantry,  1,000  cavalry,  and  650  ar 
tillerymen  manning  9  incomplete  batteries,  with  an  ag 
gregate  of  but  30  guns.  These  figures  should  be  borne 
in  mind  by  all  who  are  prone  to  question  the  ability  of 
"Little  Mac"  as  an  organizer.  Upon  the  foundation 
which  he  laid,  single-handed,  was  erected  the  whole 
structure  of  Grant's  success  in  Virginia.  He  gave  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  in  its  formative  period  the 
character,  the  cohesion,  and  indirectly,  therefore,  the 
stamina,  which  enabled  it  to  withstand  the  severest 
punishments  ever  administered  to  an  army  ultimately 
victorious. 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  157 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  artillery  the  following 
radical  and  comprehensive  regulations  were  pro 
mulgated  by  McClellan,  largely  proposed  by  Wm.  F. 
Barry,  his  Chief  of  Artillery. 

"1st.  The  proportion  of  artillery  should  be  in  the  ratio  of  at 
least  2y2  pieces  to  1,000  men,  to  be  expanded,  if  possible,  to  3 
pieces. 

"2d.  The  field  guns  should  be  restricted  to  the  systems  of  the 
United  States  Ordnance  Department  and  of  Parrott,  the  smooth 
bores  (with  the  exception  of  a  few  howitzers  for  special  service), 
to  be  exclusively  the  12-pounder  guns,  model  1857,  variously  called 
the  gun  howitzer,  light  12-pounder,  or  the  Napoleon. 

"3d.  Each  field  battery  to  be  composed,  if  practicable,  of  6, 
and  none  to  have  less  than  4,  guns,  those  of  each  battery  to  be  of 
uniform  caliber. 

4th.  The  field  batteries  to  be  assigned  to  divisions,  and  not  to 
brigades,  in  the  proportion  of  4  to  each  division,  one  of  which 
should  be  a  regular  battery,  the  rest  volunteers ;  the  captain  of  the 
regulars  to  command  the  artillery  of  the  division.  In  the  event  of 
several  divisions  being  united  into  an  army  corps,  at  least  one-half 
of  the  divisional  artillery  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  divisions  and 
formed  into  a  corps  reserve.* 

"5th.  The  reserve  artillery  of  the  whole  army  to  consist  of 
100  guns,  comprising  besides  a  sufficient  number  of  light  mounted 
batteries,  all  the  guns  of  position,  and,  until  the  cavalry  be  massed, 
all  the  horse  artillery. 

"6th.  The  amount  of  ammunition  to  accompany  the  field 
batteries  to  be  not  less  than  400  rounds  per  gun. 

"7th.     A  siege  train  of  50  pieces  to  be  provided,  f 

"8th.  Instruction  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  gunnery,  as  well 
as  the  tactics  of  that  arm,  to  be  given  to  the  officers  and  non 
commissioned  officers  of  the  volunteer  batteries,  by  the  study  of 
suitable  books  and  by  actual  recitations  in  each  division,  under  the 
direction  of  the  regular  officer  commanding  the  divisional  artillery. 

"9th.  Personal  inspections,  as  frequent  as  circumstances  will 
permit,  to  be  made  by  the  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Army,  to  see 
to  a  strict  observance  of  the  established  organization  and  drill,  of 
the  special  regulations  and  orders  issued  from  time  to  time,  under 
authority  of  the  commanding  general,  to  note  the  improvement  of 
officers  and  men  of  the  volunteer  batteries,  and  the  actual  fitness 
for  field  service  of  the  whole,  both  regulars  and  volunteers." 

*This  contingency  arose  on  the  Peninsula  in  June,  1862.  See  subsequent 
mention. 

tSubsequently  expanded  to  100  pieces  at  Yorktown,  including  13-inch  sea- 
coast  mortars  and  100-pounder  and  200-pounder  Parrotts. 


158  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

As  early  as  August  21,  Gen.  Barry  had  urged  Mc- 
Clellan  to  reorganize  and  increase  the  field  artillery  arm 
in  the  following  words: 

"To  insure  success,  it  is  of  vital  importance  that  the  army 
should  have  an  overwhelming  force  of  field  artillery.  To  render 
this  the  more  effective,  the  field  batteries  should,  as  far  as  possible, 
consist  of  regular  troops." 

While  McClellan  was  not  prepared  to  enlarge  the 
regular  establishment,  he  lost  no  time  in  increasing  the 
general  efficiency  of  the  Army,  by  encouraging  and 
directing  his  artillery  officers.  In  his  report,  he  wrote: 
"The  creation  of  an  adequate  artillery  establishment 
was  a  formidable  undertaking,  and  had  it  not  been  that 
the  country  possessed  in  the  regular  service  a  body  of 
accomplished  and  energetic  artillery  officers,  the  task 
would  almost  have  been  hopeless." 

Assembling  all  the  regular  batteries  he  could  secure 
for  his  army,  when  the  3  corps,  or  his  8  divisions  em 
barked  for  the  Peninsula,  they  were  accompanied  by  49 
batteries  aggregating  299  guns,  of  which  100,  comprised 
of  18  batteries,  were  in  the  reserve.  Of  the  49  batteries, 
20  were  of  the  regular  service  and  14  of  these  were  in 
the  reserve.  These  figures  do  not  include  the  guns  of 
McDowell's  1st  Corps,  of  which  McClellan  was  soon 
deprived.* 

The  batteries  of  McClellan's  Army  were  organized, 
equipped,  and  instructed  in  as  exact  accordance  with 
the  regulations  he  had  prescribed,  as  a  number  of  active 
and  efficient  officers,  directed  by  a  most  capable  chief, 
could  cause  them  to  be. 

When  the  divisions  were  organized  into  corps  for 
service  on  the  Peninsula,  corps  commanders  were 
ordered  to  create  out  of  a  half -part  of  their  divisional 
batteries  a  corps  reserve,  in  charge  of  a  chief.  This  was 
done  the  first  week  of  June. 

The  contemplated  employment  of  field  guns  in 
masses  as  provided  for  by  the  organization  of  divisional, 

*Historical  Sketch  of  the  Artillery  of  the  United  States  Army,  Birkhimer, 
p.  82. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  159 

corps,  and  reserve  artillery  in  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  while  a  radical  advance  in  tactics  in  one  sense, 
was  yet  but  a  reversion  to  Napoleonic  principles.  It 
has  been  stated  that  the  reason  for  the  reserve  was  to 
withhold  from  committing  to  action  all  the  guns,  since 
once  under  fire  they  might  not  be  shifted.  By  retain 
ing  in  hand  a  large  group,  its  massed  fire  might  be  sud 
denly  hurled  against  any  point,  thereby  bringing  about 
a  decision.  The  introduction  of  horse  artillery  made 
the  very  rapid  concentration  of  guns  at  any  point  all 
the  more  possible. 

Du  Teil  was  the  original  exponent  of  increased  mo 
bility  in  field  artillery,  and  -the  concentration  of  its 
fire.*  "One  must  concentrate  the  bulk  of  the  troops 
and  a  superior  artillery  on  that  point  where  one  wishes 
to  defeat  the  enemy,  while  one  must  deceive  him  in  the 
other  points.  The  artillery  will  gain  superiority  over 
the  hostile  artillery  if  it  invariably  concentrates  its  fire 
on  the  decisive  points.  The  artillery  must  be  increased 
against  those  points  which  decide  the  victory;  thus  it 
gives  decisive  results.  When  attacking  a  position,  it  is 
only  a  question  of  concentrating  one's  fire  and  efforts 
upon  some  of  its  weak  points,  in  order  to  force  the 
enemy  to  evacuate  it.  The  moment  when  troops  are  to 
act  is  determined  by  the  havoc  which  the  artillery  will 
have  caused.  If  the  redoubts  are  breached,  the  hostile 
troops  demoralized  and  beaten,  the  victory  which  the 
artillery  has  prepared  only  depends  then  on  the  valour 
of  the  assailant,  etc."  The  representative  of  these  views 
had  left  the  regiment  la  Fere  shortly  before  young 
Bonaparte  joined  it,  and  du  Teil's  elder  brother,  in 
thorough  accord  with  such  views,  was  the  Commandant 
of  the  Military  School  at  Auxonne,  where  the  young 
officer  received  his  professional  training. t  Bonaparte, 
Senarmont,  and  Drouot,  were  therefore  early  impressed 
with  the  offensive  possibilities  of  field  artillery,  and 
Napoleon,  as  Von  Caemmerer  says,  thought  of  his  guns 
when  he  exclaimed,  "Le  feu  est  tout,  le  reste  n'est  rien." 

*The  Development  of  Strategical  Science.,  Von  Caemmerer,  p.  17. 
fVon  Caemmerer.     See  also  L'Education  Militaire  de  Napoleon}  Colin. 


160  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Napoleon,  then,  was  not  so  much  the  originator  of 
artillery  masses  as  the  military  executor  of  du  Teil,  as 
well  as  of  Guibert  and  Bourcet.  In  his  day  the  in 
creased  mobility  of  field  guns  over  those  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  and  the  terrible  power  of  case-shot  prepara 
tion,  together  with  the  more  judicious  use  of  reserves, 
made  it  possible  for  him  to  shatter  the  resistance  of  the 
enemy.*  But  a  vast  change  in  conditions  had  come 
about  with  the  introduction  of  the  rifled  gun.f  Ranges 
so  increased  that  no  longer  were  field  pieces  finally  com 
mitted  when  they  first  became  engaged  and  the  old  re 
serve  constantly  tended  to  keep  out  of  action  guns  which 
might  better  have  been  employed  from  the  first. 
Superior  ranges  over  the  small  arm  not  only  enabled 
the  guns  to  be  retained  in  hand  when  pushed  into  action, 
but  the  increased  range  gave  them  a  wider  zone  of 
efficiency,  for  without  changing  position  rifled  pieces 
were  able  to  cooperate  with  others  at  distant  points,  in 
concentrating  their  fire  on  any  given  position  of  the 
enemy.  Thus  the  effect  of  concentrated  fire  could  be 
secured  from  dispersed  groups  as  well  as  from  great 
masses  of  guns.J  Such  conditions,  rendering  it  un 
necessary  to  hold  back  a  great  reserve  group  of  guns, 
led  to  the  change  of  name  for  the  component  groups  of 
the  reserve  which  now  became  known  as  corps,  or  di 
visional  reserves. 

"Many  philosophers  have  said,"  wrote  Prince  Kraft, 
"What's  in  a  name?  But,  you  think  with  me  on  this 
subject,  that  the  Army  is  not  composed  of  philosophers. 
On  the  contrary,  they  are  men,  and  thus  human,  and  in 
the  stress  of  battle,  pay  little  attention  to  abstract 
principles.  Names,  gaudy  uniforms,  orders  and  an 
empty  stomach,  all  things  which  a  philosopher  treats 
with  contempt,  play  a  decisive  part  in  war.  Thus  the 
change  of  name  by  regulation  was  an  act  of  far-reach 
ing  results.  When  the  reserve  artillery  had  been  re 
named  corps  artillery,  every  leader  of  troops  and  every 


*  Evolution  of  Infantry  Tactics,  Maude,  pp.  118-120. 
t Field  Artillery  with  the  Other  Arms,  May,  pp.  60, 
^Letters  on  Field  Artillery,  Hohenlohe,  p.  140. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL   KKriJKN   LINDSAY   WALKER 

CHIEF  OF  ARTII,LEHY.   THIRD  CORPS 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  161 

staff  officer  was  at  once  compelled  to  recognize  that 
they  were  no  longer  to  be  held  in  reserve,  but  had  be 
come  a  part  of  the  line  of  battle." 

What  the  learned  Prussian  has  written  concerning 
the  change  in  the  tactical  employment  of  field  artillery 
in  Germany,  after  the  war  of  1866,  applies  with  great 
directness  to  conditions  in  America  in  1862,  but 
an  admission  cannot  be  found  in  his  work  that  American 
experience  had  contributed  to  the  Prussian  knowledge. 
There  are  indications  that  Von  Hinder  sin,  the  In 
spector-General  of  Artillery,  did  take  notice  of  our 
development  of,  and  experience  with,  the  new  rifled 
piece  in  the  Civil  War.  But  the  lessons  of  this  war  were 
not  heeded  by  the  Prussians  until  after  they  had  re 
ceived  many  reverses  with  their  artillery  in  their 
struggle  with  Austria.  The  faulty  employment  of  their 
guns  through  a  continued  adherence  to  the  reserve 
formation  led  the  Prussians  into  many  snares  in  1866, 
their  antagonists  having  profited  by  their  own  ex 
periences  in  1859.  But  in  their  disregard  of  what  had 
transpired  in  Virginia  we  find  a  striking  admonition  not 
to  ignore  what  our  neighbors  may  be  able  to  teach  us. 
That  America  had  sounded  the  practical  note  of  divi 
sional  artillery  many  years  before  it  reverberated 
through  the  continent  there  can  be  little  question,  al 
though  the  Austrians  and  Prussians  had  both  in  theory 
provided  for  divisional  artillery.  That  Johnston  totally 
ignored  the  tactical  principles  of  Napoleon  and  the 
French,  as  displayed  at  Solferino,  in  1859,  with  respect 
to  artillery  masses,  is  also  beyond  dispute. 

It  may  be  argued  that  the  Americans  were  merely 
groping  in  the  dark;  that  realizing  that  something  was 
wrong  somewhere,  a  change  was  necessary ;  that  the  fact 
that  a  reserve  was  maintained  in  addition  to  divisional 
groups  indicates  the  imperfection  of  tactical  ideas.  Yet, 
the  fact  remains  that  new  conditions  which  could  only  be 
thrown  into  relief  by  experience  were  promptly  met  and 
that  nowhere  do  we  find  a  practical  guide  for  the  radical 
changes  effected  by  McClellan  and  Lee. 


i 1 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  HORSE  ARTILLERY  AND  THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN 

THE  principle  event  in  the  field  artillery  arm  of  the 
Army  during  the  fall  of  1861,  outside  of  the  arrival  of 
new  batteries,  including  a  number  from  Maryland, 
North  and  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia,  and  the  gen 
eral  activity  in  refitting  and  drilling,  was  the  organiza 
tion  under  special  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
November  11,  1861,  of  a  horse  battery.  This  battery 
was  created  at  the  suggestion  of  Col.  Ashby,  command 
ing  the  cavalry  with  Jackson's  Army  in  the  Valley,  who 
perceived  the  great  value  of  guns  possessing  sufficient 
mobility  to  accompany  his  troopers,  and  its  organization 
was  the  first  step  toward  the  formation  of  that  wonder 
ful  horse  artillery  corps  which,  for  the  next  four  years 
under  Pelham,  Chew,  Beckham,  Breathed,  Thomson, 
and  others,  astounded  the  world  with  its  daring  and 
deeds  of  valor. 

Organized  with  an  enlisted  personnel  of  33  men,  its 
first  officers  were:  Robert  Preston  Chew,  Captain; 
Milton  Rouse,  First  Lieutenant;  James  Thomson, 
Second  Lieutenant;  all  young  graduates  of  the  Vir 
ginia  Military  Institute  and  former  pupils  of  Jackson, 
to  the  fame  of  whose  army  they  were  now  to  contribute 
many  laurels.  Chew's  Battery  soon  earned  for  itself  a 
name  and  reputation  second  only  to  that  of  Ashby  him 
self,  and  second  to  no  other  battery  in  the  Confederate 
armies.  The  clatter  of  its  horses'  feet,  the  rumble  of 
its  guns  upon  the  turnpike,  the  shriek  of  its  shells,  were 
sounds  familiar  to  every  resident  of  the  Valley  from  the 
Potomac  to  Staunton,  and  it  probably  took  part  in  more 
engagements  than  any  other  battery  in  the  war,  North 
or  South.  The  membership  of  this  celebrated  command 
increased  rapidly  after  its  organization,  up  to  April 
9,  1865,  when  it  surrendered  197  men.  After  the  death 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  163 

of  Ashby  and  Jackson,  Chew's  Battery  became  a  part 
of  Stuart's  horse  artillery  battalion,  of  which  in  1864 
the  gallant  Chew  became  commander.  The  history  of 
the  first  horse  battery  is  so  inseparably  interwoven  with 
that  of  Ashby,  Jackson,  and  Stuart,  that  it  cannot  be 
written  apart  from  that  of  those  famous  soldiers  and 
their  cavalry.  In  the  minds  of  the  men  of  the  Army  it 
and  Ashby 's  Cavalry  "belonged  to  each  other  as  by 
natural  affinity." 

The  armament  of  the  battery  from  first  to  last  con 
sisted  of  3  pieces;  a  Blakely  imported  British  rifled 
piece,  which  fired  a  percussion  shell;  a  smooth-bore  12- 
pounder  howitzer;  and  a  3-inch  iron  rifle. 

When  Chew  and  his  officers,  mere  beardless  youths, 
called  upon  Gen.  Jackson,  their  former  instructor,  to 
report  for  duty,  the  face  of  the  stern  soldier  wore  a 
quizzical,  though  amused,  expression,*  as  he  said, 
"Young  men,  now  that  you  have  your  company,  what 
are  you  going  to  do  with  it?"  The  deeds  of  the  battery 
from  then  on  were  to  be  the  answer,  a  reply  which  ap 
pealed  far  more  to  Jackson  than  words  could  have  done. 
Nothing  in  the  history  of  artillery  ever  surpassed  in 
skill  and  courage  the  service  of  Ashby 's  horse  battery 
in  the  Valley  campaign.  Unlimbering  on  every  hill,  it 
held  the  pursuers  in  check,  and  dashing  to  the  front  with 
the  foremost  troopers  it  opened  every  fight;  in  pursuit 
it  was  always  on  hand  working  havoc  among  the  fleeing 
foe.  The  remarks  of  Henderson  regarding  the  unsur 
passed  character  of  Jackson's  light  horse  under  Ashby 
apply  to  that  portion  of  the  latter's  command  known  as 
Chew's  Battery. 

Horse  artillery  had  also  been  early  recognized  in  the 
Union  Army  as  the  associate  of  properly  organized 
cavalry,  and  about  the  time  Chew's  Battery  was  formed, 
Company  A,  Second  Regiment,  Field  Artillery,  United 
States  Army,  was  equipped  for  that  service  at  Wash 
ington.  This  and  Chew's  Battery  were  the  first  horse 

*Chew  was  19,  Rouse  17,  and  Thomson  18  years  old  in  November,  1861. 
See  Chew's  address  at  the  unveiling  of  Ezekiel's  statue  of  Jackson,  at  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute,  June  19,  1912. 


164  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

artillery  in  America  since  Bragg's  company  was  dis 
mounted  at  Sante  Fe  after  the  Mexican  War.* 

The  force  which  was  given  Jackson  in  November 
1861,  with  which  to  play  upon  the  fears  of  the  Washing 
ton  Administration  by  threatening  the  Capital  from 
the  Valley,  was  indeed  a  small  one,  but  by  the  first  of 
the  following  year  it  had  been  largely  increased.  On 
January  10,  he  had  with  him  McLaughlin's  (Rock- 
bridge)  Battery,  6  guns;  Waters'  Battery,  4  guns; 
Carpenter's  Alleghany  Battery,  4  guns;  Marye's  Bat 
tery,  4  guns;  Chew's  Battery,  3  guns;  or  a  total  of  25 
pieces,  having  lost  Cutshaw's  2  guns  at  Romney  on 
January  7.f  Jackson's  Chief  of  Artillery  was  at  this 
time  Maj.  Daniel  Truehart,  an  old  cadet,  with  Lieut. 
Ed.  Willis  as  his  assistant,  and  his  ordnance  officer  was 
Lieut.  J.  M.  Garnett,  who  was  succeeded  by  Lieut. 
H.  H.  Lee  and  the  latter  by  Lieut.  R.  H.  Meade. 

When  in  February,  1862,  Banks  began  his  advance 
to  seize  Winchester,  arriving  at  Martinsburg  March  3, 
Jackson  was  instructed  "to  endeavor  to  employ  the  in 
vaders  in  the  Valley,  but  without  exposing  himself  to 
the  danger  of  defeat,  by  keeping  so  near  the  enemy  as  to 
prevent  him  from  making  any  considerable  detachment 
to  reenforce  McClellan,  but  not  so  near  that  he  might 
be  compelled  to  fight. "J  Jackson's  force  now  consisted 
of  3,600  infantry,  600  cavalry,  and  the  6  batteries,  with 
their  27  guns  before  mentioned,  the  artillery  with  a 
total  personnel  of  369.  § 

Banks  had  with  him  when  he  crossed  the  Potomac 
38,000  men,  including  2,000  cavalry,  and  80  pieces  of 
artillery,  a  large  proportion  of  which  were  the  most 
modern  rifled  guns,  fully  horsed  and  equipped.! 

In  the  great  campaign  which  followed,  the  artillery, 
far  inferior  in  equipment  to  that  of  the  Federals  in  every 
respect,  except  as  to  personnel,  was  able  by  the  daring 

*Birkhimer,  p.   70. 
fChew  was  with  Ashby  at  the  time. 
^Johnston's  Narrative,  p.   10G. 

§Henderson's  Stonewall  Jackson.,  p.  270  ;  Jackson's  Valley  Campaign.  Allan, 
p.  39. 

^Henderson's  Jackson,  p.  265. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  165 

and  skill  of  its  men  successfully  to  oppose  the  enemy  on 
almost  every  battlefield.  The  marching  ability  of  the 
batteries,  more  often  provided  with  four-horse  teams 
than  otherwise,  was  on  a  par  with  that  of  the  wonderful 
infantry.  "Whilst  it  is  absolutely  true  that  no  soldiers 
ever  marched  with  less  to  encumber  them  than  the  Con 
federates,  it  is  no  empty  boast  that  none  ever  marched 
faster,  or  held  out  longer."  "Fine  feathers,  though  they 
may  have  their  use,  are  hardly  essential  to  efficiency  in 
the  field."* 

In  the  Valley  campaign  there  is  little  of  a  tactical 
nature  to  be  considered  concerning  the  light  artillery. 
The  batteries,  though  poorly  armed,  horsed,  and 
equipped,  were  officered  by  bold,  gallant,  intelligent 
men,  who  did  all  which  under  the  prevailing  system 
could  have  been  expected  of  them.  The  enlisted  per 
sonnel,  consisting  largely  of  highly  educated  and 
socially  superior  volunteers,  while  not  possessing  the  dis 
cipline  of  the  men  in  the  Northern  batteries,  surpassed 
the  latter  in  individual  efficiency.  Of  this,  there  can  be 
little  doubt,  and  to  this  fact  must  be  largely  attributed 
the  ability  of  the  Confederate  gunners  so  successfully 
to  oppose  the  highly  efficient  batteries  of  the  Federal 
Army.  The  batteries  of  Jackson's  army  displayed  the 
same  endurance,  tenacity,  ability  to  stand  punishment, 
and  elan  common  to  the  rest  of  his  troops.  They  were 
fought  with  few  exceptions  as  batteries;  massed  fire 
when  employed  resulting  from  the  accident  of  position, 
rather  than  from  a  preconceived  plan.  Jackson,  an 
artilleryman  himself,  did  much  to  scout  the  old  idea  that 
artillery  was  incapable  of  facing  the  fire  of  infantry. 
The  practice  of  withdrawing  the  guns  when  infantry 
fire  was  opened  upon  them,  so  common  in  the  armies  of 
his  opponents,  received  no  sanction  from  him,  and  soon 
his  gunners  learned  the  fallacy  of  such  tactics  and  took 
their  punishment  unflinchingly. 

But,  if  no  new  principle  of  light  artillery  tactics  de 
veloped,  or  no  old  forgotten  ones  were  revived,  in  this 

"Thus  wrote  Henderson  of  Jackson's  troops,  p.  273.  In  48  marching  days 
they  covered  676  miles,  an  average  of  14  miles  per  diem. 


166  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

campaign,  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  the  horse  artillery 
which  introduced  and  adopted  a  maneuver  in  battle 
hitherto  known  to  have  been  executed  in  but  insolated 
cases,  one  of  which  was  when  Ramsey's  horse  battery 
at  Fuentes  de  Onoro,  finding  itself  cut  off  by  French 
cavalry,  limbered  up,  charged  the  enemy,  and  cut  its 
way  out.  But  this  action,  nor  the  charges  of  the 
mounted  Prussian  detachments  of  the  horse  artillery, 
which  the  gunners  were  trained  to  make  to  save  their 
guns  from  capture,  can  be  said  to  have  constituted 
shock  tactics  for  artillery.  This  new  development  in 
the  Confederate  artillery  was  the  natural  outgrowth  of 
Ashby's  reckless  daring,  and  the  courage  of  Capt. 
Chew.  Born  of  an  accident,  as  it  were,  when  the 
practicability  of  the  maneuver  was  perceived,  the 
practice  became  more  or  less  general  in  the  Confederate 
horse  artillery  and  was  frequently  repeated  during  the 
war  as  will  be  shown.  The  facts  concerning  the  first 
instance  of  guns  charging  with  the  cavalry  are  given  in 
the  words  of  Col.  R.  Preston  Chew  himself,  whose  recol 
lection  of  the  incident  is  borne  out  by  numerous 
authorities.* 

"Gen.  Jackson  had  assembled  his  army  at  Cedarville,  on  the 
road  from  Front  Royal  to  Winchester,,  on  the  night  of  the  23d  of 
May,,  1862.  On  the  24th  Gen.  Ashby  was  ordered,  with  his  cavalry, 
supported  by  a  part  of  Taylor's  Bridgade,  to  take  Chew's  Battery 
and  two  guns  from  the  Rockbridge  Artillery.,  and  assail  the  enemy 
at  Middletown  on  the  Valley  turnpike.  His  advance  was  stubbornly 
opposed  by  the  Federal  Infantry,  but  he  succeeded  in  driving  them 
back,  and  emerged  into  the  open  field  near  Middletown.  Telling 
me  to  move  with  the  cavalry,  he  charged  the  enemy's  cavalry,  from 
2,000  to  2,500  strong,  in  the  road  at  Middletown.  Our  guns 
charged  with  the  cavalry,  and  when  within  a  short  distance, 
probably  100  yards  from  the  turnpike,  we  unlimbered  and  opened 
on  the  Federals.  There  was  a  stone  fence  on  either  side  of  the 
road,  and  we  caught  them  at  a  great  disadvantage.  .  .  .  The 
enemy  fled  in  every  direction,  and  Ashby  pursued  them  along  the 
turnpike  toward  Newtown.  When  we  came  to  a  point  called 
Crisman's,  he  reformed  his  cavalry,  and  telling  me  again  to  charge 

*Col.  Chew's  statement  is  contained  in  a  letter  to  the  author,  dated  November 
9,  1912.  See  also  the  Laurel  Brigade,  McDonald,  pp.  60,  61;  Asliby  and  His 
Compeers,  Avirett ;  Ashby  and  His  Men,  Thomas. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  167 

with  his  troops,  he  assailed  the  enemy,  who  were  drawn  up  upon 

the   crest  of  a  hill.     We  went   at  them  with   the  same  maneuver 

adopted    at    Middletown,    and    drove    the    enemy  back    in    great 
confusion."* 

In  referring  to  the  first  charge  of  Ashby's  cavalry, 
with  Chew's  guns,  Jackson,  in  his  official  report,  wrote: 
"In  a  few  moments  the  turnpike,  which  just  before  had 
teemed  with  life,  presented  a  most  appalling  spectacle 
of  carnage  and  destruction.  The  road  was  literally  ob 
structed  with  the  mingled  and  confused  mass  of 
struggling  and  dying  horses  and  riders.  Amongst  the 
survivors,  the  wildest  confusion  ensued,  and  they 
scattered  in  disorder  in  various  directions,  leaving  some 
200  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederates." 

Col.  Chew  recently  gave  the  author  a  verbal  arid  a 
more  detailed  account  of  the  affair,  stating  that  he  was 
utterly  amazed  when  Ashby  told  him  to  charge  with  the 
guns  and  that  he  hardly  had  time  to  consider  the  order 
before  it  was  to  be  executed,  the  command  and  the  time 
of  execution  being  almost  simultaneous.  Forming  be 
hind  a  thin  line  of  cavalry,  the  guns  moved  off  at  a 
gallop,  the  troopers  passing  to  the  flanks  as  the  guns 
unlimbered  and  went  into  action.  The  enemy,  unable 
to  discern  the  guns  at  first,  and  seeing  but  a  few 
troopers,  were  dumfounded  when  they  perceived  their 
peril  and  became  panic  stricken  upon  the  first  discharge 
of  the  "Blakely,"  and  the  bursting  of  a  shell. 

Writing  of  subsequent  charges  of  the  Horse  Artillery, 
Col.  Chew  says: 

"In  1864,  when  I  commanded  the  Horse  Artillery,  we  joined 
Rosser  on  the  Cartharpin  Road.  He  was  engaged  with  Wilson's 
Division,  cavalry,  and,  immediately  after  we  joined  him,  we  charged 
the  enemy  with  his  brigade.  I  carried  Thomson's  Battery  into 
the  charge  with  the  cavalry,  and,  after  Rosser  had  struck  the  head 
of  their  column,  we  threw  the  guns  into  position,  and  did  fine 
execution.  The  next  day  at  Rose's  farm,  when  Stuart  was  in 
command,  we  went  into  the  fight  with  the  cavalry  again.  This  was 
often  done  by  the  Horse  Artillery  in  subsequent  fights. "f 

*The  incident  as  narrated  is  also  declared  to  be  correct  by  Col.  W.  T.  Poague, 
who  commanded  the  Rockbridge  Battery  at  the  time,  and  who  is  now  an  officer 
of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute  with  the  author. 

fSame  personal   letter  hereinbefore  referred  to. 


168  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Such  action  on  the  part  of  horse  artillery  was  as 
novel  as  it  was  effective,  but  it  must  be  admitted  its 
proper  execution  required  extraordinary  qualities. 
True,  the  chief  duties  of  horse  artillery,  then  as  it  now  is 
and  always  has  been,  was  to  stay  with  the  cavalry  at  all 
costs,  and  cooperate  with  it  by  preparing  the  road  for 
its  advance  and  retarding  pursuers,  but  having  prepared 
the  road,  it  was  never  before  contemplated  that  the 
gunners  should  accompany  the  troopers  to  the  assault. 
The  feats  of  Chew  with  his  battery  excelled  even  those 
of  the  horse  gunner,  Kostenetski,  at  Austerlitz,  and 
more  than  fulfilled  the  maxim  of  Napoleon,  that  "Horse 
Artillery  and  Cavalry  must  be  the  complements,  the  one 
of  the  other";  and  of  Leer,  that  "Horse  Artillery  must 
be  Cavalry  with  guns." 

The  Prussian  Horse  Artillery,  of  1866,  was  con 
sidered  by  the  greatest  artillery  authority  on  the 
continent  to  have  done  its  full  duty  when  it  moved  into 
position,  perhaps  the  last  500  yards  at  a  gallop,  and 
silenced  the  enemy's  guns  in  the  artillery  duel  preced 
ing  the  charge  of  its  cavalry.*  And,  later,  when  rifled 
pieces  were  generally  introduced  into  the  horse  bat 
teries,  it  was  not  deemed  necessary  for  them  to  ap 
proach  as  close  to  the  enemy  as  before.  In  comparison 
with  the  Prussian  ideas,  Ashby's  innovation  was,  to  say 
the  least,  a  radical  one. 

The  limited  scope  of  such  a  work  as  this  is  designed 
to  be  precludes  the  possibility  of  following  in  detail  the 
performances  of  Jackson's  gunners,  which,  while  in  in 
numerable  instances  quite  remarkable,  displayed  few 
departures  from  the  tactical  principles  of  the  time.  For 
an  intimate  knowledge  of  officers,  men,  and  conditions 
of  the  Artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Valley,  one  must  con 
sult  the  numerous  delightful  works  to  be  had,  dealing 
with  the  minutia  of  the  service,  f 

^Letters  on  Artillery,  Hohenlohe,  p.  144. 

•\Three  Years  in  the  Confederate  Horse  Artillery,  Neese ;  The  Story  of  a 
Cannoneer  Under  Stonewall  Jackson,  Moore ;  The  Laurel  Brigade,  McDonald ; 
AsKby  and  His  Compeers,  Avirett ;  Ashly  and  His  Men,  Thomas.  For  full  and 
accurate  accounts  of  Jackson's  campaigns,  see  Jackson's  Valley  Campaign,  Allan  ; 
and  Stonewall  Jackson,  Henderson. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  169 

It  is  interesting,  however,  to  note  the  comparative 
strength  in  personnel  and  guns  of  the  artillery  of  Jack 
son  and  his  various  opponents. 

At  Kernstown,  Jackson  had  with  him  27  pieces  of 
artillery,  18  of  which  only  were  engaged,  while  Shields 
had  in  command  of  Lieut.-Col.  Philip  Daum,  Jenks' 
and  Davis'  brigade  batteries,  and  Clark's  regular  bat 
tery,  with  a  total  of  24  guns.  In  this  engagement, 
Carpenter's,  McLaughlin's,  and  Waters'  batteries, 
silenced  the  main  body  of  the  Federal  guns  and  were 
withdrawn  only  as  a  result  of  Garnett's  untimely  re 
treat.  The  Confederate  batteries  on  this  occasion  were 
divided  between  the  two  flanks  of  the  infantry  line,  and 
the  Federal  batteries,  5  in  number,  occupied  5  quite  dis 
tinct  positions,  and  of  course  with  the  available  lines  of 
communication,  were  capable  of  little  concert  of  action. 

The  massed  fire  of  batteries  contemplates  more  than 
proximity  of  position  of  guns.  At  Kernstown  there 
was  neither  concentration  of  fire  nor  proximity  of 
position,  a  number  of  the  batteries  on  both  sides  merely 
having  the  same  target.  There  is  nothing  to  lead  us  to 
believe  that  the  fire  of  the  three  batteries  which  Jackson 
placed  on  his  right  was  even  expected  to  be  directed  with 
any  definite  purpose,  except  to  do  the  most  harm  pos 
sible  to  the  enemy. 

When  Garnett  fell  back  from  his  position  near  Jack 
son's  main  group  of  artillery  on  the  right,  a  swarm  of 
Federal  skirmishers  in  the  thickets  fired  upon  the  bat 
teries,  severely  punishing  them  before  they  withdrew. 
In  limbering  up  one  of  the  6-pounders  was  overturned, 
and  as  some  of  the  enemy's  infantry  was  already  within 
50  paces,  the  sergeant  in  charge  cut  loose  the  remaining 
three  horses,  the  gun  being  abandoned  to  the  enemy. 
Jackson  had,  therefore,  lost  three  pieces  of  artillery,  in 
cluding  the  two  guns  captured  from  Cutshaw  at 
Romney. 

In  the  battle  of  Kernstown,  the  artillery  personnel 
engaged  was,  Federal  608,  and  Confederate  about 
200.*  The  latter  suffered  a  loss  of  17  wounded  and  1 
missing,  the  former,  killed  4,  wounded  2.f 

*For  Federal  strength,  see  Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XII,  Part  III,  p.  4. 
^Stonewall  Jackson,  Henderson,  p.  262.     Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  II,  p.  299. 


170  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Soon  after  the  battle  of  McDowell,  in  which  there  was 
no  good  opportunity  to  employ  artillery,  Gen.  Jackson 
applied  to  have  Lieut. -Col.  Stapleton  Crutchfield,  of 
the  58th  Virginia  Infantry,  assigned  to  him  as  Chief 
of  Artillery.  This  officer  had  the  previous  Spring  been 
assigned  to  duty  as  a  major  of  the  9th  Virginia  Ar 
tillery,  stationed  at  Craney  Island  near  Norfolk,  but  not 
liking  the  monotony  of  coast  defense  duty,  he  had  trans 
ferred  to  a  more  active  branch.  Crutchfield  was  just 
twenty-six  years  of  age  when  he  became  Jackson's 
Chief  of  Artillery,  but  their  relations  were  born  of 
mutual  confidence  in  one  another.  Not  only  had  the 
young  officer  been  a  pupil  of  Jackson's  at  the  Virginia 
Military  Institute,  graduating  first  in  the  Class  of 
1855,  but  he  had  served  as  an  assistant  professor  of 
mathematics  in  the  faculty  of  the  school  for  six  years 
with  the  man  who  was  now  to  be  his  commander, 

May  21,  Jackson's  force  was  largely  increased  by  the 
union  of  his  own  division  with  that  of  Gen.  Ewell,  to 
which  was  attached  Courtney's  and  Brockenbrough's 
batteries,  the  Army  of  the  Valley  now  numbering  about 
1,600,  including  an  artillery  personnel  of  from  300  to 
400.*  The  artillery  with  the  Army  at  the  time  of  the 
battle  of  Winchester  was  composed  of  the  following 
batteries : 

Poague's  Battery,  6  guns;  Carpenter's  Battery,  4 
guns;  Cutshaw's  Battery,  4  guns;  Wooding's  Battery, 
4  guns;  Caskie's  Battery,  4  guns;  Raine's  Battery,  4 
guns;  Rice's  Battery,  4  guns;  Lusk's  Battery,  4  guns; 
Courtney's  Battery,  6  guns;  Brockenbrough's  Battery, 
4  guns;  Chew's  Battery,  3  guns;  total  pieces  of  artillery, 
47  guns.f 

The  Federal  force  at  Strasburg,  under  Banks  at  this 
time,  numbered  between  6,000  and  7,000  men,  includ 
ing  3  batteries  with  a  personnel  of  about  280  and  an 
armament  of  ten  3-inch  Parrott  rifles,  and  six  S.  B.  6- 

*Jackson's   Valley  Campaign,  Allan,   p.   93. 

^Jackson's  Valley  Campaign,  Allan,  pp.  91,  92,  93,  108,  109,  111.  Chew's 
Battery  did  not  have  four  pieces  as  stated  by  Col.  Allan.  Poague's  (Rockbridge) 
Battery,  formerly  commanded  by  Pendleton,  then  McLaughlin,  had  had  8  guns 
for  some  time,  but  6  in  May. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  171 

pounders.  Jackson  had  captured  the  two  10-pounder 
Parrott  rifles  of  Knapp's  Battery  at  Front  Royal,  on 
the  22d  of  May,  thus  collecting  the  debt  which  the 
enemy  owed  him  for  the  3  guns  he  had  lost.* 

In  the  battle  of  Winchester,  while  the  Confederates 
were  greatly  superior  to  Banks  in  artillery,  as  well  as 
in  infantry,  2  well-placed  Federal  batteries  with  rifled 
pieces,  and  a  loss  of  but  2  killed,  14  wounded,  and  12 
missing,  severely  punished  3  batteries,  Poague's, 
Carpenter's,  and  Cutshaw's,  with  which  Jackson  en 
gaged  them  in  a  duel,  the  first  alone  losing  2  officers,  16 
men,  and  9  horses;  the  second,  1  officer,  and  5  men. 
The  Federal  batteries  were  assisted  to  some  extent  by 
their  skirmishers,  who  effectually  harassed  the  Confed 
erate  gunners,  but  the  great  damage  sustained  by 
Poague's  Battery  wras  due  to  the  fact  that  one  of  the 
Federal  batteries  skillfully  changed  position,  supported 
by  an  infantry  regiment,  and  enfiladed  it.  Yet,  the  fact 
remains  that  acting  more  or  less  together  in  their  duel 
with  Banks'  guns,  the  three  Confederate  batteries  al 
most  entirely  diverted  the  artillery  fire  of  the  enemy 
from  the  infantry,  thus  enabling  Taylor's  and  Winder's 
men  to  charge  home  and  win  the  day. 

But  the  question  naturally  arises,  if  Banks  had  but 
3  batteries  and  Jackson  had  8,  besides  the  two  on  the 
right  with  Ewell,  and  the  horse  battery  off  with  Ashby, 
where  were  the  five  disengaged  batteries?  Surely  they 
were  not  all  being  engaged  by  the  remaining  Federal 
battery  of  6  pieces.  It  is  quite  plain  now  to  see  that  with 
such  a  superiority  in  the  number  of  guns,  Jackson  should 
not  have  allowed  a  few  of  his  batteries  to  do  all  the  work, 
but  should  have  smothered  the  enemy's  fire  early  in  the 
day  with  the  combined,  or  we  should  say,  the  simul 
taneous  fire  of  every  available  gun,  not  only  saving  his 
batteries,  but  his  infantry  as  well.  The  error  committed 
by  Jackson  in  this  respect  was  one  repeatedly  com 
mitted  by  the  Prussians  in  1866,  who  did  not  under- 

*Jackson's  Valley  Campaign,  Allan,  pp.  94,  109.  These  were  Best's  Battery, 
6  guns ;  Cothran's  Battery,  6  guns ;  and  Hampton's  Battery,  4  guns.  Ibid., 
pp.  96,  98. 


172  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

stand  how  to  bring  up  their  guns  to  the  front,  a  lesson 
which  the  Austrians  had  learned  in  1859,  and  applied 
throughout  the  war  with  disastrous  results  to  their 
enemy.  But,  if  the  manner  of  the  employment  of  his 
artillery  was  faulty  in  the  engagement  itself,  the  man 
ner  in  which  he  caused  two  of  his  batteries  to  hang  upon 
the  heels  of  the  retreating  enemy  is  especially  worthy 
of  praise,  the  Potomac  alone  stopping  the  batteries 
which  had  suffered  the  most.  Indeed,  one  is  constantly 
surprised  at  the  remarkable  mobility  and  pertinacity  of 
Poague's  and  Carpenter's  batteries,  which  had  won  for 
themselves  the  name  of  the  Stonewall  Artillery,  fitting 
companions  of  the  Stonewall  Brigade,  acting  on  more 
than  one  occasion  with  Ashby's  horse  artillery. 

The  main  difference  between  the  artillery  fire  at 
Kernstown  and  Winchester,  was  in  the  range  at  which 
the  guns  fought  in  the  two  battles.  At  Kernstown,  the 
opposing  batteries  certainly  did  not  approach  each  other 
at  any  stage  of  the  battle,  nearer  than  one  mile  and 
much  of  their  fire  was  delivered  at  a  range  of  over  2,500 
yards.  On  the  other  hand,  at  Winchester,  the  artillery 
duel  between  Poague's,  Cutshaw's,  and  Carpenter's  bat 
teries,  and  the  two  Federal  batteries,  was  conducted  at  a 
short  range  even  for  that  period,  not  exceeding  800 
yards  in  the  main,  and  for  some  of  the  batteries  as  close 
as  500  yards.  This  sudden  drawing  together  of  the 
two  artilleries  was  undoubtedly  due  more  to  the  con 
figuration  of  the  terrain,  than  to  any  desire  to  develop 
the  fire  of  the  guns  at  a  decisive  range.  Then,  too,  ar- 
tilery  positions  were  determined  to  a  large  extent  by 
considerations  for  the  supporting  infantry,  as  well  as 
for  the  guns,  a  feature  which  has  become  less  important 
as  the  range  of  the  latter  has  increased,  since  batteries 
with  long  range  guns  can  secure  great  effect  at  distances 
which  forbid  the  idea  of  a  serious  fire  fight  between  in 
fantry.  In  1862,  before  infantry  received  its  support 
from  the  guns,  it  had  first  to  support  them.  Improved 
material,  however,  enabled  the  artillery  to  give  the 
infantry  effective  support,  more  or  less  independently 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  173 

of  the  position  of  the  latter,  and  the  batteries  now  are 
expected  to  enter  the  zone  of  effective  infantry  fire  only 
after  the  opposing  artillery  has  been  silenced  and  their 
own  infantry  has  advanced  to  the  assault,  masking  to  a 
large  extent  the  fire  of  the  guns  which  have  helped  them 
forward.  During  this  phase  of  the  combat  it  is  assumed 
that  either  the  infantry  will  divert  the  musketry  fire  of 
the  enemy  from  its  guns,  enabling  the  latter  to  move 
up  to  a  decisive  range,  or  that  if  the  defenders  neglect 
the  assaulting  infantry,  the  guns  by  receiving  the  fire 
will  make  it  all  the  easier  for  the  assaulting  infantry  to 
reach  the  position  of  the  enemy.  In  either  case,  the 
artillery  will  do  its  part,  but  the  former  will  be  the  gen 
eral  result  of  the  modern  method  of  attack,  when  the 
guns  of  the  offense  have  obtained  a  superiority  over 
those  of  the  defense. 

In  the  battles  of  Port  Republic  and  Cross  Keys, 
Crutchfield's  artillery  consisted  of  6  batteries,  Carpen 
ter's,  Caskie's,  Cutshaw's,  Wooding's,  Poague's,  and 
Carrington's,  with  a  total  personnel  of  about  300  men, 
the  last  having  joined  since  the  battle  of  Winchester. 
Only  5  batteries  were  actually  engaged.*  E well's  Di 
vision  had  in  addition  to  Brockenbrough's  Baltimore 
Battery,  attached  to  the  Maryland  line  under  Steuart, 
4  batteries,  Latimer's  Courtney,  Lusk's,  Raine's,  and 
Rice's.  Thus,  exclusive  of  Chew's  Battery  (under 
Munford  since  Ashby's  death) ,  Jackson  had  11  batteries 
with  a  total  personnel  of  about  600  men,  and  48  guns. 

In  the  two  engagements  the  losses  of  the  Confederate 
Artillery  were  8  killed,  29  wounded,  and  9  missing,  a 
total  of  but  46. 

Shields'  Division  at  Port  Republic  had  16  guns,  the 
batteries  being  the  same  as  at  Winchester  under  Daum. 
These  batteries  fought  with  great  gallantry,  losing  31 
men,  and  7  of  their  guns  in  hand-to-hand  encounters 
with  the  Confederate  Infantry  after  having  all  but 
routed  the  attackers  before  the  latter  were  reenforced. 
But  if  anything,  they  had  by  far  the  worst  of  the  artillery 

*Stonewall  Jackson.,  Henderson,  p.  474  ;  Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  II,  p.  301 ; 
Jackson's  Valley  Campaign,  Allan,  p.  145,  et  seq. 


174  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

fight  proper,  though  they  were  most  skillfully  disposed, 
about  half  being  placed  on  a  wooded  mountain  side. 

Fremont's  artillery  consisted  of  10  batteries  which, 
arriving  with  their  supine  leader,  were  overwhelmed  by 
the  Confederate  guns,  occupying  as  they  did  a  most 
favorable  position. 

At  Cross  Keys,  the  batteries  of  Courtney,  Lusk, 
Brockenbrough,  and  Raines,  were  massed  in  the  center 
of  Swell's  line  and  acted  more  in  concert  than  artillery 
had  hitherto  done  in  the  campaign.  Their  fire  was  well 
conducted,  with  all  the  advantages  of  position  to  which 
artillery  is  entitled  by  a  prior  selection  for  the  defense 
of  a  given  point. 

At  Port  Republic,  Wooding's,  Poague's,  and 
Carpenter's  batteries,  in  position  on  the  north  bluff  of 
the  river,  safe  from  infantry  attack,  the  brigade  being 
defended  by  Carrington's  guns,  exerted  by  a  well- 
directed  fire  great  influence  upon  the  issue,  raking  the 
Federal  Infantry  with  deadly  effect,  and  playing  upon 
Daum's  guns  whenever  an  opportunity  to  shift  from 
the  infantry  was  allowed  them.  The  employment  of 
the  artillery  at  Port  Republic  and  Cross  Keys  evidences 
a  growing  tendency  on  the  part  of  Jackson  to  use  his 
batteries,  to  a  certain  extent,  in  concert,  instead  of  dis 
tributing  them  here  and  there  on  the  battlefield  with  his 
brigades,  and  thereby  dissipating  the  effect  of  their 
fire. 

Early  in  the  war,  the  Confederate  Bureau  of 
Ordnance  had  developed  a  2.25-inch  mountain  rifle, 
which  was  transported  in  parts  on  the  backs  of  mules, 
much  after  the  present  system  of  mountain  artillery. 
There  was  also  a  12-pounder  mountain  howitzer,  of  the 
model  of  1841,  in  use  in  the  service,  though  but  few 
pieces  of  ordnance  of  this  character  were  ever  placed  in 
the  field.  For  occasional  draught,  when  the  roads  per 
mitted,  the  gun  carriage  was  provided  with  a  thill, 
which  was  attached  to  the  same  saddle  that  carried  the 
pack.*  A  mule  battery  of  12-pounder  mountain 

*See  pp.  9,  49,  Ordnance  Manual,  C.  S.  A.,  1863,  and  plate  6. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  175 

howitzers,  in  command  of  Maj.  Imboden,  reported  to 
Jackson  just  before  the  action  of  Port  Republic,  but 
did  not  accomplish  much  in  the  way  of  results  by  reason 
of  the  conduct  of  the  mules  under  fire.  Their  loads 
weighing  about  300  pounds  were  so  securely  attached 
to  them,  that  they  resorted  to  the  tactics  of  rolling  on 
the  ground  to  free  themselves,  and  the  gunners  were 
principally  occupied  in  holding  down  the  recalcitrant 
mules,  rather  than  delivering  a  fire  upon  the  enemy.* 
But  while  the  battery  did  not  accomplish  much  from  a 
military  standpoint,  it  afforded  rare  amusement  to  the 
men  of  the  Infantry.  With  the  air  of  men  seeking 
technical  information,  they  would  seriously  inquire 
whether  the  mules  or  the  guns  were  intended  to  go  off 
first,  and  whether  the  gun  was  to  fire  the  mule,  or  the 
mule  the  gun.f  In  the  estimate  of  Jackson's  artillery 
at  Port  Republic,  Imboden's  Battery  was  not  included, 
for  under  the  circumstances  its  guns  could  not  be 
properly  classed  as  effective  ordnance. 

In  the  Valley  campaign  the  Confederate  Artillery  as 
a  whole  demonstrated  its  mobility  beyond  a  question. 
It  had  been  constantly  engaged  in  fighting  and  march 
ing  for  many  days,  pitted  always  against  superior  ma 
terial.  Yet,  it  had  lost  but  3  pieces,  while  the  enemy  lost 
9.  An  unusual  proportion  of  its  officers  subsequently 
attained  higher  rank,  the  experience  they  had  gained  in 
the  Valley  proving  of  great  service  to  the  Army  as  a 
whole. 


*A  3-inch  rifled  Parrott  gun  which  Imboden  had  brought  with  him  was 
turned  over  to  1'oague's  Battery  at  1'ort  Republic. 

t Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  II,  p.  291,  et  seq.;  Stonewall  Jackson,  Henderson, 
Vol.  V..  p.  465. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  PENINSULA  CAMPAIGN 

THE  details  of  the  movement  of  the  Artillery  down  the 
Peninsula  to  Yorktown  are  simply  those  of  monotonous 
marches  day  after  day,  through  sand  and  mud,  till  men 
and  beasts  were  exhausted.  But,  on  this  long  and 
arduous  march,  the  light  batteries  were  well  seasoned  to 
work  the  character  of  which  always  tends  to  the  elimina 
tion  of  surplus  train,  and  the  weaker  element  of  the 
personnel.  It  was  the  first  duty  of  this  kind  which  the 
Field  Artillery,  except  that  in  the  Valley,  had  been 
called  upon  to  perform. 

In  front  of  Yorktown  McClellan  had  established 
siege  batteries,  mounting  71  guns,  including  two  200- 
pounder,  and  five  100-pounder  rifles,  and  a  number  of 
13-inch  mortars,  with  which  to  overwhelm  Magruder's 
weak  lines.  On  May  1,  his  batteries  opened  fire.  To 
oppose  the  Federal  land  force,  Magruder  had  mounted 
in  his  works  about  15  nondescript  pieces  of  ordnance,  in 
cluding  a  number  of  field  guns,  for  which  there  were 
from  30  to  60  rounds  of  ammunition,  according  to  the 
caliber  of  the  pieces.*  Desperate  efforts  were  now  made 
to  transfer  some  of  the  heavier  ordnance  from  the  water 
batteries  to  the  land  side  of  the  defenses. 

The  Army  of  the  Peninsula,  or  the  right  wing  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  numbering  22,740  men 
of  all  arms,  on  April  23,  1862,  included  a  field  artillery 
personnel  of  646,  with  49  pieces,  and  a  heavy  artillery 
brigade  of  697  men.f  With  such  a  deficiency  of  ar 
tillery,  both  as  to  men  and  material,  Johnston  never 
once  contemplated  risking  siege  operations  at  York- 
town,  although  on  the  18th  he  had  brought  up  the  left 
wing  and  had  reorganized  his  army,  placing  it  in  posi 
tion  behind  the  lines  already  established.  The  right  of 

*Rebcllion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  III,  pp.  438,  439,  447. 
flbid.,   p.   460. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  177 

the  position  commencing  at  Dam  No.  1,  and  extending 
to  the  Warwick  River,  was  assigned  to  Magruder; 
Yorktown  proper  to  D.  H.  Hill;  the  center  to  Long- 
street;  and  the  reserve  to  G.  W.  Smith.  With  the  last 
was  the  reserve  artillery.* 

May  2,  the  artillery,  except  the  heavy  guns,  was 
ordered  to  be  quietly  withdrawn  from  the  lines  after 
sunset,  and  put  in  motion  for  Williamsburg,t  and  on 
May  3,  the  entire  Army  began  to  retire  before  the 
enemy  up  the  Peninsula. 

The  artillery  at  this  time  was  quite  dependent  upon 
infantry  supports,  even  on  the  march.  Magruder's 
battle  orders,  he  himself  having  been  an  artilleryman, 
prescribed  that  commanding  officers  should  always 
designate  a  sufficient  force  of  infantry  to  protect  the 
guns  in  action,  and  that  in  all  marches,  whether  to  the 
front  or  rear,  the  artillery  should  be  placed  at  intervals 
in  the  infantry  columns.  In  marching  on  narrow  roads, 
brigade  batteries  were  to  be  split  up  into  sections,  one 
moving  near  the  rear  of  the  brigade  to  which  its  battery 
belonged.  If  a  column  were  attacked  in  retreat,  the 
practice  was  for  the  cavalry  and  infantry  to  leave  the 
road  in  order  to  allow  the  rear  guns  a  clear  field  of  fire, 
and  in  the  event  the  enemy's  cavalry  undertook  to 
charge  the  guns,  the  infantry  formed  a  square,  or 
circle,  about  them  at  charge  bayonets,  firing  when  neces 
sary  4  Such  dispositions  were  induced  mainly  by 
the  closeness  of  the  country  in  which  the  Army  of  the 
Peninsula  was  operating  and  were  generally  adhered 
to  in  that  section. 

The  retrograde  movement  of  the  Artillery  from  York- 
town  was  attended  with  the  utmost  difficulty  and  hard 
ship.  Execrable  weather  had  rendered  the  roads  all 
but  bottomless,  and  without  the  constant  assistance  of 
the  infantry  commands,  the  gunners  would  have  been 
utterly  unable  to  save  their  pieces  from  the  mires  and 
later  from  the  enemy.  No  march  of  artillery  was  ever, 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  III,  p.  448,  G.  O.  No.  1. 
flbid.,  p.  489,  General  Order. 
$Ibid.,  p.  410,  G.  O.  No.  168. 


12 


178  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

perhaps,  made  under  more  adverse  conditions,  for  the 
route  of  the  Army  lay  over  roads  which  were  delusions 
as  highways.  Horses  for  the  additional  guns  taken 
from  the  Yorktown  defenses  were  sadly  lacking,  and 
not  even  those  of  the  cavalry,  the  personal  property  of 
the  men  themselves,  were  available  for  purposes  of 
draught.  Thus,  the  worn-out  teams  of  the  light  bat 
teries,  already  much  reduced  by  the  march  of  the  pre 
ceding  week,  were  called  upon  for  the  most  unreason 
able  exertions.  Sunday  night,  the  4th,  the  Reserve 
Artillery  had  reached  Hickory  Neck  Church,  and  by  the 
most  tremendous  efforts  succeeded  in  reaching  Barhams- 
ville  on  the  5th.  On  that  day  occurred  the  fight  at  Wil- 
liamsburg,  in  which  nothing  of  special  import  concern 
ing  the  artillery  of  either  army  took  place,  except  that 
Hooker  and  Smith  lost  12  pieces  of  artillery  and  young 
Capt.  John  Pelham  of  Stuart's  horse  battery  greatly 
distinguished  himself  for  daring.  In  this  affair,  a  de 
taining  engagement  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  for 
the  purpose  of  saving  their  trains,  the  Confederate  Ar 
tillery  played  a  minor  role  and  only  the  brigade  bat 
teries  were  present. 

During  the  retreat,  Gen.  Rains,  commanding  the  rear 
guard  of  Johnston's  Army,  had  placed  in  the  path  of 
the  pursuers  an  explosive  shell  which  caused  consterna 
tion  among  the  enemy,  and  violent  protests  on  the  part 
of  the  Federal  authorities.  The  actual  result  had  been 
slight,  however,  yet,  the  practice  led  to  an  almost  im 
mediate  investigation  by  Gen.  Johnston.*  In  a  com 
munication,  he  took  occasion  to  say:  "It  is  the  desire  of 
the  Major- General  commanding  that  you  put  no  shells 
or  torpedoes  behind  you,  as  he  does  not  recognize  it  as 
proper  or  effective  method  of  war."  On  this  com 
munication  were  endorsed  the  following  remarks: 

"A  shell  which  can  be  prepared  and  unprepared  in  a  moment, 
and  a  sentinel  to  keep  our  own  people  off,  are  all  that  is  wanted 
for  our  protection. 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  II,  pp.  509,  510,  516. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  179 

"Our  volunteers  cannot  be  restrained  from  firing  their  guns 
when  they  ought  not.,  and  so  frequent  is  this  fault  that  the  small 
report  of  a  gun  of  a  sentinel,,  as  a  rifle,  for  instance,  is  not  heeded, 
and  our  troops  liable  to  surprise  and  destruction,  of  which  we 
have  had  three  notable  cases.  A  shell  prepared  would  remedy 
this,  for  the  advancing  enemy  would  explode  it,  and  that  would 
lessen  their  force,  demoralize  their  troops,  and  give  us  time  with 
loud  warning  to  prepare  for  the  conflict.  As  it  is,  I  am  compelled 
to  approximate  to  the  same  results — to  send  forward  a  picket  of 
artillery,  supported  by  infantry,  which  is  liable  to  be  cut  off,  and 
have  our  men  killed  or  captured  by  such  rigid  philanthropy  for 
the  enemy,  which  I  have  myself  possessed  until  lately. 

"These  shells  give  us  decided  advantage  over  the  foe  invading 
our  soil,  especially  in  frustrating  night  surprises,  requiring  but 
little  powder  for  great  results  in  checking  advancing  columns  at  all 
times. 

"For  their  being  proper  for  war,  they  are  as  much  so  as 
ambuscades,  masked  batteries,  and  mines.  The  enemy,  I  learn, 
intended  to  mine  and  blow  up  Redoubt  No.  4,  known  as  Ft. 
Magruder,  at  Yorktown;  and  if  such  means  of  killing  by  wholesale 
be  proper,  why  should  not  smaller  mines  be  used?  Can  we  accord 
to  them  alone  the  privilege  of  using  against  us  those  vast  supplies 
of  gunpowder  for  which  they  have  raked  the  world,  by  advantages 
derived  from  a  navy  much  of  which  properly  belongs  to  us?  For 
their  effectiveness,  I  refer  to  the  enemy. 

"Believing  as  I  do  the  vast  advantages  to  our  country  to  be 
gained  from  this  invention,  I  am  unwilling  to  forego  it,  and  beg 
leave  to  appeal  direct  to  the  War  Department. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be  very  respectfully,  etc., 

"C.  J.  RAINS, 
"Brigadier-General,  Commanding  Brigade 

in  the  Field,  near  Richmond." 

"Respectfully  forwarded. 

"In  my  opinion  all  means  of  destroying  our  brutal  enemies  are 
lawful  and  proper. 

"D.  H.  HILL, 

"Major-General." 


180  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

"HEADQUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VA., 

"NEAR  CROSS  ROADS,  May  12,  1862. 

"MAJ.-GEN.  D.  H.  HILL. 

"GENERAL — Gen.    Johnston    desires   that    you   inquire   into   the 
enclosed  report,  taken  from  the  New  York  Herald,  to  ascertain  if 
there  is  any  truth  in  the  statement,  to  find  out  if  there  were  any 
torpedoes  placed,  and,  if  so,  when,  where,  and  by  whom. 
"Most   respectfully, 

"Your  obedient  servant, 

"A.  P.  MASON, 

"Asst.  Adjutant-General. 

"P.  S. — The  works  where  the  enemy  say  the  torpedoes  were 
placed  were  those  at  Yorktown." 

(INCLOSURE) 
"Torpedoes." 

(Extract  from  Gen.  McClellan's  report)  : 

"The  rebels  have  been  guilty  of  the  most  murderous  and  bar 
barous  conduct  in  placing  torpedoes  within  the  abandoned  works, 
near  wells,  and  springs,  and  near  flag  staffs,  magazines,  and  tele 
graph  offices,  in  carpet-bags,  barrels  of  flour,  etc. 

"We  have  not  lost  many  men  in  this  manner — some  four  or  five 
killed  and  perhaps  a  dozen  wounded.  I  shall  make  the  prisoners 
move  them  at  their  own  peril." 

This  letter  was  referred  by  Gen.  Hill  to  Gen.  Rains 
in  much  the  same  manner  as  in  his  indorsement  before 
set  forth,  the  latter  being  referred  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,*  who  returned  the  same  with  the  following  re 
marks  : 

INDORSEMENT 

"Whether  shells  planted  in  roads  or  parapets,  are  contrary  to 
usages  of  war  depends  upon  the  purpose  with  which  they  are  used. 

"It  is  not  admissible  in  civilized  warfare  to  take  life  with  no 
other  object  than  the  destruction  of  life.  Hence  it  is  inadmissible 
to  shoot  sentinels  and  pickets,  because  nothing  is  attained  but  the 
destruction  of  life.  It  would  be  admissible,  however,  to  shoot  a 
general,  because  you  not  only  take  a  life  but  deprive  an  army  of 
its  head. 


*Major   G.    W.    Randolph,   formerly   in   command   of   the   Richmond   Howitzer 
Battalion. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  181 

"It  is  admissible  to  plant  shells  in  a  parapet  to  repel  an  assault, 
or  in  a  road  to  check  a  pursuit,  because  the  object  is  to  save  the 
work  in  one  case,  and  the  army  in  the  other. 

"It  is  not  admissible  to  plant  shells  merely  to  destroy  life  and 
without  other  design  than  that  of  depriving  your  enemy  of  a  few 
men,  without  materially  injuring  him. 

"It  is  admissible  to  plant  torpedoes  in  a  river  or  harbor,  because 
they  drive  off  blockading  or  attacking  fleets. 

"As  Gens.  Rains  and  Longstreet  differ  in  this  matter,  the 
inferior  in  rank  should  give  way,  or,  if  he  prefers  it,  he  may  be 
assigned  river  defenses,  where  such  things  are  clearly  admissible. 

"G.  W.  RANDOLPH." 

In  answer  to  the  communication  of  May  12,  referred 
to  him  by  Gen.  Hill,  Gen.  Rains  wrote  as  follows: 

"CAMP,  REAR  GUARD,  May  14,  1862. 

"MAJ.-GEN.  HILL, 

"Commanding  Third  Division. 

"GENERAL — Yours  of  yesterday  is  acknowledged,  and  in  answer 
I  beg  leave  to  recall  to  your  mind  that  my  command  was  the  first 
to  leave  Yorktown  by  your  order,  and  consequently  I  know  nothing 
of  the  location  of  torpedoes  at  the  places  mentioned,  nor  do  I 
believe  it,  as  wells,  or  springs  of  water,  barrels  of  flour,  carpet 
bags,  etc.,  are  places  incompatible  with  the  invention. 

"That  invention  is  strictly  mine,  as  well  as  the  essential  parts 
of  Colt's  weapons,  for  the  use  of  which  I  have  never  been  called  to 
account. 

"If  it  be  required  to  know  what  use  I  have  made  of  the  invention, 
I  answer  I  commanded  at  Yorktown  for  the  last  seven  months,  and 
when  Gen.  McClellan  approached  with  his  army  of  100,000  men 
and  opened  his  cannon  upon  us,  I  had  but  2,500  in  garrison,  and 
our  whole  Army  on  the  Peninsula  under  Maj.-Gen.  Magruder 
amounted  to  but  9,300  effective  men;  then,  at  a  salient  angle,  an 
accessible  point  of  our  works,  as  part  of  the  defenses  thereof,  I 
had  the  land  mined  with  the  weapons  alluded  to,  to  destroy 
assailants  and  prevent  escalade.  Subsequently,  with  a  similar 
view,  they  were  placed  at  spots  I  never  saw. 

"And,  again,  when  at  Williamsburg  we  were  ordered  to  turn 
upon  our  assailants  and  combat  them,  which  we  did  successfully, 
most  of  us  without  food  for  forty-eight  hours,  having  stood  all 
night  in  the  rain  without  fire  or  light,  the  second  of  our  vigils, 
cold  and  drenched  to  the  skin,  we  took  up  our  line  of  march  to  the 
rear  by  order,  and  when  physical  endurance  had  been  taxed  to  the 
utmost,  at  a  place  of  mud  slushes,  where  it  was  impossible  for  us 
to  fight  or  bring  a  single  cannon  to  bear,  some  six  or  seven  miles 


182  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

this  side  of  Williamsburg,  my  command  forming  the  rear  guard  of 
the  army,  and  the  enemy  advancing  upon  our  wearied  and  scattered 
troops,,  firing  his  cannon  along  the  road,,  some  four  small  shells 
found  abandoned  by  our  artillery  were  hastily  prepared  by  my 
efforts  and  put  in  the  road  near  a  tree  felled  across,  mainly  to 
have  a  moral  effect  in  checking  the  advance  of  the  enemy  (for 
they  were  too  small  to  do  more),  to  save  our  sick,,  wounded,  and 
enfeebled,  who  straggled  in  our  rear. 

"Finally,  I  conclude  by  stating  that  the  enemy's  vessels  ap 
proached  Yorktown  April  6,  1862,  and  without  a  word  of  warning 
to  innocent  women  and  children,,  as  at  New  Berne,  N.  C.,  my  native 
place,  they  commenced  to  pitch  into  the  town,  at  a  distance  of 
four  miles,  entirely  beyond  the  range  of  our  guns,  massive  beams 
of  iron  18  feet  long,  and  enormous  shells  (which  they  continued 
for  a  month),  both  by  day  and  even  at  the  hour  of  midnight,  burst 
ing  with  awful  noise  and  scattering  their  death-dealing  fragments 
among  the  innocent  and  unoffending ;  fiendish  acts  unknown  among 
civilized  nations,  reversing  the  scriptural  text  that  it  is  better  for 
ninety-nine  guilty  persons  to  escape  than  for  one  innocent  to  suffer. 
"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"C.  J.  RAINS, 

"Brigadier-General,  Commanding  Brigade,  Rear  Guard.'' 

The  merits  of  Rains'  argument  cannot  be  discussed 
here.  The  facts  have  been  set  forth  in  full  merely  to 
controvert  the  exaggerations  emanating  from  Mc- 
Clellan,  and  it  is  suggested  that  the  enforced  removal  of 
the  torpedoes,  mines,  shells, — whatever  they  were — by 
prisoners  of  war  as  described  by  him  in  such  merry  vain 
was,  perhaps,  as  great  a  breach  of  the  rules  of  civilized 
warfare  as  the  use  of  the  objectionable  explosives  by 
the  Confederates.  The  equitable  principle  that  "he  who 
comes  into  court  must  do  so  with  clean  hands"  applies 
to  military  as  well  as  to  civil  cases.  The  foregoing  cor 
respondence  should  forever  acquit  the  Confederate 
authorities  from  the  charge  that  they  resorted  to  foul 
practice  on  this  occasion,  or  failed  to  take  immediate 
steps  to  discontinue  a  questionable  practice,  which  to 
the  minds  of  many  was  admissible  in  war. 

May  7,  the  artillery  train  reached  New  Kent  Court 
House,  after  resting  the  6th  while  waiting  for  the  Army 
to  catch  up.  Meantime,  Pendleton  had  heard  of  the 
movement  of  the  enemy  along  the  York  River.  On  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  183 

9th,  the  Army  had  reached  the  north  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy  and  had  escaped  the  Peninsula  trap,  as 
it  was  thought  by  all  to  be.*  Thus  we  see  that  the  Con 
federate  Army  had  actually  returned  in  the  course  of  a 
few  days  to  the  locality  which  Pendleton  had  hitherto 
declared  the  only  suitable  point  for  successful  resistance. 

The  morale  of  the  Federal  Army  had  been  maintained 
at  a  high  pitch  in  spite  of  the  weather  conditions  by 
reason  of  the  almost  uninterrupted  advance  upon 
Richmond,  while  that  of  Johnston's  Army  had  most 
certainly  been  depressed  by  the  retrograde  movement 
and  the  exertions  incident  to  the  retreat.  But  the  news 
of  Jackson's  exploits  at  Cross  Keys  and  Port  Republic 
now  arrived  to  cheer  the  drooping  spirits  of  the  Con 
federates  and  counteract  the  influences  mentioned,  as 
well  as  to  increase  McClellan's  uncertainty  due  to  the 
constant  interference  with  his  movements  by  the  timid 
Administration  in  Washington.  It  is  impossible  even  to 
estimate  the  importance  of  such  moral  factors  in  the 
game  of  war.  To  trace  a  campaign,  without  according 
them  much  weight,  is,  as  Clausewitz  constantly  points 
out,  but  to  mislead  one's  self.  Indeed  they  supply  the 
reason  for  the  delays  as  well  as  the  motive  for  the 
various  moves,  on  the  part  of  the  opposing  commanders. 
They  sharpen  the  edge  of  the  weapon  of  the  one,  while 
they  dull  that  of  the  other  adversary.  It  was  under 
the  influence  of  just  such  conditions  that  McClellan  and 
Johnston  were  feeling  for  their  openings  in  the  impene 
trable  fastness  of  the  Chickahominy  Valley,  the  former 
now  in  the  mire,  the  latter  with  his  feet  on  firmer 
ground. 

When  the  Army  was  reorganized  at  Yorktown,  the 
light  batteries  were  disposed  as  follows  :f 

RIGHT  OF  POSITION    (Magruder) 

FIRST  DIVISION    (McLaws) 
McLaws'  Brigade — 

Garrett's   Williamsburg   Battery 50  men 

Young's   Norfolk   Battery 57  men 

*  Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton.  Lee,  p.  183. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I.  Vol.  XI,  Part  III,  pp.  479,  485,  April   30,   1862. 


184 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 


Griffith's  Brigade — 

Cosnahan's    Peninsula    Battery 51   men 

McCarthy's  Richmond  Howitzer  Battery 103  men 

Manly's  North  Carolina  Battery 37  men 

Read's  Georgia  Battery 72  men 

Sands'  Henrico  Battery 80  men 

Kershaw's  Brigade — 

Kemper's  Alexandria  Battery 77  men 

Cobb's  Brigade — 

Page's  Morris  Louisa  Battery 48  men 

SECOND  DIVISION  (Toombs) 
Toombs'  and  Semnes'  Brigades,  no  batteries 

FORCE  AT  WILLIAMSBURG  (B.  S.  Ewell) 
No  light  batteries,  but  621  heavy  artillerymen 

CENTER  OF  POSITION   (Longstreet) 

A.  P.  Hill's  Brigade— 

Rogers'  Loudoun  Battery 62  men 

R.  H.  Anderson's  Brigade — 

Stribling's  Fauquier  Battery 68  men 

Colston's  Brigade — 

No   batteries 00  men 

Pickett's  Brigade— 

Bearing's  Lynchburg  Battery 60  men 

Wilcox's  Brigade — 

Stanard's  Richmond  Howitzer  Battery 60  men 

Pryor's  Brigade — 

Macon's  Richmond  Fayette  Battery 60  men 

LEFT  OF  POSITION   (D.  H.  Hill) 

EARLY'S  DIVISION 
Early's  Brigade — 

Jeff  Davis  Alabama  Battery 80  men 

Rodes'  Brigade — 

Carter's  King  William  Battery 80  men 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  185 

RAINS'  DIVISION 
Rains'  Brigade — 

Nineteen  Heavy  Batteries 1,151   men 

Featherston's  Brigade — 

No    batteries 00  men 

Crump's  Force  at  Gloucester  Point — 

Armistead's  Mathews  Battery 46  men 

Battalion    Heavy    Artillery 332  men 

RESERVE  (G.  W.  Smith) 

WHITING'S  DIVISION 
Whiting's  Brigade — 

Imboden's  Staunton  Battery 111   men 

Reilly's    North   Carolina   Battery 132  men 

Hood's  Brigade — 

No   batteries 00  men 

Hampton's  Brigade — 

Moody 's  Louisiana  Battery 72  men 

S.  R.  Anderson's  Brigade — 

Braxton's   Fredericksburg  Battery 50  men 

Pettigrew's  Brigade — 

Andrews'  1st  Maryland  Battery 130  men 

Cavalry  Brigade — 

Stuart    Horse    Artillery    (1    battery,,    Capt.    John 

Pelham)    141   men 

RESERVE   ARTILLERY    (Pendleton) 

Pendleton's  Corps  (10  batteries),  36  pieces 
Walton's  Corps  (Washington  Artillery  Battalion,    j-   1,050  men 
4  batteries),  20  pieces 

The  foregoing  figures  are  instructive.  With  the  bri 
gades  were  23  light  batteries,  with  a  total  personnel  of 
1,727,  or  with  an  average  strength  of  75  men.  With 
the  Reserve  Artillery  were  14  batteries.*  Allowing 
each  battery  75  men,  the  personnel  of  the  Reserve  Ar- 

*Memoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  Lee,  pp.  184-5. 


186  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

tillery  numbered  1,050.  The  total  field  artillery  per 
sonnel  of  the  Army  then  numbered  at  this  time  2,777, 
very  unequally  distributed  among  37  batteries,  with  an 
average  of  4  pieces  each,  or  a  total  of  152  guns.  There 
was  absolutely  no  equality  of  distribution  of  guns,  with 
respect  to  divisions  and  brigades.  In  Magruder's  com 
mand  consisting  of  16,106  men,  exclusive  of  heavy  and 
light  artillery  personnel,  there  were  9  light  batteries,  or 
about  36  guns,  a  proportion  of  slightly  over  2  guns  per 
1,000  men  of  the  other  arms,  the  field  artillery  per 
sonnel  numbering  575.  To  the  center,  or  Longstreet's 
command,  numbering  13,506  men  exclusive  of  a  field 
artillery  personnel  of  310,  were  assigned  5  light  bat 
teries  with  about  20  guns,  a  proportion  of  less  than  1.5 
guns  per  1,000  men.  The  left,  or  Hill's  command,  ex 
clusive  of  1,483  heavy,  and  206  field,  artillerymen  num 
bered  10,945  men.  With  this  portion  of  the  Army  were 
but  3  light  batteries,  or  12  guns,  a  proportion  of  about 
1  gun  per  1,000  men.*  With  the  reserve  division  under 
G.  W.  Smith,  were  5  field  batteries  with  a  total  per 
sonnel  of  520  and  20  guns.  Smith's  command,  ex 
clusive  of  his  artillerymen,  numbered  10,072  men.  The 
proportion  of  guns  was  therefore  about  2  per  1,000 
men.  Stuart's  cavalry  brigade  numbered  1,148  men, 
and  with  it  he  had  Capt.  John  Pelham's  horse  battery 
of  141  men  and  8  pieces. t  The  proportion  of  horse 
guns  to  cavalry  was,  therefore,  about  8  per  1,000  men. 
This  battery  was  the  second  horse  battery  to  be  organ 
ized  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  had  been 
assigned  to  Stuart  with  his  original  brigade  in 
December,  1861.  It  was  always  spoken  of  as  the 
"Stuart  Horse  Artillery,"  a  name  given  it  at  first  to 
distinguish  it  from  Ashby's  or  Chew's  Battery  in  the 
Valley  with  Jackson.  It  was  commanded  after  Pel- 
ham's  death  by  the  gallant  Breathed. 

Johnston's  return  of  April  30,  1862,  shows  a  total 
strength  for  his  army,  exclusive  of  the  Reserve  Artillery, 

*Naturally  a  small  proportion  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  command  was 
largely  assigned  to  fortifications,  in  which  were  mounted  the  heavy  guns. 
tSee  Pelham's  Report  of  Battle  of  Williamsburg,  Rebellion  Records. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  187 

of  55,633  men.  If  from  that  number,  2,104  heavy  ar 
tillerymen,  1,727  field  artillerymen,  and  1,289  men  of 
the  cavalry  brigade,  including  Pelham's  Battery,  be 
deducted,  or  a  total  of  5,120,  it  appears  that  the  infantry 
force  must  have  been  50,513.  Since  the  total  number 
of  his  field  guns,  exclusive  of  those  of  the  horse  battery, 
was  144,  the  general  proportion  of  guns  to  infantry  was 
less  than  3  per  1,000  men. 

It  is  not  so  much  for  the  strength  of  his  field  artillery 
as  for  its  loose  distribution  that  fault  is  to  be  found  with 
Johnston,  a  condition  which  extended  to  the  other  arms 
of  his  command,  and  which  very  justly  led  to  constant 
demands  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Davis,  that  the  Army  be 
reorganized  into  divisions  and  brigades  of  some  degree 
of  equality  as  to  strength.  Johnston,  like  McClellan, 
is  often  referred  to  in  handsome  terms  as  a  soldier  of 
marked  ability  for  organization.  This  is  undoubtedly 
true  of  them  both,  and  it  is  not  the  only  point  of  simi 
larity  between  the  two.  But,  the  fact  remains,  that  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  April  and  May,  1862, 
was  very  poorly  hung  together,  a  defect  which  became 
sorely  apparent  in  the  jungle  of  the  Peninsula,  where 
cohesion,  of  all  things,  was  most  to  be  desired.  It  must 
be  said,  however,  that  its  organization  had  been  given 
it  at  Yorktown  for  the  specific  work  of  defending  the 
lines  at  that  point,  the  topography  of  which  enforced 
a  distribution  entirely  unsuited  to  the  subsequent  ret 
rograde  movement.  The  conditions  to  be  met  in  the 
one  case  were  entirely  in  opposition  to  those  of  the 
other.  But,  if  Johnston  intended  from  the  first  to  fall 
back,  as  he  invariably  claimed,  he  should  have  foreseen 
the  needs  of  the  future  and  organized  with  the  certain 
contingency  of  retreat  before  him.  He  had  been  ad 
vised  from  the  first  by  Pendleton,  if  by  no  one  else,  that 
a  battle,  if  it  were  to  be  fought,  must  be  undertaken  near 
Richmond,  and  the  character  of  the  terrain  in  that 
quarter  was  well  known  to  him.  It  was  not  until  he 
reached  the  Chickahominy  that  Johnston  reorganized 


188  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

his  army  into  4  divisions,  giving  it  a  somewhat  more 
cohesive  character.  The  artillery  is  now  found  dis 
tributed  as  follows:* 

FIRST  DIVISION  (G.  W.  Smith) 

Whiting's  Brigade — 

Imboden's  Staunton  Battery. 

Hampton's  Brigade — 

Moody's  Louisiana  Battery. 

Hood's  Brigade — 
No  artillery. 

Hatton's  Brigade — 

Braxton's  Fredericksburg  Battery. 

Pettigrew's  Brigade — 

Andrews'  1st  Maryland  Battery. 

Strength  of  division,  10,592.     Number  of  guns,  16. 
SECOND  DIVISION  (Longstreet) 

A.  P.  Hill's  Brigade- 
Rogers'  Loudoun  Battery. 

Pickett's  Brigade — 

Dearing's  Lynchburg  Battery. 

R.  H.  Anderson's  Brigade — 

Stribling's  Fauquier  Battery. 

Colston's  Brigade — 
No  artillery. 

Wilcox's  Brigade — 

Stanard's  Richmond  Howitzer  Battery. 

Pryor's  Brigade — 

Macon's  Richmond  Fayette  Artillery. 

Strength  of  division,  13,816.     Number  of  guns,  20. 

THIRD  DIVISION   (Magruder) 
McLaws'  Brigade — 

Garrett's   Williamsburg   Battery. 
•Rebellion  Records,  Ibid.,  pp.  530,  533,  May  21,  1862. 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  189 

Cobb's  Brigade— 

Page's  Morris  Louisa  Battery. 

Kershaw's  Brigade — 

Kemper's  Alexandria  Battery. 

Toombs'  Brigade — 
No  artillery. 

Griffith's  Brigade— 

McCarthy's  Richmond  Howitzer  Battery. 

D.  R.  Jones'  Brigade — 

No  artillery. 
Strength  of  division,,  15,920.     Number  of  guns,  16. 

FOURTH  DIVISION   (D.  H.  Hill) 
Early 's  Brigade — 

Jeff  Davis  Alabama  Battery. 

Rodes'  Brigade — 

Carter's  King  William  Battery. 

Rains'  Brigade — 
No  artillery. 

Crump's  Brigade — 

Armistead's  Mathews  Battery. 

Feather ston's  Brigade — 
No  artillery. 

Ward's   Command — 

No  artillery. 
Strength  of  division,  11,151.     Number  of  guns,  12. 

CAVALRY  BRIGADE  (Stuart) 
Pelham's  Horse  Battery. 
Strength  of  brigade,  1,289.     Number  of  guns,  8. 

RESERVE  ARTILLERY   (Pendleton) 

Pendleton's  Corps,  19  batteries,  about  56  guns. 
Walton's  Battalion,  Washington  Artillery,  20  guns. 
Cabell's  Corps  (attached  to  3d  Division). 
Cosnahan's  Peninsula  Battery 
Manly's  North  Carolina  Battery 
Read's  Georgia  Battery  16 

Sands'  Henrico  Battery 


190  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  foregoing  assignment  shows  a  total  of  160  guns, 
bearing  a  proportion  to  the  entire  army  strength  of 
53,688,  of  about  3  guns  per  1,000  men.  With  the  bri 
gades  were  64  guns,  or  a  proportion  of  slightly  over  1 
gun  per  1,000  men,  supported  by  a  reserve  in  3  sections 
of  92  guns,  and  one  battery  of  horse  artillery. 

Having  become  familiar  with  the  relative  strength  of 
the  artillery,  it  will  prove  interesting  to  examine  the 
condition  of  other  armies  in  this  respect. 

It  has  ever  been  impossible  to  establish  dogmatically 
the  proper  proportion  of  field  guns  to  the  other  arms, 
and  strictly  adhere  thereto,  for  the  question  depends 
upon  many  considerations,  such  as  the  theater  of 
operations,  the  composition  of  the  enemy's  forces,  the 
special  adaptability  of  the  people  of  the  country  to  one 
arm  or  another,  and  even  upon  the  casualties  in  cam 
paign.  A  comparison  of  the  field  armies  of  the  past 
century  will  show  that  the  number  of  guns  has  gen 
erally  varied  from  2  to  5  to  1,000  infantry,  limits  which 
have  not  been  infrequently  exceeded.  It  would  appeal- 
that  the  common  desire  has  been  to  provide  from  3  to 
4  guns  for  every  1,000  men  of  the  other  arms  of  the 
service,  but  in  mountainous  or  heavy-wooded  coun 
tries,  where  operations  could  only  be  conducted  over  a 
few  poor  roads,  this  proportion  has  quite  generally  been 
reduced.  For  instance,  in  Lombardy,  in  1859,  the 
French  found  it  impossible,  owing  to  the  narrow  roads 
and  marshy  fields,  to  get  all  their  guns  into  action,  al 
though  they  had  only  3  guns  to  1,000  men.*  Referring 
to  conditions  in  the  Wilderness  Campaign,  Gen.  Grant 
wrote:  "Artillery  is  very  useful  when  it  can  be  brought 
into  action,  but  it  is  a  very  burdensome  luxury  where 
it  cannot  be  used.  Before  leaving  Spotsylvania,  there 
fore,  I  sent  back  to  the  defenses  of  Washington  over 
100  pieces  of  artillery,  with  the  horses  and  caissons. 
This  relieved  the  road  over  which  we  were  to  march  of 
more  than  200  six-horse  teams,  and  still  left  us  more 
artillery  than  could  be  advantageously  used."t 

*  Organization  and  Tactics,  Wagner,  p.  12. 
^Memoirs,  U.  S.  Grant,  Vol.  II,  p.  241. 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  191 

In  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea,  and  in  his  subsequent 
campaign  in  the  Carolinas,  his  artillery  was  reduced  to 
1  gun  to  every  1,000  men  of  the  other  arms,  the  re 
duction  being  induced  by  the  character  of  the  country, 
but  made  possible  by  the  deficiency  in  the  enemy's  ar 
tillery.  The  broad  and  hard  chaussees  of  France  en 
abled  the  Germans  in  1870  to  maintain  a  proportion  of 
4  guns  to  1,000  men,  their  artillery  being  always  on 
hand  when  needed  and  rendering  splendid  service. 

Due  to  the  fact  that  losses  are  generally  heavier  in 
the  infantry,  no  matter  how  efficient  the  service  of  the 
guns  may  be,  the  tendency  is  for  the  proportion  of  the 
latter  to  increase  towards  the  end  of  a  campaign.  The 
personnel  of  the  artillery  may  diminish  in  numbers,  but 
the  loss  of  guns  is  ordinarily  slight.  In  the  Franco- 
German  War,  notwithstanding  the  admirable  recruit 
ing  methods  of  the  Germans,  their  army  corps  were  at 
times  reduced  to  15,000,  or  even  as  low  as  7,000  men, 
while  the  number  of  guns  remained  unchanged.  The 
increased  proportion  due  to  depletion  is  more  desirable 
than  otherwise,  for  an  infantry  weak  in  numbers,  or  in 
morale  due  to  depressing  losses,  more  than  ever  needs 
the  support  of  a  large  and  efficient  artillery. 

While,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  definitely  to  fix  the 
proportion  of  artillery  to  the  other  troops,  it  may  be 
safely  prescribed  that  guns  with  an  army  should  be  as 
many  as  there  is  prospect  of  being  effectively  employed 
on  the  field  of  battle.*  Malvern  Hill  and  Sedan  bear 
witness  that,  under  favorable  circumstances,  the  fire  of 
artillery  may,  almost  alone,  crush  the  enemy.  But  the 
fact  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  the  terrible  "circle 
of  fire"  was  made  possible  by  a  gallant  infantry. 

In  view  of  the  dense  character  of  the  Peninsula 
country,  and  the  entire  absence  of  any  but  primitive 
roads,  the  available  ones  being  few  in  number,  we  are 
forced  to  the  conclusion  that  in  point  of  numbers 
Johnston's,  as  well  as  McClellan's,  artillery  was  more 
than  adequate  to  the  work  at  hand. 

* Organization  and  Tactics,  Wagner,  p.  14.     The  same  is  said  by  Hohenlohe. 


192  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Anticipating  a  great  struggle  about  Richmond, 
Pendleton  had  been  ordered  to  place  the  redoubts  and 
batteries  of  the  lines  in  condition  for  effective  defense, 
in  addition  to  his  regular  work  with  the  field  batteries. 
Much  material  had  been  lost  during  the  month  of  May, 
and  the  deficit  in  the  number  of  horses  for  the  light 
batteries  was  appalling.  There  was  little  to  be  expected 
of  field  artillery  maneuvers  about  the  Chickahominy. 
All  that  could  be  done  was  to  dispose  such  guns  as  the 
terrain  permitted  in  earthworks,  near  the  various  cross 
ings,  or  on  the  more  commanding  eminences  of  the 
swamps,  in  support  of  the  infantry  lines.  The  nature 
of  the  country  was  such  as  to  permit  McClellan  slowly 
to  move  his  heavy  guns  up  into  position,  but  yet  to  pre 
vent  their  successful  resistance  by  the  lighter  field  pieces 
of  his  enemy.  On  one  occasion,  May  12,  the  Reserve 
Artillery  had  been  brought  upon  the  field  several  miles 
below  Chickahominy  bridge  to  support  the  infantry  in 
a  pending  action,  but  its  services  were  not  called  for. 

On  May  30,  the  battle  of  the  next  day,  known  as 
Seven  Pines,  or  Fair  Oaks,  was  planned.  D.  H.  Hill 
had  made  a  reconnaissance  which  disclosed  McClellan's 
awkward  position  astride  the  Chickahominy.  On  that 
day  the  following  note  was  addressed  to  Gen.  Johnston 
by  his  Chief  of  Artillery: 

"I  venture  to  offer  a  suggestion  based  upon  some  information 
respecting  the  Chickahominy  River.  It  is  said  to  rise  immediately 
after  a  rain  like  this,,  and  to  continue  in  flood  some  twenty-four 
hours.  Would  not  this  seem  a  providence  to  place  all  the  Yankee 
force  this  side  that  stream,  almost  centainly  in  your  power?  Might 
not  an  active,  sudden,  and  adequate  movement  of  troops  to-night 
and  at  dawn  in  the  morning  so  overwhelm  the  divisions  confronting 
Gen.  Hill  as  to  crush  and  capture  them  with  next  to  certainty?  I 
submit  it  with  great  deference.  Your  judgment  will,  I  know, 
determine  sagaciously  on  the  subject."* 

When  this  note  was  written,  7:30  p.  M.,  Pendleton 
was  at  Oakwood  Cemetery,  in  the  northern  environs  of 
Richmond.  Shortly  after  noon  that  day,  Johnston  in- 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  III,  p.  685. 


COLONEL   JAMES   B.   WALTON 

CHIEF   OF  ARTILT,ERY,   LONGSTREET'S    CORPS 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  193 

formed  D.  H.  Hill  that  he  would  lead  an  attack  upon 
the  enemy  next  morning.*  But  at  that  time  the  details 
of  the  attack  had  not  been  worked  out.  This  was  done 
by  Johnston  in  conference  with  Longstreet  some  time 
later  in  the  day.  Gen.  Alexander  states  that  the  confer 
ence  was  prolonged  by  a  violent  storm,  in  which 
probably  over  three  inches  of  rain  fell.  Pendleton  could 
not  have  penned  his  note  until  after  the  rain  commenced, 
for  he  refers  to  the  fact  of  its  violent  character.  The 
suggestion  was  undoubtedly  received  by  Johnston 
within  two  hours  after  it  was  written,  that  is  before 
10  P.  M.,  and  the  influence  it  exerted  upon  the  delibera 
tions  of  Johnston  and  Longstreet,  coming  as  it  did  from 
one  of  Pendleton's  character,  must  be  estimated  by  the 
reader.  It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  McClellan's 
situation  at  once  suggested  a  similar  plan  to  Johnston 
and  Longstreet.  At  any  rate,  the  idea  was  clearly  as 
original  with  Pendleton  as  with  them,  a  fact  which  testi 
fies  to  the  ready  and  accurate  military  perception  of  the 
Chief  of  Artillery,  who  was  destined  to  see  the  failure 
of  the  plan,  which  appeared  so  simple  to  him.  Before 
dismissing  this  point,  let  us  inquire  if  it  is  possible  that, 
receiving  Pendleton's  suggestion  after  Longstreet  was 
dismissed  from  the  conference,  Johnston  sought  to  act 
upon  it,  and  that  Longstreet's  failure  the  next  day  to  co 
operate  as  expected  was  due  to  the  late  alteration  of  the 
plan  being  imperfectly  comprehended  by  him?  This 
suggestion  is  fruitful  of  many  explanations. 

The  Reserve  Artillery  took  no  part  in  the  battle  of 
Seven  Pines,  nor  were  the  Confederate  brigade 
batteries  employed  with  any  degree  of  effect  or  in 
telligence.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that 
the  artillery  had  no  organization  competent  to  rapid 
movements  in  such  a  country,  no  field  officers  to  direct 
its  batteries,  hither  and  thither  in  groups  as  needed,  and 
that  the  staff  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery  was  entirely  de 
ficient  in  numbers  as  well  as  in  experience  with  large 
bodies  of  artillery.  In  the  light  of  the  time,  there  is 

*Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.  74. 


13- 


194  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

more  to  commend  than  to  censure,  for  not  only  had  the 
idea  of  a  reserve  taken  firm  root,  but  this  reserve  was 
being  steadily  increased  from  time  to  time,  already  con 
taining  half  again  as  many  guns  as  the  total  number 
with  the  brigades,  a  fact  which  to  the  unprejudiced 
mind  was  a  presage  of  the  future.  Again,  let  the  plea 
be  advanced  for  a  judgment  based  on  conditions  as  they 
existed  in  1862.  Criticism  after  the  event,  and  in  the 
light  of  modern  days,  is  of  no  value  whatever,  and  only 
serves  to  muddle  history.  In  his  memoirs,  a  work  of 
great  military  value,  Gen.  Alexander  is  given  to  this 
fault.*  Writing  of  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  he  says : 
"Perhaps  our  greatest  deficiency  at  this  period  was  in 
the  artillery  service.  None  of  our  batteries  were  com 
bined  into  battalions,  but  each  infantry  brigade  had  a 
battery  attached  to  it.  There  were  no  field  officers  of 
artillery,  charged  with  combining  batteries  and  mass 
ing  them  to  concentrate  heavy  fire  upon  important 
points.  There  was  never  greater  need  or  better  op 
portunity  for  this  than  in  Johnston's  battle  of  the  31st. 
The  enemy  had  but  two  batteries,  Kirby's  and  Brady's, 
and  no  more  were  available.  They  did  not  receive  a 
single  hostile  cannon  shot,  and  were  able  to  devote  their 
whole  fire  to  our  infantry  lines,  which  in  every  instance 
seemed  to  be  finally  repulsed,  only  by  heavy  canister  at 
close  quarters. 

"We  had  no  lack  of  batteries.  The  roads  were  full 
of  them,  but  there  was  no  organization  to  make  them 
effective.  Both  roads  and  open  fields  were  in  very  miry 
condition,  and  all  movements  would  have  been  slow,  but 
a  competent  officer  by  doubling  teams  could  have 
brought  up  the  guns  with  little  delay." 

This  last  sentence  contains  rather  a  caustic  criticism. 
It  certainly  reacts  more  on  Johnston  than  on  Pendleton, 
who  held  his  reserve  batteries  at  all  times  ready  for  use 
when  called  upon.  But  it  is  in  no  small  measure  a  self- 
accusation,  for  who  better  than  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
of  an  Army,  and  in  this  instance  one  of  the  acknow- 

*Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  E.  P.  Alexander,  p.  90. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  195 

ledged  authorities  of  the  commanding  officer's  staff  on 
all  matters  pertaining  to  artillery,  was  better  able  to 
employ  the  guns  as  they  should  have  been  employed? 
Magruder,  equally  as  able  an  artilleryman  as  Alexander 
had  shown  himself  to  be,  was  in  command  of  a  division. 
Certainly  it  was  not  his  office  to  advise  Johnston  about 
the  employment  of  the  auxiliary  arm.  Had  Alexander 
really  seen  such  opportunities  at  the  time  for  the 
tactical  employment  of  artillery  masses,  which  we  now 
know  existed,  then  he  himself  as  much  as  any  other  was 
to  blame  for  the  omissions  he  complains  of.  The  guns 
were  at  hand.  He  should  have  urged  their  being 
ordered  forward  at  the  proper  time.  Certainly 
Johnston  and  Pendleton  would  not  have  opposed  any 
thing  which  when  explained  would  so  materially  have 
contributed  to  the  success  of  the  Army  and  the  credit 
of  the  Artillery.  In  his  usual  full  and  fair  account  of 
the  Confederate  military  operations,  Col.  William 
Allan,  makes  no  such  criticism  as  does  Alexander.* 

After  the  disjointed  affair  of  Seven  Pines,  every  one 
began  to  seek  for  a  scapegoat,  and  one  was  at  last  found 
in  Huger.  But  earnest  investigation  and  search 
disclosed  many  facts  hitherto  disregarded,  among  them 
the  tactical  neglect  of  the  artillery. 

Before  closing  this  chapter  an  anecdote  may  well  be 
included  which  throws  an  interesting  light  on  the  con 
ditions  of  the  time.  On  the  retreat  from  Yorktown  to 
Williamsburg  Johnston  ordered  his  cavalry  to  bring 
up  the  rear  and  help  the  cannoneers  with  their  guns 
when  necessary.  A  single  piece  of  a  certain  battery  had 
become  stalled  and  the  Gloucester  troop  undertook  to 
assist  in  saving  it.  Meantime  the  Federals  were  stream 
ing  over  a  hill  about  half  a  mile  distant  and  already 
hurrying  to  seize  the  gun.  In  the  troop  was  a  young 
Britisher  who  wore  a  monocle  and  who  afforded  his 

*Lieut.-Col.  William  Allan,  Chief  Ordnance  Officer,  Second  Corps  A.  N.  V., 
author  of  Chancellorsville.,  Stonewall  Jackson's  Valley  Campaign.,  and  The  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  in  1862,  has  contributed  three  of  the  most  trustworthy 
military  narratives  yet  written  concerning  the  Civil  War.  He  is  invariably 
followed  by  Henderson  in  preference  to  all  others,  and  much  of  Col.  Henderson's 
greatest  work  is  based  on  Col.  Allan's  writings. 


196  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

comrades  much  amusement  with  his  broad  accent.    Rid 
ing  up  to  his  troop  commander  he  said: 

"I  beg  pahdon,  Capting,  but  may  I  enquire  why  we 
are  staying  here  so  long?" 

"To  save  this  gun,"  the  Captain  replied. 

"What,  that  d — n  thing,"  the  Englishman  enquired 
in  a  most  puzzled  manner. 

"Certainly.  We  can't  afford  to  leave  it,"  said  the 
officer. 

"Pahdon  me  again,"  rejoined  the  gentleman  with 
the  monocle,  "If  I  ask  how  much  it  is  worth." 

"I  suppose  about  a  thousand  dollars,"  answered  the 
Captain. 

The  Englishman  readjusted  his  monocle  in  the  most 
deliberate  way,  looked  once  more  at  the  approaching 
enemy  who  were  now  popping  at  the  troop,  and  turn 
ing  to  his  officer,  said  in  the  most  off-hand  way: 

"Well,  Capting,  let's  move  on,  I'll  give  you  my  check 
for  it  at  once." 

Such  were  the  conceptions  of  military  service  which 
were  held  by  some  of  the  gentry  who  served  in  the  Con 
federate  ranks  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  But  it  was 
not  long  before  these  pampered  volunteers  learned 
better  and  became  as  fine  soldiers  as  ever  bore  a  musket, 
strode  a  horse,  or  swabbed  a  gun. 


CHAPTER  XII 

GEN.    LEE    ASSUMES    COMMAND REORGANIZATION- 
BEGINNING  OF  THE  SEVEN  DAYS 

JUNE  1,  1862,  Robert  E.  Lee  assumed  command  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Gen.  Johnston  having 
been  wounded  that  day.  He  immediately  directed  his 
Chief  of  Engineers  to  make  a  thorough  examination  of 
the  country  in  the  vicinity  of  the  lines  occupied  by  his 
army,  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  the  best  position  in 
which  a  battle  might  be  brought  on,  or  the  advance  of 
the  enemy  resisted.  The  commanding  points  on  the 
line  selected  were  to  be  promptly  prepared  for  occupa 
tion  by  the  field  batteries.  This  order  was  given  June 
3.  "My  object,"  explained  Gen.  Lee,  "is  to  make  use 
of  every  means  in  our  power  to  strengthen  ourselves 
and  to  enable  us  to  fight  the  enemy  to  the  best  ad 
vantage."*  June  5,  Gen.  Lee  suggested  the  construc 
tion  of  a  railroad  battery  consisting  of  plated  cars  and 
a  heavy  gun  for  the  purpose  of  resisting  the  transpor 
tation  by  the  enemy  of  heavy  ordnance  over  the  York 
River  railway.  And  on  the  same  date  he  urged  that 
an  imported  Armstrong  breech-loading  piece  be 
mounted  on  wheels  and  sent  forward  with  a  supply  of 
projectiles.f  There  were  at  this  time  in  the  opinion  of 
Gen.  Lee  a  sufficient  number  of  Parrott  rifles  with  the 
Army.  His  main  effort  was  to  perfect  the  batteries 
already  in  the  field,  and  the  organization  of  the  artillery 
as  a  whole,  rather  than  to  increase  its  numbers.  Thus, 
on  the  8th,  he  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War  discouraging 
the  organization  of  light  batteries  in  Richmond,  and 
suggesting  that  the  horses  and  men  available  there  be 
transferred  to  other  branches  of  the  service,  since 
Beauregard  was  in  no  more  need  of  field  artillery  than 
he  himself  was.J 


*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,   Vol.   XI,  Part  III,  pp.   572,  573. 
tlbid.,  pp.   574,  575. 


pieces 


JIbid.,  p.  583,  Lee  states  that  Beauregard  had  already  sent  150  surplus  field 
?es  to  the  rear. 


198  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

The  point  has  now  been  reached  when  not  only  the 
numbers  but  the  material  of  the  field  artillery  seemed 
adequate  to  the  commanding  general.  More  than  the 
necessary  number  of  light  batteries  were  available,  and 
the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  was  at  last  prepared  to  supply 
more  guns  than  were  actually  needed  in  the  field.  But, 
as  has  been  said,  the  artillery  organization  was  most 
defective,  and  to  the  increase  of  its  efficiency,  Gen.  Lee's 
attention  was  at  once  directed. 

June  2,  the  day  after  taking  command,  he  sent  for 
Gen.  Pendleton,  with  whom  he  had  been  a  cadet  at 
West  Point,  and  requested  him  to  continue  as  Chief  of 
Artillery,  and  to  make  every  effort  to  bring  that  arm  of 
the  service  up  to  the  fullest  possible  efficiency.  The 
directions  Gen.  Lee  gave  his  engineers  the  following 
day  were  significant  of  his  determination  to  make  more 
use  of  the  guns. 

Encouraged  by  his  conference  with  his  new  com 
mander,  for  whom  he  possessed  profound  admiration, 
Gen.  Pendleton  now  set  about  the  task  of  reorganiza 
tion.  One  of  the  first  measures  was  to  complete  his 
staff.  His  nephew,  Dudley  D.  Pendleton,  was  ap 
pointed  his  adjutant-general,  and  George  Peterkin,  a 
son  of  a  clerical  brother,  Bishop  Peterkin,  was  assigned 
to  duty  on  his  staff  as  aide-de-camp.  Edward  P. 
Dandridge  was  appointed  inspector  of  artillery,  with 
Charles  Hatcher,  of  Richmond,  and  Thomas  N. 
Randolph,  of  Clarke  County,  Virginia,  as  volunteer 
aides.  His  original  quartermasters,  Maj.  John  Page, 
and  Capt.  William  Meade;  commissary,  Maj.  B.  L. 
Wolff  e;  ordnance  officer,  Major  John  C.  Barn  well;  and 
medical  officer,  Dr.  I  sham  Randolph  Page,  were  re 
tained. 

With  the  assistance  of  a  more  complete  staff,  the 
Chief  of  Artillery  at  once  undertook  the  reconnaissance 
of  the  Chickahominy  lines,  to  determine  upon  suitable 
positions  for  his  guns,  in  accordance  with  Gen.  Lee's 
views. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  199 

Before  the  first  week  of  June  was  over,  Gen.  Pendle- 
ton's  reserve  corps  had  been  divided  into  3  battalions 
under  Col.  Cutts,  Maj.  Richardson,  and  Maj.  Nelson, 
respectively.  With  Walton's  and  Cabell's  commands, 
the  Reserve  Artillery  now  consisted  of  5  battalions. 
These  battalions  were,  in  the  main,  camped  in  different 
places  in  rear  of  the  lines,  but  daily  there  was  some 
popping  away  between  these  and  the  enemy's  guns,  a 
random  practice,  which  resulted  only  in  disclosing  the 
position  of  the  artillery,  without  accqmplishing  any 
material  results. 

The  promptness  with  which  Gen.  Pendleton  carried 
out  Gen.  Lee's  instructions  to  render  the  artillery  as 
effective  as  possible  was  most  commendable.  With 
increased  independence  of  action  and  support,  the  Chief 
displayed  marked  abilities  as  an  organizer,  and  at  once 
put  into  effect  reforms  which  his  experience  and  gen 
eral  grasp  of  the  situation  enabled  him  to  inaugurate. 
His  letter  book  shows  that  as  early  as  June  5  he  drafted 
regulations  for  the  more  systematic  administration  of 
the  artillery,  which,  being  submitted  to  Gen.  Lee,  were 
approved.*  Some  of  Pendleton's  more  radical  ideas,  in 
his  own  phrasing,  were  incorporated  in  G.  O.  No.  71, 
June  22,  1862,  an  order  by  which  the  new  commander 
sought  to  overcome  many  defects  in  the  Army.  Those 
paragraphs  relating  to  the  artillery  are  here  quoted  :f 

"4.  The  artillery  of  the  army  is  necessarily  so  extensively 
diffused  that  it  becomes  essential  for  its  due  efficiency  there  should 
be  in  its  administration  rigid  system. 

"5.  The  Chief  of  Artillery  in  each  division  will  have  charge 
of  all  the  batteries  thereto  attached,,  whether  acting  with  brigades, 
or  held  in  reserve.  A  battery  duly  assigned  to  a  brigade  will, 
until  properly  relieved,  report  to  and  be  controlled  by  the  brigade 
commander.  It  must  also,  however,  report  to  and  be  inspected  by 
the  division  Chief  of  Artillery,  as  he  may  require.  When  a  brigade 
battery  needs  relief  it  will,  when  practicable,  be  made  to  change 
place  with  the  division  reserve.  Should  this  be  impracticable, 
application,  authorized  by  the  division  commander,  must  be  made 
to  the  army  Chief  of  Artillery  for  temporary  relief  from  the 
general  reserve. 

"This  book  is  on  file  at  Washington. 

tRebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  III,  p.  612. 


200  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

6.  The  army  Chief  of  Artillery  will  have  general  charge  of  that 
branch  of  service  and  special  direction  of  the  general  reserve.  He 
will,  under  instructions  from  the  commanding  general,  see  that  the 
batteries  are  kept  in  as  efficient  condition  as  practicable,  and  so 
distributed  as  to  promise  the  best  results.  To  this  end,  he  will 
require  from  the  several  chiefs  of  artillery  weekly  returns  exhibit 
ing  the  condition  of  each  battery,  and  where  it  is  serving.  He  will, 
also,  make  to  the  commanding  general  a  tri-monthly  report  of  his 
entire  charge." 

These  provisions,  secured  by  the  initiative  of  Pendle- 
ton  alone,  establish  the  claim  that  his  tactical  con 
ceptions  were  well  abreast  of  his  time.  Not  only  did 
he  preserve  the  general  army  reserve,  also  possessed  by 
the  enemy,  but  he  went  further  and  provided  for  divi 
sional  reserves  for  the  more  immediate  support  of  the 
brigade  batteries,  and  even  before  the  promulgation  of 
Gen.  Lee's  order,  he  had  organized  his  general  reserve 
into  battalion  groups.  The  creation  of  this  general 
reserve  was  a  distinct  tactical  advance  for  the  Con 
federates,  who  were  by  no  means  slow  in  profiting  by 
the  reforms  of  McClellan  and  Barry. 

During  the  reorganization  of  the  Artillery  in  June, 
1862,  it  was  found  that  many  superfluous  and  quite  in 
efficient  heavy  artillery  companies  were  stationed  in  the 
various  redoubts  of  the  Richmond  lines.  To  Pendleton 
was  assigned  the  task  of  mustering  them  out,  reducing 
their  officers,  and  distributing  the  better  men  among  the 
troops  of  the  mobile  army.  A  number  of  new  light 
batteries  were  also  broken  up,  and  their  men  used  to 
fill  the  ranks  of  the  seasoned  batteries.  In  the  mean 
time,  the  divisional  reserves  had  been  assigned  to 
position  near  the  lines  for  use  as  prescribed  in  the  order 
regulating  the  better  employment  of  the  Artillery. 
Anticipating  the  assault  on  McClellan's  right,  the  re 
serve  corps  was  so  disposed  as  to  aid  in  the  operations 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  and  to  resist 
any  approach  of  the  enemy  towards  Richmond,  also  to 
provide  support  wherever  it  might  be  required.* 

'General  Lee's  Report,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  III.  Se< 
also  letter  to  Pendleton,  Ibid.,  Part  III,  p.  686. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  201 

There  was  now  a  distinct  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
various  division  commanders  to  employ  with  better  ad 
vantage  the  batteries  assigned  them  and  the  conception 
of  divisional  groups  for  the  support  of  the  brigade  bat 
teries  had  taken  firm  root.  On  the  17th,  Magruder  had 
appointed  Lieut.-Col.  Stephen  D.  Lee,  Acting  Chief 
of  Artillery,  of  the  Right  Wing,  and  had  provided  for 
his  reserve. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Days  fighting,  the 
field  pieces  with  the  various  brigades  had  been  generally 
placed  in  entrenched  positions  along  the  infantry  lines, 
the  redoubts  for  the  guns  of  the  reserve  battalions,  be 
ing  placed  in  their  immediate  rear,  and  further  back 
the  army  reserve.  It  was  hoped  that  with  such  a  dis 
position  of  the  guns  any  threatened  point  might  be  sup 
ported  by  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery,  and  that  any  advance 
of  the  lines  which  became  expedient  might  be  accom 
panied  with  the  requisite  artillery  force. 

The  efficiency  of  the  field  artillery  was  yet  far  from 
satisfactory,  as  will  appear  from  an  analysis  of  the  14 
batteries  of  Magruder's  command.* 

Yet,  all  of  the  batteries  were  rated  as  good  by  Col. 
Lee,  except  3,  which  he  urged  should  be  sent  to  the  re 
serve  for  repairs  and  refitting.  The  personnel  of  the 
batteries  varied  in  strength  from  26  to  121  men,  the 
average  personnel  being  65  men  and  3  officers.  Thir 
teen  of  the  batteries  were  armed  with  two  24-pounder 
and  twelve  12-pounder  Howitzers,  two  24-pounder 
guns,  three  1 -pounder  guns,  six  6-pounder  guns,  two  6- 
pounder  Parrotts  and  six  3-inch  rifles,  or  34  pieces  in 
all,  an  average  armament  of  less  than  3  pieces.  One  bat 
tery  had  but  1  piece,  others  had  2,  some  3,  4,  5,  and  6 
pieces.  The  number  of  horses  varied  from  93  to  15 
per  battery,  with  an  average  number  of  53. t 

Magruder's  artillery,  at  this  time,  was  composed  of 
Carlton's  Troup,  Jordan's  Bedford,  Read's  Pulaski 
(Ga.),  Brown's  Wise,  Cosnahan's  Peninsula,  Lane's 

*Ibid.,   p.  688. 

tit  will  be  recalled  that  84  horses  were  prescribed  for  a  battery  of  6  pieces. 
Regulation  strength,  150  men  and  5  officers. 


202  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Georgia,  Kemper's  Alexandria,  Page's  Magruder, 
Richardson's  James  City,  Hitter's  Henrieo,  Woolf oik's 
Ashland,  Young's  Norfolk,  Manly's  North  Carolina, 
and  Moody's  Louisiana  batteries. 

Longstreet's  artillery  with  a  total  personnel  of  1,600 
men,  of  which  number  395  were  absent,  consisted  June 
23,  of  Carter's  King  William,  Nelson's  Hanover, 
Hardaway's  Jeff  Davis,  Clarke's,  Peyton's  Orange, 
Huger's  Norfolk,  Grimes'  Portsmouth,  Moseley's 
Richmond  Howitzer,  Turner's  Goochland,  Rogers' 
Loudoun,  Stribling's  Fauquier,  Dearing's  Lynchburg, 
Macon's  Richmond  Fayette,  Anderson's  Thomas, 
Coke's  Williamsburg,  Watson's,  and  Chapman's  Dixie 
batteries,  17  in  all,  the  average  strength  being  94  men.* 

With  Holmes  there  were,  about  this  same  time,  6 
light  batteries.  According  to  the  report  of  Col.  Deshler, 
Chief  of  Artillery  of  Holmes'  Division,  French's  Bat 
tery  with  98  men,  three  12-pounder  howitzers,  one  Par- 
rott  rifle  and  two  3-inch  iron  rifles,  was  excellent  in 
point  of  efficiency,  but  the  other  five,  namely,  Branch's, 
Brem's,  E.  Graham's,  Grandy's,  and  Lloyd's,  needed 
much  drilling,  f  Of  a  personnel  of  636  with  an  average 
strength  of  106  men,  but  440  were  reported  effective 
for  the  6  batteries,  the  armament  of  which  consisted  of 
eight  6-pounders,  thirteen  12-pounder  howitzers,  one 
Parrott  rifle  and  nine  3-inch  rifles,  or  a  total  of  31 
pieces. 

The  foregoing  figures  give  some  idea  of  the  armament 
and  strength  of  the  field  batteries  of  the  Army  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Seven  Days  campaign,  and  will  enable 
a  fairly  accurate  estimate  to  be  made  of  the  total 
strength  of  the  Artillery  at  that  time. 

Before  this  campaign  commenced  many  changes  were 
made  in  the  disposition  of  the  batteries,  their  assign 
ments  during  that  period  being,  approximately,  as 
follows : 

•Rebellion  Records,  Ibid.,  p.  615. 

tThe  last  two  joined  after  July  1.  See  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI, 
Part  II,  p.  912. 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  203 

JACKSON'S  COMMAND 

Col.  Stapleton  Crutchfield,  Chief  of  Artillery 
WHITING'S  DIVISION 

Balthis'  Staunton  Battery,  Capt.  W.  L.  Balthis. 

Reilly's  Rowan  (N.  C.)  Battery,       Capt.  James  Reilly. 

JACKSON'S  DIVISION 

Poague's   1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  William  T.  Poague. 

Carpenter's  Alleghany  Battery,  Lieut.  John  C.  Carpenter. 
Caskie's  Richmond  Hampden 

Battery,  Capt.  William  H.  Caskie. 

Wooding's  Danville  Battery,  Capt.  George  W.  Wooding. 

EWELL'S  DIVISION 

Courtney's  Henrico  Battery,  Capt.  A.  R.  Courtney. 

Carrington's  Charlottesville  Battery,  Capt.  J.  McD.  Carrington. 
Brockenbrough's  Baltimore  Battery,  Capt.  J.  B.  Brockenbrough. 

D.  H.  HILL'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  S.  P.  Pierson,  Chief  of  Artillery 

Carter's  King  William  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  H.  Carter. 

Hardaway's  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  R.  A.  Hardaway. 

Jeff  Davis  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  J.  W.  Bondurant. 

Nelson's  Hanover  Battery,  Capt.  George  W.  Nelson. 

HILL'S  RESERVE  BATTALION   (Temporarily  attached) 
Maj.   Hilary  P.   Jones 

Clarke's  Long  Island  Battery,  Capt.  P.  H.  Clarke. 

Richmond  Orange  Battery,  I  ieut.  C.  W.  Fry. 

Rhett's  South  Carolina  Battery,         Capt.  A.  Burnett  Rhett. 

MAGRUDER'S  COMMAND 
JONES'  DIVISION 

Brown's  Wise  Battery,  Capt.  James  S.  Brown. 

Washington   (S.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  James  F.  Hart. 

Madison  (La.)  Battery,  Capt.  George  F.  Moody. 

Dabney's  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  W.  J.  Dabney. 

McLAWs'  DIVISION 

Manly's  North  Carolina  Battery.       Capt.  Basil  C.  Manly. 
Kemper's  Alexandria   Battery,  Capt.  Del  Kemper. 


204  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

MAGRUDER'S  DIVISION 

Carlton's  Troup  (Ga.)  Battery,         Capt.  Henry  H.  Carlton. 
1st  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  E.  S.  McCarthy. 

MAGRUDER'S  RESERVE  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.  Stephen  D.  Lee,  Chief  of  Artillery 

Pulaski  George  Battery,  Capt.  J.  P.  W.  Read. 

James  City  Battery,  Capt.  L.  W.  Richardson. 

Magruder  Battery,  Capt.  T.  Jeff  Page,  Jr. 

LONGSTREET'S  DIVISION 

Rogers'  Loudoun  Battery,  Capt.  Arthur  L.  Rogers. 

Anderson's   Thomas   Battery,  Capt.  Edwin  J.  Anderson 

Donaldsonville   (La.)    Battery,  Capt.  Victor  Maurin. 

3d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Benj.  H.  Smith,  Jr. 

LONGSTREET'S  RESERVE  BATTALION 
Col.  J.  B.  Walton,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1st  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  Chas.  W.  Squires. 

2d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  John  B.  Richardson. 

3d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  M.  B.  Miller. 

4th  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  Joseph  Norcom. 

Dearing's  Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  James  Dearing. 

Chapman's  Dixie  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Chapman. 

HUGER'S  DIVISION 
Lieut.-Col.  J.  A.  de  Lagnel,  Chief  of  Artillery 

Grimes'  Portsmouth  Battery,  Capt.  Carey  F.  Grimes. 

Lynchburg  Beauregard  Battery,  Capt.  M.  N.  Moorman. 

Huger's  Norfolk  Battery,  Capt.  Frank  Huger. 

Stribling's  Fauquier  Battery,  Capt.  Robert  M.  Stribling. 

Goochland  Battery,  Capt.  William  H.  Turner^ 

A.  P.  HILL'S  (LIGHT  DIVISION) 

Maj.  R.  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 
Maj.  Lewis  M.  Coleman,  Assistant  Chief  of  Artillery 

Andrews'  1st  Maryland  Battery,        Capt.  R.  Snowden  Andrews. 
Charleston  (S.  C.)  German  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  K.  Bachman. 
Braxton's  Fredericksburg  Battery,     Capt.  Carter  M.  Braxton. 
Crenshaw's  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  William  G.  Crenshaw. 

Davidson's  Letcher  Battery,  Capt.  Greenlee  Davidson. 

Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Marmaduke  Johnson. 

Masters' Battery  (improvised  siege),  Capt.  L.   Masters. 
Pee  Dee  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  D.  G.  Mclntosh. 

Pegram's  Purcell  Battery,  Capt.  W.  J.  Pegram. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  205 

HOLMES'  DIVISION 
Col.  James  Deshler,  Chief  of  Artillery 

Branch's  Petersburg  Battery,  Capt.  James  R.  Branch. 

Brem's  North  Carolina  Battery,  Capt.  T.  H.  Brem. 

French's  Stafford  Battery,  Capt.  David  A.  French. 

Graham's  North  Carolina  Battery,  Capt.  Edward  Graham. 

WISE'S  LEGION 

Andrews'  Henry  Battery,  Capt.  W.  C.  Andrews. 

Rives'  Nelson  Battery,  Capt.  J.  H.  Rives. 

RESERVE  ARTILLERY,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA 

Brig.-Gen.  Wm.  N.  Pendleton,  Chief  of  Artillery 
First  Virginia  Artillery,  Col.  J.  Thompson  Brown. 

Williamsburg  Battery,  Capt.  John  A.  Coke. 

Richmond  Fayette  Battery,  Lieut.  William  I.   Clopton. 

2d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  David  Watson. 

Jones'  Battalion  (temporarily 

attached  to  D.  H.  Hill's  Division)    Maj.  H.  P.  Jones. 

Long  Island  Virginia  Battery,  Capt.  P.  H.  Clarke. 

Orange  Richmond  Battery,  Lieut.  C.  W.  Fry. 

Rhett's  South  Carolina  Battery,         Capt.  A.  Burnett  Rhett. 

FIRST  BATTALION  ARTILLERY 
Lieut.-Col.  A.  S.  Cutts 

"D"  Bat'ry,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Battalion,  Capt.  James  A.  Blackshear. 
"E"  Bat'ry,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Battalion,  Capt.  John  Lane. 
"B"  Bat'ry,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Battalion,  Capt.  John  V.  Price. 
"A"  Bat'ry,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Battalion,  Capt.  H.  M.  Ross. 
Georgia  Regular  Battery,  Capt.  S.  P.  Hamilton. 

SECOND  BATTALION  ARTILLERY 
Maj.  Chas.  Richardson 

Ancell's  2d  Fluvanna  Battery,  Capt.  John  J.  Ancell. 

Milledge's  Georgia  Battery,  Capt.  John  Milledge,  Jr. 

Woolfolk's   Ashland  Battery,  Capt.   Pichegru  Woolfolk. 

THIRD  BATTALION  ARTILLERY 
Maj.  William  Nelson 

Huckster's  1st  Fluvanna  Battery,      Capt.  Charles  T.   Huckstep. 
Kirkpatrick's  Amherst  Battery,          Capt.   Thomas  J.   Kirkpatrick. 
Morris  Louisa  Virginia  Battery,         Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page. 


206  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

CAVALRY  BRIGADE 

Stuart  Horse  Artillery  Battery,         Capt.  John  Pelham. 
Chew's  Battery,  Capt.  R.  Preston  Chew. 

An  analysis  of  the  foregoing  organization  of  the  Ar 
tillery  shows  a  total  of  45  batteries  assigned  to  the  bri 
gades  exclusive  of  the  6  batteries  of  Walton's  Battalion 
attached  to  Longstreet's  Division,  and  Lee's  Battalion 
of  3  batteries  attached  to  Magruder's  command,  both 
of  which  were  organized  as  a  reserve  force.  In  the 
general  reserve,  we  now  find  5  battalions,  four  of  3,  and 
one  of  5  batteries,  or  a  total  of  17  batteries.  With  the 
Army  then,  there  were  not  less  than  71  batteries,  includ 
ing  the  horse  artillery.  Taking  75  men  as  the  average 
effective  strength  of  a  battery,  the  total  personnel  must 
have  numbered  in  the  neighborhood  of  5,500  men. 

Between  June  11  and  15,  Stuart,  with  about  1,200 
men,  including  a  section  of  Pelham's  horse  battery  with 
2  guns,  had  performed  a  most  remarkable  exploit.  Per 
haps  nothing  that  occurred  during  the  early  days  of  the 
war  so  awakened  the  Army  to  the  possibilities  of  the 
more  mobile  guns  as  did  this  raid  around  McClellan,  in 
which  Pelham  took  part.  But,  while  it  was  a  brilliant 
feat,  its  results  were  adverse  to  Lee  and  far-reaching. 
It  warned  McClellan  of  a  fatal  opening  on  his  right, 
through  which  other  troops  with  more  guns  would  soon 
endeavor  to  pass,  and  his  change  of  base  to  Harrison's 
Landing  was  but  the  consequence  of  the  cavalry  exploit. 
Soon  Jackson  approached  this  very  exposed  point,  ac 
companied  by  Col.  Crutchfield  and  his  artillery,  as  yet 
not  organized  in  the  new  manner. 

According  to  the  general  order  of  battle,  No.  75, 
June  24,  Jackson  was  to  march  from  Ashland  on  the 
25th,  in  the  direction  of  Slash  Church,  encamping  for 
the  night  west  of  the  Central,  or  the  present  Chesa 
peake  &  Ohio  Railroad,  and  to  advance  at  3  A.  M.  on 
the  26th,  and  turn  Beaver  Dam.  A.  P.  Hill  was  to 
cross  the  river  at  Meadow  Bridge  when  Jackson's  ad 
vance  beyond  that  point  should  be  known  and  move  di 
rectly  upon  Mechanicsville.  As  soon  as  the  bridge  at 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  207 

that  point  should  be  uncovered,  Longstreet  and  D.  H. 
Hill  were  to  cross,  the  latter  to  proceed  to  the  support  of 
Jackson,  and  the  former  to  that  of  A.  P.  Hill.  The  four 
commands  were  then  to  sweep  down  the  north  side  of 
the  Chickahominy  River  toward  the  York  River  Rail 
road,  Jackson  on  the  left  in  advance,  Longstreet  near 
est  the  river  and  in  the  rear.  Huger  and  Magruder 
were  to  hold  their  positions  on  the  south  side  of  the 
river,  and  on  the  right  of  the  line,  to  observe  the  enemy 
and  pursue  in  the  event  of  his  retreat.  Stuart,  with  the 
cavalry  and  Pelham's  horse  battery,  was  to  cover  Jack 
son's  left.  A  part  of  the  Reserve  Artillery  under  Pendle- 
ton  himself  was  to  support  the  movement  on  the  north 
side,  the  remainder  to  be  held  in  readiness  for  use  when 
ever  required.* 

In  the  execution  of  this  excellent  plan,  Jackson's  ar 
rival  at  the  contemplated  point  on  the  26th  was  de 
layed,  but  A.  P.  Hill  crossed  the  river  at  Mechanics- 
ville  and  attempted  to  turn  the  left  of  the  enemy's 
position,  being  severely  punished  by  musketry  and  ar 
tillery  fire;  yet,  he  drove  the  enemy  from  his  intrench- 
ments  and  forced  him  back  about  a  mile  to  his  works 
on  the  left  bank  of  Beaver  Dam,  the  strong  character  of 
the  position  preventing  an  assault  that  night.  Hill  had 
taken  with  him  but  6  field  batteries  of  4  guns  each.f 

Before  daylight  on  the  27th,  the  Federal  batteries 
along  Beaver  Dam  opened,  and  under  cover  of  a 
brisk  cannonade  Porter's  troops  gradually  withdrew 
to  his  lines  at  Games'  Mill  and  Cold  Harbor.  On  the 
Confederate  side,  A.  P.  Hill  and  Longstreet  replied  to 
the  enemy's  fire,  and  advanced  their  skirmishers  to  the 
borders  of  the  stream.  D.  H.  Hill  was  ordered  to  ad 
vance  on  the  road  from  Mechanicsville  to  Bethesda 
Church,  and  turn  the  Federal  right  flank,  while  Jack 
son,  having  left  his  bivouac  of  the  night  before  at 
Hundley's  early  in  the  morning,  was  moving  south  to 
gain  their  rear.|  By  the  time  Jackson  was  fairly  across 
Beaver  Dam,  and  D.  H.  Hill  had  gained  the  flank  of 
Porter's  former  line,  the  bird  had  flown. 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  III,  pp.  490,  498. 
•\From  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  Longstreet,  p.  123. 
%The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  1862,  Allan,  p.  84. 


208  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

In  this  affair  not  over  8  Confederate  brigade  bat 
teries  were  engaged.  Of  any  employment  of  masses 
or  of  the  new  divisional  reserve  battalions  as  such,  of 
any  effort  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  infantry  attack 
in  accordance  with  a  previously  well-defined  schedule, 
there  is  no  evidence.  Cooperation,  or  "the  need  to  do 
it,"  might  have  been  understood;  "how  to  do  it"  was 
still  not  known.  Porter  met  the  purely  frontal  attack 
of  Fender's  and  Ripley's  brigades,  and  5  batteries,  with 
a  withering  fire  from  his  guns;  he  suffered  little  from 
those  opposing  him.  Jackson's  guns,  so  tardy  in  their 
arrival,  did  succeed  in  delivering  their  fire  upon  the 
head  of  Hill's  column  before  the  identity  of  the  latter 
was  discovered. 

Porter  had  employed  6  of  his  20  batteries,  massed, 
losing  but  one,  though  forced  to  retire  by  Jackson's 
enveloping  movement.  Had  the  Confederate  Artillery 
been  properly  handled,  no  such  wholesale  retirement  of 
the  Federal  guns  could  have  occurred  in  the  face  of  not 
less  than  19  hostile  batteries.  In  fact,  many  of  the  80 
guns  which  Porter  undoubtedly  had  should  have  been 
unable  to  retire  had  the  Confederate  Artillery,  even 
without  the  support  of  Jackson's  batteries,  been 
properly  employed.  But,  again,  let  us  not  blame  the 
gunners.  The  pernicious  brigade  distribution  destroyed 
their  power  at  the  outset  to  cope  with  Porter's  masses. 
They  were  but  victims  of  a  system.  The  reserve  bat 
talions,  just  organized,  were  not  brought  into  action 
for  pure  lack  of  experience  in  handling  such  large 
masses  of  artillery,  not  only  on  the  part  of  the  artillery 
men,  but  on  the  part  of  Hill  as  well,  whose  attack  was 
too  headlong  even  to  have  permitted  an  artillery 
preparation,  had  the  guns  been  on  hand.  The  general 
who  hurls  his  infantry  columns  upon  the  enemy's 
position  at  sight,  simply  chooses  the  precipitate  assault 
in  preference  to  the  more  deliberate  attack  with  the  ar 
tillery  support  which  he  might  have  elected,  and  if  he 
neglects  his  guns,  the  artillery  is  not  to  blame. 

The  time  had  not  yet  come,  nor  ever  will,  when  an 
artillery  column  can  patrol  the  battlefield,  undirected 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  209 

by  the  will  of  the  commanding-general,  or  by  the  lieu 
tenants  to  whom  particular  sections  of  the  field  have 
been  assigned,  and  push  its  guns  into  action  at  the 
points  which  subsequent  investigation  will  show  to  have 
been  necessary  and  proper.  Artillery  officers  must  be 
conversant  with  the  general  design,  and  particular 
duties  must  be  assigned  them.  The  more  definitely  its 
mission  is  outlined  in  advance,  the  more  definite  will 
be  the  results  which  the  artillery  will  attain.  While  an 
efficient  artillery  is  the  bone  of  an  army,  it  is  not  like  the 
cavalry,  an  arm  of  sudden  movements,  of  rapidity  of 
action,  of  improvisation,  and  especially  is  this  so  when  it 
is  in  masses. 

In  the  study  of  the  earlier  battles  of  the  Civil  War, 
the  student  must  be  deeply  impressed  by  the  nerve  of 
the  attacking  infantry,  which  advanced  to  the  assault 
practically  without  the  support  of  artillery,  the  latter 
primarily  designed  to  give  the  attack  that  solidity  so 
characteristic  of  the  arm.  In  the  infantry,  the  human 
element  dominates  everything.  "Its  essential  is  solid 
character,  unity  of  action,  and  mutual  confidence.  The 
man  and  the  man  alone  makes  the  measure  of  these 
elements.  All  the  power  of  the  arm  resides  in  the  man 
himself."*  To  supplement  the  individualistic  qualities 
of  the  foot-soldier  a  sufficient  proportion  of  the  "long 
arm"  is  essential.  In  the  artillery,  the  part  of  the  men 
is  a  secondary  one.  The  reason  for  their  being  is  the 
material  about  which  the  men  are  united,  and  they  fight 
only  by  serving  the  guns.  Within  certain  limits,  losses 
in  its  personnel  do  not  affect  the  fighting  efficiency  of 
a  battery,  the  fire  of  which  can  continue  undimished 
until  a  percentage  of  the  gunners  is  lost,  which  occurring 
in  the  infantry  would  render  the  force  of  its  blow  harm 
less.  Hence,  the  artillery  is  the  "supporting  arm  par 
excellence."  Its  very  nature  makes  it  so.  All  the  more 
remarkable  then  does  the  early  power  of  the  Confed 
erate  Infantry  seem  when  it  is  recalled  that  not  only 
did  it  fail  to  receive  the  moral  support  of  artillery,  but 
that  it  faced  an  enemy  abundantly  provided  with  such 
aid. 


*Psychology  of  War,  Eltinge,  p.  92. 
14 


CHAPTER  XIII 

GAINESJ  MILL 

WHEN  the  morning  of  the  27th  was  half  gone,  the 
four  Confederate  divisions  were  at  last  united  about  3 
miles  from  the  new  line  of  the  enemy.  That  line  was  an 
arc  of  a  circle  about  2  miles  in  extent,  behind  Powhite 
Creek,  covering  the  approaches  to  the  bridge  which  con 
nected  the  Federal  right  wing  with  the  troops  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  to  hold  which  Porter 
now  had  not  less  than  27,000  men  and  20  batteries  or 
80  guns,  12  batteries  being  held  in  reserve.  Naturally 
strong,  it  was  rapidly  strengthened  with  abattis  and 
rifle  pits,  and  before  noon  an  excellent  disposition  of 
the  defending  force  had  been  made,  the  guns  having 
been  adroitly  placed  along  the  commanding  ground  in 
groups  between  the  divisions  and  brigades.  Besides  the 
division  batteries,  there  were  Robertson's  and  Tidball's 
excellent  horse  batteries  from  Hunt's  reserve.  One  of 
these  batteries  was  posted  on  the  right  of  Sykes'  Divi 
sion,  and  the  other  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  line  where 
it  rested  in  the  Valley  against  the  river.  The  left  flank 
in  the  bottom  was  heavily  supported  by  pieces  of 
position  as  well  as  field  guns  placed  in  batteries  on  the 
south  side  of  the  stream.  The  approach  to  the  Federal 
position  was  generally  over  an  open  plain,  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  wide,  affording  a  splendid  field  of 
fire  for  the  defender's  guns. 

As  soon  as  it  had  become  evident  that  Porter  was  re 
tiring  from  his  position  of  the  night  before,  Gen.  Lee 
ordered  A.  P.  Hill  to  follow  and  attack,  while  D.  H. 
Hill  was  directed  to  unite  with  Jackson  in  operating 
against  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  new  line.  The  Con 
federate  commanders  on  the  south  side  were  meantime 
ordered  to  keep  up  a  vigorous  demonstration  with  a 
view  to  preventing  the  reenf  orcing  of  Porter.  Pressing 
on  toward  the  York  River  Railroad,  A.  P.  Hill  en- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  211 

countered  the  enemy  near  New  Cold  Harbor  about  2 
P.  M.  and  soon  became  hotly  engaged.  The  arrival  of 
Jackson  upon  the  field  was  now  momentarily  expected. 
Longstreet,  unexpectedly  delayed,  in  order  to  repair 
a  bridge  over  Beaver  Dam  for  the  crossing  of  his  ar 
tillery,  had  been  expected  to  arrive  as  the  effect  of  Jack 
son's  threat  became  apparent.  But  again  the  plan  mis 
carried.  Jackson  and  Longstreet  were  both  late  in 
coming  up,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  counting  on  their  support, 
launched  his  division  against  the  centre  and  left  of  the 
enemy's  position,  with  little  effective  support  from  his 
artillery,  except  on  the  part  of  Braxton's  Battery, 
which  accompanied  Archer's  Brigade,  maintaining  a 
desperate  struggle  for  nearly  2  hours.  Though  it  suc 
ceeded  in  reaching  and  piercing  Porter's  lines  at  a  num 
ber  of  points,  as  was  to  be  expected  under  such 
conditions  this  gallant  division  was  finally  repulsed, 
though  not,  however,  until  heavy  reinforcements  in 
cluding  2  batteries  had  reached  Porter's  lines,  nor  until 
it  had  been  decimated  by  the  almost  undisturbed  fire 
of  the  batteries  on  the  crest  as  well  as  on  the  south  side 
of  the  river. 

Again  we  must  pause  to  marvel  at  the  prowess  of  this 
infantry.  Few  of  the  men  of  this  particular  division 
had  been  under  fire  before  June  26.*  Yet,  on  two  con 
secutive  days,  it  had  made  the  most  desperate  frontal 
assaults  upon  exceptionally  strong  artillery  positions, 
without  the  slightest  preparation  by  its  own  guns.  In 
fact,  such  batteries  as  had  attempted  to  deliver  their  fire 
upon  the  enemy  acted  the  role  of  infantry  rather  than 
that  of  supporting  guns.  At  Beaver  Dam,  Pegram's, 
Andrews',  Mclntosh's,  Johnson's,  and  Braxton's  bat 
teries  had  forced  their  way  to  as  close  quarters  as  pos 
sible,  and  at  Games'  Mill,  Braxton's,  Pegram's, 
Johnson's,  Crenshaw's,  Pelham's,  Brockenbrough's, 
Carrington's,  Courtney's,  Bondurant's,  and  perhaps  a 
few  other  batteries  had  been  engaged,  but  their  fire 

*General  Lee's  Report,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  II,  p.  492. 


212  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

action  had  been  entirely  independent  of  each  other,  and 
entirely  without  unison  with  the  infantry. 

But,  to  resume.  A  number  of  Hill's  brigades  were 
broken  and  his  division  as  a  whole  was  forced  to  recoil 
from  sheer  lack  of  the  necessary  weight.  Realizing  the 
unsupported  character  of  Hill's  attack,  Gen.  Lee  had 
ordered  Longstreet,  who  had  now  come  up,  to  make 
a  diversion  on  Hill's  right.  In  spite  of  the  strength  of 
the  enemy's  position  in  this  quarter,  as  previously 
described,  Longstreet  determined  at  once  to  carry  the 
heights  by  assault,  and  while  his  columns  were  deploy 
ing  Whiting's  Division  of  Jackson'  force,  which  had 
lost  its  way,  arrived  on  the  field  and  formed  on  Long- 
street's  left.  At  the  same  time,  D.  H.  Hill  with  the 
sole  aid  of  Bondurant's  Battery,  soon  overwhelmed  arid 
forced  to  retire,  pushed  his  way  to  the  front,  Ewell  com 
ing  up  on  his  right.  Jackson's  other  two  brigades  now 
filled  the  gap  between  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill.  The 
position  on  the  left  was  defended  by  Sykes'  Division  of 
regulars,  supported  by  18  guns,  afterwards  increased 
to  24.  This  portion  of  Porter's  line  was  in  some 
respects  stronger  than  his  right,  for  the  field  of  fire  for 
the  guns  widened  towards  the  east  of  the  position,  to 
1,000  yards  or  more  of  cornfields  sloping  from  the 
opposing  ridges  to  a  thick  swamp,  in  the  bottom  of 
which  it  was  impossible  to  advance  a  battery.  Crutch- 
field  had  to  move  to  the  extreme  left  with  his  artillery, 
6  batteries  of  which  forced  their  way  through  the  dense 
thickets  in  the  direction  of  Old  Cold  Harbor,  and  were 
able  later  to  cover  McGehee's  Hill,  raking  Sykes' 
right,  with  a  storm  of  shell. 

Between  4  and  5  o'clock  a  general  assault  commenced 
which  lasted  about  two  hours  in  the  face  of  a  tremendous 
artillery  fire.  So  rapidly  were  Porter's  guns  dis 
charged,  that  his  gunners  had  difficulty  in  loading  the 
foul  pieces,  accomplished  in  some  instances  only  by 
jamming  the  rammers  against  the  trees.*  Finally, 
after  terrific  losses,  the  Federal  lines  were  carried,  in- 

*  Letter  from   Porter  to  Longstreet. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  213 

eluding  the  artillery  position,  and  22  guns  were  taken 
on  the  field.  Night  put  an  end  to  pursuit  and  daybreak 
the  28th  found  the  north  bank  clear  of  the  enemy. 

Why,  is  it  asked,  was  the  Confederate  Artillery 
totally  neglected  in  this  engagement  as  at  Mechanics- 
ville,  especially  when  Porter  had  given  such  evidence 
the  day  before  of  his  ability  to  prepare  his  position  for 
defense?  The  same  answer  may  be  made.  There  was 
no  reconnaissance  of  the  new  position,  no  staff  to  dis 
cover  its  outlines  in  advance  of  an  attack.  A.  P.  Hill 
before  leaving  one  field  of  battle  was  ordered  to  follow 
up  the  enemy  and  attack.  Without  hesitation,  and  with 
undiminished  ardor,  he  complied.  As  Longstreet  and 
Jackson  came  upon  the  field  to  the  support  of  Hill,  their 
onrushing  columns  alone  located  the  position  of  the  ene 
my.  The  Artillery  could  not  have  preceded  these  col 
umns  upon  the  field.  There  was  not  time  allowed  it  for 
a  duel  nor  was  there  time  in  which  it  might  prepare  for 
the  attack.  Go  forward  with  the  attacking  lines  it  must 
or  not  at  all,  for  once  those  lines  were  launched  in  their 
headlong  assaults  the  leaders  had  but  one  thought  and 
that  to  reach  the  position  of  their  adversary.  Thus  in 
large  measure,  the  guns  were  masked  from  the  first,  and 
at  no  time  was  their  role  more  than  a  secondary  one. 

The  better  employment  of  his  guns  by  Porter  in  these 
two  engagements  in  no  wise  argues  a  superior  skill  with 
respect  to  artillery  on  his  part.  The  effective  use  of  his 
artillery  was  due  to  his  defensive  attitude  more  than  to 
his  skill  as  an  artilleryman.  Had  the  Confederates  been 
on  the  defensive,  their  artillery  would  no  doubt  have  oc 
cupied  the  first  line.  Under  such  conditions,  there  is 
nothing  to  do  with  the  guns  but  mass  them.  It  is  on 
the  offensive  that  the  massing  of  artillery  requires 
knowledge,  coupled  with  skill  and  experience. 

The  errors  of  A.  P.  Hill  with  respect  to  his  artillery 
are  attributable  to  A.  P.  Hill.  When  preparing  for 
operations  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  he 
issued  orders  that  but  one  battery  would  accompany  each 
of  his  6  brigades,  and  that  the  rest  of  his  batteries  in- 


214  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

eluding  those  of  his  reserve  battalion  would  remain  in 
the  position  previously  prepared  for  them  on  the  south 
side.*  He  did  take  the  precaution  of  carrying  with  him 
6  teams  of  spare  horses  for  each  of  his  batteries,  but 
drew  them,  nevertheless,  from  his  remaining  batteries, 
thus  crippling  the  latter  for  effective  use. 

* Rebellion  Records.  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  III,  p.  616,  G.  O.  No.  ,  June 

24,  1862. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

SAVAGE'S  STATION  AND  FRAZIER'S  FARM* 

FROM  the  field  of  Games'  Mill,  long  columns  of  dust 
rising  above  the  forest  to  the  south  were  descried  by 
the  Confederates  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  of  June, 
and  it  soon  became  apparent  that  McClellan  had 
abandoned  his  base  on  York  River.  That  evening, 
after  a  reconnaissance  of  the  cavalry,  Lee  rightly  con 
cluded  that  McClellan  was  falling  back  upon  the  James 
instead  of  retreating  down  the  Peninsula. 

While  McClellan  was  much  embarrassed  by  the  neces 
sity  of  moving  his  enormous  trains  and  over  50  field 
batteries  across  the  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  then  past 
the  front  of  Magruder's  and  Huger's  lines,  Lee  was 
equally  hindered  by  the  dense  character  of  the  country, 
the  lack  of  roads,  and  the  destruction  of  the  bridges 
across  the  river,  by  means  of  which  Jackson,  Long- 
street,  and  A.  P.  Hill  could  pursue  the  enemy,  their 
columns  by  necessity  being  widely  separated. 

The  Federal  movement  was  completed  the  night  of 
the  28th,  and  the  following  morning  saw  the  corps  of 
Sumner  and  Heintzleman,  and  the  division  of  Smith  of 
Franklin's  Corps,  occupying  a  strong  position  covering 
Savage's  Station,  with  Slocum's  Division  in  reserve. 
In  the  meantime,  Keyes  was  instructed  to  retire  to  the 
James  and  occupy  a  defensive  position  near  Malvern 
Hill,  the  extreme  left  of  the  Federal  line.  Late  in  the 
afternoon  Magruder  gained  contact  with  the  enemy  in 
position  at  Savage's  Station,  but  was  heavily  repulsed 
without  receiving  support  from  Huger.  Jackson,  Long- 
street,  and  Hill  also  failed  to  come  up  as  contemplated. 

During  this  disjointed  attack,  3  Federal  batteries, 
Hazzard's,  Pettit's,  and  Osborn's,  severely  punished 
Magruder's  Infantry.  Later,  Kershaw's  Brigade  with 
Kemper's  Alexandria  and  Hart's  South  Carolina  bat- 

*Frazier's  Farm  also  called  Glendale. 


216  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

teries  came  upon  the  field  and  pierced  the  enemy's 
center,  creating  some  confusion  until  reinforcements  re 
established  the  line.  Kershaw  also  made  excellent  use 
of  a  32-pounder  rifled  gun  under  Lieut.  Barry,  which 
had  been  mounted  on  a  railway  car,  protected  with  a 
sloping  roof  of  iron  plates.  Magruder  utterly  failed  to 
bring  the  remainder  of  his  artillery  into  action,  and  suc 
ceeded  in  employing  only  a  small  portion  of  his 
infantry.  Thus,  McClellan  was  able  by  means  of  this 
rear  guard  action  to  withdraw  the  last  of  his  trains  from 
Savage's  Station,  and  cover  the  retreat  of  his  army  dur 
ing  the  night,  though  he  had  lost  many  prisoners  and 
several  batteries. 

At  nightfall,  Jackson  was  still  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Chickahominy,  Swell's  Division  near  Bottom's 
Bridge,  and  the  others  at  Grape  Vine,  or  Alexander's 
Bridge;  Magruder  lay  in  front  of  the  Federal  position 
at  Savage's  Station;  Huger  was  at  Brightwell's  on  the 
Charles  City  Road.  Holmes  had  crossed  to  Drewry's 
Bluff  on  the  north  of  the  James;  and  Longstreet 
and  A.  P.  Hill  were  on  the  Darbytown  Road  at  Atlee's. 
Again  Gen.  Lee  ordered  his  lieutenants  to  press  for 
ward  from  their  positions  in  order  to  deliver  to  the 
enemy  a  decisive  blow  on  the  morrow. 

The  morning  of  the  30th,  Longstreet,  with  Hill  in 
support,  moved  forward  and  found  a  Federal  division 
in  position  near  Glendale.  Bringing  his  artillery  into 
action  with  most  creditable  decision,  instead  of  rushing 
headlong  upon  the  first  position  against  which  his 
column  happened  to  bump,  Longstreet  now  held  his 
men  in  hand  until  Huger  should  come  up  on  his  left, 
and  Jackson's  guns  should  be  heard  at  White  Oak 
Swamp  which  he  did  not  reach  until  about  noon.  But 
when  Jackson's  guns  did  open  Longstreet  was  ordered 
to  attack.  The  Federals  holding  their  position  until 
nightfall,  made  good  their  escape  again,  losing  many 
prisoners,  and  10  pieces  of  artillery  including  Ran 
dolph's  Battery,  but  having  inflicted  heavy  losses  upon 
Longstreet  in  the  sanguinary  conflict.  Huger  failed 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  217 

utterly  to  support  Longstreet  and  hardly  a  man  of 
Jackson's  Infantry  pulled  a  trigger,  Hill  alone  being 
employed  to  assist  Longstreet  in  repelling  a  determined 
counter  attack.  Holmes  accomplished  little  in  his 
quarter. 

While  Longstreet  employed  his  guns  at  Glendale,  in 
a  manner  approximating  an  artillery  preparation,  it 
would  seem  that  the  opportunity  given  them  was  more 
due  to  the  necessity  of  his  delay  in  the  attack  than  to 
any  intention  of  sending  his  infantry  forward  after  the 
enemy  had  been  shaken  by  the  fire  of  artillery. 

On  the  left  the  artillery  performed  with  credit  the 
task  assigned  it,  though  the  end  for  which  it  was  used 
and  the  delay  incident  thereto  may  be  subject  to 
criticism.  Reaching  the  swamp  about  noon,  Jackson 
met  with  a  determined  effort  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
to  prevent  his  junction  with  Longstreet.  The  bridge 
at  the  only  crossing  was  destroyed,  and  the  point  was 
commanded  by  two  batteries  of  artillery  with  heavy 
infantry  supports. 

The  ground  on  the  north  bank  of  the  swamp  by  no 
means  favored  the  action  of  guns.  To  the  right  of  the 
road  the  slopes  opposite  the  position  of  the  enemy  were 
entirely  open,  but  the  crest  was  covered  with  a  dense 
forest,  while  on  the  left  both  the  ridge  and  valley  lay 
beneath  a  heavy  growth  of  pine.  The  artillery  of  the 
enemy  occupied  an  excellent  position  on  a  crest  opposite 
Jackson's  right,  and  below  the  guns  which  commanded 
the  crossing  a  thick  growth  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
stream  was  occupied  by  a  swarm  of  sharpshooters. 
Finding  no  ground  for  the  deployment  of  his  infantry, 
Jackson  determined  to  force  a  crossing  with  his  guns. 
Much  time  was  consumed  in  cutting  a  road  through  the 
woods  on  the  right  of  the  road  by  means  of  which  his 
batteries  could  gain  the  crest,  but  finally  when  Crutch- 
field's  28  guns,  moving  forward  simultaneously,  ready 
shotted,  opened  fire  on  the  enemy,  the  surprise  was  com 
plete.  One  of  the  Federal  batteries  which  had  already 
driven  the  cavalry  back,  dispersed  at  once  in  confusion, 


218  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

and  the  other  soon  disappeared.  Whereupon  Jackson 
ordered  up  2  guns  of  Wooding's  Battery  to  shell  the 
belt  of  trees  occupied  by  the  skirmishers,  who  were  also 
driven  off.  While  he  was  engaged  in  repairing  the 
bridge,  3  Federal  batteries  with  infantry  supports  came 
up  and  drove  off  the  working  parties,  and  an  artillery 
duel  in  which  neither  side  could  see  the  other  continued 
throughout  the  afternoon,  but  Crutchfield's  guns, 
mostly  smooth-bore  pieces,  were  quite  unable  to  silence 
the  Federal  artillery  of  superior  range  and  caliber. 

Gen.  Alexander  is  most  critical  of  Jackson's  failure 
to  effect  a  crossing,  claiming  that  even  had  the  enemy 
been  able  to  prevent  it  at  the  main  bridge,  a  nearby 
ford  was  available.  That  that  ford  too  was  defended 
by  artillery,  there  can  be  little  doubt.*  He  asserts  that 
Jackson's  failure  on  this  occasion  to  cooperate  ef 
fectively  with  Longstreet  was  due  to  the  same  reluct 
ance  to  bring  his  infantry  into  action  which  he  had  dis 
played  ever  since  his  arrival  on  the  Peninsula. t  "Here 
infantry  alone  could  accomplish  anything,  but  only 
cavalry  and  artillery  were  called  upon.  He  could  have 
crossed  a  brigade  of  infantry  as  well  as  Munford's 
Cavalry,  and  that  brigade  could  have  been  the  entering 
wedge  which  would  split  apart  the  Federal  defense,  and 
let  in  13  brigades  which  followed.  The  bridge,  whose 
destruction  is  mentioned,  was  not  necessary  to  a  cross 
ing.  It  was  only  a  high  water  bridge  with  a  ford  by 
it,  which  was  preferably  used  except  in  freshets.  Now 
the  floor  of  the  bridge,  made  of  poles,  had  been  thrown 
into  the  ford,  but  Munford's  Cavalry  got  through  with 
out  trouble,  and  the  infantry  could  have  swarmed 
across."  This  is  a  severe  arraignment  of  Jackson.  The 
feat  which  appears  so  simple  to  the  critic  certainly  must 
have  been  attended  with  some  elements  of  difficulty  not 
mentioned.  It  is  not  in  reason  that  so  simple  an  under 
taking  would  have  been  foregone  by  Jackson.  Of  the 
artillery,  Gen.  Alexander  writes:  "The  cannonade, 
which  was  kept  up  during  all  the  rest  of  the  day,  was 

*8tonewall  Jackson,  Henderson,  Vol.  II,  pp.  68,  69. 
^Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.  147. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  219 

not  only  a  delusion,  but  useless  burning  both  of  day 
light  and  ammunition,  for  it  was  all  random  fire.  The 
Federal  and  Confederate  artillery  could  not  see  each 
other  at  all.  They  could  scarcely  see  the  high-floating 
smoke  clouds  of  each  other's  guns.  They  fired  by 
sound,  at  a  distance  of  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  across 
a  tall  dense  wood,  until  they  exhausted  their  ammuni 
tion.  One  Federal  battery  reported  the  expenditure 
of  1,600  rounds.  The  noise  was  terrific,  and  some  fir 
ing  was  kept  up  till  9  o'clock  at  night,  but  the  casualties 
on  each  side  were  naturally  trifling.  Only  one  Con 
federate  battery,  Rhett's,  mentions  any,  and  it  reported 
but  2  killed  and  5  wounded."* 

But,  however  correct  the  criticism  may  be  as  to  the 
faulty  delays  of  Jackson,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  his 
guns  were  properly  employed  in  the  execution  of  the 
work  assigned  them.  Jackson  encountered  artillery  in 
position.  Whether  he  should  have  maneuvered  around 
them  or  not  is  a  consideration  without  the  scope  of  this 
work.  When  he  did  decide  to  silence  them  with  his 
own  artillery,  the  attempt  was  made  by  the  employment 
of  all  his  guns  and  here  again  we  find  evidence  of  his 
growing  tendency  to  make  use  of  massed  fire.  The 
very  fact  that  he  delayed,  however  unnecessary  his 
action  may  have  been,  in  order  to  bring  his  entire  ar 
tillery  to  the  front,  is  significant  in  our  investigation  of 
a  better  conception  on  his  part  of  the  use  of  artillery, 
and  in  its  employment  we  are  alone  concerned.  One 
thing  is  certain,  Jackson  sought  to  prepare  a  passage 
for  his  infantry  by  the  massed  fire  of  his  guns,  even  at 
the  cost  of  the  time  required  for  bringing  his  batteries 
into  position.  A.  P.  Hill  might  have  essayed  a  crossing 
without  such  aid.  Had  he  succeeded,  his  batteries  would 
have  been  blocking  the  roads  far  to  the  rear.  Jackson 
failed  to  cross  in  the  proper  way.  On  the  other  hand, 
Hill  might  have  crossed,  but  certainly  not  without  tre 
mendous  loss  to  his  command.  On  this  point,  Hender 
son  says:  "It  is  quite  true,  as  a  tactical  principle,  that 

^Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.  148. 


220  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

demonstrations,  such  as  Jackson  made  with  his  artillery, 
are  seldom  to  be  relied  upon  to  hold  an  enemy  in 
position.  When  the  first  alarm  has  passed  off,  and  the 
defending  general  becomes  aware  that  nothing  more 
than  a  fight  is  intended,  he  will  act  as  did  the  Federals, 
and  employ  his  reserves  elsewhere.  A  vigorous  at 
tack  is,  almost  invariably,  the  only  means  of  keeping 
him  to  his  ground.  But,  an  attack  which  is  certain  to 
be  repulsed,  and  to  be  repulsed  in  quick  time,  is  even 
less  effective  than  a  demonstration.  It  may  be  the  pre 
cursor  of  a  decisive  defeat."* 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  remarked,  that  not  only  was 
the  closest  student  of  Jackson's  campaigns  who  has  yet 
contributed  to  military  history  thus  convinced  that 
Jackson  could  not  have  effected  a  crossing,  his  con 
viction  being  based  upon  an  actual  inspection  of  the 
terrain,  but  that  Jackson's  action  on  the  30th  was  in  no 
wise  a  feint.  It  was  a  serious  effort  on  the  part  of 
Jackson  to  attain  that  superiority  of  fire  over  the  enemy 
which  would  permit  his  choked  columns  to  pass  through 
what  amounted  to  a  tactical  defile.  In  the  topographical 
features  of  the  position,  Jackson  undoubtedly  recog 
nized  many  elements  of  danger  for  his  command  and 
sought  in  vain  to  overcome  them. 

*Stonewall  Jackson,  Vol.  II,  pp.  69,  70. 


CHAPTER  XV 

MALVERN   HILL 

IN  connection  with  the  history  of  warfare,  one  in 
voluntarily  thinks  of  Austerlitz,  of  Friedland,  of  Wa- 
gram,  of  Malvern  Hill,  of  Gettysburg,  of  Koniggratz, 
of  Sedan,  of  Plevna,  of  Mukden,  each  in  its  own  time, 
as  typifying  the  great  power  of  concentrated  artillery 
fire.  It  is  one  of  these,  the  great  battle  of  Malvern  Hill, 
now  about  to  be  considered,  which  Maj.  May,  R.  H.  A., 
states  is  as  worthy  to  be  remembered  by  gunners  as  is 
Friedland  and  Wagram. 

About  10  P.  M.,  June  30,  Franklin,  followed  by 
Slocum,  Heintzleman,  and  Sumner,  fell  back  from  the 
positions  they  had  so  stoutly  maintained  against  Jack 
son  and  Longstreet,  and  by  daylight  had  reached  Mal 
vern  Hill  overlooking  the  James  River,  at  Turkey 
Bend,  where  Porter  had  been  placed  the  day  before, 
and  where  McClellan  determined  to  make  another 
stand. 

The  battlefield  selected  by  McClellan  is  an  elevated 
plateau  rising  to  the  height  of  150  feet  above  the  sur 
rounding  forests  and  embraced  by  the  two  branches  of 
Western  Run,  and  possessing  nearly  every  requirement 
of  a  strong  defensive  position.  The  main  branch  of  the 
stream  gathers  near  the  battlefield  of  the  day  before, 
and  flows  with  a  marshy  course  until  it  expands  into  the 
long  milldam  that  supplies  Carter's  Mill.  After  pass 
ing  this  mill,  it  turn  with  a  sinuous  course  at  a  sharp 
angle  to  the  northwest,  along  the  base  of  the  bluff  that 
constitutes  the  south  end  of  Malvern  Hill,  and  enters 
the  James  at  Turkey  Bend.  Before  entering  the  river, 
it  receives  a  branch,  which,  rising  about  a  mile  further 
west,  pursues  a  southeast  course,  parallel  to  the  main 
branch  and,  skirting  the  western  base  of  the  hill,  joins 
the  main  stream.  Small  tributaries  drain  the  country 
to  the  north  of  the  plateau  between  the  two  branches. 


222  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  open  ground  on  the  top  of  the  hill  is  about  ll/2 
miles  in  length  by  half  a  mile  in  breadth.  Sloping 
gradually  to  the  north,  northwest  and  northeast,  the 
hillsides  were  covered  with  wheat  standing  or  in  shock, 
to  the  edge  of  a  wood  some  800  yards  or  more  from  the 
commanding  crest.  The  base  of  the  hill,  except  to  the 
east  and  southeast,  was  covered  with  a  dense  growth 
of  trees,  in  the  edge  of  which  lay  the  marshy  bed  of  a 
stream.  Towards  the  southwest,  and  south,  the  plateau 
terminates  in  abrupt  bluff-like  hills,  overlooking  the 
river.  To  the  southeast,  it  slopes  away  to  the  milldam 
bounding  it  on  that  side.  On  the  left,  or  more  open  side 
of  the  upland,  was  an  excellent  artillery  position,  com 
manding  a  broad  stretch  of  meadows,  drained  by  a 
narrow  stream  and  numerous  ditches,  capable  of  being 
flanked  by  fire  from  gunboats  on  the  river.  To  Malvern 
Hill  there  were  but  three  practicable  approaches  by  land 
—the  Quaker  Road,  from  the  north,  the  River  Road 
from  the  west,  and  a  track  joining  the  Quaker  Road 
from  the  northwest  and  connecting  that  road  with  the 
Long  Bridge  Road  something  over  a  mile  from  the 
summit. 

Reconnaissance  early  on  July  1  disclosed  the  fact 
that  the  Federal  Army  was  drawn  up  in  an  arc  on  the 
summit  of  Malvern  Hill,  the  center  convex  towards  the 
north;  the  left  wing  extending  southward  to  the  bluffs 
above  the  river  and  facing  west,  the  right  wing  curved 
back  along  the  eastern  side  of  the  plateau,  and  facing 
east.  A  powerful  artillery,  posted  just  in  rear  of  the 
crest,  swept  the  wheat  fields  on  the  slopes,  the  guns 
capable  of  ranging  well  into  the  woods  beyond.  Be 
hind  the  guns  were  stationed  heavy  masses  of  infantry, 
well  under  cover,  with  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers 
pushed  down  the  hillside  below  the  batteries. 

Col.  H.  J.  Hunt,  McClellan's  Chief  of  Artillery,  had 
for  some  time  been  familiar  with  the  striking  features 
of  the  position,  which  once  seen  would  not  soon  be  for 
gotten  by  an  artilleryman.  Anticipating  the  battle,  he 
had  undertaken  the  posting  of  a  number  of  his  batteries 
on  June  30,  rearranging  the  artillery  lines  the  following 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  223 

morning.  On  the  west  side  of  the  hill  overlooking  War 
ren,  to  whom  had  been  assigned  Martin's  Battery  of  12- 
pounders,  he  had  placed  about  36  guns,  some  of  long 
range,  to  sweep  the  Low  Meadow  Valley.  To  these, 
later  in  the  day,  were  added  the  siege  guns  of  the  1st 
Connecticut  Artillery  under  Col.  Robert  O.  Tyler. 
These  guns  were  supported  by  Sykes'  Division,  the  line 
of  which  was  extended  in  a  northerly  direction  to  the 
Quaker  Road  by  Morell's  Division,  with  which  were  7 
batteries  under  Weeden  and  Griffin,  the  latter  our  gal 
lant  friend  of  Bull  Run.  Couch's  Division  extended  the 
line  to  the  right  almost  as  far  as  Western  Run,  and  to 
his  right  and  rear  were  the  troops  of  Heintzleman  and 
Sumner.  Hunt's  reserve  artillery  of  100  guns,  com 
plete  in  itself,  and  only  a  reserve  in  name,  was  held 
closely  in  hand  and  from  it  batteries  were  sent  to  the 
front  line  to  replace  those  whose  ammunition  was  ex 
hausted,  others  being  used  to  strengthen  the  line.* 
Thus,  we  see  that  there  was  no  question  as  to  a  suf 
ficiency  of  guns,  but  simply  one  as  to  space  for  their 
effective  employment. 

The  setting  was  complete  for  a  tremendous  disaster, 
the  certainty  of  which  to  an  attacking  force  unsupported 
by  a  preponderance  of  artillery  fire  would  have  been  pat 
ent  to  a  novice  who  had  become  familiar  with  Porter's 
position.  But  the  same  elan  which  had  borne  A.  P. 
Hill  on  at  Beaver  Dam  and  Games'  Mill,  now  swept 
forward  the  Confederate  Army.  But  one  man  there 
was  in  Lee's  Army  who  forecasted  the  result.  D.  H. 
Hill  was  familiar  with  the  character  of  the  new  Federal 
position,  for  a  resident  had  described  it  to  him,  his  in 
formant  stating  that  "its  commanding  height,  the  diffi 
culties  of  approach,  its  amphitheatrical  form  and  ample 
area,  would  enable  McClellan  to  arrange  his  350  field 
guns,  tier  above  tier,  and  sweep  the  plain  in  every 
direction.''!  Meeting  Gen.  Lee  early  on  the  1st,  Hill 
promptly  apprised  him  of  the  substance  of  this  report, 

*Battles  and  Leaders.  Vol.  II,  pp.  410,  411. 
flbid.,  p.   391. 


224  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

and  remarked  that  "if  Gen.  McClellan  is  there  in  force, 
we  had  better  let  him  alone,"  but  Longstreet  who  was 
present,  jocularly  scoffed  at  the  suggestion. 

On  rushed  the  Confederates  and  orders  were  im 
mediately  issued  for  an  attack,  Jackson  having  crossed 
White  Oak  Swamp  early  in  the  morning.  Preparatory 
to  the  launching  of  his  troops  against  the  formidable 
Federal  position,  Gen.  Lee,  who  was  by  no  means  well, 
directed  Longstreet  to  reconnoiter  the  enemy's  left. 
Jackson  upon  coming  up  had  opposed  a  frontal  attack, 
and  advised  an  enveloping  movement  about  the  enemy's 
right.  But  Longstreet  again  took  the  lead,  reporting 
that  there  was  a  good  position  for  batteries  opposite  the 
Federal  left  from  which  the  guns  could  sweep  the  field 
over  to  their  right,  and  suggested  that  60  pieces  be 
stationed  there  for  the  purpose.*  The  open  space  along 
Jackson's  front,  also  appeared  to  him  to  offer  a  field  of 
fire  for  a  hundred  or  more  guns,  and  it  was  his  opinion 
that  Porter's  batteries,  under  a  cross  fire  from  the  two 
great  Confederate  groups,  posted  as  he  suggested, 
would  be  overwhelmed  and  the  infantry  thus  enabled  to 
make  a  successful  assault,  t 

While  Longstreet's  conception  was  good,  its  execu 
tion  for  many  reasons  proved  impossible.  Lee  ordered 
the  attempt  to  be  made. 

The  line  of  battle  was  formed  about  4  o'clock  with 
Jackson  on  the  left,  Whiting's  Division  extending  be 
yond  the  Quaker  Road,  and  D.  H.  Hill  to  its  right. 
Swell's  and  Jackson's  own  divisions  were  in  reserve. 
About  half  a  mile  to  the  right  of  Hill's  5  brigades,  came 
2  of  Huger's,  6  of  Magruder's,  and  then  2  more  of 
Huger's,  including  Ranson's  detached  from  Holmes' 
Division,  the  latter  occupying  the  extreme  right  near 
the  River  Road.  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  were  in 
reserve  on  the  Long  Bridge  Road,  a  mile  or  more  to 
the  rear  of  Magruder. 

At  the  outset,  warning  was  given  by  the  enemy  of 
what  was  to  be  expected,  for  heavy  losses  were  inflicted 

*Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  II,  p.  403. 
"\From  Manassas  to  Appomattox •,  p.   13. 


COLONEL    STAPLETON   CRT'TCIIFIELD 

CHIEF   OF   ARTILLERY.    JACKSON'S    CORPS 

Killed  at   Sailor's   Creok.    lSGr» 


THE  LONG  AEM  OF  LEE  225 

by  Hunt's  guns  upon  D.  H.  Hill's  Division  while  de 
ploying  in  the  woods. 

The  battle  order  sent  about  noon  to  Magruder, 
Huger,  and  D.  H.  Hill,  with  their  14  brigades,  was  re 
markable.  It  consisted  of  the  following  words: 

"July    1,   1862. 

"Batteries  have  been  established  to  rake  the  enemy's  line.  If 
it  is  broken,  as  is  probable,  Armistead,  who  can  witness  the  effect 
of  the  fire,  has  been  ordered  to  charge  with  a  yell.  Do  the  same. 
By  order  of  Gen.  Lee. 

"R.  H.  CHILTON,  A.  A.  C." 

Of  one  thing  we  are  sure.  When  this  order  was 
penned,  no  batteries  had  been  established  to  rake  the 
enemy's  line,  nor  was  it  possible  to  do  so  at  any  time  dur 
ing  the  day,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  pioneers  had 
made  an  unsuccessful  effort  to  open  a  road  by  means  of 
which  guns  could  be  brought  up,  and  the  evidence  is 
that  Gen.  Pendleton  did  all  in  his  power  to  overcome 
the  insurmountable  difficulties  presented  by  the  ter 
rain.  Holding  well  in  hand  his  four  reserve  battalions  in 
which  were  to  be  found  the  best  material  of  the  artillery, 
he  sought  in  vain  for  an  opening  for  their  employment. 
His  official  report  is  as  follows : 

"Tuesday,  July  1,  was  spent  by  me  in  seeking,  for  some  time, 
the  commanding  general,  that  I  might  get  orders,  and,  by  reason 
of  the  intricacy  of  routes,  failing  in  this,  in  examining  positions 
near  the  two  armies  toward  ascertaining  what  could  be  best  done 
with  a  large  artillery  force,  and  especially  whether  any  position 
could  be  reached  whence  our  large  guns  could  be  used  to  good 
purpose.  These  endeavors  had,  of  course,  to  be  made  again  and 
again  under  the  enemy's  shells,  yet  no  site  was  found  from  which 
the  large  guns  could  play  upon  the  enemy  without  endangering  our 
own  troops,  and  no  occasion  was  presented  for  bringing  up  the 
reserve  artillery.  Indeed,  it  seemed  that  not  one-half  of  the 
division  batteries  were  brought  into  action  either  Monday  or 
Tuesday.  To  remain  nearby,  therefore,  and  await  events  and 
orders  in  readiness  for  whatever  service  might  be  called  for,  was 
all  I  could  do."* 


*Rf>bellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  II,  p.  536. 


15 


226  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Again  we  may  feel  sure  of  one  thing,  and  that  is,  that 
Pendleton  had  not  seen  the  Commanding-General  the 
morning  of  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill.  In  other  words, 
Gen.  Lee  and  Gen.  Longstreet  had  decided  to  attack, 
the  latter  making  the  artillery  reconnaissance,  without 
the  slightest  consultation  with  the  Chief  of  Artillery  of 
the  Army  and  the  immediate  commander  of  the  reserve, 
from  which,  presumably,  the  large  groups  to  be  em 
ployed  for  the  purposes  of  artillery  preparation  were  to 
be  drawn.  And  this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  upon  the 
success  of  that  preparation  the  entire  action  was  to 
hinge.  It  could  not  have  been  that  Pendleton  was  lost. 
His  5  battalions  of  not  less  than  17  batteries  were 
literally  blocking  the  few  roads  that  existed  in  rear  of 
the  Army,  not  a  brigade  of  which  but  had  stumbled 
across  them  in  winding  its  way  from  the  direction  of 
Glendale  and  White  Oak  Swamp.  If  there  was  one 
officer  in  the  Army  easy  to  find  it  was  certainly  the 
Chief  of  Artillery  with  his  immense  column  of  guns 
and  trains.  It  is  quite  clear  that  Pendleton  had  no  part 
in  the  conference  before  the  battle,  and  we  find  the  re 
markable  situation  of  a  contemplated  artillery  duel,  in 
which  over  100  guns  were  to  participate,  unknown  to 
the  Chief  of  Artillery  and  the  commander  of  those  guns. 

Referring  to  Gen.  Pendleton,  Alexander  has  this  to 
say:  "Pendleton  graduated  from  West  Point  in  1830, 
one  year  after  Lee.  He  resigned  in  1833,  and  entered 
the  ministry  in  1837.  In  1861,  he  returned  to  military 
life,  and  was  appointed  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Army 
October,  1861,  under  Gen  Johnston.  His  command 
did  little  during  the  Seven  Days,  and  Col.  Brown,  com 
manding  his  largest  battalion,  in  his  report  mentions 
the  great  superabundance  of  artillery,  and  the  scanty 
use  that  was  made  of  it."*  Couched  in  these  words  is  a 
direct  accusation  of  his  old  chief.  There  is  in  them  an 
intentional  insinuation  of  incompetence,  a  practice  to 
which  many  participants  in  the  great  Civil  War  have 
been  too  freely  given.  As  a  rule,  such  remarks  only  re- 

*  Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  pp.  158,  159. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  227 

act  upon  the  author  as  they  certainly  do  in  this  case,  in 
a  way  to  be  shown  later. 

Again  referring  to  that  portion  of  Pendletori's  report 
which  has  been  cited,  Alexander  writes:  "Between  the 
lines  one  can  but  read  a  disappointing  story.  Pendle- 
ton  did  not  find  Lee  all  day  long,  nor  did  any  orders 
from  Lee  find  him.  He  implies  that  his  reserve  artillery 
was  not  expected  to  go  in  until  all  the  division  batteries 
were  first  engaged.  The  division  batteries  were  not 
organized  as  battalions,  and,  acting  separately,  were 
easily  overpowered  when  brought  out  one  by  one,  in  face 
of  many  guns,  already  in  position.  Pendleton's  bat 
talions,  of  from  3  to  6  batteries  each,  would  have  stood 
much  better  chances;  and  while  there  were  not  many 
places,  there  were  two  extensive  ones,  in  either  of  which 
all  of  these  battalions  could  have  been  used — Poin- 
dexter's  field,  and  the  position  on  Magruder's  right,  to 
which  Lee  made  the  pioneers  open  a  road.  As  matters 
were,  our  whole  reserve  artillery  stood  idle  all  day."* 

If  General,  then  Col.  Alexander,  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
on  Lee's  staff  at  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  knew  of 
such  positions  as  those  to  which  he  refers  a  half  century 
later;  knew  that  a  road  had  been  cut  to  one  of  them, 
and  then  failed  to  find  the  Chief  of  Artillery  with  his  5 
battalions,  may  the  good  God  have  mercy  on  his  soul, 
for  he  knew  what  the  majority  of  the  generals  did  not 
know  at  the  time,  and  yet  let  thousands  of  their  men  be 
sacrificed  while  he  remained  silent.  With  such  infor 
mation,  it  was  his  duty  as  a  staff  officer  and  one  so 
closely  affiliated  with  the  artillery,  to  find  the  guns  and 
guide  them  to  the  positions  so  obvious  to  him  over  the 
routes  already  blazed!  The  reserve  battalions,  the 
superabundance  of  artillery  to  which  he  alludes,  could 
certainly  have  been  found.  A  verbal  order  from  Gen. 
Lee,  transmitted  by  the  initiative  of  Col.  Alexander,  for 
which  initiative  he  was  justly  noted  throughout  his  mili 
tary  career,  would  have  brought  them  all  galloping  to 
the  front,  even  had  Gen.  Pendleton  been  absent  from 
his  post  as  Alexander  naively  insinuates  he  was. 

*Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  pp.   158. 


228  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

That  there  is  any  inplication  in  the  words  of  Pendle- 
ton,  already  quoted,  that  the  reserve  artillery  was  not 
expected  to  become  engaged  until  the  divisional  bat 
teries  had  gone  into  action,  is  denied.  Gen.  Alexander's 
conclusion  is  unwarranted.  The  obvious  meaning  of  the 
words  referred  to  is  that  there  was  not  space,  due  to  the 
dense  character  of  the  terrain  and  the  lack  of  roads,  in 
which  the  divisional  batteries,  even  acting  individually, 
could  maneuver,  and  that  since  this  was  so,  all  the  more 
impossible  was  it  for  large  masses  of  artillery  to  act. 
Nor  is  there  anything  novel  in  Gen.  Alexander's  criti 
cism  of  the  artillery  in  the  Seven  Days  campaign.  Re 
ferring  to  Pendleton's  report,  dated  July  26,  1862, 
penned  not  less  than  fifty  years  before  Alexander  wrote 
his  book,  we  find  the  following  remarks:  "In  con 
clusion,  while  gratefully  recognizing  that  Divine  favor 
which  crowned  us  with  victory,  I  would  commend  to 
the  consideration  of  the  commanding  general  what 
seems  to  me  to  have  been  a  serious  error,  with  regard  to 
the  use  of  artillery  in  these  several  fights — too  little  was 
thrown  into  action  at  once;  too  much  was  left  in  the 
rear  unused.  One  or  two  batteries  brought  into 
position  at  a  time  to  oppose  a  much  larger  artillery  force 
well  posted  must  greatly  suffer,  if  not  ultimately  yield, 
under  the  concentrated  fire.  This  was  in  several 
instances  our  experience.*  We  needed  more  guns  tak 
ing  part,  alike  for  our  own  protection  and  for  crippling 
the  enemy.  With  a  powerful  array  opposed  to  his  own, 
we  divide  his  attention,  shake  his  nerves,  make  him  shoot 
at  random,  and  more  readily  drive  him  from  the  field 
worsted  and  alarmed.  A  main  cause  of  this  error  in  the 
present  case  was  no  doubt  a  peculiar  intricacy  in  the 
country,  from  the  prevalence  of  woods  and  swamps. 
We  could  form  little  idea  of  positions,  and  were  very 
generally  ignorant  of  those  chosen  by  the  enemy  and 
of  the  best  modes  of  approaching  them;  nor  were  good 
maps  readily  accessible  by  which  in  some  measure  to 
supply  this  deficiency;  hence  a  considerable  degree  of 

*Beaver  Dam,  Games'  Mill,  Glendale,  Malvern  Hill. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  229 

perplexity,  which  nothing  but  careful  reconnaissance, 
by  skillful  officers,  experienced  in  such  service,  could 
have  obviated,  but  being  obviated,  attack  had  been  more 
cooperative,  concentrated  and  effectual,  the  enemy's 
condition  more  crippled,  and  our  success  more  trium 
phant,  with  less  mourning  in  the  land." 

The  man,  who  three  weeks  after  Malvern  Hill  wrote 
this  accurate,  thorough,  and  terse  resume  of  the  Con 
federate  operations  on  the  Peninsula,  and  of  the  er 
roneous  tactical  employment  of  field  artillery  in  the 
campaign  just  over,  is  more  entitled  to  credit  than 
his  critics  of  a  half  century  later,  for  they  show  beyond 
dispute  that  the  Chief  of  Artillery  appreciated  at  the 
time  the  errors  which  had  been  committed.  If  the 
causes  had  not  been  beyond  his  control,  in  a  measure  at 
least,  the  Chief  of  Artillery  would  never  have  so  placed 
himself  on  record. 

The  order  for  the  attack  was  distributed,  we  have 
seen,  about  noon.  Not  only  did  it  contain  false  infor 
mation,  in  that  it  declared  as  a  matter  of  fact  supporting 
batteries  to  have  been  established,  but  it  left  the  de 
cision  as  to  the  proper  time  for  the  assault  entirely  in 
the  hands  of  a  brigade  commander.  Armistead  com 
manded  but  one  of  the  14  brigades  ordered  to  attack. 
Those  brigades  extended  over  a  mile  or  more  of  shell- 
swept  field,  many  of  them  entirely  hidden  from  view  in 
the  dense  thickets.  In  such  circumstances  it  is  diffi 
cult  to  conceive  how  any  but  a  disjointed  effort  could 
result,  even  were  Armistead  competent  to  determine 
when  the  enemy  had  been  effectively  shaken.  Not  only 
was  Armistead  unable  to  decide  upon  the  time  at  which 
the  assault  should  be  made,  but  he  would  have  been 
equally  unable  to  observe  from  his  position  the  effect 
of  the  Confederate  batteries,  had  they  come  into  action 
as  contemplated.  But  this  fatal  order,  which  should 
have  been  used  by  Buddecke  and  Von  Kiesling  in  their 
works  on  Battle  Orders  to  illustrate  how  not  to  write 
one,  stood,  with  what  results  we  shall  see. 


230  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  difficult  advance  of  Magruder's,  Huger's,  and 
D.  H.  Hill's  brigades  to  the  positions  in  line  assigned 
them,  at  once  disclosed  the  impossibility  of  executing 
the  proposed  plan,  for  it  became  apparent  that  the  bat 
teries  not  only  could  not  be  massed  as  contemplated,  but 
that  they  could  hardly  force  their  way  to  the  front 
through  the  swampy  thickets.  Yet,  instead  of  abandon 
ing  so  hopeless  a  plan,  every  prospect  of  its  success,  and 
every  reason  for  its  adoption,  depending  upon  the 
massed  fire  of  artillery,  upon  the  unison  of  action  of 
large  groups  of  guns,  which  had  never  been  attained  by 
the  Confederates,  even  in  favorable  country,  the  few  bat 
teries  which  could  press  through  the  thickets  were 
ordered  forward  singly  to  their  fate.  Gallantly  they 
essayed  the  task  assigned  them,  and  quickly  they  reaped 
the  fruits  of  the  error  which  committed  them  to  so  hope 
less  an  undertaking,  for  as  they  unlimbered  at  the  edge 
of  the  thicket  they  were  swept  from  their  positions  by  the 
concentrated  fire  of  the  Federal  guns.  From  battery  to 
battery,  Hunt  shifted  the  enormous  sheaf  of  fire  of  more 
than  50  superior  pieces,  disabling  four  of  Huger's  and 
several  of  Jackson's  batteries  almost  the  instant  they 
came  into  action.  Those  with  Jackson  which  did  man 
age  to  hold  on  in  spite  of  the  most  terrible  punishment 
not  only  acted  without  concert,  but  were  entirely  too 
few  to  make  an  impression,  much  less  subdue  the  op 
posing  batteries. 

The  manner  in  which,  on  this  occasion,  Hunt  handled 
his  superb  battery  of  60  pieces,  together  with  a  very 
similar  performance  at  Gettysburg,  the  next  year,  show 
that  he  at  any  rate  recalled  the  secret  of  Napoleon's 
success  with  artillery,  and  no  doubt  justifies  the  high 
encomium  bestowed  upon  him  by  Col.  Wagner,  who  de 
clares  that  his  "ability  as  an  organizer  and  commander 
of  artillery  places  him  in  the  same  rank  with  Lichten- 
stein,  Senarmont,  and  Drouot.*" 

On  the  Confederate  side  the  batteries  of  Poague, 
Carpenter,  Pegram,  Davidson,  Grimes,  Balthis,  Moor- 

* Organization  and  Tactics,  Wagner,  p.  347. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  231 

man,  and  the  few  others  which  singly  from  time  to  time 
took  up  the  fight,  while  so  ineffective  against  the  ar 
tillery  of  the  enemy  that  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill  described 
their  efforts  as  almost  farcical,  succeeded  in  driving 
Sumner's  infantry  to  the  cover  of  the  bluffs  above  the 
river,  Porter  being  ordered  to  follow,  which  he  refused 
to  do.  "How  eloquent,"  writes  Gen.  Alexander,  "is 
this  episode  of  what  might  have  been  the  effect  of  bold 
and  energetic  use,  early  in  the  day,  not  only  of  our 
large  artillery  reserve,  but  of  all  our  brigade  and  divi 
sion  batteries,  brought  in  under  their  protection,  as 
might  have  been  done  under  efficient  management." 
Again,  we  say,  Col.  Alexander  of  Gen.  Lee's  own  staff, 
should  have  contributed  something  besides  a  half 
century  of  criticism.  It  was  clearly,  as  has  been  shown, 
within  his  power  to  do  it  at  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill. 
According  to  his  own  words,  the  occasion  was  rife  with 
opportunities  for  an  artilleryman.  The  commanding 
general  would  have  gladly  permitted  him  to  suggest  the 
way  to  accomplish  that  which  the  original  plan  had  con 
templated. 

Realizing  the  inequality  of  the  contest  which  the  few 
batteries  that  had  succeeded  in  gaining  position  were 
waging,  and  the  ineffectiveness  of  their  fire,  Gen.  Lee 
himself,  about  3  o'clock,  abandoned  his  intention  of  as 
saulting  with  the  infantry  and  so  notified  Longstreet, 
who  was  in  direct  charge  of  the  battle.  Shortly  before 
this  Gen.  Lee,  accompanied  by  Longstreet,  had  recon- 
noitered  the  enemy's  right,  passing  along  the  entire 
left  of  the  Confederate  position.  Strange  to  say,  even 
before  directing  Longstreet  to  break  off  the  fight, 
neither  he  nor  the  latter,  the  originator  of  the  con 
templated  artillery  duel,  now  detected  a  practical  posi 
tion  for  the  massing  of  the  reserve  batteries.  Had  the 
developments  of  the  Confederate  position  not  been  con 
trary  to  their  original  expectations,  it  seems  reasonable 
to  suppose  some  concerted  effort  to  bring  up  the  re 
serve  artillery  would  have  been  made  by  them,  for 


232  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

neither  Lee  nor  Longstreet  was  given  to  vacillation  or 
indecision  on  the  field  of  battle,  especially  when  once  en 
gaged. 

While  the  generals  were  making  their  reconnaissance, 
the  infantry  became  heavily  engaged,  and  from  then  on, 
the  various  commands  advancing  by  detachments,  con 
tinued  a  spasmodic  though  desperate  effort  to  carry  the 
crest,  all  in  vain.  The  field  of  Malvern  Hill  was  the 
scene  of  unsurpassed  heroism  on  the  part  of  the  Con 
federate  troops,  destined  as  they  were  by  the  attending 
circumstances  to  defeat.  Let  Porter  describe  the  as 
sault. 

"The  spasmodic,,  though  sometimes  formidable,  attack  of  our 
antagonists,  at  different  points  along  our  whole  front  up  to  about 
4  o'clock,  were,  presumably,  demonstrations  or  feelers  prepara 
tory  to  their  engaging  in  more  serious  work.  An  ominous  silence, 
similar  to  that  which  had  preceded  the  attack  in  force  at  Games' 
Mill,  now  intervened,  until,  at  about  5  :30  o'clock,  the  enemy  opened 
upon  both  Morell  and  Couch  with  artillery  from  nearly  the  whole  of 
his  front,  and  soon  after  pressed  forward  his  columns  of  infantry, 
first  on  one,  then  on  the  other,  or  on  both. 

"As  if  moved  by  a  reckless  disregard  of  life  equal  to  that  dis 
played  at  Games'  Mill,  with  a  determination  to  capture  our  army, 
or  destroy  it  by  driving  us  into  the  river,  brigade  after  brigade 
rushed  at  our  batteries,  but  the  artillery  of  both  Morell  and  Couch 
mowed  them  down  with  shrapnel,  grape,  and  canister,  while  our 
infantry,  withholding  their  fire  until  the  enemy  were  in  short  range, 
scattered  the  remnants  of  their  columns,  sometimes  following  them 
up  and  capturing  prisoners  and  colors."* 

Every  account  of  this  battle,  whether  upon  Northern 
or  Southern  authority,  has  for  its  main  feature  the  over 
whelming  and  irresistible  artillery  fire  of  Hunt's  50 
field  pieces,  and  10  siege  guns,  which,  continuing  their 
fire  until  after  9  P.  M.,  always  concentrating  on  the  most 
threatening  points,  completely  overthrew  in  detail  the 
3  of  Lee's  9  divisions,  which  were  engaged,  inflicting 
upon  them  a  loss  of  not  less  than  5,000  men.f  But  in 
spite  of  their  losses  and  the  succession  of  mistakes,  there 
seems  to  be  little  doubt  that  the  Confederates  came  very 

*Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  II,  pp.  41G,  417. 

fAlexander  says  5,965  ;  Allan  says  a  little  over  5,000,  so  also  does  Henderson. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  233 

near  winning  the  day.  The  most  positive  indications  of 
this  fact  are  to  be  found  in  Porter's  account  as  well  as 
in  Hunt's  report.  The  latter  stating  that  3  horse  bat 
teries  and  eight  32-pounder  howitzers,  were  "brought 
up  to  the  decisive  point  at  the  close  of  the  day,  thus 
bringing  every  gun  of  this  large  artillery  force  (ar 
tillery  reserve  of  100  pieces)  into  the  most  active  and 
decisive  use.  Not  a  gun  remained  unemployed ;  not  one 
could  have  been  safely  spared."* 

Before  10  p.  M.  the  great  battle  had  become  a  matter 
of  history,  the  Federal  force  was  in  full  retreat  to 
Harrison's  Landing,  the  haven  of  which  it  reached  be 
fore  morning,  and  one-third  of  Lee's  Army  lay  bleed 
ing  and  exhausted  before  Malvern  Hill,  the  awful 
sepulchre  of  victory,  which  for  6  of  the  past  7  days  had 
attended  the  Confederate  arms. 

One  episode  of  the  pursuit  the  next  morning  alone 
concerns  the  artillery.  At  9  A.  M.,  Stuart's  Cavalry  had 
occupied  Evelington  Heights,  overlooking  and  com 
manding  the  Federal  position  and  camp  at  Harrison's 
Landing.  These  heights  were  peculiarly  the  position 
for  the  immediate  occupation  by  Lee's  artillery,  a  fact 
which  the  slightest  forethought  should  have  grasped. 
Dominating  as  they  did  the  upper  part  of  the  peninsula 
which  McClellan  had  occupied,  thereby  placing  him 
self  in  a  position  in  which  the  alternatives  were  further 
retreat  down  the  river,  or  a  frontal  attack  upon  the 
heights,  crowned  with  artillery  they  would  have  been 
impregnable.  But,  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  unable 
to  resist  the  temptation,  Stuart  ordered  Pelham,  with 
one  of  his  howitzers,  for  which  little  ammunition  re 
mained,  to  fire  upon  the  enemy's  camp  below.  "Judging 
from  the  great  commotion  and  excitement  below,  it  must 
have  had  considerable  effect,"  wrote  Stuart.  Thus,  by 
Stuart's  horse-play,  McClellan  was  at  once  apprised  of 
his  peril,  and  by  causing  the  Federal  general  to  im 
mediately  reoccupy  Evelington  Heights,  Lee's  last  op 
portunity  to  force  him  to  the  offensive  was  sacrificed  by 
Stuart. 

*Rel)cllion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI.  Part  II,  p.   239. 


234  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

One  more  incident  in  which  the  role  of  the  Artillery 
was  a  leading  one  in  connection  with  the  Peninsula  cam 
paign  remains  to  be  mentioned.  McClellan,  as  well  as 
a  number  of  his  more  ardent  admirers,  had,  fortunately 
for  the  peace  of  their  own  minds,  been  able  to  find 
solace  in  the  belief  that  in  reaching  Harrison's  Landing, 
via  the  Seven  Pines  and  Seven  Days  route,  beset  as  it 
had  been  by  so  many  dangers  and  the  loss  of  some  20,- 
000  men,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  at  last  in  a  most 
advantageous  position  to  threaten  Richmond  from  the 
south  side  of  the  James.  The  contemplated  route  in 
that  quarter  was  no  doubt  less  circuitous  than  the  one 
pursued  from  Hampton  Roads  to  Westover.  What 
ever  the  proposed  course  may  have  been,  preparatory 
thereto  McClellan  had  for  several  weeks  neglected  to 
secure  his  army,  confident  in  the  ability  of  the  gunboats 
to  keep  the  opposite  bank  free  of  the  enemy. 

Late  in  the  month  of  July,  it  was  decided  by  Gen. 
Lee  to  bombard  McClellan's  camp  and  shipping  by 
night  from  Coggin's  Point,  to  which  task  an  expedition 
ary  force  of  artillery  in  command  of  Gen.  Pendleton 
was  assigned.  The  force  of  artillery  designated  for  the 
work  consisted  of  parts  of  Brown's  Regiment  and  the 
battalions  of  Cutts  and  Nelson.  Leaving  Richmond 
with  32  field  pieces,  and  2  heavy  rifles  on  siege  carriages 
drawn  by  the  teams  of  Milledge's  Battery,  Pendleton 
reached  Petersburg  the  night  of  July  29,  where  he  was 
joined  by  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill  with  an  infantry  force  and 
several  batteries.  After  spending  the  next  day  and 
night  in  reconnoitering  the  south  shore  in  the  neighbor 
hood  of  Coggin's  Point,  Hood's  Point,  and  Claremont, 
Gen.  Hill  returned  to  Petersburg,  leaving  the  expedition 
in  charge  of  Gens.  French  and  Pendleton.  Having 
successfully  kept  the  guns  concealed  from  the  observers 
in  the  Federal  balloons,  they  were  ordered  on  the  night 
of  the  31st  into  the  positions  which  had  been  selected 
with  great  care  for  the  various  detachments.  At  12:30, 
41  of  the  43  pieces  which  had  been  brought  up  opened 
fire  simultaneously,  firing  from  20  to  30  rounds  apiece, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  235 

the  total  expenditure  being  about  1,000  rounds,  where 
upon  the  guns  were  limbered  and  quietly  moved  to  the 
rear  as  previously  directed,  and  proceeded  to  Peters 
burg  after  a  slight  rest. 

The  result  of  the  enterprise  was  principally  a  great 
excitement  in  the  Federal  camp,  and  40  or  50  casualties 
among  the  sleeping  troops.  A  number  of  vessels  were 
also  slightly  injured.  The  Confederate  casualties  were 

1  killed  and  7  wounded.*     The  results  obtained  were 
in  no  wise  commensurate  with  the  labor  and  risk  inci 
dent  to  the  undertaking  and  well  illustrate  the  unfruit 
ful  character  of  such  enterprises,  however  deliberately 
planned   and  carefully  executed.      The   range   to  the 
shipping  was  some  600  to  800  yards ;  to  the  camp  on  the 
opposite  shore  much  greater,  and  owing  to  these  facts 
no  great  results  should  have  been  expected.    The  whole 
affair  was  farcical,  but  while  it  served  the  purpose  of 
causing  McClellan  to  grasp  the  strategic  advantages  of 
a  position  astride  the  river,  it  also  necessitated  the  con 
struction  of  intrenchments  about  Petersburg,  which  in 
1864  enabled  Beauregard  with  a  small  force  to  ward 
off  Grant  for  three  whole  days  until  reinforcements 
came  to  his  support.  The  result,  then,  of  Pendleton's  ex 
pedition,  was  solely  one  which  was  not  anticipated,  t 
This  incident  practically  ended  the  Peninsula  campaign. 

The  battles  of  the  Seven  Days  cost  the  Confederates 
20,000  men.  The  Federal  loss  was  not  more  than  16,- 
000,  of  which  10,000,  about  half  wounded,  were 
prisoners.  In  addition  to  their  loss  in  men,  was  that 
of  52  guns,  35,000  rifles,  and  vast  quantities  of  stores, 
captured  and  destroyed.  The  loss  of  the  Confederate 
Artillery  in  material  was  slight,  and  in  personnel,  the 
strength  of  which  just  after  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill 
was  186  officers  and  3,778,  did  not  exceed  500.J  In  the 
Reserve  Artillery,  the  loss,  as  stated  by  Alexander,  was 

2  men,  a  figure  at  variance  with  the  casualty  return 

'Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  II,  pp.  944-6,  Pendleton's  Report. 

fGen.  Alexander  is  much  confused  as  to  the  character  of  the  ordnance  used 
on  this  occasion  as  well  as  to  dates.  See  his  book,  p.  173,  and  compare  with 
Official  Records. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  II,  p.  506,  and  Ibid.,  Part  III, 
pp.  645,  976. 


236  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

which  shows  a  loss  of  8  killed  and  30  wounded.*  The 
heaviest  individual  loss  of  any  battery  was  that  of  Pe- 
gram's.  Engaged  in  every  battle  of  the  Seven  Days 
campaign,  the  gallant  Purcell  Battery  had  suffered  a 
loss  of  59  out  of  80  men,  and  was  able  to  man  but  a 
single  gun  at  the  close  of  the  battle  of  July  1.  John 
son's,  Davidson's,  and  Rhett's  batteries  were  next  in 
order,  with  a  loss  of  19  men  each.  The  loss  in  horses 
suffered  by  the  Artillery  was  especially  great,  many  of 
the  batteries  being  almost  dismounted,  t  But  the  dam 
age  done  in  this  respect  was  soon  remedied  and  was 
more  than  compensated  for  by  the  fine  rifled  pieces 
captured  from  the  enemy,  among  which  were  listed  3 
repeating  guns.J 

It  would  be  tedious  and  unfruitful  to  discuss  in  de 
tail  the  individual  movements  of  the  various  Confed 
erate  batteries  engaged  in  the  Seven  Days  campaign. 
Enough  facts  have  been  given  to  show  that  the  bri 
gade  batteries  merely  acted  as  best  they  could  with  the 
commands  to  which  they  were  attached,  being  called 
upon  to  inflict  such  damage  upon  the  enemy  as  they 
might  without  any  special  time  or  assistance  being  given 
them  for  the  purpose.  It  was  simply  a  case  of  blaze 
away  for  the  brigade  batteries.  Of  the  Reserve,  Jones' 
Battalion  had  alone  accompanied  a  division  in  the 
various  egagements,  eliciting  from  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  to 
whom  it  was  assigned,  high  praise.  The  other  bat 
talions  of  the  Reserve  and  Brown's  Regiment  had  en 
deavored  with  only  slight  success  to  render  service,  but 
due  more  to  a  total  ignorance  of  the  tactical  employ 
ment  of  such  masses  on  the  part  of  the  division  com 
manders  than  to  anything  else  no  opportunity  was 
afforded  them  to  cooperate  with  the  infantry  and  bri 
gade  batteries.  On  several  occasions,  however,  while 
hovering  about  the  flanks  or  rear  of  the  lines  of  battle, 
in  an  entirely  independent  way,  these  battalions  had 

*Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.  174  ;  and  Official  Casualty 
Return,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  II,  p.  505,  and  also  p.  973. 

•^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  III,  pp.  689-690. 

Jlbid.,  Part  II,  pp.  510-513:  Also  see  a  reference  to  revolving  gun  on  p.  938, 
no  doubt  one  of  those  referred  to  in  Part  I  of  this  work. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  237 

found  openings,  as  in  the  case  of  Richardson's  and 
Nelson's  battalions  at  Games'  Mill,  and  Golding's 
Farm.*  The  absence  of  the  Reserve  Artillery  on  the 
various  battlefields  of  the  Peninsula  was  as  conspicuous 
as  the  presence  of  the  splendid  Federal  batteries  on  all 
occasions,  a  result  due  in  some  degree  to  the  artillery 
organization  and  experience  of  the  two  armies,  but 
principally  due  to  the  fact  that  McClellan  invariably 
defended  selected  and  prepared  positions,  while  Lee 
assailed  them,  as  a  rule,  without  previous  reconnaissance 
and  in  the  most  headlong  manner.  The  element  of 
time  requisite  to  the  proper  employment  of  field  ar 
tillery  in  so  difficult  a  country  was  lacking  in  every 
instance.  The  one  case  in  which  an  artillery  duel  was 
attempted,  that  of  Jackson  at  White  Oak  Bridge,  in 
curring  almost  universal  adverse  criticism. 

If  the  topography  of  the  theater  of  operations  dur 
ing  the  Peninsula  campaign  be  considered,  with  its 
dense  covering  of  forest,  its  lack  of  all  but  the  crudest 
highways,  these  facts  alone,  as  Pendleton  pointed  out, 
would  seem  to  account  for  the  neglect  of  artillery 
masses  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates.  But  to  repeat 
what  has  been  said  before,  coupled  with  the  adverse 
conditions  of  the  terrain  w^ere  even  stronger  influences 
which  militated  against  the  effective  employment  of  the 
artillery,  especially  in  masses.  Lack  of  training  and 
experience  on  the  part  of  the  division  commanders,  and 
the  entire  absence  of  trained  staff  officers,  both  in  the 
infantry  and  artillery,  from  which  resulted  accidental 
contact  with  the  enemy,  precluded  the  deliberate  use  of 
artillery  masses. 

It  is  not  so  easy  to  overcome  the  enormous  friction 
which  must  occur  in  war  as  it  is  to  propound  new 
theories.  The  novelty  of  reserve  battalions  of  artillery, 
while  readily  accepted,  was  not,  and  could  not  have 
been  expected  to  be,  immediately  adopted  in  practice. 
This  will  always  be  the  case  with  tactical  innovations, 
in  all  armies,  at  all  times.  Nothing  is  more  natural  in 

*Pendleton's  Report,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  II,  pp. 
533-537. 


238  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

green  armies  entirely  lacking  in  anything  approximat 
ing  a  tactical  doctrine.  It  was  true  even  in  the 
Prussian  Army  of  1866,  the  leaders  and  staff  of  which 
were  the  carefully  trained  products  of  a  school  of 
thought,  founded  by  Scharnhorst,  tested  by  Napoleon, 
codified  by  Clausewitz,  and  put  into  more  practical 
form  by  Gneisenau.  But,  in  spite  of  their  past  ex 
perience,  an  experience  which  the  Confederates  had  not 
had,  in  spite  of  all  their  training,  the  Prussians  utterly 
failed  in  1866  at  Munchengratz,  and  Gitschin  to  bring 
up  their  reserve  artillery,  and  at  Nachod,  Trautenau, 
and  Sor,  only  succeeded  in  getting  it  into  position  very 
late  in  the  day,  not  indeed  until  nightfall.  In  Austria, 
just  as  on  the  Peninsula,  the  long  columns  of  reserve 
artillery  with  their  ammunition  trains  were  allowed  to 
march  in  rear,  the  foremost  gun  following  the  hindmost 
combatant  of  the  other  arms.  Thus  it  was  that  even  a 
division  marching  alone  when  it  gained  contact  with  the 
enemy,  more  often  than  not  unexpectedly,  found  its 
artillery  reserve  many  miles  to  the  rear.  During  the 
advance  of  the  infantry  the  sight  of  the  artillery 
columns  filled  the  infantry  officers  with  alarm,  lest  the 
roads  might  be  blocked  and  the  batteries  were  invariably 
side-tracked  to  make  way  for  the  foot  columns.  In 
both  campaigns,  orders  were  given  from  time  to  time 
tending  to  the  more  timely  arrival  of  the  artillery,  but 
such  orders  when  given  suddenly,  and  when  opposed  to 
all  previously  existing  principles,  were  very  naturally 
rendered  inoperative  by  that  friction  ever  present  with 
the  movement  of  troops  in  the  field. 

It  is  not  sufficient  merely  to  wish  and  to  order  that 
masses  of  artillery  be  brought  into  action  on  time;  it 
is  necessary  also  to  have  learned  and  practiced  the  man 
ner  of  doing  it.  The  Prussians  had  partly  learned  the 
lesson  before  Koniggratz,  and  profited  by  it  in  1870; 
the  Confederates  did  not  learn  and  practice  it  during 
the  seven  days  terminating  in  the  catastrophe  of  Mal- 
vern  Hill.  In  his  noted  work  on  artillery,  Prince  Kraft 
devotes  an  entire  chapter  to  the  subject  of  "How  it  was 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  239 

that  the  artillery  always  came  up  at  the  right  time,"  in 
the  Franco-German  War,  and  yet  another,  "How  the 
Artillery  saved  itself,"  during  that  war.  These  chapters 
are  merely  complements  of  an  unnamed  one,  "How  the 
Artillery  rarely  came  up  at  the  right  time,"  in  the  war 
of  1866.  Most  of  Hohenlohe's  deductions  apply  with 
peculiar  force  to  the  artillery  operations  on  the  Penin 
sula. 

Before  summing  up  the  campaign,  it  should  be  said 
that  Gen.  Lee  undoubtedly  appreciated  the  many  glar 
ing  defects  of  his  army,  yet  was  of  great  enough  mind 
to  recognize  them  as  natural  ones  and  not  merely  due  to 
inefficiency  on  the  part  of  his  lieutenants.  With  respect 
to  the  Artillery,  he  knew  that  conditions  and  inex 
perience  with  the  arm  on  the  part  of  all  was  at  the  root 
of  the  trouble,  and  did  not  cast  the  blame  upon  the 
shoulders  of  its  chief  as  Gen.  Alexander  has  sought  to 
do,  for  in  his  report  he  stated  that  Gen.  Pendleton, 
Chief  of  Artillery,  attended  unceasingly  to  his  duty.* 

Finally,  it  may  be  said  that  the  following  conclusions, 
concerning  the  Peninsula  campaign,  seem  to  be  justi 
fied  by  the  facts : 

1.  The  Confederate  Army,  especially  with  respect 
to  the  artillery,  was  poorly  organized,  and  possessed  but 
little    cohesion    among    the    divisional    units;    though 
slightly  improved  in  this  respect  by  Gen.  Lee,  who,  in 
immediate  contact  with  the  enemy  from  the  day  he  was 
assigned  to  command  until  the  end  of  the  campaign, 
had  no  opportunity  to  reorganize  his  forces. 

2.  The  success  of  the  Confederate  arms  was  entirely 
due  to  the  almost  irresistible  force  of  the  infantry,  the 
morale  of  which,  in  spite  of  the  severest  punishment, 
never  waned. 

3.  In  no  general  action  during  the  campaign  was 
anything   approaching  cooperation   between  the   divi 
sional  units  attained,  a  result  due  to  the  lack  of  a  trained 
staff,  sufficient  cavalry,  and  the  ignorance  and  almost 
entire  neglect  of  reconnaissance  duty. 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XI,  Part  II,  p.  498. 


240  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

4.  The  artillery  failed  to  perform  the  role  of  that 
arm  by  reason  of  inexperience  on  the  part  of  divisional 
leaders,    the    impetuosity    of    their    attacks,    defective 
organization,  the  topographical  features  of  the  terrain, 
and  comparatively  inferior  material  and  equipment. 

5.  Lee     overthrew    McClellan,     not    by    superior 
tactical  dispositions,  which  on  the  part  of  the  Confeder 
ates  were  in  the  main  inferior  to,  though  of  an  entirely 
different  character  from  those  of  the  Federals,  but  by 
the  sheer  elan  of  his  lion-hearted  infantry,  which,  though 
unsupported  by  artillery,  and  poorly  led  from  a  tactical 
point  of  view,  simply  could  not  be  stopped. 

6.  The  superior  tactical  employment  of  artillery  on 
the  part  of  the  Federals  was  due,  not  merely  to  a  better 
organization,  material,  equipment,  and  ammunition,  but 
in  far  greater  measure  to  the  defensive  attitude  it  was 
invariably  called  upon  to  assume,  thus  minimizing  those 
elements  which  kept  the  opposing  artillery  from  the 
field. 

7.  The  final  situation  of  the  two  armies  arose  from 
the  fact  that  without  consideration  of  the  tactical  re 
sults   which  had  been,   or  were   to  be   attained,   Lee, 
morally  the  stronger,  always  ordered  his  lieutenants  for 
ward  to  assail  the  enemy,  while  McClellan  uniformly 
ordered  his  to  retire  to  defensive  positions,  each  in  ad 
herence  to  a  strategic  plan  from  which  there  was  no 
departure  after  Lee  took  command. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CEDAR  MOUNTAIN 

WITH  the  close  of  the  Peninsula  campaign  the  Ar 
tillery  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  may  be  said 
to  have  passed  its  formative  period  in  which  the  great 
crisis  of  its  youth  had  been  Malvern  Hill.  The  Army 
which  had  been  united  and  fused  in  the  fiery  furnace  of 
experience  was  now  prepared  to  prosecute  a  greater 
career. 

The  salvation  of  the  Artillery  lay  in  the  fact  that  in 
all  matters  connected  with  it,  save  in  the  undaunted 
courage  of  its  officers  and  men,  and  the  native  talent 
they  had  displayed  for  the  arm,  grave  defects  were 
recognized  to  exist.  A  great  effort  was  now  made  to 
increase  its  efficiency  and  to  provide  for  its  more  ade 
quate  employment  in  battle.  For  its  tactical  neglect, 
the  general  consensus  of  opinion  rested  the  blame  on 
conditions.  No  one  was  particularly  blamed  at  the 
time,  though  frequent  harsh  criticisms  of  individuals 
have  since  been  made  by  those  possessing  belated 
sagacity. 

Before  the  end  of  July  a  redistribution  of  the  field 
batteries  had  been  made  and  a  number  of  new  batteries 
had  reported  for  duty  in  the  field,  among  them 
Girardey's,  and  Crawford's  or  "C"  Battery  of  the 
Sumter  Battalion  from  Georgia,  Joseph  Graham's  from 
North  Carolina,  Coit's  from  South  Carolina,  and 
Parker's  Richmond,  Fleet's  Middlesex,  Ruffin's  Surry, 
Wyatt's  Albemarle,  Hupp's  Salem,  and  Dance's 
Powhatan  batteries  of  Virginia. 


16 


242  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

The  Reserve  Artillery  was  now  organized  as  follows : 

FIRST  VIRGINIA  LIGHT  ARTILLERY  REGIMENT 
Col.  J.  Thompson  Brown 

1.  Williamsburg  Battery,  Capt.  J.  A.  Coke. 

2.  Powhatan  Battery,  Capt.  Willis  J.  Dance. 

3.  Salem  Battery,  Capt.  A.  Hupp. 

4.  Fayette  Battery,  Capt.  M.  C.  Macon. 

5.  James  City  Battery,  Capt.  L.  W.  Richardson. 

6.  Henrico  Battery,  Capt.  W.  B.  Ritter. 

7.  3d  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  B.  H.  Smith. 

8.  2d  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  D.  Watson. 

9.  Albemarle  Battery,  Capt.  J.  W.  Wyatt. 
10.  Fairfax  Battery,  Capt.  E.  R.  Young. 

FIRST  BATTALION  RESERVE  ARTILLERY 
Lieut.-Col.  A.  S.  Cutts 

1.  "A"  Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.  H.  M.  Ross. 

2.  "B"  Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.  J.  V.  Price. 

3.  "C"  Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.  C.  P.  Crawford. 

4.  "D"  Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.  J.  A.  Blackshear. 

5.  "E"  Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.  J.  Lane. 

SECOND  BATTALION  RESERVE  ARTILLERY 
Maj.  Charles  Richardson 

1.  2d  Fluvanna  Battery,  Capt.  J.  J.  Ancell. 

2.  Georgia  Battery,  Capt.  John  Milledge. 

3.  Ashland  Battery,  Capt.   Pichegru  Woolfolk. 

THIRD  BATTALION  RESERVE  ARTILLERY 
Maj.  William  Nelson 

1.  Charlottesville   Battery,  Capt.  Jas.  McD.  Carrington. 

2.  1st  Fluvanna  Battery,  Capt.  C.  T.  Huckstep. 

3.  Amherst  Battery,  Capt.   Thomas  J.   Kirkpatrick. 

4.  Morris  Virginia  Battery,  Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page. 

FOURTH  BATTALION  RESERVE  ARTILLERY 
Maj.  Hilary  P.  Jones 

1.  Long  Island  Battery,  Capt.  P.  H.  Clarke. 

2.  Richmond  Orange  Battery,  Capt.  T.  Jefferson  Peyton. 

3.  South  Carolina  Battery,  Capt.  A.  B.  Rhett. 

4.  Goochland  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Turner. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  243 

This,  indeed,  was  a  powerful  array  which  Gen. 
Pendleton  had  collected.  With  the  26  batteries  of  the 
reserve  were  not  fewer  than  100  guns,  including  much 
of  the  best  material  in  the  service.  Among  the  guns 
captured  from  McClellan  were  many  fine,  serviceable 
pieces.  In  point  of  ordnance,  the  Confederate  reserve 
now  approached  that  of  Hunt,  but  in  discipline,  mounts, 
and  equipment,  the  artillery  always  fell  far  behind  the 
Federal  standard.  The  deficiencies  in  harness  and 
equipment  were  now  beginning  to  be  made  up  to  some 
extent  by  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  its  manufacturing 
activities  being  in  full  swing  by  this  time,  thanks  to  the 
unremitting  efforts  of  Col.  Gorgas.  Foreign  impor 
tations  of  ordnance  material  and  stores  were  also  now 
being  received  and  distributed  to  the  Army  by  this 
energetic  officer.  Among  the  ordnance  of  the  Army 
at  this  time  was  to  be  found  a  small  number  of  Hotch- 
kiss,  Whitworth,  Armstrong,  and  Blakely  guns,  pur 
chased  abroad  by  foreign  agents,  and  brought  in  by  the 
fleet  of  blockade  runners  operated  by  the  Bureau  of 
Ordnance.  The  Blakely  field  pieces  were  especially 
favored  by  the  horse  batteries. 

In  the  lull  succeeding  the  activities  of  June  and  July, 
strenuous  efforts  were  also  made  by  Pendleton  to  re 
cruit  the  depleted  batteries  of  the  Army  to  full  strength 
and  to  overcome  the  existing  deficiencies  with  respect  to 
their  horses.  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  the  per 
sonnel  of  the  reserve  numbered  3,000  men  or  more  by 
the  middle  of  August,  and  that  most  of  the  batteries 
were  well  horsed,  that  is,  with  a  sufficient  number  of 
four-horse  teams,  for  the  stringency  in  the  South  in 
the  supply  of  remounts  had  not  yet  begun  to  pinch. 

Another  great  stride  forward  occurred  about  this 
time  in  the  enlargement  and  reorganization  of  the  re 
serve  ordnance  train  by  Col.  Alexander,  Chief  of 
Ordnance.  While  the  service  of  ammunition  supply  on 
the  Peninsula  had  been  remarkably  efficient,  yet,  for 
the  contemplated  increase  in  the  activity  of  the  artillery 
it  did  not  appear  adequate  to  its  chief. 


244  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

The  batteries  with  the  divisions  were  neither  as  strong 
in  personnel,  nor  as  well  equipped  and  mounted  as  were 
those  of  the  reserve  at  this  time.  For  instance,  on  July 
21,  the  4  batteries  with  Early's  and  Trimble's  brigades 
of  Swell's  Division,  namely,  Johnson's  Bedford 
(W.  Va.),  Brown's  Chesapeake,  the  Manchester,  and 
Latimer's  Courtney  batteries,  possessed  a  personnel  of 
but  222  men,  present  and  absent,  increased  to  12  of 
ficers  and  384  men  by  July  31.  But  of  the  latter  num 
ber  only  236  were  present  for  duty,  or  an  average  of  3 
officers  and  56  effective  men,  and  up  to  August  10,  there 
had  been  no  additions  even  to  make  up  for  the  losses 
sustained,  though  the  tri-monthly  return  for  August 
20  shows  14  officers  and  276  men  present,  with  an  ag 
gregate  present  and  absent  of  419.  On  paper,  there 
fore,  the  individual  battery  strength  was  about  105  men, 
while  in  the  field  it  was  but  72.  Since  Ewell's  Division 
had  been  ordered  to  take  the  field  July  13  for  active 
work,  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  figures  of  these  bat 
teries,  if  not  typical,  were  rather  above  than  below  the 
average.* 

G.  O.  No.  150,  A.  N.  V.,  July  13,  1862,  directed 
Jackson,  with  his  own  and  Ewell's  Division,  to  proceed 
to  Louisa  Court  House  and  if  possible  to  Gordonsville, 
to  check  the  advance  of  Pope  from  the  direction  of 
Orange  Court  House.  The  same  day  Crutchfield  as 
signed  to  Ewell  Latimer's  (Courtney's),  Lusk's  2d 
Rockbridge,  the  2d  Baltimore  or  Brockenbrough's,  and 
Rice's  Star,  batteries.  On  the  14th,  in  addition  to 
Poague's  1st  Rockbridge,  Carpenter's  Alleghany,  and 
Caskie's  Hampden  batteries  already  with  Jackson's  Di 
vision,  Balthis'  Staunton,  Brown's  4th  Baltimore  or 
Chesapeake,  and  J.  R.  Johnson's  Bedford,  batteries 
were  attached  to  it.  Maj.  R.  Snowden  Andrews,  and 
Maj.  A.  R.  Courtney,  former  battery  commanders, 
were  promoted  and  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
artillery  of  Jackson's  and  Ewell's  divisions,  respectively. 
Carrington's  Albemarle  Battery  was  detached  from 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XII,  Part  III,  pp.  964,  965,  966.  Ibid., 
p.  915. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  245 

E well's  Division  and  ordered  to  report  for  duty  with 
the  reserve.  All  of  Jackson's  batteries  were  to  move 
with  the  infantry  by  train.* 

Upon  arriving  at  Gordonsville,  July  19,  Jackson  at 
once  perceived  that  his  force  of  12,000  was  inadequate 
as  opposed  to  Pope's  47,000  and  called  for  reenforce- 
ments.  A.  P.  Hill  was  consequently  ordered  to  join 
him  July  27,  with  12,000  men,  and  Pegram's  Purcell, 
Fleet's  Middlesex,  Braxton's  Fredericksburg,  and 
Latham's  North  Carolina  or  Branch,  batteries.  Lieut. - 
Col.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker  commanded  the  artillery 
of  the  division. 

Before  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  August  9,  a 
number  of  changes  were  made  in  the  assignment  of  the 
artillery.  With  the  three  divisions  under  Jackson  which 
were  present  with  him  in  that  action  were  the  following 
batteries : 

FIRST  DIVISION  (Winder  (K)  Taliaferro) 
Maj.  R.  Snowden  Andrews,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  W.  T.  Poague. 

Alleghany    Battery,  Capt.  Joseph  Carpenter. 

Hampden  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Caskie. 

SECOND  (LIGHT)  DIVISION  (A.  P.  Hill) 
Lieut.-Col.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 

Purcell  Battery,  Capt.  W.  J.  Pegram. 

Middlesex  Battery,  Lieut.  W.  B.  Hardy. 

Fredericksburg   Battery,  Capt.  Carter  M.  Braxton. 

Branch  (N.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  A.  C.  Latham. 

THIRD  DIVISION  (Ewell) 
Maj.  A.  R.  Courtney,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1st  Md.  or  Andrews'  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  F.  Dement. 

4th  Md.  or  Chesapeake  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  D.  Brown. 

La.  Guard  (Girardey's)   Battery,  Capt.  Louis  E.  D'Aquin. 

Courtney's  Henrico  Battery,  Capt.  J.  W.  Latimer. 

Bedford  Battery,  Capt.  J.  R.  Johnson. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XII,  Part  III,  p.  915,  and  Vol.  XI,  Part 
III,  p.  652.  But  compare  with  batteries  enumerated  in  Vol.  XII,  Part  III, 
p.  964. 


246  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Thus,  with  23,750  men,  Jackson  had  about  47  guns, 
or  a  proportion  of  2  per  1,000  men  of  all  arms.  But, 
though  small  in  numbers,  his  artillery  was  better 
organized  than  it  had  ever  been  before,  that  is  in  divi 
sional  masses,  each  commanded  by  an  efficient  officer, 
and  all  under  the  able  Crutchfield,  between  whom  and 
Jackson  a  perfect  mutual  confidence  existed. 

Jackson  was  now  in  his  element.  The  sight  of  the 
Blue  Ridge  was  to  his  soul  like  a  tonic.  Independence 
again  roused  him  to  emulate  himself.  No  longer  were 
his  actions  circumscribed  by  superior  authority  at  which, 
whether  intentionally  or  not,  he  ever  chafed. 

Released  from  the  monotonous  swamp-land  of  the 
Peninsula,  the  eagle  had  returned  to  his  native  hills 
where  from  familiar  eyrie  he  might  swoop  upon  the 
prey,  or  freely  wheel  from  craggy  peak  to  peak.  No 
historian  has  yet  satisfactorily  explained  the  anomaly 
of  Jackson's  lethargy  on  the  Peninsula.  The  very 
variance  of  the  proffered  solutions  only  serves  to  dis 
satisfy  the  student.  Given  this  or  that  set  of  facts  it  can 
be  explained.  Taking  them  all  together,  again  we  be 
come  mystified.  With  his  battery  in  Mexico,  the  young 
Jackson  had  in  the  independence  of  such  a  command 
won  fame.  As  a  professor  in  a  subordinate  position  at 
the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  his  initiative  waned,  and 
over  his  whole  career  in  Lexington  there  hung  a  moody 
gloom,  with  only  occasional  flashes  of  his  fiery  soul,  as 
when  in  his  section  room  he  expressed  a  soulful  longing 
for  war,  and  declared  that  if  war  must  come,  the  South 
should  throw  away  its  scabbard.  From  the  moment 
Jackson  joined  Lee  near  Richmond  he  was  no  longer 
the  "Eagle  of  the  Valley,"  but  became  a  falcon,  and, 
perched  upon  the  wrist  of  a  master,  it  seemed  as  if  his 
wings  were  clipped.  No  longer  did  he  swoop  hither  and 
thither  glorying  in  his  power.  But,  the  hood  removed, 
once  more  we  discern  the  eagle-like  character  of  his  old 
self,  for  Jackson  had  become  Jackson  again.  Some  men 
are  great  when  their  efforts  are  directed  by  a  guiding 
hand;  the  souls  of  others  perish  from  dependence  like 
wild  animals  in  captivity. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  247 

On  the  2d  of  August,  while  Jackson's  command  lay 
about  Gordonsville,  a  brisk  cavalry  skirmish  near 
Orange  Courthouse  gave  warning  that  Pope's  force 
must  be  struck  promptly,  if  it  were  to  be  encountered  in 
detail.  August  7,  therefore,  the  three  divisions  moved 
forward  to  gain  contact  with  Banks,  who  had  become 
separated  from  and  was  in  advance  of  McDowell.  The 
Federal  Cavalry  being  driven  back  to  Culpeper  Court 
house,  the  Army  crossed  the  Rapidan,  Swell's  Division 
leading,  early  on  the  8th.  Continuing  to  press  for 
ward  in  spite  of  the  many  delays  and  misunderstandings 
which  interefered  with  his  plans,  Jackson  at  last  reached 
the  vicinity  of  Cedar  Run,  where  he  gained  contact  with 
the  Federal  Infantry,  disposed  for  the  purpose  of 
disputing  his  advance. 

The  Federal  position  lay  behind  a  tributary  stream 
running  southward  and  joining  Cedar  Run  near  the 
eastern  end  of  Slaughter  Mountain,  a  range  of  hills 
running  from  northeast  to  southwest  and  overlooking 
the  battlefield.  The  road  from  Orange,  or  the  Cul 
peper  Road,  over  which  Banks  and  Jackson  approached 
each  other,  crossed  the  tributary  stream  at  right  angles, 
the  Federal  position  lying  in  an  elevated  wood  to  the 
west  side  of  the  latter.  In  front  of  the  Federals  lay  an 
open  and  broken  country,  with  a  large  wheatfield  on  the 
north  side  of  the  road,  surrounded  by  woods,  except 
along  the  highway.  Farther  to  the  north  lay  heavily- 
wooded  high  ground,  but  on  the  south  side  of  the  road 
was  an  open  plateau  of  cornfields  and  pastures,  gently 
ascending  to  the  mountain.  Ewell  with  Trimble's  and 
Hays'  brigades,  Latimer's  Courtney  Battery,  and  a 
section  of  Johnson's  Bedford  Battery,  under  Lieut. 
Nathaniel  Terry,  was  ordered  forward  about  1  o'clock, 
and  occupied  a  commanding  position  on  the  northeast 
point  of  the  mountain,  completely  overlooking  the  Fed 
eral  left  wing.  Early's  Brigade  moved  forward  along 
the  Culpeper  Road  and  pressing  back  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  took  up  a  position  on  the  crest  opposite  the 
Federal  center,  perpendicular  to  the  road  and  a  little 


248  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

south  of  it,  posting  one  3-inch  rifle  from  Brown's  Chesa 
peake  and  2  from  Dement' s  1st  Maryland  Battery  on 
his  right,  near  a  clump  of  cedars  just  in  advance  of,  and 
2  of  Dement's  and  3  of  D'Aquin's  in  rear  of,  Mrs. 
Crittenden's  house.  In  Early's  front  was  open  pasture 
ground  sloping  gently  downward,  beyond  which  was 
a  cornfield  sloping  upward  to  the  Federal  position ;  thus 
the  ground  at  this  point  afforded  an  excellent  field  of 
fire  for  the  guns  on  both  sides.  North  of  the  Culpeper 
Road  the  wheatfield  mentioned  was  just  opposite  the 
cornfield  on  the  south  side,  but  the  country  on  the  north 
side  was  much  less  open  than  to  the  south.  To  Early's 
immediate  left  was  timber,  which  everywhere  on  the 
north  side  of  the  road  extended  up  to  the  wheatfield. 
Winder,  whose  division  had  followed  Swell's,  was 
directed  to  support  Early.  Advancing  along  the  main 
road  he  placed  Garnett's  Brigade  in  the  woods  to  the 
north  facing  the  wheatfield  with  his  right  facing  the 
road,  near  which  5  guns  from  Poague's,  Carpenter's, 
and  Caskie's  batteries  were  posted,  supported  by  Talia- 
ferro's  Brigade.  Winder's  own  brigade  was  held  in 
reserve.  From  left  to  right  of  the  Confederate  line  the 
distance  was  probably  2  miles,  a  considerable  gap  inter 
vening  between  Early  and  E well's  other  brigades.  The 
26  guns  of  Jackson's  artillery  which  had  been  brought 
up  were  disposed  in  a  crescent,  the  horns  of  which  were 
to  the  rear,  in  3  small  groups;  that  of  Maj.  Andrews 
on  the  left  with  5,  that  of  Early  in  the  center  with  8, 
and  that  of  Ewell  on  the  right  with  6  pieces,  the  range 
of  the  center  group  being  perhaps  500,  and  the  ranges 
of  the  others  as  much  as  2,500  yards  from  the  enemy's 
batteries. 

In  Banks'  Corps,  were  9  batteries  well  grouped 
about  opposite  Early.  As  soon  as  the  latter  took  up  his 
position,  the  Federal  guns  opened  upon  him,  to  which 
Dement  and  Brown  at  once  replied,  soon  supported  by 
Maj.  Andrews'  guns  on  the  left  and  Latimer's  on  the 
right.  The  ensuing  artillery  duel  continued  with  great 
vigor  for  about  2  hours.  Gen.  Winder  was  mortally 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  249 

wounded  while  directing  the  fire  of  his  batteries.  About 
3  P.  M.  from  Hill's  divisional  artillery,  then  in  park  in 
rear,  Col.  Walker  was  able  to  bring  forward  Pegram's 
Purcell,  and  Hardy's  Middlesex  batteries,  to  the  sup 
port  of  those  already  in  action,  but  found  it  impossible 
to  bring  up  more  guns  before  the  action  was  over,  due  to 
the  blocked  condition  of  the  roads  in  rear  of  the  field. 
Thus  the  number  of  pieces  engaged  in  this  duel  was 
finally  about  equal  on  the  two  sides. 

Between  5  and  6  p.  M.  Banks,  who,  with  his  superior 
ordnance,  had  gotten  somewhat  the  best  of  the  artillery 
duel,  advanced  to  the  attack.  His  right,  overlapping 
the  Confederate  left,  threw  the  latter  into  confusion, 
routing  Garnett's  Brigade.  Maj.  Andrews  ordering 
his  batteries  with  those  of  A.  P.  Hill,  which  Walker 
had  brought  up,  to  change  front,  maintained  a  terrific 
fire  from  his  guns  upon  the  Federal  Infantry,  which 
had  approached  to  within  300  yards  before  A.  P.  Hill's 
Division  began  to  arrive  upon  the  scene,  and  enabled  the 
Confederates  to  repulse  the  assault  and  drive  the  Fed 
erals  across  Cedar  Creek.  By  this  time  it  was  dark, 
but  favored  by  a  moon,  almost  full,  two  fresh  brigades 
with  Pegram's  Purcell  Battery  undertook  the  pursuit, 
but  were  checked  by  Ricketts'  Division,  3  of  the  bat 
teries  of  which  inflicted  a  loss  of  2  killed  and  14 
wounded  on  Pegram's  Battery  alone.  Pegram's  action 
on  this  occasion  was  characteristically  cool  and  gallant.* 

In  the  whole  affair,  the  loss  of  the  Confederate  Ar 
tillery  was  2  killed  and  28  wounded;  that  of  the  enemy 
was  7  killed,  and  29  wounded,  and  6  missing.  In  ma 
terial,  the  Federal  loss  was  the  greater,  involving,  how 
ever,  but  one  12-pounder  Napoleon. 

Some  idea  of  the  severity  of  the  artillery  duel  may 
be  derived  from  the  fact  that  Knapp's  Pennsylvania 
Battery  of  six  10-pounder  Parrotts  reported  an  ex 
penditure  of  980  rounds  during  the  day. 

In  this  exceptionally  bloody  action  on  the  part  of  the 
infantry,  much  less  so,  however,  than  it  would  have  been 

*  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XII,  Part  II,  p.  171,  Report  of  Major  Davis 
Tillson,  Chief  of  Artillery,  3d  Army  Corps. 


250  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

had  Jackson  made  the  usual  headlong  assault  on  the 
Federal  position,  we  again  find  him  delaying  until  his 
better  guns  could  be  brought  into  action.  While  not 
all  of  his  artillery  was  brought  up,  yet  that  employed 
was  grouped  in  masses,  small  though  they  were,  in  order 
to  secure  from  them  the  benefits  of  a  cross  fire  on  the 
Federal  artillery.  Jackson  had  undoubtedly  learned 
the  lesson  that  with  long  range  guns  concentrated  fire 
did  not  necessarily  require  massed  guns.  Though 
Banks  anticipated  him  in  the  infantry  attack,  yet  the 
disposition  of  his  guns  had  enabled  Jackson,  both  on 
the  right,  between  Early  and  Ewell,  and  on  the  ex 
treme  left,  to  assist  his  infantry  with  the  canister  of  his 
batteries.  In  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  in  which 
the  batteries  were  directed  by  divisional  chiefs,  is  to  be 
found  by  far  the  best  tactical  employment  of  field  ar 
tillery  up  to  that  time  exhibited  by  the  Confederates, 
and  in  point  of  individual  battery  action  in  pursuit, 
nothing  could  have  excelled  the  skill  and  dash  displayed 
by  Pegram,  who,  though  severely  punished,  adroitly 
followed  up  the  retreating  infantry,  working  havoc  in 
its  ranks  with  his  guns  until  they  were  silenced  by  the 
concentrated  fire  of  4  fresh  batteries. 

To  Pegram  belongs  the  credit  of  having  been  first  to 
make  Pope,  with  his  entire  staff,  turn  his  back  on  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  a  practice  which  he  had 
boastingly  declared  was  the  great  fault  with  his  prede 
cessor.* 

We  shall  frequently  meet  with  the  name  of  William 
Johnston  Pegram  in  this  narrative  from  now  on.  As 
no  officer  of  the  Artillery  of  Lee's  Army  was  more 
noted  than  he,  some  account  of  his  career  up  to  the  time 
of  which  we  write  should  here  be  given,  f 

"In  October,  1860,  he  matriculated  as  a  student  in 
the  University  of  Virginia,  entering  the  School  of  Law. 

*The  disappearance  of  Pope,  when  a  salvo  from  Pegram's  Battery  suddenly 
burst  upon  him  as  he  arrived  on  the  field,  is  an  amusing  incident  in  the  career 
of  that  general. 

tFor  complete  sketch  of  his  life  see  "The  University  Memorial,"  by  the 
Rev.  John  L.  Johnson.  The  sketch  of  Pegram  is  by  W.  Gordon  McCabe,  his 
brilliant  adjutant  and  inseparable  comrade. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  251 

He  was  then  nineteen  years  old,  reserved  almost  to 
shyness,  grave  and  gracious  in  his  manner,  in  which 
there  was  little  of  primness  and  much  of  the  charm  of 
an  old-fashioned  politeness.  His  apparent  shyness  was 
owing  partly  to  his  extreme  near-sightedness,  partly  to 
the  modesty  of  his  nature.  To  those  students  who  wrere 
not  his  intimates,  but  happened  to  meet  him  occasionally 
in  the  rooms  of  common  friends,  it  was  often  a  matter  of 
wonder  and  remark  how  keen  a  sense  of  humor  there 
was  in  this  quiet,  sober-looking  lad,  who  assuredly 
yielded  to  no  one  in  his  thorough  appreciation  of  the 
most  delicate  criticism. 

"In  the  autumn  of  this  year  the  students  determined 
to  organize  two  companies  of  infantry,  and  Pegram  at 
once  became  an  active  promoter  of  the  enterprise.  He 
entered  the  first  company  formed,  known  as  the  'South 
ern  Guard,'  and  was  appointed  1st  Sergeant.  He  was 
then  a  capital  infantry  soldier,  having  been  for  two 
years  a  member  of  the  famous  'Company  F'  of  Rich 
mond,  and  proved  untiring  in  drilling  his  men.  In 
1861  came  Lincoln's  proclamation  calling  for  50,000 
volunteers.  From  that  moment  books  were  little 
thought  of  in  the  University.  All  were  eager  to  ex 
change  gown  for  sword.  Pegram  at  once  left  college 
and  reported  for  duty  with  his  old  company,  which  had 
been  ordered  to  Aquia  Creek.  With  this  company  he 
remained  but  a  short  time.  Sent  as  drillmaster  to  exer 
cise  the  artillerymen  of  Walker  in  the  infantry  tactics, 
he  was  elected  Lieutenant  of  the  'Purcell  Battery.'  It 
was  as  commander  of  this  battery  that  he  was  destined 
to  achieve  his  hard- won  fame — a  battery  which  was  with 
him  from  the  first  battle  of  Manassas,  through  every 
general  action  in  Virginia,  to  the  trenches  of  Peters 
burg — which,  always  skillfully  handled  in  the  presence 
of  the  enemy,  yet  lost  during  its  four  years  of  service 
more  than  200  men  killed  and  wounded;  and  which  he 
declared  repeatedly  when  colonel  that  'the  Purcell  men 
were  the  coolest  and  the  most  desperate  men  he  ever 
saw  in  a  tight  place.'  Lindsay  Walker,  afterwards 


252  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Brigadier- General  and  Chief  of  Artillery  of  Hill's 
Corps,  was  then  captain  of  the  battery,  and  was  not 
slow  to  discover  what  a  thorough  soldier  he  possessed  in 
his  young  subaltern.  Long  afterwards  Walker  gener 
ously  said  that  Pegram  spared  him  all  trouble,  and  that 
commanding  a  battery,  the  most  troublesome  thing  in 
the  world,  became  a  pleasure  with  such  an  executive 
officer.  In  the  campaign  of  '61  the  battery  was  engaged 
at  Bull  Run;  Walker  received  his  majority  early  in 
'62,  and  Pegram  became  captain  on  the  reorganization. 
But  it  was  not  until  the  great  struggle  in  front  of  Rich 
mond,  in  July  of  '62,  that  the  battery  came  into  marked 
prominence.  At  Mechanicsville  it  held  the  post  of 
honor,  and  paid  the  price  which  the  post  of  honor  ever 
exacts.  Here  first  to  the  Army  the  young  captain  gave 
proof  of  that  stubborn  courage  and  literal  obedience  to 
orders  which  all  men  thereafter  looked  for  in  him.  Ex 
posed  to  a  murderous  fire  of  infantry,  to  the  convergent 
fire  of  five  six-gun  batteries,  long  after  night  came 
down  the  thunder  of  his  guns  told  that  lie  was 
tenaciously  holding  his  ground.  But  there  was  sur 
prise  mingled  with  admiration  when  it  became  known 
to  the  Army  on  the  next  day  that  of  his  six  guns  four 
had  been  disabled  before  nightfall,  that  two  of  his  of 
ficers  had  been  badly  wounded,  more  than  half  his 
horses  killed,  and  that  of  the  ninety  dashing  cannoneers 
who  had  on  yesterday  galloped  into  action  more  than 
fifty  lay  killed  and  wounded  on  the  field. 

"The  day  after  'Mechanicsville'  he  equipped  thor 
oughly  the  two  guns  which  had  not  been  disabled,  and 
again  applied  to  Gen.  Hill  to  have  the  advance.  Every 
where  during  the  Seven  Days  that  plucky  section  and 
its  young  captain  found  their  place  where  the  battle 
raged  hottest.  Richmond,  in  her  joy  of  triumph,  a  joy 
chastened  by  the  sorrow  which  victory  ever  brings,  was 
not  unmindful  of  her  younthful  hero.  The  town  rang 
with  his  praises — praises  closest  to  a  soldier's  heart — 
from  the  lips  of  wounded  men,  who  had  seen  him  in  the 
dust  and  sweat  of  battle,  and  who  spoke  of  him  as  only 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  253 

brave  men  can  speak  of  each  other.  His  name  was 
introduced  into  the  play  by  one  of  the  actors  at  the 
theater,  and  elicited  the  most  tumultuous  applause. 
The  player  declared  that  the  boy  captain  fought  at 
such  close  quarters  because  he  was  too  near-sighted  to 
see  a  dozen  yards,  and  would  never  open  fire  until  he 
saw  the  enemy.  At  this  the  bronzed  and  bearded 
veterans  in  the  pit  rose  and  cheered  lustily.  Mean 
while  the  young  captain  remained  modestly  at  his 
camp,  riding  into  the  city  but  rarely  to  visit  his  im 
mediate  family,  and  blushing  painfully  when  any  one 
spoke  to  him  of  the  attention  his  gallantry  had  excited. 
Especially  annoying  to  him  were  the  fulsome  praises 
showered  upon  him  by  newspapers.  His  distress  at 
these  paragraphs  was  a  great  source  of  amusement  to 
his  comrades.  'Why,  this  is  simply  disgusting,'  he  would 
say;  'every  man  at  the  front  will  be  laughing  over  it.' 
But  the  men  at  the  front  were  never  prone  to  laugh  at 
good  fighters,  and  gave  even  more  exaggerated  ac 
counts  of  his  achievements  than  did  the  florid  para 
graphs  of  the  journals. 

"A  few  days  of  rest,  and  his  battery,  newly  equipped 
and  recruited,  was  on  the  march  to  Cedar  Mountain 
with  Jackson's  flying  column.  Here  again  his  guns, 
pushed  up  within  eighty  yards  of  the  enemy,  were 
served  with  such  rapidity  and  precision  as  won  a  nod 
of  approval  even  from  the  great  leader,  always  so  chary 
of  praise.  About  nightfall,  when  Gen.  Jackson  had  de 
termined  to  press  the  retreating  enemy,  Pegram's  guns, 
supported  by  Field's  Brigade,  were  advanced  within 
close  range  of  the  spot  where  the  enemy  was  supposed 
to  have  halted.  In  a  few  moments  a  heavy  column  was 
seen  marching  on  the  flank  of  the  guns.  Owing  to  the 
uncertain  light  it  was  impossible  to  tell  whether  it  was 
a  column  of  Federals  or  of  our  own  men.  The  officers 
of  the  support  differed  in  opinion  regarding  the  matter, 
and  time  was  precious.  Pegram  at  once  turned  his  bat 
tery  over  to  his  1st  lieutenant,  saying:  'McGraw,  I 
shall  ride  up  close  to  these  fellows;  keep  a  sharp  look- 


254  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

out,  and  if  you  see  me  wave  my  hat,  open  all  the  guns.' 
In  a  moment  he  was  galloping  towards  the  column  now 
within  a  hundred  yards,  reined  in  his  horse  close  to 
the  silently-moving  mass,  turned,  and  waved  his  hat. 
Another  moment  and  he  rode  at  full  speed  into  the 
line  of  guns,  where  old  Stonewall  sat  on  his  sorrel 
watching  the  column.  Pegram  cried  out  in  great  glee : 
'Pitch  in,  men;  Gen.  Jackson  is  looking  at  you!'  The 
enemy  were  broken  in  a  few  minutes  by  his  rapid  fire, 
but  speedily  put  three  batteries  into  position  and  re 
turned  it.  For  2  hours  this  single  battery  fought  18 
guns  of  the  enemy,  and  it  was  not  until  10  o'clock  that 
his  heated  and  disabled  Napoleons  were  silenced.  His 
loss  was  proportionally,  very  nearly  as  great  as  at 
Mechanicsville ;  but  he  was  determined  to  push  on  with 
Walker's  Battalion  to  Manassas,  where  for  the  second 
time  his  guns  did  good  service  on  that  glorious  field." 


CHAPTER  XVII 

GAINESVILLE   AND   GROVETON 

AUGUST  14,  McClellan,  with  the  main  body  of  his 
army  began  his  movement  to  Fortress  Monroe,  from 
which  point  his  troops  were  to  be  transferred  to  the 
vicinity  of  Alexandria,  for  the  purpose  of  moving  out 
to  the  support  of  Pope.  Burnside's  Corps  which  had 
reached  Fredericksburg  began  to  move  up  the  Rappa- 
hannock  for  the  same  purpose.  Gen.  Lee  personally  took 
command  at  Gordons ville  on  the  15th,  to  which  point 
Jackson  had  returned  on  the  12th.  On  the  13th,  Long- 
street's  command  consisting  of  19  brigades  was  ordered 
to  Gordonsville  by  rail,  and  Hood  with  2  brigades  to 
Hanover  Junction,  R.  H.  Anderson's  Division  being 
ordered  to  proceed  from  Drewry's  Bluff  to  Louisa 
Courthouse.*  As  soon  as  it  was  positively  learned  that 
Burnside  had  left  Fredericksburg,  Hood  was  ordered  to 
join  Longstreet.  On  the  18th,  the  Reserve  Artillery, 
which  had  not  taken  part  in  Jackson's  operations  about 
Orange,  was  ordered  to  proceed  by  road  to  Gordons 
ville.  f  Leaving  his  camp  about  Richmond  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  19th,  the  same  day  Pendleton  was  directed 
to  halt  his  command  upon  reaching  the  North 
Anna,  behind  which  Ripley  had  been  ordered  to  mass 
Smith's  Division  for  the  purpose  of  opposing  the  re 
ported  advance  of  a  Federal  column  over  the  Fred 
ericksburg  Road.  Tarrying  here  for  a  time,  Pendleton 
was  soon  ordered  to  join  Gen.  Lee,  the  Reserve  reaching 
Louisa  Courthouse  on  the  27th.  From  this  point  its 
route  was  deflected  to  Rapidan  Station.  While  Pendle 
ton  himself,  by  dint  of  hard  riding,  succeeded  in  joining 
Gen.  Lee  on  the  battlefield  of  Second  Manassas,  the  Re 
serve  Artillery,  as  seen,  was  lumbering  along  far  to  the 
rear  at  the  rate  of  about  20  miles  a  day. 

*  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XII,  Part  III,  pp.  928,  929,  931. 
tlbid.,  p.  965. 


256  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

On  the  19th,  Gen.  Lee  had  published  his  order  for  the 
advance  of  his  army  from  Gordonsville  to  begin  early 
the  following  morning.  Longstreet's  command  consti 
tuting  the  right,  and  Jackson's  constituting  the  left 
wing,  were  to  cross  the  Rapidan  at  Raccoon  and  Somer- 
ville  Fords,  respectively,  moving  in  the  direction  of 
Culpeper  Courthouse,  the  latter  followed  by  R.  H. 
Anderson's  Division  in  reserve,  with  which  Col.  S.  D. 
Lee's  newly-organized  battalion  of  6  batteries  was  to 
move.  This  reserve  battalion  was  composed  as  follows: 

Bath  Battery,  Capt.  J.  L.  Eubank. 

Portsmouth  (Grimes')  Battery,  Lieut.  Thomas  J.  Oakham. 

Bedford   Battery,  Capt.  T.  C.  Jordan. 

Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  W.  W.  Parker. 

Rhett's   South   Carolina   Battery,  Lieut.  Wm.  Elliott. 

Ashland  Battery,  Capt.  Pichegru  Woolfolk,  Jr. 

The  mass  of  Pope's  troops  was  near  the  Rapidan, 
opposite  Orange  Courthouse,  where  they  had  been  con 
fronting  Jackson  at  Gordonsville.  The  commanding- 
general  becoming  apprised  on  the  18th  of  Lee's  plans 
and  numbers  by  means  of  a  captured  autograph  com 
munication  of  the  latter,  at  once  ordered  his  army  to 
fall  back  behind  the  Rappahannock,  where  he  would  be 
nearer  his  base  and  more  promptly  ree'nf  orced  by  a  part, 
at  least,  of  McClellan's  army.  By  the  night  of  the 
19th  the  Federal  Army  lay  behind  the  river,  its  left 
opposite  Kelly's  Ford,  and  its  right  behind  Hazel  Run, 
near  Rappahannock  Station.  The  following  night  the 
Confederates  had  crossed  the  Rapidan,  and  Longstreet, 
on  the  right,  had  gained  contact  with  the  Federal  left 
at  Kelly's  Ford.  On  the  21st,  Jackson  moved  forward 
from  his  bivouac  at  Stevensburg  to  the  river,  his  front 
extending  from  the  railroad  bridge  to  Beverly  Ford. 
At  the  latter  point,  Col.  Rosser  with  two  regiments  of 
cavalry  crossed  the  river,  dispersing  the  opposing 
infantry  and  disabling  one  of  Banks'  batteries  which 
had  been  posted  behind  the  ford.  With  a  section  of 
Pelham's  horse  battery,  Rosser 's  force  remained  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river  until  late  in  the  day,  supported 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  257 

from  the  other  bank  by  Taliaferro's  8  divisional  bat 
teries  under  Maj.  L.  M.  Shumaker.  When  Stuart 
withdrew  before  King's  Division  and  some  of  Sigel's 
troops,  sent  up  by  McDowell  to  retake  the  ford,  an 
active  artillery  duel  ensued  during  the  remainder  of  the 
day  between  the  opposing  batteries,  a  cannonade  with 
out  material  results  on  either  side. 

The  main  point  to  be  noticed  in  connection  with  the 
Artillery  in  this  movement  is  that  it  was  comparatively 
well  organized  in  divisional  masses,  only  a  few  batteries 
being  assigned  to  brigades,  and  that  it  was  kept  well 
up  to  the  front  in  the  advance,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Reserve.  It  would  seem  that  Pendleton's  remonstrance 
against  the  inadequate  use  of  the  Artillery  on  the 
Peninsula  had  had  some  effect,  though  of  course  the 
error  which  had  been  previously  committed  with  respect 
to  the  neglect  of  the  arm  had  been  perceived  and  ap 
preciated  by  Gen.  Lee.  Its  organization  was  now,  ap 
proximately,  as  follows: 

RIGHT  WING  OR  LONGSTREET'S  CORPS 

ANDERSON'S  DIVISION 
Lieut.-Col.  Stephen  D.  Lee,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Bath  Battery,  Capt.  J.  L.  Eubank. 

2.  Portsmouth   Battery,  Lieut.  Thomas  J.  Oakham. 

3.  Bedford  Battery,    "  Capt.  T.  C.  Jordan. 

4.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  W.  W.  Parker. 

5.  Rhett's  South  Carolina  Battery,  Lieut.  William  Elliott. 

6.  Ashland  Battery,  Capt.  Pichegru  Woolfolk,  Jr. 

WILCOX'S  DIVISION 

1.  Thomas  Battery,  Capt.   Edwin  J.   Anderson.* 

2.  Dixie  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Chapman.f 

HOOD'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  B.  W.  Frobel,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Charleston    (S.   C.)    German 

Battery,  Capt.  W.  R.  Bachman. 

2.  Palmetto   (S.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  Hugh  R.  Garden. 

3.  Rowan   (N.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  James  Reilly. 

*Wilcox's  Brigade. 
tFeatherston's   Brigade. 


17 


258  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

KEMPER'S  DIVISION 
1.   Macbeth  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  R.  Boyce.* 

CORPS  RESERVE  ARTILLERY  (RIGHT  WING) 
Col.  John  B.  Walton,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  1st  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Squires. 

2.  2d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  B.  Richardson. 

3.  3d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  M.  B.  Miller. 

4.  4th  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  B.  F.  Eshleman. 

5.  Norfolk  Battery,  Capt.  Frank  Huger. 

6.  Goochland  (Leake)  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  H.  Turner. 

7.  Donaldsonville  (La.)  Battery,  Capt.  Victor  Maurin. 

8.  Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  M.  N.  Moorman. 

9.  Loudoun  Battery,  Capt.  A.  L.  Rogers. 
10.  Fauquier  Battery,  Capt.  R.  M.  Stribling. 

LEFT  WING  OR  JACKSON'S  CORPS 

Col.  Stapleton  Crutchfield,  Chief  of  ArtiUery 

TALIAFERRO'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  L.  M.  Shumaker,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  2d   Baltimore   Battery,  Capt.  J.  B.  Brockenbrough. 

2.  Alleghany  Battery,  Capt.  Joseph  Carpenter. 

3.  Hampden  Richmond  Battery,        Capt.  Wm.  H.  Caskie. 

4.  Winchester   Battery,  Capt.  W.  E.  Cutshaw. 

5.  1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  T.  Poague. 

6.  Lee  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  J.  Raine. 

7.  8th  Star  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Rice. 

8.  Danville  Battery,  Capt.  George  W.  Wooding. 

A.  P.  HILL'S  DIVISION 
Lieut.-Col.  R.  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Fredericksburg  Battery,  Capt.  Carter  M.  Braxton. 

2.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  W.  G.  Crenshaw. 

3.  Letcher   Battery,  Capt.  Greenlee  Davidson. 

4.  Middlesex  Battery,  Lieut.  W.  B.  Hardy. 

5.  Branch   (N.  C.)   Battery,  Lieut.  John  R.  Potts. 

6.  Pee  Dee  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  D.  G.  Mclntosh. 

7.  Purcell  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  J.  Pegram. 


*Evans'  Brigade. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  259 

EWELL'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  A.  R.  Courtney,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Staunton  Battery,  Lieut.  A.  W.  Garber. 

2.  1th  Md.  or  Chesapeake  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  D.  Brown. 

3.  Louisiana  Guard  Battery,  Capt.  Louis  E.  D'Aquin. 

4.  1st  Maryland  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  F.  Dement. 

5.  Bedford  Battery,  Capt.  John  R.  Johnson. 

6.  Henrico  Courtney  Battery,  Capt.  James  W.  Latimer. 

Thus  with  Lee's  Army,  numbering  between  47,000 
and  55,000  men,  were  43  batteries,  with  a  total  of  about 
175  guns,  or  something  over  3  guns  per  1,000  of  all 
arms.*  With  Longstreet's  Corps  were  22,  and  with 
Jackson's,  21  batteries.  The  total  personnel  did  not 
exceed  2,500  men. 

In  addition  to  the  light  batteries  of  the  Army,  there 
were,  however,  with  the  cavalry,  Pelham's  and  Chew's 
horse  batteries.  About  this  time  the  Washington 
(S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  James  F.  Hart,  was  converted 
into  a  horse  battery,  but  it  did  not  rejoin  the  Army  until 
September  2. 

In  Longstreet's  Corps,  a  large  reserve  force  of  10 
batteries  is  found  collected  under  the  immediate  com 
mand  of  Col.  Walton,  an  organization  only  approxi 
mating  the  corps  artillery  reserve  of  the  following  year, 
for  6  of  these  batteries  were  used  at  this  time  in  a 
purely  individual  capacity. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22d,  Jackson,  seeking  to  gain 
the  enemy's  right,  left  the  position  he  had  previously 
occupied,  Longstreet  having  been  ordered  over  thereto 
from  Kelly's  Ford,  and  moved  towards  the  fords  near 
Warrenton  or  Fauquier  White  Sulphur  Springs, 
where  he  arrived  during  the  afternoon,  having  crossed 
the  Hazel  River  at  Welford's  Mill.  Longstreet  had. 
meanwhile,  been  engaging  the  enemy  in  an  active  ar 
tillery  combat  at  Beverly  Ford. 

Although  aware  of  the  movement  on  his  right,  Pope 
held  the  mass  of  his  army  near  Rappahannock  Station 

*For  strength  of  Lee's  army,  see  Ropes,  p.  198;  Allan,  p.  199;  Four  Years 
With  General  Lee,  Taylor,  p.  60  ;  Southern  Historical  Papers,  Vol.  VII,  p.  181. 


260  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

in  order  to  hold  the  railroad  and  keep  open  the  route 
for  his  reen  for  cements  from  Fredericksburg,  both  of 
which  were  threatened  by  Longstreet.  During  the 
various  active  movements  that  ensued,  resulting  after 
much  vacillation,  in  Pope's  occupying  with  his  whole 
army  a  position  between  Sulphur  Springs  and  War- 
renton,  the  Artillery  had  been  actively  employed  both 
by  Longstreet  at  Beverly  Ford  and  by  Jackson  against 
Sigel,  in  his  flanking  movement  on  the  Federal  right. 
On  the  24th,  Jackson's  artillery  had  also  been  active 
along  the  river  from  Sulphur  Springs  to  Waterloo, 
A.  P.  Hill's  Division  holding  the  Confederate  side  of 
the  river.  Practically  all  of  the  artillery  of  the  two 
corps  had  been  engaged. 

It  now  became  known  that  Pope  had  plans  of  his 
own,  and  that  Lee  had  been  foiled  in  his  effort  to  cross 
the  river.  At  this  juncture  it  also  became  evident  that 
Pope's  50,000  men  would  soon  be  increased  to  130,000 
or  more,  and  though  Lee's  strength  would  soon  exceed 
70,000,  immediate  action  on  his  part  was  necessary. 
Without  waiting  for  his  reinforcements,  since  the  de 
lay  would  in  effect  only  contribute  to  the  disparity  in 
numbers  between  the  two  armies,  Lee  now  decided  to 
make  one  more  effort  to  fall  upon  Pope's  rear. 

Accordingly,  late  on  the  24th,  Jackson,  with  22,000 
men,  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  beyond 
Pope's  right  flank,  and  move  by  forced  marches  through 
Thoroughfare  Gap  until  he  struck  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Railroad  in  the  Federal  rear. 

In  order  to  make  possible  this  movement,  Lee  now 
gave  the  most  brilliant  example  of  the  use  of  artillery 
which  had  yet  occurred  in  the  war.  The  success  of 
Jackson's  movement  depended  absolutely  upon  its 
secrecy,  and  yet  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  withdraw 
his  guns  from  under  the  very  eyes  of  the  enemy.  It 
was  accomplished  on  the  following  day.  Perceiving 
that  the  Federals  had  largely  withdrawn  from  the  lower 
fords  along  the  Rappahannock,  Longstreet,  leaving  but 
a  small  force  in  his  old  position,  was  ordered  up  to  re- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  261 

lieve  Jackson,  the  latter's  guns  having  maintained  their 
fire  until  nightfall,  making  a  brave  display  of  force. 
Upon  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  his  guns  were  quietly 
substituted  for  those  of  Jackson  under  the  cover  of 
night,  continuing  the  fire  with  great  activity  at  dawn. 

Late  on  the  24th,  Jackson's  Corps  had  been  as 
sembled  about  Jeffersonton,  where  the  troops  were  re 
lieved  of  all  baggage  and  trains.  Nothing  in  the  way 
of  a  train  but  the  ambulance  and  ammunition  wagons 
and  a  few  beeves  on  the  hoof  was  to  accompany  the 
light  column  and  its  artillery.  Marching  northwest  to 
Amissville,  and  then  north  to  Salem,  with  the  artillery 
in  the  rear,  Jackson  covered  26  miles  on  the  25th.  On 
the  26th,  the  column  was  under  way  at  daybreak,  and 
now  turned  eastward.  Passing  through  Thoroughfare 
Gap  in  the  Bull  Run  Mountain,  it  reached  Gainesville 
about  3  P.  M.,  from  which  point  Jackson  marched  to 
Bristoe,  EwelFs  Division  arriving  there  about  sunset 
after  a  march  of  25  miles.  The  presence  of  the  Con 
federates  being  now  discovered,  Trimble's  Brigade 
hastened  on  another  4  miles  to  capture  Manassas 
Junction  before  reinforcements  could  arrive  from 
Alexandria.  This  he  gallantly  did,  capturing  the 
Federal  works  with  2  light  batteries  complete  and  fully 
mounted.  When  Jackson  arrived  at  Manassas  Junction 
early  the  morning  of  the  27th,  with  Taliaferro's  and 
Hill's  divisions,  he  had  with  him  the  entire  divisional 
artillery.  Thus,  in  little  more  than  48  hours,  Jackson's 
21  batteries,  with  four-horse  teams,  had  covered  over  55 
miles,  no  mean  performance  even  with  the  most  superior 
full  teams  of  draught  animals. 

In  the  meantime,  Longstreet  by  ostentatiously  plant 
ing  fresh  batteries  and  keeping  up  a  heavy  fire  of  ar 
tillery  in  periodical  cannonades,  had  succeded  in  deceiv 
ing  Pope  throughout  the  25th  and  the  morning  of  the 
26th  into  believing  that  a  crossing  was  to  be  attempted 
either  at  Sulphur  Springs  or  Waterloo  Bridge.* 
About  noon  of  the  latter  day,  however,  leaving  Ander- 

*Rel)ellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XII,  Part  II,  p.  66. 


262  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

son's  Division  at  Sulphur  Springs  to  observe  the  enemy, 
Longstreet  with  about  25,000  men  set  out  to  follow 
Jackson's  route,  bivouacking  at  Orleans  that  night  and 
reaching  White  Plains  the  next  day,  24  miles  west  of 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  Meantime,  Pope,  possessed  of  a 
great  desire  to  crush  Jackson  at  Manassas,  ordered  all 
his  forces  to  that  point  on  the  28th. 

When  Pope  reached  the  battlefield  on  Manassas 
plains  which  he  had  sketched  out  for  himself,  his 
antagonist  was  not  to  be  found,  for  Jackson  lay  hidden 
in  the  woods  within  seven  miles  of  the  ruins  of  Manassas. 
It  was  not  until  5  p.  M.  that  King's  Division  of  Mc 
Dowell's  Corps  accidentally  developed  his  presence 
while  marching  from  Gainesville  to  Centreville  to  join 
the  main  Federal  body  in  pursuance  of  Pope's  orders. 

Jackson's  position  lay  about  a  mile  north  of  the  War- 
renton  pike,  near  Groveton.  As  soon  as  King's  bri 
gades  began  to  stream  by,  utterly  unconscious  of  the 
former's  presence,  Jackson  ordered  Lawton's  and 
Trimble's  brigades  to  the  attack,  and  Wooding's  and 
Garber's  batteries  to  trot  forward  and  open  fire  upon 
the  center  of  the  column  opposite  them.  Gibbon  sent 
a  regiment  to  drive  off  the  guns,  thinking  perhaps  he 
had  encountered  a  part  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,  with  its 
horse  batteries,  and  also  opened  upon  them  with  his  own 
two  batteries,  which,  admirably  served,  soon  compelled 
the  Confederate  guns  to  limber  up  and  shift  their  posi 
tions.  To  the  support  of  Wooding  and  Garber,  Jackson 
had  ordered  up  from  his  rear  20  more  pieces  which  failed 
to  arrive,  due  to  the  thickness  of  the  woods,  though 
two  of  Pelham's  guns  were  brought  forward.  For 
2^/2  hours  the  conflict  raged  with  heavy  loss  to  both  sides, 
the  Federals,  who  had  displayed  great  courage,  finally 
withdrawing  at  nightfall.  Surprised  while  marching  en 
route  by  the  fire  of  two  batteries  that  were  supported  by 
a  large  force  of  infantry,  and  again  when  ordered  to  drive 
off  a  supposed  small  cavalry  force,  the  Federal  Infantry 
as  well  as  their  two  batteries,  neither  of  which  had  been 
in  action  before,  sustained  and  inflicted  serious  losses 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  263 

under  circumstances  which  would  have  justified  con 
fusion  among  seasoned  troops.  They  could  not  have 
been  taken  at  a  greater  disadvantage,  and  while  they 
lost  1,100  out  of  2,800,  among  the  4,500  Confederates 
engaged,  the  loss  was  not  less  than  1,200.  The  rifled 
Federal  guns  had  undoubtedly  carried  off  the  artillery 
honors. 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th,  Jackson  realized,  as  he 
gazed  upon  the  heavy  masses  forming  on  the  hills  op 
posite  him,  that  the  day  was  a  critical  one,  for  whether 
Longstreet  had  broken  through  Thoroughfare  Gap  or 
not,  it  would  be  many  hours  before  he  could  reenforce 
the  Second  Corps  on  the  battlefield  of  July  21,  1861. 

Jackson's  three  divisions  occupied  a  long,  flat-topped 
ridge,  standing  about  a  mile  north  of  the  Warrenton- 
Centerville  Road,  and  commanding  the  approaches 
from  the  south  and  east,  was  an  unfinished  railroad  bed 
running  some  500  yards  below  the  crest.  Before  the 
right  and  the  right  center  of  the  position,  about  1% 
miles  in  length,  lay  green  pastures,  almost  free  of  ob 
stacles  to  the  fire  of  the  defenders  for  a  distance  of  1,300 
yards,  and  sloping  to  a  brook  known  as  Young's 
Branch.  The  left  center,  and  left,  however,  were  shut 
in  by  a  thicket  near  Groveton,  from  400  to  600  yards  in 
width,  which  crossed  the  cut,  and  reduced  the  field  of 
fire  at  that  point.  Within  the  position  behind  the 
copses  and  folds  in  the  land,  there  was  ample  cover  for 
reserves.  Behind  the  deep  cuttings  and  high  embank 
ments  of  the  railroad  bed,  the  advanced  line  was 
strongly  placed.  The  left,  slightly  refused,  rested  on  a 
rocky  spur  near  Bull  Run,  commanding  Sudley 
Springs  Ford,  and  the  road  to  Aldie  Gap.  Between 
this  eminence  and  the  creek  lay  an  open  cornfield. 

On  the  wooded  ridge  500  yards  to  the  left  rear  of  the 
infantry  line,  16  guns  were  posted  and  the  24  pieces  of 
Poague's,  Carpenter's,  Dement's,  Brockenbrough's,  and 
Latimer's  batteries  were  stationed  in  rear  of  the  right 
center. 


264  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  left  of  the  position  was  occupied  by  A.  P.  Hill's 
Division  of  6  brigades  in  3  lines ;  the  center  by  Trimble's 
and  Lawton's  brigades  of  Ewell's  Division,  and  the 
right  by  Jackson's  old  division  of  4  brigades,  now  com 
manded  by  Starke,  also  in  3  lines.  Early  with  2  bri 
gades  and  a  battery,  occupied  a  wooded  knoll  where  the 
railroad  bed  crossed  the  highroad  in  the  right  rear  of  the 
main  line,  and  Stuart  protected  the  flanks,  meantime 
endeavoring  to  gain  touch  with  Longstreet  whose  ap 
proach  was  from  the  right  rear.  Thus  Jackson  had 
taken  up  a  most  defensible  position  with  his  18,000  men, 
and  placed  every  gun  in  position,  for  which  there  was 
room  on  the  ragged  crest.  Behind  the  deep  ditches  and 
high  parapets  formed  by  the  railroad  bed  were  roughly 
5  muskets  per  running  yard  of  front,  with  a  clear  field 
of  fire,  except  at  one  point,  up  to  the  limit  of  their 
effective  range,  the  same  being  true  with  respect  to  the 
guns  from  which  a  plunging  fire  would  have  to  be  en 
countered  by  the  attacking  infantry. 

Jackson's  disposition  of  his  artillery  was  a  wise  one, 
from  which  many  advantages  were  to  be  expected.  If 
the  enemy's  long  range  pieces  elected  to  engage  in  a 
duel  with  the  batteries  on  the  ridge  above  and  to  the  rear 
of  his  infantry,  then  the  latter  would  be  relieved  of  the 
fire  of  the  opposing  batteries,  and,  should  the  enemy 
decide  to  hammer  at  his  infantry  in  the  railroad  cuts 
and  behind  the  fills  with  his  artillery,  the  supporting 
batteries  would  be  free  to  play  either  upon  the  hostile 
guns  or  the  attacking  columns  at  will.  Little  effect 
with  common  shell  could  be  had,  at  best,  against  the 
natural  line  of  works,  which  Jackson  had  availed  him 
self  of  for  his  infantry,  and  before  the  assaulting 
columns  could  gain  the  position,  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
guns  would  become  masked.  From  every  consideration, 
then,  the  Confederates  seemed  possessed  of  a  position 
guaranteeing  a  fire  superiority  over  the  enemy.  That 
such  proved  to  be  the  case  in  the  battle  of  Groveton 
is  borne  out  by  the  repulse  of  overwhelming  numbers. 
That  Jackson  and  Crutchfield  had  employed  much 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  265 

judgment  in  the  disposition  of  their  artillery  is  not  to  be 
denied,  and  in  this  engagement  many  of  the  advantages 
of  modern  indirect  fire  accrued  to  the  defense,  that  is, 
the  attacker,  since  he  did  not  possess  a  greatly  superior 
number  of  guns,  was  forced  to  neglect  either  the  artillery 
or  the  infantry  of  his  adversary  by  reason  of  their  entire 
separation.  Again,  Jackson  gives  us  the  first  example 
of  the  kind  to  be  found  in  the  operations  of  Virginia. 
In  the  study  of  his  battles  too  little  attention  has  been 
paid  such  considerations,  elements  of  his  success,  par 
ticularly  on  this  occasion,  which  can  not  be  overlooked. 
A  general  who  makes  good  use  of  his  artillery  holds  in 
his  hand  a  strong  trump  card. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

SECOND   MANASSAS 

SHORTLY  after  5  A.  M.  on  the  30th,  while  the  Confed 
erates  were  still  taking  up  their  positions,  the  Federals 
began  to  move  down  the  heights  near  the  Henry  House 
about  2  miles  distant,  in  imposing  masses,  and  about  7 
o'clock,  4  divisions  deployed  in  several  lines  at  the  foot 
of  the  hills,  their  skirmishers  engaging  the  Confederate 
pickets,  and  3  batteries  came  into  action  on  a  rise  north 
east  of  Groveton,  opposite  the  Confederate  center. 

On  the  right  and  left  of  the  Groveton  wood,  Jackson's 
two  large  groups  of  guns  had  a  clean  field  of  fire  which 
they  utilized  with  splendid  effect,  completely  checking 
the  attacking  columns  in  their  front,  the  enemy's  infan 
try  entering  the  wood,  however,  from  which  the  Con 
federates,  protected  in  a  measure  from  the  fire  of  Pope's 
batteries  by  the  thickness  of  the  cover,  succeeded  in 
driving  them.  The  batteries  of  Poague,  Carpenter, 
Dement,  Brockenbrough,  and  Latimer,  under  Maj. 
Shumaker,  were  now  thrown  forward  from  the  right  to 
shell  the  retreating  columns.  These  batteries  were  met 
by  the  fire  of  those  of  the  enemy  which  had  been  shell 
ing  the  woods,  and  a  fierce  duel  ensued,  lasting  until 
perhaps  10:30  A.  M.^  when  Shumaker  withdrew  his  bat 
teries.  The  Federal  guns  were  now  moved  more  to 
their  right  to  prepare  the  way  for  another  attack  on 
Hill's  right.  About  noon  the  second  assault  was  re 
pulsed,  although  the  Federals  reached  the  Confederate 
position  in  such  strength  as  to  require  the  third  line  of 
Hill's  Division  to  assist  in  clearing  the  wood,  a  section 
of  Pegram's  Battery  moving  out  with  the  infantry  to 
fire  upon  the  retreating  foe. 

Meanwhile  the  divisions  of  Reno,  Kearney,  and 
Hooker  had  reached  the  field  from  Centre ville,  and 
about  1  p.  M.  they  were  ordered  to  renew  the  attack. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  267 

Kearney  on  the  right  was  completely  foiled  by  the  fire 
of  the  left  group  of  guns,  but  Hooker  and  Reno  enter 
ing  the  woods,  portions  of  their  heavy  columns  actually 
crossed  the  railroad  line  and  engaged  in  the  most 
desperate  hand-to-hand  encounter  with  Field's  and 
Thomas'  brigades.  Again  reinforcements  were  sent 
forward  from  Hill's  third  line  and,  repelling  the  assault, 
pursued  the  enemy  through  the  wood  to  the  open 
ground  beyond,  where  Fender's  Brigade,  encountering 
a  destructive  artillery  fire,  fell  back  to  the  thicket  some 
what  disorganized.  Seeing  Fender's  retirement, 
Grover's  Brigade  of  Hooker's  Division,  being  in  re 
serve,  was  ordered  to  deliver  a  counterstroke  and  per 
formed  the  task  with  such  splendid  courage  that, 
unsupported,  it  carried  a  considerable  part  of  the  Con 
federate  line  in  the  wood. 

In  the  third  attack,  the  Federal  infantry  column  had 
been  well  supported  by  the  fire  of  its  guns,  2  of 
which,  rifled  pieces,  had  been  moved  well  forward  to 
the  right,  causing  Braxton's  Battery  to  be  ordered  to 
Hill's  left  to  reply  to  them.  Before  the  fourth  assault 
was  undertaken,  the  batteries  of  Crenshaw  and  Latham 
had  also  been  moved  out  to  the  left  to  drive  off  the  2 
Federal  guns  and  secure  oblique  fire  to  their  own  right. 
They  succeeded  in  silencing  the  2  guns. 

While  the  Federals  had  forced  Hill  back  about  300 
yards,  they  were  themselves  thrown  into  disorder  and 
the  arrival  of  Early's  and  Lawton's  brigades  now  en 
abled  Hill  once  more  to  regain  his  position  and  drive 
the  enemy  from  the  wood.  He  was  ably  assisted  by 
Crenshaw's  and  Latham's  batteries  which  delivered  a 
destructive  fire  upon  the  enemy  at  a  range  of  not  over 
450  yards,  and  Starke's  Brigade  captured  the  two  3- 
inch  Federal  rifles  which  had  caused  so  much  trouble. 

It  was  now  nearly  6  o'clock.  The  Federals  had  never 
been  able  to  reach  close  quarters  with  the  Confederates, 
either  on  the  right  or  left  of  the  Groveton  wood  over  the 
approaches  dominated  by  Crutchfield's  artillery  groups, 
although,  at  a  cost  of  4,000  men,  they  had  four 


268  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

times  reached  the  line  in  the  wood  where  little  artillery 
fire  was  encountered.  The  contrast  is  significant  and 
clearly  illustrates  the  fact  that  artillery  efficiency  is  not 
to  be  measured  by  the  losses  it  sustains  nor  by  those 
which  it  inflicts.  Indeed,  it  is  very  often  the  case  that 
the  greater  the  influence  the  guns  exert  upon  the  course 
of  a  battle,  as  at  Groveton,  the  fewer  the  losses  the  de 
tachments  sustain,  by  reason  of  their  ability  to  hold  the 
enemy  at  ranges  beyond  the  fire  effect  of  the  latter. 
Had  the  groups  of  guns  at  Groveton  proved  inade 
quate  to  check  the  attacking  columns  opposite  them, 
and  had  those  columns  been  able  to  advance  to  close 
quarters  in  spite  of  the  fire  of  the  opposing  guns,  then 
the  artillery,  having  failed  to  accomplish  the  mission 
assigned  it,  would  undoubtedly  have  suffered  heavy 
losses.  As  it  was,  it  suffered  little. 

Again,  the  effectiveness  of  artillery  is  not  to  be  meas 
ured  by  the  losses  it  inflicts.  We  often  hear  the  sneer 
ing  criticism  that  at  such  and  such  a  battle  but  1  or  2 
per  cent  of  the  enemy's  loss  was  due  to  the  fire  of  the 
artillery.  Any  such  test  is  entirely  erroneous.  Not 
only  do  the  guns  exert  a  tremendous  moral  effect  in 
support  of  their  infantry,  and  adverse  to  the  enemy, 
but  they  do  far  more.  They  often  actually  preclude 
heavy  damage  from  the  enemy  by  preventing  him  from 
essaying  an  assault  against  the  position  the  guns  oc 
cupy.  Then,  again,  by  forcing  the  enemy  to  seek  cover, 
they  eliminate  their  antagonists  to  that  extent,  and 
though  they  are  able  to  inflict  little  damage  upon  the 
enemy  while  he  is  under  cover,  they  not  only  reduce  his 
volume  of  fire,  but  render  that  which  is  delivered  less 
effective.  Let  us  hear  no  more  of  artillery  efficiency  as 
measured  by  the  number  of  its  victims. 

Had  the  terrain  permitted  Jackson  to  post  a  large 
group  of  guns  so  as  to  command  the  approach  to  the 
Groveton  wood,  the  Federal  loss  would  have  been  much 
less  than  it  was  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  Pope's  dense 
columns  would  never  have  come  within  the  zone  of  ef 
fective  musketry  fire,  since  they  would  have  been  held 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  269 

at  arm's  length  by  the  artillery.  The  weakest  point 
of  Jackson's  line  was  clearly  the  one  the  approach  to 
which  was  not  commanded  by  his  guns,  yet  at  that  point 
the  attack  being  more  successful  than  elsewhere,  the 
heaviest  losses  were  incurred  by  the  enemy,  only  a  small 
percentage  of  which  were  inflicted  by  the  artillery. 

Throughout  the  latter  half  of  the  day,  the  divisions 
of  Longstreet's  Corps,  which  had  forced  their  way 
through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  were  arriving  on  Jackson's 
right,  to  oppose  which  the  troops  of  Reynolds,  Mc 
Dowell  and  two  of  Porter's  divisions  had  taken  position. 
Longstreet,  on  his  arrival,  instead  of  prolonging  Jack* 
son's  right,  had  inclined  his  line  forward,  thus  forming 
with  the  former  an  obtuse  angle. 

While  approaching  his  position  in  line,  Gen.  Hood, 
about  11  A.  M.,  ordered  forward  his  divisional  batteries 
under  Maj.  Frobel  to  assist  Jackson's  right  group  of 
guns  in  holding  Reynolds  at  bay.  Commencing  about 
1  P.  M.,  a  duel  with  the  enemy's  batteries  near  Groveton 
House  continued  about  2%  hours  in  which  the  hostile 
guns  were  silenced  and  driven  from  the  field.  In  this 
duel,  Bachman's  and  Reilly's  batteries,  Garden's  not 
being  engaged  because  not  armed  with  rifled  pieces,  ex 
pended  about  100  rounds.  The  incident  is  mentioned 
because  it  clearly  shows  the  change  which  had  taken 
place  in  the  tactical  employment  of  artillery.  Here  we 
find  a  division  commander,  instead  of  keeping  his  bat 
talion  in  the  rear,  ordering  forward  his  artillery  to  co 
operate  with  the  guns  of  another  commander,  even 
before  the  position  is  reached.  To  accomplish  his  move 
ment,  it  was  necessary  for  Frobel  to  have  the  right  of 
way,  a  thing  quite  unheard  of  for  the  artillery  on  the 
Peninsula.  So  we  see  that  a  marked  advance  is  not 
only  to  be  noted  in  Jackson's  use  of  his  artillery  on  the 
defensive,  but  that  indications  of  better  tactical  employ 
ment  while  advancing  to  the  attack  are  to  be  found  in 
the  battle  of  Groveton,  which  ended  about  9  p.  M.,  after 
Hood  and  Evans  had  overthrown  King. 


270  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  the  Confederate  line, 
about  4  miles  long,  was  occupied  by  about  47,000  men, 
exclusive  of  2,500  cavalry.  Pope  with  65,000  men  and 
28  batteries  compactly  massed  under  his  own  eye,  might 
expect  in  the  course  of  several  hours  a  reenf orcement  of 
42,000  men  from  Alexandria. 

While  the  Federal  commander  was  making  his  dis 
positions  to  renew  the  battle  of  the  day  before,  a  long 
range  and  ineffective  cannonade  was  indulged  in  by  the 
opposing  artilleries.  Although  with  the  28  Federal  bat 
teries  there  were  not  over  125  guns,  practically  all  of 
them  were  rifled  pieces  and  many  were  of  heavy  caliber. 
It  is  quite  certain  that  the  43  Confederate  batteries 
present,  with  a  total  of  perhaps  175  guns,  were  out 
matched  in  point  of  metal,  for  the  best  artillery  material 
in  Lee's  Army  was  with  the  reserve  which  had  not  yet 
come  up. 

The  Federal  line  of  battle,  when  finally  formed,  was 
short  and  strong.  From  its  right  on  Bull  Run  opposite 
Jackson's  left,  to  its  left,  which  rested  just  across  the 
Warrenton  pike,  near  Groveton,  the  distance  was  less 
than  3  miles.  Deployed  in  the  front  line  were  20,000 
infantry,  with  40,000  held  in  great  compact  masses  to 
be  hurled  in  columns  whenever  needed,  a  formation  Na 
poleonic  in  the  grandeur  of  its  density. 

Satisfied  with  his  railroad  line,  Jackson  clung  to  his 
old  position,  but  a  number  of  changes  were  effected  in 
the  posting  of  the  guns.  The  left  group  of  16  guns  re 
mained  as  before,  but  18  guns  from  the  right  center 
group  were  advanced  by  Col.  Crutchfield  to  a  position 
from  which  they  could  enfilade  any  columns  that  might 
attempt  to  assault  the  infantry  line.*  Still  farther  to 
ward  the  turnpike  and  about  half  a  mile  west  of  Grove- 
ton,  was  stationed  another  group  of  18  guns  drawn 
from  Longstreet's  reserve  and  in  command  of  Col.  S.  D. 
Lee.  The  ammunition  chests  of  all  the  batteries  had 
been  replenished  during  the  night. 

*From  the  batteries  of  J.  R.  Johnson,  Rice,  Wooding,  Poague,  Carpenter, 
Brockenbrough,  Latimer,  and  D'Aquin. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  271 

Col.  Lee's  Battalion,  composed  of  the  batteries  of 
Eubank,  Parker,  Rhett,  and  Jordan,  was  skillfully 
posted  on  the  high  ground  just  west  of  the  Douglas 
House,  the  guns  pointing  northeast,  or  at  right  angles 
to  Jackson's  line,  overlooking  and  commanding  the 
wide  tract  of  undulating  meadow  stretching  away  for  a 
mile  or  more  in  front  of  the  Stonewall  and  Lawton's 
divisions.  The  entire  open  space  in  front  of  Jackson's 
line  was  now,  therefore,  exposed  to  a  cross-fire  from  the 
3  formidable  groups,  besides  that  from  the  batteries  on 
the  infantry  line. 

To  the  right  of  Jackson,  Stuart's  Hill  was  strongly 
occupied  by  Longstreet,  and  this  wing  of  the  Confed 
erate  Army,  held  always  under  cover,  was  gradually 
swung  forward  until  it  occupied  a  line  almost  perpen 
dicular  to  the  unfinished  railroad. 

With  slight  knowledge  of  Longstreet's  position,  it 
would  seem,  or  at  least  with  an  utter  failure  to  grasp  the 
meaning  of  Porter's  reports,  Pope,  satisfied  that  Jack 
son  would  abandon  his  position,  determined  to  launch 
his  superb  columns  once  more  against  it.  The  weight 
which  he  apparently  lacked  the  previous  day  he  thought 
he  had  now  secured.  So,  about  noon,  he  sent  forward 
a  swarm  of  skirmishers  along  his  whole  front  to  clear 
the  way  for  the  3  great  lines  in  their  rear. 

The  advance  of  the  skirmishers  did  not  provoke  the 
fire  of  the  guns,  but  when  the  compact  lines  came  within 
range,  the  heavens  rocked  with  the  roar  of  the  Con 
federate  batteries.  Meantime,  Jackson's  brigades, 
which  had  retired  to  the  thickets  behind  their  lines,  a 
move  that  had  misled  Pope  into  believing  the  position 
was  only  weakly  held,  rushed  down  the  hillside  to  re- 
occupy  the  improvised  works  of  the  railroad  bed.  The 
whole  force  of  Pope's  blow  falling  on  Jackson's  thinned 
line,  the  pressure  was  tremendous  and  reinforcements 
from  Longstreet  were  called  for. 

By  this  time,  the  left  of  Pope's  assaulting  columns 
had  come  within  the  reentrant  angle  which  Longstreet's 
line  formed  with  that  of  Jackson's,  and  Longstreet 


272  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

grasped  the  unusual  opportunity  presented  to  enfilade 
with  his  guns  the  left  of  the  Federal  reserves  as  they 
advanced.  The  rapidity  with  which  the  foremost  lines 
of  the  Federals  had  reached  Jackson's  line,  masked  in 
large  measure  the  guns  on  his  right  which  were  unable 
to  fire  upon  the  enemy  without  doing  great  damage  to 
the  Confederates.  Crutchfield's  and  Lee's  groups, 
therefore,  turned  their  attention  to  the  advancing  re 
serves.  Though  half  of  their  guns  were  short  range 
pieces,  even  these  proved  effective  on  the  nearest  part  of 
Porter's  column,  while  the  others  poured  a  storm  of 
iron  over  all  parts  of  the  field.  Meanwhile,  the  Federal 
guns  at  the  Dogan  House  and  elsewhere  behind  their 
line  devoted  themselves  principally  to  Jackson's  front 
in  an  endeavor  to  prepare  a  way  for  the  attacking 
infantry.  But  two  batteries  seem  to  have  engaged 
Crutchfield  and  Lee,  who  had  much  the  better  position, 
and  were  considerably  overshot  by  the  enemy.  No 
serious  effort,  whatever,  was  made  to  neutralize  the 
artillery  masses  of  the  Confederates. 

It  was  now  that,  instead  of  sending  Jackson  a  ree'n- 
f orcement  of  infantry  as  called  for,  Longstreet  ordered 
Bachman's  and  Reilly's  batteries  of  Frobel's  Battalion 
over  from  the  hill  in  front  of  the  Groveton  House, 
where  they  had  been  engaged  with  the  Federal  guns  in 
the  Dogan  House  orchard,  to  the  right  front  of  S.  D. 
Lee's  group,  from  which  advanced  point  they  opened  a 
raking  fire  with  terrific  effect  into  the  left  rear  of 
Porter's  dense  column.  These  two  batteries  added  all 
that  was  needed  to  put  an  end  to  the  attack.  Before  the 
second  battery,  Reilly's,  with  its  howitzer  section  gained 
its  position,  the  enemy  began  to  retire,  and  in  less  than 
10  minutes  after  the  effect  of  the  guns  began  to  be  felt, 
Porter's  troops  gave  up  the  contest  and  retired  in  con 
fusion  to  the  woods  through  which  they  had  advanced. 
In  vain  now  did  Pope  endeavor  to  stem  the  tide  of 
disaster.  A  great  mass  of  troops  from  the  various  com 
mands,  which  had  become  mingled,  was  again  gallantly 
urged  forward,  but  this  time  their  advance  not  being  so 


COLONEL   JOHN   THOMPSON   BROWN 
ACTING  CHIEF  OF  ARTILI.EKY.,  SECOND  COUPS 
Killed  at  the  Wilderness.  1864 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  273 

rapid  as  before,  Crutchfield's  and  Lee's  guns  were  able 
to  find  the  range  before  the  Federals  closed  with  Jack 
son's  line.  Thoroughly  disorganized  by  the  flanking 
fire  of  the  artillery,  the  great  Federal  column  was  now 
driven  back  by  a  counter-charge  of  two  of  Jackson's  bri 
gades,  and  Pope's  battle  was  lost. 

Anticipating  Lee's  wishes,  Longstreet,  as  soon  as  he 
saw  Porter's  defeat  in  the  center,  ordered  his  whole  line 
forward  at  the  charge,  advancing  his  batteries  along 
the  turnpike  with  the  infantry  in  an  endeavor  to  take 
the  Henry  House  plateau,  on  which  the  Federal  regu 
lars  and  the  best  troops,  including  a  number  of  bat 
teries,  were  making  a  desperate  stand.  This  force,  as 
sisted  by  a  flanking  fire  from  his  left  upon  Longstreet's 
advancing  columns,  checked  the  attack  at  nightfall,  the 
Federal  left  crossing  Bull  Run  after  dark.  The  op 
portunity  presented  to  Longstreet  to  capture  this 
portion  of  the  Federal  Army,  had  he  had  a  large  and 
well-organized  reserve  artillery,  was  an  unusual  one. 
But  this  was  not  to  be.  That  he  used  his  available  guns 
with  exceptional  skill  is  not  to  be  denied. 

From  the  battlefield  of  Second  Manassas,  Lee 
gleaned  some  30  pieces  of  Federal  ordnance,  while  the 
Confederates  lost  none. 

Some  idea  of  the  intensity  of  the  Confederate  ar 
tillery  fire  in  the  battle  of  Second  Manassas  may  be 
gained  from  the  expenditures  in  ammunition  of  the  1st, 
2d,  and  3d  batteries  of  Washington  Artillery.  Capt. 
Squires  reported  an  expenditure  of  400  rounds,  Capt. 
Richardson  of  178  rounds,  and  Capt.  Miller  of  356 
rounds.  By  one  section  of  the  Dixie  Battery,  297 
rounds  were  fired;  Stribling's  Battery  expending  354, 
and  a  section  of  Maurin's  Battery  119.  None  of  these 
batteries  were  engaged  as  continuously  as  were  those 
under  Crutchfield  and  Lee.  The  expenditures  of  the 
latter  must  have  been  enormous,  certainly  not  less  than 
600  rounds  per  battery,  or  150  per  gun.*  Let  us  com 
pare  this  expenditure  with  that  in  other  battles. 

*The  expenditure  of  Waterman's  Rhode  Island  Battery  was  500  rounds, 
and  of  Hazlett's  regular  battery,  6  pieces,  1,000  rounds,  Rebellion  Records, 
Scries  I,  Vol.  XII,  Part  II,  pp.  468,  469. 


18 


274  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

In  the  battle  of  Leipzig,  1813,  the  expenditure  of  the 
Austrian  guns  was  199  rounds  per  gun  in  the  3  days, 
or  66  per  gun  per  day.  The  greatest  expenditure  in  one 
day  by  a  Prussian  battery,  1866,  was  180  rounds  per 
gun,  at  Blumenau;  by  an  Austrian  battery,  217  per 
gun  at  Koniggratz. 

In  1870,  the  Prussian  batteries  averaged  at  Vionville, 
89  rounds  per  gun;  35  per  cent  of  the  batteries  fired 
over  100  rounds  per  gun.  At  Gravellote- Saint 
Privat,  the  Prussian  guns  averaged  55  rounds;  16  per 
cent  of  the  batteries  firing  over  100  rounds  per  gun;  the 
French  average  being  90  rounds  per  gun,  but  no  bat 
tery  exhausted  its  normal  ammunition  supply.  Dur 
ing  the  whole  war  the  15  batteries  of  the  German  Guard 
expended  but  270  rounds  per  gun. 

At  Gettysburg,  the  Federals  averaged  102  rounds 
per  gun  for  the  3  days,  or  34  rounds  per  day  for  each 
of  the  320  guns  engaged,  the  greatest  individual  bat 
tery  expenditure  reported  being  1,380  rounds  for  the 
3  days,  or  a  daily  average  of  77  rounds  per  gun  per 
day.  The  Confederate  expenditure  on  this  occasion 
was  probably  100  rounds  per  gun  or  an  average  of  33 
per  day,  the  greatest  expenditure  for  1  battery  being 
882  rounds,  or  73  rounds  per  gun  per  day. 

At  the  Sha-ho,  in  1904,  the  Artillery  of  the  34th 
Russian  Division  averaged  278  rounds  per  gun  per  day. 
At  Liaoyang,  the  Artillery  of  the  1st  and  3d  Siberian 
Corps  averaged  420  rounds  per  gun  per  day.  At 
Tashichiao,  Colonel  Patchenko's  Battery  fired  522 
rounds  per  gun,  which  was  the  greatest  expenditure  for 
a  single  battery  ever  reported  for  one  day. 

Now,  if  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  days  of  muzzle- 
loading  field  pieces,  it  is  seen  that  the  expenditure  at 
Second  Manassas  compares  favorably  with  that  of  the 
greatest  artillery  conflicts  of  history,  exceeding  per 
haps  that  at  Gettysburg. 

The  Confederate  Artillery  losses  in  this  battle  were: 
killed,  about  30;  wounded,  about  90.  In  Lee's  Bat 
talion  there  were  but  6  wounded,  a  fact  to  be  borne  in 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  275 

mind  by  those  who  would  rate  the  service  of  field  ar 
tillery  by  the  magnitude  of  its  losses,  for  probably  no 
one  force  exerted  a  greater  influence  upon  the  final  re 
sult  of  the  battle  than  did  this  group  of  18  guns. 

At  the  battle  of  Second  Manassas,  many  decided  ad 
vances  in  the  tactical  employment  of  the  Confederate 
field  artillery  are  to  be  noticed.  It  is  true,  the  de 
fensive  attitude  assumed  by  Jackson  gave  him  the 
same  advantage  in  point  of  time  to  dispose  his  guns  as 
was  enjoyed  by  McClellan  in  the  various  fights  on  the 
Peninsula.  Yet,  the  grouping  of  his  artillery  was  by 
no  means  accidental.  It  was  disposed  with  a  special 
mission  in  view  and  to  each  piece  was  assigned  a  definite 
sector  of  fire.  Not  only  were  40  of  his  guns  well  massed, 
but  others  were  posted  along  the  infantry  lines  in 
positions  from  which  they  were  free  to  move  from  point 
to  point,  as  developments  might  require.  The  principal 
features  and  advantages  derived  from  his  artillery 
position  have  already  been  discussed.  It  has  also  been 
noticed  that  when  Longstreet  began  to  arrive,  his  bat 
teries  preceded  many  of  his  infantry  brigades,  instead 
of  being  choked  off  from  the  field  by  infantry  columns 
unwilling  to  give  them  a  right  of  way.  The  massing  of 
Lee's  Battalion  in  advance  of  Jackson's  right  flank  was 
a  masterly  move,  and  showed  clearly  that  the  lesson  of 
Malvern  Hill  had  been  well  digested.  And  then,  as  if 
to  demonstrate  to  the  Army  the  tremendous  influence 
of  which  even  a  handful  of  guns,  well  served,  is  capable 
of  exerting,  at  the  very  crisis  of  Pope's  powerful 
infantry  attack  Longstreet  ordered  2  batteries  into 
action  with  decisive  effect,  followed  by  a  general  rush 
to  the  front  of  the  few  remaining  batteries  capable  of 
following  up  the  repulsed  attacking  columns. 

The  grave  defect  in  Lee's  tactics,  from  an  artillery 
point  of  view,  was  the  absence  of  his  reserve.  Had 
Pendleton's  battalions  with  their  superior  material,  a 
part  of  which  at  least  was  equal  to  that  of  the  enemy, 
been  on  hand  to  engage  in  Lee's  counter  stroke,  the 
fruits  of  the  victory  would  certainly  have  been  greater. 


276  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

The  comparative  ineffectiveness  of  the  Federal  Ar 
tillery  was  due  to  a  number  of  causes.  In  the  first 
place,  the  disadvantage  of  inexperience  in  the  attack 
now  rested  upon  it.  There  was  no  Hunt  present  to 
direct  the  massed  fire  of  the  batteries  and  consequently 
they  frittered  away  their  efforts  as  individuals.  In  the 
second  place,  Crutchfield  and  then  Lee  occupied  vastly 
superior  positions  from  which  they  invited  the  fire  of 
the  heavier  hostile  guns,  in  order  to  divert  it  from  the 
infantry  line.  And,  in  the  third  place,  the  Federal  Ar 
tillery  was  definitely  assigned  the  mission  of  shaking 
Jackson's  Infantry  line,  which  it  could  not  attempt,  by 
reason  of  his  dispositions,  without  utterly  neglecting 
his  artillery.  Thus,  not  only  did  it  fail  to  neutralize  the 
latter,  leaving  it  sufficient  in  itself  as  events  proved  to 
hold  at  bay  the  attacking  columns  in  all  but  a  single 
quarter,  but  roughly  handled  by  the  opposing  guns 
more  or  less  free  from  hostile  artillery  fire,  and  quite 
without  the  effective  zone  of  musketry,  the  Federal  Ar 
tillery  was  unable  to  accomplish  the  undivided  task  as 
signed  it. 

Groveton  and  Second  Manassas  were  battles  in  which 
the  role  of  the  artillery  was  a  supreme  one.  In  vain 
do  we  find  their  true  features  disclosed  in  the  numerous 
accounts  of  Lee's  battles,  which  have  been  contributed 
to  history.  On  the  contrary,  they  have  been  masked  in 
narratives  in  which  the  influence  of  the  infantry 
position  behind  the  railroad  bed  is  presented  as  the  most 
potent  element  of  Lee's  and  Jackson's  success.  But, 
far  above  that  accidental  field  work  stood  the  guns 
of  Stapleton  Crutchfield  and  Stephen  D.  Lee,  in  im 
posing  masses  with  ready  thumbs  upon  the  vents  and 
hands  upon  the  rammers.  And  never  in  the  history  of 
war  have  more  superb  or  denser  columns  recoiled  before 
the  muzzles  of  an  artillery. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  MARYLAND   INVASION HARPER^S  FERRY  AND 

SOUTH  MOUNTAIN 

AFTER  the  battle  of  Second  Manassas,  Gen.  Lee  de 
cided  that  the  time  was  a  propitious  one  for  the  invasion 
of  Maryland  and  therefore  headed  his  columns  towards 
Leesburg  as  soon  as  he  was  satisfied  of  the  retreat  of 
Pope  to  Washington,  the  movement  beginning 
September  3. 

On  that  day  the  Reserve  Artillery  arrived  at  Sudley, 
Pendleton  having  reported  in  person  to  Gen.  Lee  dur 
ing  the  battle  on  August  29,  after  temporarily  turning 
over  his  command  to  Lieut.-Col.  Cutts  on  the  17th. 

In  the  meantime,  a  considerable  force  of  field  ar 
tillery  had  been  collected  about  Richmond  and  Col.  T.  S, 
Rhett  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  permanent  bat 
teries  as  well  as  the  former.  Lieut.  James  Howard,  Ar 
tillery  Corps,  with  temporary  rank  of  lieutenant- 
colonel,  and  Lieut.-Col.  C.  E.  Lightfoot,  Provisional 
Artillery,  were  assigned  to  duty  under  Col.  Rhett  to 
command  the  permanent  works  of  the  inner  line  and  the 
field  guns  of  the  outer  line,  respectively. 

In  the  defenses  about  Richmond  at  this  time  there 
was  an  artillery  force  of  89  officers  and  1,693  men 
present,  with  an  aggregate  present  and  absent  of  2,983, 
including  the  companies  of  heavy  artillery.  Near 
Petersburg,  Capt.  S.  T.  Wright  also  had  about  120  men 
and  13  field  pieces.* 

Between  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill  and  the  Mary 
land  invasion,  the  field  artillery  passed  through  a  dis 
tinct  transition.  The  former  affair  had,  as  has  been 
shown,  directed  the  attention  of  many  minds  to  the  ar 
tillery  problem.  The  faith  of  the  Army  in  an  arm  of 
such  latent  ability,  vouched  for  by  the  high  character  of 

*Re~belUon  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  II,  Part  II.  p.  601. 


278  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

its  officers,  was  unimpaired.  Every  one  recognized  the 
capabilities  of  the  gunners  and  felt  that  a  solution  would 
soon  be  effected.  But  how  to  accomplish  the  results 
expected  of  them  was  a  serious  task  for  the  gunners. 
The  battle  of  Second  Manassas  proved  an  object  lesson 
of  the  greatest  value.  In  that  battle  the  Artillery 
rendered  yeoman  service,  justifying  the  faith  and  the  ex 
pectations  of  all.  The  tremendous  effect  of  concen 
trated  artillery  fire  had  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  value 
of  masses  of  guns.  The  names  of  Crutchfield,  S.  D. 
Lee,  Lindsay  Walker,  Pegram,  and  the  other  gallant 
artillerymen  whose  talents  had  been  so  ably  displayed, 
were  on  the  lips  of  every  soldier  in  the  Army,  and  a 
spirit  of  intense  admiration  for  the  Artillery  sup 
planted  the  criticisms  hitherto  so  rife.  The  "long  arm" 
had  vindicated  itself.  Yet,  many  improvements  were 
possible  and  steps  were  immediately  taken  to  raise  the 
standard  of  efficiency  of  the  Artillery. 

It  was  now  generally  perceived  that  more  guns 
should  accompany  the  divisions,  and  that  the  old  system 
of  isolating  batteries  by  attaching  them  to  brigades 
simply  crippled  the  power  of  concentrating  them  in 
action.  It  was  also  realized  that  reserve  artillery  did 
not  mean  a  great  mass  of  guns  rumbling  along  in  rear 
of  the  army,  but  that  its  true  purpose  was  its  active 
use  under  the  direction  of  the  commanding-general 
whose  wider  grasp  enabled  him  to  throw  the  reserve  ar 
tillery  into  action  with  the  greatest  effect  upon  the  issue. 

When  Gen.  Pendleton's  reserve  column  reached 
Leesburg,  it  had  with  it  much  of  the  best  material  in 
the  service,  but  many  of  the  batteries  with  the  divisions 
were  much  depleted  in  personnel  and  horses,  and  the 
material  of  others  was  of  the  most  defective  character. 
In  fact,  the  Artillery  in  general  showed  the  effects  of 
the  long  marches  and  the  severe  fighting  of  the  pre 
ceding  month,  the  former  not  less  wearing  than  the 
latter.  It  was  at  once  decided,  therefore,  to  weed  out 
those  batteries  in  the  poorest  condition,  using  the  men 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  279 

and  effective  animals  drawn  therefrom  for  the  purpose 
of  strengthening  others.  The  horses  were  at  this  time 
particularly  run  down.* 

The  more  depleted  batteries,  including  Leake's 
Goochland,  Stribling's  Fauquier,  Rogers'  Loudoun, 
Fleet's  Middlesex,  Latham's  Branch  North  Carolina, 
and  Anderson's  Thomas  batteries,  with  all  the  animals 
of  the  artillery  and  train  unfit  for  service,  were  ordered 
to  be  detained  at  Leesburg  in  command  of  Maj. 
Richardson,  who  was  directed  to  proceed  with  them  as 
soon  as  possible  to  the  neighborhood  of  Winchester  and 
establish  there  a  remount  depot  and  recruiting  station 
for  the  Artillery. 

In  the  effort  to  place  the  Artillery  on  a  more  ef 
fective  footing,  it  was  designed  to  attach  one  battalion 
to  each  of  Longstreet's  5,  and  Jackson's  4  divisions, 
with  an  additional  reserve  battalion  for  each  of  these 
corps  and  a  general  reserve  for  the  entire  army.  Each 
battalion,  whether  with  the  divisions  or  in  the  reserve, 
was  to  have  its  own  field  officer.  A  battalion  assigned 
to  a  division  fell  under  the  command  of  the  Division 
Chief  of  Artillery.  The  foregoing  was  the  general  plan 
of  the  reorganization,  but  it  was  not  rigidly  adhered  to 
as  shown  by  the  assignments  of  the  batteries  and  bat 
talions  in  effect  during  the  Maryland  campaign,  f  At 
one  time  during  the  operations  in  Maryland,  D.  R. 
Jones'  Division  of  Longstreet's  Corps  had  with  it  but 
one  battery  and  Walker's  Division  but  two  batteries.  At 
Sharpsburg,  Swell's  Division  had  with  it  but  two  bat 
teries,  having  left  four  at  Harper's  Ferry.  On  the  other 
hand,  D.  H.  Hill  not  only  had  Maj.  Pierson's  Bat 
talion  with  his  division  at  Sharpsburg,  but  Maj.  Jones' 
Battalion  of  the  reserve  was  also  assigned  him.  With 
Longstreet's  Corps,  there  were  also  two  reserve  bat 
talions,  Walton's  of  four,  and  Lee's  of  six  batteries, 
whereas  no  reserve  battalion  was  assigned  as  an  integral 
part  of  Jackson's  Corps,  Jones'  Battalion  being  first 

*See  G.  O.  No.  102,  A.  N.  V.,  September  4,  1862,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I, 
Vol.  XIX,  Part  II,  p.  592,  and  G.  O.  No. ,  September  5,  Ibid.,  p.  595. 

"[Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  I,  pp.  803-810.  Battles  and 
Leaders,  Vol.  II,  pp.  600-603. 


280  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

detached  from  the  general  reserve  for  the  purpose,  and 
later  Brown's  First  Virginia  Regiment.  Roughly,  the 
batteries  and  battalions  were  assigned  as  follows : 

IST  CORPS  OR  RIGHT  WING  (Longstreet) 

Col.  Henry  Coalter  Cabell,  Chief  of  Artillery 

Mcl/Aws'  DIVISION 
Maj.  S.  P.  Hamilton,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Manly's  North  Carolina  Battery,  Capt.  Basil  C.  Manly. 

2.  Pulaski  (Ga.)   Battery,  Capt.  John  P.  W.  Read. 

3.  Richmond  Fayette  Battery,  Capt.  Miles  C.  Macon. 

4.  1st  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  E.  S.  McCarthy. 

5.  Troup  (Ga.)  Battery,  Capt.  H.  H.  Carlton. 

R.   H.   ANDERSON'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  J.  S.  Saunders,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Donaldsonville  (La.)  Battery,  Capt.  Victor  Maurin. 

2.  Huger's  Norfolk  Battery,  Capt.  C.  R.  Phelps. 

3.  Grimes'  Portsmouth  Battery,  Lieut.  Thompson. 

4.  Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  Marcellus  N.   Moorman. 

D.  R.  JONES'S  DIVISION 

1.  Fauquier   Battery,  Capt.  Stribling.* 

2.  Loudoun  Battery,  Capt.  Arthur  L.  Rogers.* 

3.  Wise  Battery,    '  Capt.  J.  S.  Brown. 

4.  Goochland  Battery,  Capt.  Leake.* 

WALKER'S  DIVISION 

1.  Petersburg  Battery,  Capt.   James   R.   Branch. 

2.  Stafford  Battery,  Capt.  David  A.  French. 

HOOD'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  B.  W.  Frobel,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Charleston  German  Battery,  Capt.  W.  K.  Bachman. 

2.  Palmetto   (S.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.   H.  R.  Garden. 

3.  Rowan  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  James  Reilly. 

4.  Macbeth    (S.  C.)    Battery,  Capt.  R.  Boyce. 

*Left  at  Leesburg. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  281 

IST  RESERVE  BATTALION 
Col.  John  B.  Walton 

1.  1st  Co.  Washington  Artillery,        Capt.  C.  W.  Squires. 

2.  2d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,        Capt.  J.  B.  Richardson. 

3.  3d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,        Capt.  M.  B.  Miller. 

4>.  4th   Co.   Washington  Artillery,     Capt.  B.  F.  Eshleman. 

2o   RESERVE   BATTALION 
Col.  Stephen  D.  Lee 

1.  Ashland  Battery,  Capt.    Pichegru   Woolfolk,    Jr. 

2.  Bedford  Battery,  Capt.  T.  C.  Jordan. 

3.  Brook's  South  Carolina  Battery,  Lieut.  William  Elliott. 

4.  Bath  Battery,  Capt.  J.  L.  Eubank. 

5.  Madison   (La.)   Battery,  Capt.  Geo.  V.  Moody. 

6.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  W.  W.  Parker. 

2ND  CORPS  OR  LEFT  WING  (Jackson) 

Col.  Stapleton  Crutchfield,  Chief  of  Artillery 

SWELL'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  A.  R.  Courtney,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Bedford  Virginia  Battery,  Capt.  Jno.  R.  Johnson. 

2.  Louisiana  Guard  Battery,  Capt.  Louis  E.  D'Aquin. 

3.  1st  Maryland  Battery,    *  Capt.  Wm.  F.  Dement.f 

4.  4th  Md.  or  Chesapeake  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  D.  Brown.f 

5.  Courtney  or  Henrico  Battery,  Capt.  J.  W.  Latimer.f 

6.  Staunton   Battery,  Lieut.  A.  W.  Garber.j 

7.  Charlottesville  Battery,  Capt.  J.  McD.  Carrington.* 

A.  P.  HILL'S  LIGHT  DIVISION 
Lieut.-Col.  R.  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  G.  Crenshaw. 

2.  Fredericksburg  Battery,  Capt.  Carter  M.  Braxton. 

3.  Letcher  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Greenlee  Davidson.* 

4.  Purcell  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  J.  Pegram. 

5.  Pee  Dee   (S.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  D.  G.  Mclntosh. 

6.  Middlesex  Battery,  Capt.  Fleet.} 

7.  Branch   (N.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  A.   C.   Latham.} 

*Left  in  Richmond  in  August. 

fLeft  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  not  at  Antietam. 

iLeft  at  Leesburg. 


282  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

J.  R.  JONES'  DIVISION 
Maj.  L.  M.  Shumaker,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  2d  Md.  or  Baltimore  Battery,  Capt.  J.  B.   Brockenbrough. 

2.  Alleghany  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  Carpenter. 

3.  Danville   Battery,  Capt.  George  W.  Wooding. 

4.  Richmond  Hampden  Battery,  Capt.  William  H.  Caskie. 

5.  Lee  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  J.  Raine. 

6.  1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  T.  Poague. 

D.  H.  HILL'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  S.  F.  Pierson,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Alabama   Battery,  Capt.  R.  A.  Hardaway. 

2.  Jeff  Davis  Alabama  Battery.  Capt.  J.  W.  Bondurant. 

3.  Peninsula   Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  B.  Jones. 

4.  King  William  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  H.  Carter. 

GENERAL  RESERVE  ARTILLERY 

W.  N.  Pendleton,  Chief  of  Artillery 

IST  REGIMENT  VIRGINIA  ARTILLERY 

Col.  John  Thompson  Brown 

1.  Powhatan   Battery,  Capt.  Willis  J.  Dance. 

2.  2d  Co.   Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  D.  Watson. 

3.  3d  Co.   Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Benj.  H.  Smith,  Jr. 

4.  Salem  Battery,  Capt.  A.  Hupp. 

5.  Williamsburg   Battery,  Capt.  John  A.  Coke. 

CUTTS'  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.  A.  S.  Cutts 

1.  "D"  Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.  James  A.  Blackshear. 

2.  "C"   Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.  John  Lane. 

3.  "A"  Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.  H.  M.  Ross. 

4.  "B"   Battery,  Sumter  Battalion,  Capt.   G.   M.  Patterson. 

5.  Lloyd's  North  Carolina  Battery,  Capt.  W.  P.  Lloyd. 

JONES'  BATTALION 
Maj.  Hilary  P.  Jones 

1.  Morris  Louisa  Battery,  Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page. 

2.  Richmond  Orange  Battery,  Capt.  Jefferson  Peyton. 

3.  Goochland  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Turner. 

4.  Long  Island  Battery,  Capt.  A.  Wimbish. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  283 

NELSON'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  William  Nelson 

1.  Amherst  Battery,  Capt.  T.  J.  Kirkpatrick. 

2.  2d   Fluvanna    Battery,  Capt.  John  J.  Ancell. 

3.  1st  Fluvanna   Battery,  Capt.  Charles  T.  Huckstep. 

4.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Marmaduke  Johnson. 

5.  Milledge's  Georgia  Battery,  Capt.  John  Milledge. 

MISCELLANEOUS  RESERVE  BATTERIES 

1.  Winchester  Battery,  Capt.  W.  E.  Cutshaw. 

2.  Dixie  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Chapman. 

3.  Magruder  Battery,  Capt.  T.  J.  Page,  Jr. 

4.  8th  Star  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Rice. 

5.  Thomas  Battery,  Capt.  E.  J.  Anderson.* 

CAVALRY  CORPS   (Stuart's  Horse  Artillery) 

1.  Chew's  Battery,  Capt.  Robert  Preston  Chew. 

2.  Pelham's   Battery,  Capt.  John  Pelham. 

3.  Hart's  Battery,  Capt.  J.  F.  Hart. 

At  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  but  two  battalions,  Cutts' 
and  Nelson's  of  three  batteries  each,  remained  in  the  gen 
eral  reserve  with  Pendleton  along  the  river,  and  many 
of  the  batteries  with  the  Army  when  it  left  Leesburg 
soon  disappeared,  as  we  shall  see. 

Though  not  distributed  exactly  as  contemplated, 
there  appear  to  have  been  29  batteries  assigned  to  the 
1st  Corps,  grouped  in  6  battalions,  26  batteries  ac 
companying  the  Corps  in  the  Maryland  operations ;  and 
to  the  2d  Corps  25  batteries,  grouped  in  4  battalions,  22 
batteries  crossing  the  Potomac.  In  the  Reserve  we  find 
4  battalions  with  a  total  of  19  batteries  and  5  batteries 
unassigned.  There  were  then  on  the  rolls  of  the  Army 
some  78  batteries,  of  which  number  71  engaged  in  the 
Maryland  operations.  The  total  personnel  of  these  71 
batteries  approximated  but  4,000  men,  for  numbers  of 
them  were  so  weak  as  to  be  either  disbanded  or  con 
solidated  with  others  at  an  early  date. 

In  the  report  of  Gen.  Pendleton,  dated  September 
24, 1862,  it  is  stated  that  to  each  of  Longstreet's  five  bat 
talions  was  attached  a  battalion  of  artillery  with  a  6th 

*Left  at  Leesburg. 


284 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 


battalion  as  the  corps  reserve,  with  a  total  of  112  pieces, 
viz.:  45  rifles,  13  Napoleons,  and  54  common  smooth 
bore  guns,  and  that  to  each  of  the  4  divisions  of  Jack 
son's  Corps  was  also  attached  a  battalion  of  artillery 
with  a  5th  battalion  as  the  corps  reserve,  with  a  total 
of  123  pieces,  viz.:  52  rifles,  18  Napoleons,  and  53  com 
mon  smooth-bore  guns.  This  statement  does  not  in 
clude  the  batteries  of  E.  J.  Anderson,  Blackshear,  J.  S. 
Brown,  Chapman,  Coke,  Fleet,  John  R.  Johnson, 
Leake,  Lloyd,  Nelson,  T.  J.  Page,  Jr.,  Rogers,  Thomp 
son,  and  Wimbish,  which  were  disbanded  under  a  gen 
eral  order  of  October  4,  1862;  nor  account  for  those  of 
Cutshaw  and  Rice,  which  were  consolidated  with 
Carpenter's  and  Wooding's  batteries  on  September  26; 
nor  for  Boyce's,  Moorman's,  and  Woolfolk's  batteries. 
But,  as  the  material,  men,  and  animals  of  the  disbanded 
batteries  were  distributed  among  the  remaining  ones, 
it  would  seem  that  with  Lee's  army  in  Maryland  there 
were  225  guns,  in  addition  to  12  with  the  three  horse  bat 
teries  and  36  in  the  Reserve,  or  a  grand  total  of  about 
300  guns.  McClellan  estimated  the  number  at  400,  a 
figure  not  so  absurd  as  Gen.  Early  and  others  have  con 
sidered  it. 

In  order  that  the  character  of  the  armament  of  Lee's 
artillery  at  this  time  may  be  seen,  the  following  table 
is  inserted: 


co 

C 

CO 

CO 

t>0 

^ 

^ 

<u 

^ 

j^ 

0)     ,« 

NAME  OF  BATTERY 

^d  4-> 

§? 

^42 

•c 

ll 

^     O 

- 
o 
cu 

1 

CO 
r^* 

PH 

ay 

&i 

§ 

OH^ 

a 

."S 

^ 

p- 

15 

6Pn 

GO 

F—  1 

CO 

oa^ 

<M  ^ 

& 

^ 

S 

0 

£ 

L/ewis    .  

2 

2 

4 

Grandy                  

2 

2 

^ 

fi 

Maurin 

2 

1 

3 

6 

Huger 

1 

1 

2 

4 

Meanly 

1 

2 

6 

Carlton 

2 

1 

2 

5 

McCarthy 

2 

2 

4 

Read 

1 

1 

2 

4 

THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 


285 


NAME  OF  BATTERY 

20-pounder 
Parrotts 

10-pounder 
Parrotts 

8 

cC 

'fH 

| 

CO 

24-pounder 

howitzers 

12-pounder 
howitzers 

Napoleons 

Whitworths 

GO 
>» 

3 

cd 
M 

02 
c 

3 
be 

« 
OQ 

,0 

CD 

I 

Dearing     .     .       

1 

1 

2 

4 

Macon 

2 

1 

4 

6 

Stribling 

2 

4 

6 

Bachman    

4 

4 

Garden       

1 

1 

2 

4 

Reilly 

2 

2 

2 

6 

Branch 

1 

9 

3 

fi 

French   

3 

3 

6 

Squires    

1 

?, 

3 

Miller  

9 

2 

Richardson    ... 

2 

? 

4 

Eshleinan 

2 

9 

4 

Jordan 

9 

1 

1 

4 

Rhett   

2 

2 

4 

Moody   

9 

2 

4 

Parker 

9 

2 

4 

Eubank 

1 

1 

1 

4 

Bondurant  

2 

2 

4 

R.  C.  M.  Page  

9 

1 

3 

6 

Peyton   (Fry)      .     . 

1 

1 

3 

5 

Hardaway   

9 

1 

3 

Carter    

1 

2 

? 

5 

Braxton   

9 

4 

6 

Latham  

9 

9 

4 

Mclntosh    

1 

1 

1 

1 

4 

Davidson 

1 

9 

1 

5 

Crenshaw  

1 

1 

9 

4 

M.  Johnson   

9 

2 

4 

Pegram  

2 

9 

4 

Brockenbrough    

1 

1 

2 

4 

Raine   ... 

3 

1 

4 

Caskie    

1 

3 

4 

Lusk   

1 

1 

2 

4 

Carpenter  

9 

9 

4 

Wooding  

2 

1 

1 

4 

Brown   

2 

1 

3 

Balthis    

2 

2 

Dement   

4 

4 

Carrington    

9 

2 

2 

6 

Latimer    

9 

9 

4 

D'Aquin    

1 

2 

3 

Poague    

2 

2 

4 

Smith    

2 

2 

4 

Dance  

1 

2 

1 

4 

Watson   

2 

1 

*3 

Hupp    

2 

o 

A 

Brooke    

1 

1 

2 

4 

'Watson's  Battery  also  had  one  Hotchkiss  rifle. 


286 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 


From  the  foregoing  table  it  will  be  seen  that  abso 
lutely  no  uniformity  of  armament  obtained  in  the  divi 
sional  batteries,  either  as  to  the  character  of  the  ma 
terial  or  the  number  of  pieces.  The  following  table 
shows  the  armament  of  some  of  the  reserve  batteries, 
there  being  but  12  rifled  pieces  with  Pendleton. 


NAME  OF  BATTERY 

20-pounder 
Parrotts 

10-pounder 
Parrotts 

1 

"fH 

| 
CO 

Hotchkiss  rifle 

o> 

TH 
FH 

00 
OJ 

s 

cj 

1-5 

Whitworth 
rifle 

12-pounder 
howitzers 

cc 

1 
1 

tf 

fc 

c» 

1 

PQ 

CO* 

,£! 
CO 

1 

H 

Lane 

2 

3 

1 

6 

ROSS     

2 

1 

3 

Blackshear    



3 

3 

fi 

Kirkpatrick  .  . 

2 

4 

6 

Massie 

6 

6 

Milledge 

1 

3 

1 

1 

6 

It  is  impossible  exactly  to  determine  the  strength  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  this  time,  but  the 
most  conservative  estimate  does  not  place  the  maximum 
strength  of  the  infantry  at  more  than  30,000  men.  Tak 
ing  this  figure  and  300  as  the  number  of  guns  with  the 
Army,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  proportion  had  reached 
10  guns  per  1,000  infantry.  Deducting  the  guns  of  the 
Reserve,  those  of  the  Horse  Artillery,  and  those  left  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  proportion  actually  with  the 
divisions  at  Sharpsburg  appears  to  have  been  about  9 
per  1,000,  the  largest  yet  found.  The  assignment  of 
Walton's  and  Lee's  battalions  to  Longstreet,  and 
Brown's  Regiment  to  Jackson,  as  corps  reserves,  fore 
shadowed  the  artillery  reorganization  of  1863,  and 
again  we  find  an  analogy  in  the  development  of  the 
artillery  in  the  Civil  War  and  in  the  Prussian  cam 
paigns  of  1866  and  1870-71. 

Hohenlohe,  summarizing  the  revolution  in  the 
tactical  employment  of  field  artillery  which  Prussian 
experience  brought  about,  states  that  in  1866  great  un- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  287 

willingness  was  shown  to  employ  much  artillery  to  pre 
pare  the  action,  but  that  in  1870,  intentionally  from  the 
first,  as  many  guns  as  possible  were  brought  into  play. 
He  then  shows  that  even  at  the  moment  when  the  fight 
was  at  its  height,  a  strong  reserve  of  all  arms  was  held 
out  in  1866,  a  practice  which  kept  at  least  half  of  the 
great  mass  of  reserve  artillery  of  the  1st  Army  from  fir 
ing  a  shot  at  Koniggratz,  when  the  fire  of  every  gun 
was  needed,  whereas  in  1870  such  a  practice  was  so  op 
posed  to  the  tactical  ideas  of  the  time  that  even  the 
name  "Reserve  Artillery"  was  abolished,  and  replaced 
with  that  of  "Corps  Artillery."  Then  again,  in  1866, 
we  find  the  Prussian  reserve  marching  as  near  the  tail 
of  the  column  as  possible,  and  on  some  occasions  days 
in  rear  of  the  Army,  just  as  in  the  case  of  the  Con 
federate  reserve  in  the  Cedar  Mountain- Second  Manas- 
sas  campaign.  Whereas,  in  1870,  the  Prussians  even 
sent  their  reserve  guns,  then  called  corps  artillery, 
ahead,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Guard  and  the  3d  Corps  at 
Saint-Privat,  and  the  5th,  llth,  and  12th  corps  at 
Sedan.  As  a  parallel  to  this  we  find  the  reserve  bat 
talions  of  Walton,  S.  D.  Lee,  and  Brown,  moving  into 
Maryland  with  the  most  advanced  columns.  In 
Prussia,  two  wars  were  necessary  to  bring  about  such 
developments,  simply  because  of  the  brevity  of  the 
first,  lasting  as  it  did  but  seven  weeks,  whereas  in 
America  the  tactics  of  the  artillery  had  to  be  developed 
in  a  single  period  of  continuous  campaigning.  The 
Prussians  naturally  derived  a  great  advantage  from  the 
interim  between  their  activities,  which  afforded  them 
a  breathing  spell  during  which  they  found  opportunity 
for  serious  reflection  upon,  and  digestion  of,  their  recent 
experiences. 

By  the  afternoon  of  September  7,  the  mass  of  Gen. 
Lee's  army  had  reached  Frederick,  Maryland,  Gen. 
Pendleton  reporting  with  the  Reserve  Artillery  on  the 
morning  of  the  8th. 

In  advancing  into  Maryland,  Gen.  Lee,  whose  army 
was  greatly  depleted  by  straggling  and  lack  of  shoes 


288  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

for  his  infantry,  took  into  consideration  the  character  of 
his  old  opponent,  McClellan.  His  principal  cause  of 
anxiety  was  not  so  much  the  smallness  of  his  army  (for 
in  the  ranks  were  those  only  who  had  best  stood  the 
strain  of  two  campaigns)  as  it  was  the  difficulty  of  secur 
ing  ammunition,  especially  for  the  artillery.  Without 
an  ordnance  officer  of  Alexander's  ability,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how  the  invasion  of  Maryland  in  1862  would 
have  been  possible.  The  brevity  of  the  campaign,  how 
ever,  coupled  with  almost  superhuman  efforts  on  the 
part  of  the  ordnance  officers,  relieved  the  situation. 

When  the  Army  reached  Frederick,  two  develop 
ments  affected  its  proposed  movements.  In  the  first 
place,  Halleck,  instead  of  following  McClellan's  ad 
vice  and  ordering  the  garrison  of  12,000  men  at 
Harper's  Ferry  to  fall  back,  directed  it  to  remain  there. 
In  the  second  place,  the  people  of  the  North  forced  Mc 
Clellan  to  move  out  from  Washington  at  once,  to  drive 
Lee  from  Maryland,  whether  he  would  or  no.  It  there 
fore  became  necessary  for  the  latter  to  dispose  of  the 
force  at  Harper's  Ferry  while  holding  off  McClellan, 
or  to  return  with  his  whole  army  to  Virginia  in  the 
event  his  new  line  of  communication  up  the  Valley  was 
not  cleared  of  the  enemy.  Not  impressed  with  the 
necessity  of  abandoning  Maryland,  Gen.  Lee  on  the 
9th  ordered  Jackson  to  seize  Harper's  Ferry,  and  held 
D.  H.  Hill  with  a  small  force  at  South  Mountain,  while 
Longstreet  moved  to  Boonsboro. 

Harper's  Ferry  was  to  be  invested  by  three  columns, 
the  first  under  Jackson  himself  from  the  south,  the  sec 
ond  under  J.  G.  Walker  from  the  east,  and  the  third 
under  McLaws  from  the  north.  Leaving  Frederick  on 
the  morning  of  the  10th,  Jackson  moved  westward  and 
crossed  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport  on  the  llth. 
After  driving  in  a  small  portion  of  the  enemy  from 
Martinsburg,  he  reached  Halltown  in  view  of  Bolivar 
Heights,  strongly  held  by  the  garrison  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  on  the  13th.  Meanwhile,  Walker  reached 
Loudoun  Heights  on  the  east  early  that  day,  and  find- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  289 

ing  them  unoccupied,  succeeded  in  placing  five  pieces  of 
artillery  in  position  before  noon  the  next  day.  McLaws, 
driving  a  small  hostile  force  into  Harper's  Ferry,  suc 
ceeded  in  occupying  Maryland  Heights  on  the  north 
before  the  night  of  the  13th,  and  the  next  morning  cut 
a  road  to  the  crest,  over  which  Maj.  Hamilton,  Divi 
sional  Chief  of  Artillery,  dragged  two  guns  from  Read's 
and  2  from  Carlton's  batteries,  into  position  before  2 
p.  M.  the  14th. 

Bolivar  Heights,  lying  below  and  to  the  south  and 
west  of  Maryland  Heights  and  Loudoun  Heights,  re 
spectively,  was  now  commanded  by  the  guns  of  Mc 
Laws  and  Walker,  so  that  when  a  Federal  battery 
opened  upon  Walker  at  1  p.  M.  the  14th,  the  four  pieces 
on  Loudoun  Heights  silenced  it  within  two  hours.  The 
elevation  to  the  guns  of  Maryland  Heights  was  so  great 
that  McLaws  was  free  to  join  in  the  cannonade  without 
fear  of  injury  from  the  Federal  guns. 

When  Jackson  on  the  night  of  the  13th  learned  that 
McLaws  and  Walker  were  both  in  position,  he  moved 
forward  from  Halltown.  On  the  morning  of  the  14th, 
he  ordered  A.  P.  Hill  to  advance  on  the  Confederate 
right  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Shenandoah,  directing 
him  to  turn  the  enemy's  flank  and  get  into  Harper's 
Ferry  in  his  rear,  if  possible.  Lawton,  with  Swell's 
Division,  moved  along  the  Charleston  turnpike  which 
passed  over  Bolivar  Heights  about  the  center  of  the 
Federal  position,  and  J.  R.  Jones  moved  against  the 
enemy's  right  near  the  river. 

Jones  soon  seized  a  position  for  Poague's  and  Carpen 
ter's  batteries  near  the  river  and  commanding  the 
enemy's  right,  on  which  the  guns  of  McLaws  were 
already  playing,  and  during  the  night  Lieut.-Col.  R. 
Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery,  A.  P.  Hill's  Divi 
sion,  placed  Pegram's,  Mclntosh's,  Davidson's,  Brax- 
ton's,  and  Crenshaw's  batteries  in  position  on  an  emi 
nence  commanding  the  Federal  left.  While  Hill  and 
Jones  were  thus  taking  up  their  positions,  Lawton  ad 
vanced  during  the  night  along  the  pike  and  formed  his 


290  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

line  in  front  of  the  Federals  on  Bolivar  Heights.  He  was 
supported  by  batteries  posted  by  Col.  Crutchfield  on 
School  House  Hill.  Guns  from  the  batteries  of  Brown, 
Dement,  Garber,  and  Latimer,  ten  pieces  in  all,  were 
then  taken  by  Crutchfield  across  the  Shenandoah  at 
Kelly's  Ford  and  moved  down  stream  to  a  position  op 
posite  the  left  of  the  enemy's  line  of  entrenchments,  to 
which  a  road  for  the  guns  had  to  be  cut.  This  position, 
although  commanded  by  Bolivar  Heights,  yet  secured 
a  fire  into  the  rear  of  a  work  on  the  enemy's  left,  where 
there  was  an  embrasure  battery  of  four  pieces,  just  op 
posite  A.  P.  Hill  and  forming  the  keystone  of  the  posi 
tion. 

For  several  hours  after  dark  on  the  14th,  while 
Walker  and  Crutchfield  were  placing  their  batteries, 
the  Confederate  guns  on  Maryland  and  Loudoun 
Heights  engaged  in  a  duel  with  the  Federal  Artillery 
on  Bolivar  Heights,  presenting  a  scene  of  surpassing 
grandeur,  but  striking  terror  into  the  hearts  of  the  be 
sieged. 

At  dawn  on  the  15th,  the  attack  was  ordered  to  begin 
and  was  opened  by  the  fire  of  Col.  Walker's  group  of 
guns,  soon  joined  by  those  of  Crutchfield  on  the  east 
side  of  the  Shenandoah,  the  batteries  on  School  House 
Hill,  those  near  the  Potomac,  and  the  guns  on  Mary 
land  and  Loudoun  Heights.  The  gunners  were  almost 
immediately  driven  from  the  Federal  work,  commanded 
by  the  ten  pieces  which  Crutchfield  had  so  skillfully 
placed  across  the  river. 

After  about  an  hour  of  concentration  upon  the 
enemy's  position,  his  artillery  and  musketry  fire  were 
almost  subdued  by  the  great  circle  of  guns,  whereupon 
orders  were  issued  to  carry  the  Federal  position  by 
storm.  But  again  the  battery  in  front  of  Hill's  Divi 
sion  was  gallantly  manned  and  reopened  its  fire  only 
to  be  silenced  by  Crutchfield's  group,  after  another  hour 
of  firing.  Meanwhile,  Pegram  and  Crenshaw  moved 
their  batteries  up  to  within  400  yards  of  the  Federal 
works  and  poured  a  rapid  enfilading  fire  into  them.* 

*It  was  not  Carpenter's  Battery  as  stated  by  Allan,  but  Crenshaw's.  See 
Walker's  Report. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  291 

As  the  infantry  approached  the  Federal  position,  about 
8  A.  M.J  a  white  flag  was  displayed,  and  as  soon  as  the 
artillery  could  be  caused  to  cease  firing  the  surrender 
was  effected,  the  Confederates  taking  11,500  prisoners, 
13,000  stand  of  arms,  49  field  pieces,  and  24  mountain 
howitzers. 

The  losses  in  the  Confederate  Infantry  at  Harper's 
Ferry  were  not  over  100,  mostly  wounded.  The  Ar 
tillery  loss  probably  did  not  exceed  10  men,  yet 
Harper's  Ferry  vividly  illustrates  the  power  of  artillery. 
An  assault  on  Bolivar  Heights  by  infantry  without  the 
support  of  a  large  number  of  guns  would  have  been 
as  costly  as  it  would  have  been  doubtful  of  success.  And 
this  Jackson  knew. 

From  a  tactical  standpoint,  Jackson's  movements 
were  splendidly  conceived  and  superbly  executed.  He 
employed  his  artillery,  almost  every  effective  piece  be 
ing  brought  to  bear  on  the  enemy's  position,  in  a  way 
above  criticism.  True,  the  opportunity  presented  for 
its  use  was  a  rare  one,  yet  the  fact  remains  that  he 
grasped  it  and  saved  his  infantry  almost  to  a  man,  and 
those  that  were  lost  were  not  sacrificed  in  an  assault  un 
til  the  hostile  guns  were  practically  silenced.  Seldom 
has  a  general  been  fortunate  enough  to  secure  so 
thorough  an  artillery  preparation. 

The  work  of  Crutchfield,  of  Lindsay  Walker,  and  of 
the  other  artillery  officers  was  brilliant,  and  again 
Pegram  displayed  that  dauntless  spirit  which  soon  made 
his  name  a  by-word  in  the  Army. 

We  look  in  vain  for  a  parallel  to  Harper's  Ferry  in 
the  Civil  War,  and  involuntarily  turn  to  Sedan.  The 
great  artillery  battle  of  the  Franco- German  War  was 
on  a  grander  scale,  of  course,  than  that  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  there  being  engaged  in  the  terrible  "circle  of 
fire"  five  great  artillery  groups  with  a  total  of  540 
guns,  whereas  Jackson  had  fewer  than  75  in  action. 
Yet,  the  mise  en  scene  of  Sedan  was  not  as  awe  inspir 
ing  in  its  grandeur  as  that  at  Harper's  Ferry.  In  fact, 
no  battlefield  could  be  more  sublime  in  its  altitudes  than 
the  latter. 


292  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

As  soon  as  possible  after  the  surrender  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  Jackson  prepared  to  join  Gen.  Lee,  leaving 
A.  P.  Hill's  Division  to  take  charge  of  the  captured 
property. 

Arriving  on  the  16th,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  at  once 
collected  the  73  captured  guns,  sending  them  to  Win 
chester  along  with  a  large  supply  of  ammunition  un- 
suited  to  the  field  pieces.  With  the  exception  of 
canister,  there  was  little  field  artillery  ammunition 
captured  by  the  Confederates  at  Harper's  Ferry. 

While  Jackson  had  been  engaged  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
the  1st  and  9th  corps  of  McClellan's  army,  with  18 
batteries,  had  appeared  before  D.  H.  Hill  at  South 
Mountain.  After  a  desperate  fight,  Hill,  reenforced  by 
four  of  Longstreet's  brigades,  succeeded  in  checking  the 
advance  of  the  enemy,  until  the  Reserve  Artillery  and 
the  ordnance  trains  at  Boonsboro  could  move  off  to  a 
position  of  safety. 

When  the  Reserve  Artillery  under  Gen.  Pendleton, 
consisting  on  the  14th  of  the  battalions  of  S.  D.  Lee, 
Brown,  and  Nelson — Cutts  having  been  sent  to  the 
support  of  D.  H.  Hill* — retraced  its  steps  to  Boons 
boro  from  Hagerstown,  it  was  first  ordered  to  be  placed 
in  position  along  the  Beaver  Creek  Heights,  which  was 
done  before  nightfall.  But  when  it  became  apparent 
that  Hill's  position  had  been  overlapped  and  that  a  re 
tirement  was  necessary,  Gen.  Pendleton  was  ordered  to 
send  Lee's  Battalion  to  Centreville  to  report  to  Long- 
street  and  take  the  rest  of  his  command  by  the  shortest 
route  across  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport  and  guard 
the  fords  of  the  river. 

Leaving  Beaver  Creek  about  midnight,  Pendleton's 
command  with  Alexander's  reserve  ordnance  train 
reached  the  intersection  of  the  Sharpsburg,  Boonsboro, 
Hagerstown  and  Williamsport  roads  about  daybreak 
the  following  morning,  at  which  point  information  was 
received  that  a  large  cavalry  column  of  the  enemy  was 
near  at  hand.  Immediate  steps  were  taken  to  repel  an 

*See  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.   XIX,  Part  II,  p.   547. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  293 

attack  and  to  protect  the  trains  by  organizing  the  strag 
glers  and  teamsters  at  hand.  The  hostile  force  con 
sisted  of  Gregg's  Brigade  of  3  regiments  of  cavalry 
under  Col.  Davis,  which  had  escaped  from  Harper's 
Ferry  on  the  14th.  Although  narrowly  missing  Pendle- 
ton's  column  it  later  met  Longstreet's  reserve  ordnance 
train  and  burned  45  wagons  of  precious  ammunition. 

Upon  reaching  the  river  the  defense  of  the  Williams- 
port  ford  and  the  adjacent  lower  one  was  assigned  Col. 
Brown's  Battalion,  Gen.  Pendleton  continuing  with 
Nelson's  Battalion  and  Alexander's  train  to  Shepherds- 
town.  By  10  A.  M.  on  the  16th,  the  passage  at  that  point 
was  also  well  guarded. 

Meanwhile  the  demands  upon  the  Chief  of  Artillery 
from  Sharpsburg,  the  point  upon  which  Gen.  Lee  had 
determined  to  concentrate,  for  long-range  field  pieces 
were  becoming  most  pressing,  so  that  when  Jackson's 
column  arrived,  Col.  Crutchfield  was  directed  to  return 
to  Harper's  Ferry  and  bring  up  all  the  heavy  captured 
rifles  he  could  find.  Upon  his  return,  however,  he  dis 
covered  that  Col.  Alexander  had  already  directed  most 
of  the  captured  material  to  be  sent  to  Winchester.  Be 
fore  leaving  Harper's  Ferry,  Crutchfield  had  found  it 
necessary  to  leave  the  batteries  of  Brown,  Dement, 
Latimer,  and  Garber,  for  sheer  lack  of  horses.  For  the 
same  reason,  Col.  Walker  was  forced  to  leave  David 
son's  Battery  behind.  Impressing  a  sufficient  number 
of  draught  animals  for  the  first  three  of  his  batteries 
above  named,  securing  two  3-inch  captured  rifles  for  De 
ment,  and  filling  the  caissons  with  a  fresh  supply  of  Fed 
eral  ammunition,  Crutchfield  now  proceeded  to  Sharps- 
burg,  but  arrived  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  battle  of  the 
17th.  Meanwhile,  Brown's  Battalion  had  been  relieved 
from  duty  at  the  Williamsport  fords  and  moved  for 
ward  as  the  reserve  of  Jackson's  Corps,  one  battery  of 
which,  Watson's,  being  the  only  one  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  Sharpsburg.  Nelson's  Battalion  at  this  time 
consisted  of  the  batteries  of  Kirkpatrick,  Milledge, 


294  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Ancell,  Marmaduke  Johnson,  and  Huckstep,  the  arma 
ment  of  which  was  very  light,  and  therefore  they  were 
not  called  upon.* 

The  surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry  had  come  in  the 
nick  of  time.  By  a  rapid  night  march  of  17  miles  Jack 
son  arrived  at  Sharpsburg  on  the  16th,  Walker  the 
same  day,  and  McLaws  at  sunrise  on  the  17th,  and 
A.  P.  Hill,  leaving  a  brigade  at  Harper's  Ferry,  ar 
rived  during  the  battle.  Thus  the  Army  was  concen 
trated  at  Sharpsburg  before  the  close  of  the  17th. 

When  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  had  fallen  back 
upon  Sharpsburg,  the  Federal  Army  passing  through 
the  various  gaps  followed  upon  their  heels.  The  greater 
part  of  the  16th  was  spent  by  McClellan  in  putting  his 
troops  in  position  along  the  ridge  east  of  the  Antietam, 
a  creek  flowing  along  the  Confederate  front  and  on  the 
west  side  of  which  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  were  in 
position. 

The  Confederate  position  stretched  across  the  angle 
formed  by  the  Potomac  and  the  Antietam,  the  latter  a 
deep  stream  of  more  than  60  feet  in  width,  over 
shadowed  by  a  tangle  of  trees,  that  filled  the  bottom 
from  which  the  ground  on  both  sides  ascends  to  the 
ridges.  Just  beyond  the  one  on  the  west  runs  the 
Hagerstown  pike,  which  is  about  a  mile  distant  from  the 
stream.  On  the  reverse  slope  of  the  western  ridge,  fall 
ing  as  it  does  to  the  Potomac,  lay  the  small  village  of 
Sharpsburg,  behind  the  center  of  the  Confederate  line, 
which  followed  the  main  crest  just  east  of  the  Hagers 
town  pike.  A  mile  north  of  the  village  and  on  the  pike 
Lee's  left  center  rested  near  the  Dunkard  church,  be 
hind  which  lay  a  tract  of  trees  known  as  the  west  wood, 
500  yards  in  front  of  which  stood  a  smaller  wood  known 
as  the  east  wood.  Extending  southward  from  Sharps 
burg  the  line  rested  its  right  on  a  wooded-spur  over 
looking  the  Antietam  where  it  turns  westward  to  the 
Potomac. 

*On  October  4,  1862,  Ancell's  and  Huckstep's  batteries  were  consolidated 
and  became  Massie's  Battery. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  295 

From  the  main  position  just  across  the  Hagerstown 
pike,  open  slopes,  broken  by  long  ravines,  fell  eastward 
to  the  bottom,  affording  the  Confederates  an  admirable 
field  of  fire  to  the  stream  from  1,000  to  2,500  yards 
distant.  Many  lanes  crossed  the  Confederate  front,  the 
sunken  ones,  together  with  the  numerous  low  stone  walls 
near  the  village,  forming  natural  entrenchments  of  great 
strength  for  the  defenders. 

In  the  west  wood,  not  only  was  there  an  entire  ab 
sence  of  undergrowth,  but  the  ground  was  intersected 
with  waist-high  outcroppings  of  rock  which  afforded 
excellent  protection  from  hostile  fire.  But  this  portion 
of  the  line  was  the  weak  point,  for  the  enemy  was  able 
to  approach  it  closely  through  the  east  wood,  and  also 
threaten  the  flank  under  cover  of  a  larger  thicket  which 
spread  across  the  pike  some  distance  to  the  north.  Be 
hind  and  between  these  screened  approaches  from  the 
Antietam  lay  several  small  farms  with  orchards  and 
stone  fences,  among  which  an  attacking  force,  if 
checked,  might  rally,  and  near  the  Dunkard  church  were 
also  a  number  of  cottages  and  barns  which  offered  cover. 

The  only  ford  across  the  Antietam  was  commanded 
by  the  bluff  on  the  extreme  right,  yet  a  number  of  stone 
bridges  remained  intact.  That  nearest  the  Potomac, 
over  which  the  road  to  Harper's  Ferry  passed,  was  de 
fended  by  rifle  pits  and  enfiladed  by  batteries.  The 
next,  known  as  the  Burnside  Bridge,  just  east  of 
Sharpsburg,  was  well  commanded  by  the  western  ridge, 
and  the  one  opposite  the  Confederate  center  could  be 
raked  throughout  its  length.  But  one  more  to  the 
north  at  Pry's  Mill  was  entirely  screened  from  the  Con 
federates'  view  and  fire,  and  was  left  unguarded,  laying 
as  it  did  a  mile  and  a  half  east  of  the  west  wood  and  be 
hind  the  east  and  Poffenberger  woods. 

While  the  position  was  an  exceptionally  strong  one 
with  the  pike,  an  excellent  lateral  communication  for 
the  most  part  under  cover,  and  numerous  other  inter 
secting  roads,  it  possessed  the  grave  disadvantage  of 
being  paralleled  by  the  ridge  east  of  the  Antietam, 


296  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

along  which,  though  slightly  commanded  by  the  hostile 
position,  McClellan  had  ample  space  to  deploy  his  275 
pieces  of  artillery.  The  superiority  of  his  ordnance  in 
weight  and  range  far  overbalanced  the  Confederate  ad 
vantage  in  elevation.  The  range  from  ridge  to  ridge  in 
no  place  exceeded  2,000  yards,  but  at  many  points 
approached  that  limit.  The  Federal  guns  were  there 
fore  able  to  deliver  upon  the  hostile  batteries  a  damag 
ing  fire  to  which  little  effective  reply  could  be  made. 
Not  only  was  McClellan  able  to  engage  the  Confederate 
10-pounder  rifles  and  6-pounder  guns  with  his  20- 
pounder  Parrotts,  but  a  greater  discrepancy  had  to  be 
contended  with  by  the  latter,  for  their  projectiles  and 
fuses  were  of  very  inferior  quality,  whereas  those  of  the 
enemy  were  of  the  best.  Not  alone,  then,  will  a  com 
parison  between  the  guns  themselves  suffice,  for  inferior 
ammunition  reduced  still  further  the  comparative  effi 
ciency  of  the  lighter  ordnance.  It  was  his  ready  grasp 
of  the  situation  that  led  Gen.  Lee  to  make  such  press 
ing  demands  upon  Pendleton  for  all  the  heavy  rifled 
pieces  the  latter  could  possibly  forward  from  Harper's 
Ferry  and  Shepherdstown  on  the  16th  and  17th. 

As  his  troops  arrived,  Gen.  Lee  assigned  Jackson  to 
the  left  of  the  position  with  his  5,500  men  and  the  16 
guns  he  had  brought  up  from  Harper's  Ferry,  and  later 
Hood  was  placed  in  his  rear.  Next,  on  Jackson's  right, 
came  D.  H.  Hill  with  5,000  men  and  26  guns.  Long- 
street  with  8,000  men  and  50  guns  held  the  center  and 
right,  the  Washington  Artillery  commanding  the  bridge 
in  his  front  and  Eubank's  Battery  the  Burnside  Bridge 
with  Richardson's  on  a  hill  slightly  to  its  rear. 
Walker's  Division  of  3,500  men,  and  Branch's  and 
French's  batteries  with  12  guns,  was  held  as  a  reserve 
in  rear  of  Toombs'  Brigade  on  the  extreme  right.  Mun- 
ford's  two  regiments  of  cavalry,  with  Chew's  Battery, 
were  stationed  on  the  extreme  right  to  hold  the  bridge 
at  the  Iron  Works  and  keep  open  the  line  of  communica 
tions  with  Harper's  Ferry,  while  Stuart  with  Fitzhugh 
Lee's  Brigade  of  cavalry  and  Pelham's  four  guns  was 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  297 

stationed  behind  the  extreme  left.  Thus  on  the  line  from 
Nicodemus  Run  to  the  Potomac,  a  distance  of  three 
miles,  were  about  20,000  infantry,  2,500  cavalry,  and 
about  2,000  artillerymen  with  108  guns,  Pendleton  hold 
ing  the  fords  of  the  river  with  1,000  men,  including  a 
small  infantry  escort,  and  26  guns.  Urgent  orders  had 
been  dispatched,  however,  for  A.  P.  Hill  to  come  up 
with  his  13,000  men  and  60  guns. 

At  2  P.  M.  on  the  16th,  Hooker  was  ordered  to  cross 
the  Antietam  at  Pry's  Mill  and  attack  the  Confederate 
left.  The  movement  being  discovered,  Hood  was 
ordered  into  the  front  line,  having  already  placed  a 
number  of  his  guns  on  a  rise  in  the  open  ground  east 
of  the  Hagerstown  pike.  A  spirited  combat  now  en 
sued  between  Hood  and  Meade,  lasting  until  dark,  re 
sulting  in  the  former  regaining  the  east  wood  and  driv 
ing  Meade  therefrom  after  he  had  once  taken  it.  The 
artillery  on  both  sides  was  active,  Poague's  Battery 
rendering  valiant  support  to  Garden's,  Bachman's,  and 
Reilly's  batteries,  of  Frobel's  Battalion,  Hood's  Divi 
sion,  all  of  which  were  much  punished.  In  this  affair, 
the  howitzer  section  of  Rhett's  Battery,  Lee's  Battalion, 
was  also  engaged.  Meanwhile,  the  rifled  sections  of 
Rhett's  and  Parker's  batteries,  and  one  rifled  piece  of 
Jordan's  Battery,  of  Lee's  Battalion,  had  been  engaged 
in  firing  upon  the  Federal  Infantry  massing  opposite 
the  center,  suffering  some  loss  from  the  heavier  guns  of 
the  enemy.  Earlier  in  the  day,  Squires'  Battery  of 
rifles,  Walton's  Battalion,  posted  near  the  center,  in 
dulged  in  an  artillery  duel  of  about  an  hour's  duration 
with  the  enemy.  Before  night,  however,  both  Walton 
and  Lee  withdrew  their  battalions  behind  the  cover  of 
the  ridge  forming  the  infantry  position. 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  S.  D.  Lee  established  a 
large  group  of  guns  in  rear  of  Longstreet's  center,  to 
support  Walton's  batteries,  all  of  his  guns  being 
necessarily  much  exposed  to  the  Federal  artillery  fire. 
Another  large  group  of  guns  was  established  by  D.  H. 
Hill  not  far  in  rear  of  his  center  near  the  Clipp,  Rou- 


298  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

lette,  and  Mumma  houses.  Though  Hill's  Infantry  had 
been  much  reduced  at  South  Mountain,  he  was  well  sup 
ported  by  artillery,  having  Jones'  reserve  battalion  of 
14  guns,  his  divisional  batteries,  or  those  of  Carter,  Bon- 
durant,  and  Hardaway,  with  their  12  pieces,  under  Maj. 
Pierson,  Cutts'  reserve  battalion  consisting  of  Ross's, 
Patterson's,  Blackshear's,  and  Lane's  batteries,  with 
their  24  pieces,  and  Lloyd's  Battery  of  4  guns.  Of  the 
16  guns  of  Jones'  and  E well's  divisions  of  Jackson's 
Corps  present,  all  except  those  of  Poague's  Battery 
were  attached  to  Stuart,  and  placed  by  him  under  Pel- 
ham  on  the  extreme  left,  Crutchfield  not  having  ar 
rived  with  Brown's,  Dement's,  Latimer's,  and  Garber's 
batteries  from  Harper's  Ferry. 

McClellan,  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  had  available 
87,164  men  and  275  guns.  Upon  gaining  contact  with 
the  Confederates,  Gen.  Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery,  at 
once  selected  an  excellent  position  for  10  batteries  of  his 
reserve.  In  his  report  he  states :  "They  overlooked  the 
enemy  and  swept  most  of  the  ground  between  them  and 
our  troops.  They  were  well  served,  especially  the  guns 
of  Benjamin's  Battery.  Their  field  of  fire  was  exten 
sive,  and  they  were  usefully  employed  all  day,  and  so 
constantly  that  the  supply  of  ammunition  for  the  20- 
pounders  ran  short."  It  should  here  be  noted  that  in 
Lee's  entire  army  there  were  but  six  20-pounder  field 
pieces. 

All  during  the  successive  and  more  or  less  isolated 
attacks  of  Hooker,  Mansfield,  and  Sedgwick  on  Lee's 
left,  of  French  and  Richardson  on  his  center,  and  of 
Burnside  on  his  right,  Hunt's  great  masses  of  guns 
played  upon  the  Confederate  batteries  and  their  infan 
try  lines,  adding  the  tremendous  weight  of  their  metal 
to  that  of  the  corps  and  division  batteries,  with  the  sev 
eral  assaulting  columns.  As  to  the  effect  of  Hunt's 
Reserve  Artillery,  we  may  judge  from  the  report  of 
D.  H.  Hill,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  controlled  the  largest 
group  of  Confederate  guns.  He  wrote:  "Positions 
were  selected  for  as  many  of  these  guns  as  could  be 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  299 

used,  but  all  the  ground  in  my  front  was  commanded  by 
the  long  range  artillery  of  the  Yankees,  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Antietam,  which  concentrated  their  fire  upon 
every  gun  that  opened  and  soon  disabled  it."  And 
Col.  S.  D.  Lee,  the  batteries  of  whose  reserve  battalion 
were  distributed  along  the  center  and  left  center,  after 
wards  declared  that  "Sharpsburg  was  Artillery  Hell." 
The  latter  statement  is  no  doubt  correct,  but  Hill's  is 
somewhat  exaggerated,  for  the  artillery  of  his  portion 
of  the  line  undoubtedly  rendered  most  effective  service, 
in  spite  of  Hunt's  batteries,  the  fire  of  which  they  dis 
regarded  when  necessary  for  them  to  play  upon  the  ad 
vancing  columns  of  the  enemy. 

Jones'  Division  was  all  on  the  left  of  the  pike,  drawrn 
up  in  two  lines,  facing  northward,  the  first  extending 
from  the  road  to  the  Nicodemus  house,  the  other  in  ths 
northern  edge  of  the  west  wood.  Near  the  turnpike,  0112 
of  Poague's  rifles  and  two  of  Raine's  howitzers  were 
posted  in  the  front  line,  while  to  the  left  rear  Pelham 
was  in  position  with  a  number  of  batteries.  On  the  east 
of  the  pike,  and  in  prolongation  of  Jones'  line,  was 
Lawton's  Division. 

At  3  A.  M.  on  the  17th,  Hooker  renewed  his  attack, 
Doubleday  on  the  right,  Ricketts  on  the  left,  and 
Meade  in  reserve  close  behind.  As  this  splendid  force 
of  10  brigades  and  10  batteries  advanced  to  the  attack, 
Hunt's  guns  3,000  yards  to  the  east  opened  a  heavy  en 
filade  fire  upon  the  Confederate  left,  but  disregarding 
both  this  and  the  fire  of  the  batteries  in  their  front, 
Poague,  Raine,  and  the  three  batteries  of  Woolfolk, 
Parker,  and  Rhett,  which  Col.  Lee  had  ordered  into 
position  near  the  Dunkard  church,  opened  a  continuous 
fire  upon  the  infantry  of  the  enemy  with  splendid  effect. 
But  as  the  Federal  Infantry  advanced,  with  Campbell's 
Battery  in  the  front,  Jones'  first  line  was  forced  back 
upon  the  wood  and  its  leader  was  carried  wounded  from 
the  field.  Poague  and  Raine  after  firing  a  few  shots 
now  retired  their  guns  to  a  position  in  rear  of  the  west 
wood,  from  which  they  continued  to  fire.*  To  the  east 

*  These  guns  were  not  abandoned  as  stated  by  Henderson.  See  Poague's 
Report. 


300  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

of  the  road,  Lawton's  Division,  with  the  three  batteries 
of  Lee's  Battalion  firing  over  the  infantry  from  the  rear, 
first  checked  Meade  and  then  drove  him  back  upon  six 
batteries  massed  on  his  right,  whereupon  a  section  of 
Jordan's  Battery  under  Capt.  J.  S.  Taylor  was  sent 
forward  by  Col.  Lee  with  Lawton's  line,  but  was  soon 
driven  back  by  the  opposing  batteries. 

About  this  time  the  Confederate  skirmishers,  creep 
ing  through  the  corn  in  front  of  the  west  wood,  shot 
down  the  gunners  and  many  horses  of  Campbell's  Bat 
tery,  all  but  taking  the  guns,  and  Starke,  who  had  suc 
ceeded  Jones,  led  his  line  forward  once  more.  Mean 
while,  the  fire  from  Pelham's,  Poague's,  Raine's,  and 
Col.  Lee's  guns  near  the  church,  had  been  most  effective, 
though  the  right  group  suffered  severely  from  Hunt's 
fire  as  well  as  from  that  of  two  of  Hooker's  batteries. 
Col.  Grigsby,  who  in  turn  succeeded  Starke,  now  held 
the  original  position  of  his  division,  but  Lawton,  having 
forced  back  Meade,  was  now  himself  being  driven,  for 
with  splendidly-served  batteries  the  Federals  were  again 
pushing  forward,  only  to  be  checked  by  the  arrival  of 
Hood's  Division,  with  Frobel's  Battalion  of  divisional 
artillery.  Capt.  Bachman,  galloping  out  into  the  corn 
field  with  a  section  of  Napoleons,  opened  fire  upon  the 
enemy  at  a  range  of  150  yards.  But  in  a  few  minutes 
Hooker's  skirmishers,  creeping  up  to  within  50  yards 
of  the  guns,  drove  them  from  the  field  with  the  loss  of 
a  number  of  men  and  many  horses.  Meanwhile  the 
rifled  section  of  the  battery  had  gone  into  action  on  the 
turnpike,  Reilly's  Battery  supporting  the  infantry  from 
a  position  further  in  rear.  Garden's  or  the  third  battery 
of  the  battalion  had  been  left  in  position  near  Long- 
street's  center,  with  Walton's  Battalion. 

To  Hood's  support,  D.  H.  Hill  now  sent  over  Rip- 
ley's,  Colquitt's,  and  Garland's  brigades,  which  in 
column  in  the  order  named  and  on  Hood's  right  struck 
the  left  of  the  Federal  attack  and  assisted  in  driving  the 
enemy  a  second  time  back  upon  their  guns.  Mean 
while,  Woolf oik's,  Parker's,  and  Rhett's  batteries,  much 


THE  LONG  ABM  or  LEE  301 

damaged  and  with  ammunition  exhausted,  the  first 
leaving  a  piece  on  the  field,  had  been  ordered  to  the 
rear  to  refit,  and  Moody's  Battery  sent  into  position  in 
their  place.  But  as  Hood's  line  advanced,  Moody's 
guns  were  masked.  Without  hesitation  the  gallant  of 
ficer  with  a  section  of  his  battery  dashed  forward  300 
yards  into  a  ploughed  field  and  from  a  position  in  ad 
vance  of  the  infantry  for  15  minutes  delivered  a  galling 
fire  upon  the  enemy.  Lieut.  Gorey,  an  officer  of  an 
other  battery,  who,  seeing  Capt.  Moody's  guns  advanc 
ing  to  a  post  of  such  danger,  had  begged  to  be  allowed 
to  accompany  them,  was  shot  through  the  head  and 
killed  while  sighting  for  the  final  shot. 

It  was  now  7:30  A.  M.  and  Mansfield's  Corps  was 
rapidly  approaching  to  the  support  of  Hooker's 
shattered  troops  which  had  rallied  about  their  artillery. 
On  Hood's  left,  J.  G.  Walker's  two  brigades  and  G.  T. 
Anderson's  Brigade  had  arrived  from  the  extreme  right, 
and  Early  had  taken  position  in  the  west  wood,  where 
the  remnants  of  Jones'  Division  remained.  Pelham, 
joined  by  Poague,  meanwhile  had  moved  13  pieces  to  a 
position  just  in  rear  and  to  the  immediate  left  of  Jones' 
old  line,  from  which  he  was  able  to  sweep  the  open 
ground  from  the  Nicodemus  house  to  the  Dunkard 
church.  Thus  with  ready  perception  he  had  grasped 
the  key-point  of  Jackson's  whole  line,  and  yet  placed  his 
guns  where  they  were  entirely  free  from  Hunt's  fire, 
which  relentlessly  continued  to  play  upon  the  Confed 
erate  left.  Whatever  may  be  said  of  McClellan's  dis 
jointed  attacks  in  this  quarter,  Hunt  at  least  did  his 
part  in  the  matter  of  artillery  support.  But  in  Pel- 
ham  he  found  an  equal  in  the  aggressive  handling  of 
artillery,  for  no  one  movement  on  either  side  bore  a 
greater  influence  upon  the  final  issue  of  the  battle  than 
did  the  advancement  of  Pelham's  group  during  the  in 
terim  between  Hooker's  and  Mansfield's  attacks.  This 
was  a  move  on  the  chess  board,  though  perhaps  by  a 
pawn,  which  baffled  the  most  powerful  pieces  of  the 
enemy.  It  was  one  of  those  master  strokes  by  a  sub- 


302  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

ordinate  of  highly-developed  initiative,  which  has  so 
often  been  found  to  play  a  major  part  in  the  tactical 
success  of  the  superior. 

It  is  perhaps  incorrect  to  speak  of  an  interim  between 
the  first  two  attacks  on  Jackson,  for  Mansfield's  over 
lapped  Hooker's,  his  massed  divisions  pressing  for 
ward  in  time  to  check  Hood's  advance,  and  forcing  his 
division  back  with  fearful  loss  through  the  thirty-acre 
cornfield,  east  of  the  pike,  to  the  church.  Ripley  and 
Colquitt  were  also  being  driven  back  to  the  same  point 
from  the  east  wood,  to  which  they  had  advanced  in 
following  up  Ricketts,  by  Greene's  Division  and 
Knapp's  Battery.  At  this  time  Hood  and  Lawton  held 
the  southern  part  of  the  west  wood,  Ripley's  and  Col- 
quitt's  brigades  retiring  from  the  line  towards  D.  H, 
Hill's  position  along  the  "bloody  lane."  But,  while 
the  Federals  had  gained  all  the  ground  north  of  the 
church  and  east  of  the  pike,  Jackson's  left,  by  means 
of  Pelham's  guns,  had  held  fast.  No  troops,  however 
brave,  could  cross  the  space  which  Pelham's  group  so 
perfectly  commanded.  The  Confederate  line,  when  the 
lull  succeeding  Mansfield's  repulse  came,  ran  north 
ward  from  the  Dunkard  church,  almost  parallel  to  the 
pike,  while  the  Federal  line  near  Miller's  house  faced 
south,  its  center  in  the  east  wood,  and  its  left  near  the 
church,  facing  west.  So  far,  less  than  8,000  Confeder 
ates  with  perhaps  35  guns  actually  engaged,  had, 
though  suffering  terribly  themselves,  foiled  both 
Hooker's  and  Mansfield's  corps,  aggregating  not  less 
than  20,000  men,  and  60  or  more  guns  present  on  the 
field. 

The  lull  about  9  A.  M.  was  of  short  duration,  for  Sum- 
ner's  columns  were  fast  approaching  from  the  north, 
and  Porter  was  preparing  to  throw  a  heavy  force,  ac 
companied  by  his  horse  batteries,  and  supported  by  his 
corps  artillery  as  well  as  Hunt's  guns,  across  the  Boons- 
boro  Bridge  opposite  the  Confederate  center.  Mean 
while  Gen.  Lee  was  sending  his  last  reserves  then  on  the 
field,  McLaws  and  R.  H.  Anderson's  divisions,  to  the 
front  line,  the  former  to  Jackson's  right  at  the  Dunkard 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  303 

church,  and  the  latter  to  the  support  of  D.  H.  Hill.  Be 
fore  following  up  Sumner's  or  the  third  attack,  let  us 
turn  to  the  center. 

Soon  after  Col.  Lee  withdrew  the  three  batteries  of  his 
battalion,  and  Jordan's  section,  from  their  positions 
near  the  church,  he  was  ordered  by  D.  H.  Hill  to  mass 
his  battalion  along  the  ridge  between  the  church  and 
Sharpsburg,  just  west  of  the  pike.  From  this  position 
he  was  able  to  support  Hill  by  firing  over  his  infantry 
upon  the  extreme  left  of  the  Federal  attack,  which,  over 
lapping  Jackson,  fell  upon  Hill's  left.  But  in  this  posi 
tion  the  batteries  were  so  severely  punished  by  Hunt 
that  upon  the  arrival  of  McLaws  they  were  ordered 
about  a  mile  to  the  rear  to  replenish  their  ammunition 
and  make  such  repairs  as  were  possible. 

After  the  retirement  of  the  five  batteries  of  Lee's  own 
battalion,  viz.,  Woolfolk's,  Moody's,  Jordan's,  Parker's, 
and  Rhett's,  which  had  been  heavily  engaged  in  support 
ing  Jackson,  D.  H.  Hill  had  in  position  behind  him 
Cutts'  reserve  battalion  of  5  batteries  with  26  pieces 
in  addition  to  his  divisional  battalion  of  4  batteries  with 
16  guns  under  Maj.  Pierson.  Further  to  the  right,  and 
behind  Longstreet's  center,  was  Walton's  Battalion 
with  16  pieces,  the  12  guns  of  Eubank's,  Branch's,  and 
French's  batteries,  the  last  two  having  been  left  by  J.  G. 
Walker's  Division,  being  still  opposite  the  Burnside 
Bridge.  Bachman's  Battery  had  also  been  ordered  to  the 
rear  to  refit.  Save  for  a  few  companies  of  skirmishers, 
not  a  Federal  soldier  had  yet  crossed  the  Antietam  south 
of  the  Dunkard  church,  and  they  had  been  driven  to 
cover  by  Squires'  Battery,  which  then  withdrew  to  cover 
behind  the  crest  with  the  other  batteries  of  Walton's 
Battalion,  allowing  the  enemy  to  expend  many  rounds 
of  ammunition  in  a  one-sided  duel. 

Sumner,  who  had  gained  contact  with  Jackson's  line, 
now  threw  three  divisions,  Sedgwick's  leading,  and  all  in 
the  closest  order,  against  the  west  wood  and  the  Rou 
lette  house.  As  the  head  of  the  column  emerged  from 
the  east  wood,  moving  across  the  cornfield  beyond  the 


304  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

turnpike,  Greene,  of  Mansfield's  Corps,  advanced  from 
his  position  near  the  church.  Early,  with  a  handful  of 
Jones'  Division,  still  holding  the  west  wood,  now  moved 
rapidly  forward  to  meet  the  attack  almost  solely  op 
posed  by  Pelham's  guns,  and  striking  Greene's  left 
flank  drove  him  back.  At  this  moment  McLaws  ad 
vanced  in  line  through  the  west  wood  with  the  church 
on  his  right  and  struck  Sedgwick  in  flank,  and  with 
Early 's  assistance  Sumner's  leading  division  was 
quickly  driven  off  towards  the  north,  losing  nearly  2,000 
men  in  a  few  minutes. 

In  vain  did  Sumner's  guns,  massed  with  those  of  the 
corps  which  had  preceded  him  on  the  slope  north  of  the 
cornfield,  hurl  canister  at  McLaws'  and  Early's  lines. 
As  Col.  Cabell  brought  up  McLaws'  divisional  bat 
talion  of  artillery,  the  batteries,  plying  whip  and  spur, 
dashed  to  the  front,  unlimbering  and  firing  as  they  ad 
vanced.  Read's  Battery,  which  went  into  action  in  the 
open  on  the  right  of  the  wood,  alone  lost  14  officers  and 
men  and  16  horses  in  as  many  minutes,  and  Carlton's 
Battery  further  to  the  left  and  in  front  of  Ransom's 
Brigade  was  all  but  cut  to  pieces  by  the  opposing  guns. 

Meanwhile  Pelham's  group  on  the  extreme  left  con 
tinued  its  fire  with  great  energy  in  an  effort  to  beat 
down  the  storm  of  shot,  shell,  and  canister  from  the 
Federal  Artillery,  but  while  it  sought  in  vain  to  silence 
the  great  group  of  guns  much  damage  was  done  them 
and  at  least  a  part  of  their  fire  diverted  from  McLaws 
and  Early.  Now  again  the  fleeing  mass  of  Federals 
rallied  upon  the  artillery  position,  as  Hooker  and 
Mansfield  had  done  before,  a  position  which  Stuart  had 
vainly  attempted  to  turn  all  through  the  forenoon. 
During  the  successive  combats  it  had  proved  the  source 
of  many  evils  to  the  Confederates,  and  never  once  had 
the  guns  of  the  enemy  been  driven  therefrom,  though 
Pelham,  greatly  outmatched  in  the  number  of  pieces  as 
well  as  the  weight  of  his  metal,  had  with  unsurpassed 
courage  and  skill  done  all  of  which  his  men  and  material 
were  capable. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  305 

On  the  right  of  the  west  wood,  as  Early's  men  forced 
Greene  back  upon  the  east  wood,  and  were  about  to 
capture  Knapp's  Battery,  which  had  so  harassed  them, 
"A"  Battery,  4th  United  States  Artillery,  under  Lieut. 
Thomas,  galloped  into  action  beside  Knapp,  and  to 
gether  they  gave  a  superb  exhibition  of  what  light 
batteries  are  capable  of  doing  even  in  the  face  of 
point  blank  musketry  fire.  In  position  near  the  south 
west  corner  of  the  east  wood,  on  the  Smoketown  road, 
almost  surrounded  by  Aiken's  North  Carolina  Regi 
ment,  they  were  saved  only  by  the  timely  arrival  of 
Smith's  Division  of  Franklin's  Corps,  the  latter  now 
coming  upon  the  field  and  forming  a  line  between  the 
church  and  the  east  wood,  sheltered  by  a  rise  in  the 
ground.  At  this  juncture,  the  Confederates  having 
been  checked  by  Franklin's  fresh  divisions,  the  fighting 
was  reduced  to  an  active  artillery  duel,  at  ranges  from 
600  to  1,500  yards,  and  the  attention  of  Cabell's  and 
Pelham's  batteries  were  principally  devoted  to  the  most 
advanced  Federal  group  near  the  Miller  house,  com 
posed  of  Cowan's,  Frank's  and  Cothran's  batteries,  to 
the  support  of  which  Hancock  had  been  sent.  At  least 
15  Federal  batteries  were  in  position  to  the  right  front 
of  Pelham.  While  the  infantry  of  neither  side  was  able 
to  assume  the  aggressive,  the  Confederates  were  well 
satisfied,  since  they  had  repossessed  themselves  of  and 
continued  to  hold  the  west  wood,  under  cover  of  which 
their  lines  had  reformed  before  10:30  A.  M. 

At  last  Jackson's  trials  were  over  and  opposite  him  lay 
three  shattered  corps  and  a  fourth  or  Franklin's  with  all 
its  ardor  gone.  With  less  than  19,400  men  and  40  guns 
engaged  on  his  part  of  the  line,  he  had  held  at  bay  at 
least  30,500  infantry  and  25  superb  batteries  with  not 
less  than  100  guns,  all  of  which  had  been  handsomely 
supported  by  Hunt's  powerful  mass  of  long-range 
rifles.  In  their  assaults,  extending  over  a  period  of  five 
hours,  the  Federals  had  lost  7,000  officers  and  men, 
while  the  Confederate  losses  on  the  left  up  to  10 :30  A.  M. 
were  5,754,  or  29  per  cent  of  those  engaged. 


20 


306  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

When  Sumner's  Corps  came  upon  the  field  about 
9:30  A.  M.,  French's  Division  overlapped  Jackson  and 
fell  upon  D.  H.  Hill  with  great  fury,  soon  joined  by 
two  brigades  of  Franklin's  and  Richardson's  divisions. 
The  main  attack  fell  upon  that  part  of  the  line  from  a 
point  just  southeast  of  the  church  past  the  Roulette 
and  Piper  houses. 

At  a  point  about  one-third  of  the  way  from  the 
church  to  Sharpsburg,  a  sunken  lane,  running  from  the 
east  side  of  the  turnpike,  zigzagged  into  the  Boons- 
boro  road  halfway  between  the  village  and  the  Antie- 
tam.  This  erratic  route,  now  know  as  the  "bloody  lane" 
by  reason  of  the  slaughter  which  occurred  therein  dur 
ing  Hill's  defense,  at  first  descending  in  an  easterly 
direction,  soon  meets  a  hollow  where  the  lane  to  the 
Clipp  house  branches  to  the  northeast.  From  thence 
the  main  lane  runs  southeast,  ascending  abruptly  to  the 
Boonsboro  road.  North  of  the  sunken  lane,  and  be 
tween  it  and  the  east  wood  were  the  Clipp,  Roulette, 
and  Mumma  houses  in  the  order  named  from  the  south, 
the  last  being  the  "burning  building"  so  constantly  re 
ferred  to  in  the  reports.  Within  the  salient  formed  by 
the  "bloody  lane"  is  a  plateau  on  which  stood  the  Piper 
house.  In  rear  of  this  plateau,  or  flat-topped  hill,  the 
land  gently  dips  to  the  west,  rising  again  to  a  ridge 
of  greater  elevation  just  west  of  the  Hagerstown  pike, 
which  lies  in  the  depression.  It  was  from  this  ridge 
that  Lee's  Battalion,  after  firing  for  some  time  upon 
French's  left,  had  been  forced  to  withdraw  about  10 
A.  M.  by  Hunt's  guns,  and  it  was  in  the  depression 
running  along  its  front  to  the  south  as  far  as  the  village 
that  Jones,  Cutts,  and  Walton,  had  held  their  artillery 
battalions  under  cover. 

Although  French  assaulted  Hill's  position  with  great 
vigor,  he  was  able  to  make  little  permanent  headway,  in 
spite  of  numerous  efforts,  but  when  Richardson  came 
to  his  assistance  the  Confederates  were  forced  back  out 
of  the  "bloody  lane"  after  a  desperate  defense,  through 
the  fields  and  the  orchard  in  front  of  the  Piper  house. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  307 

But  at  the  latter  point  the  Federal  advance  was  checked 
by  a  terrific  fire  from  Cutts'  guns  now  with  Col.  Lee 
on  the  ridge  beyond  the  pike.  But  on  the  left  of  Richard 
son's  line  the  Federals  now  gained  the  rise  of  ground  on 
Hill's  right  and  also  drove  the  Confederates  defending 
it  towards  the  Piper  house,  exposing  the  men  holding 
the  sunken  lane  to  a  destructive  enfilade  fire.  Cutts' 
and  Jones'  reserve  battalions  and  Hill's  divisional  bat 
teries  under  Maj.  Pierson,  utterly  disregarding  the  tre 
mendous  shower  of  shot  and  shell  which  Hunt  poured 
upon  them,  now  massed  across  the  pike  and  sought  to  re 
pel  the  advancing  enemy;  but  as  the  foremost  batteries 
opened  fire  they  were  silenced  and  swept  from  the  field. 
Realizing  the  weakness  of  Hill's  line,  Longstreet  or 
dered  Miller's  Battery  of  the  Washington  Artillery  to 
the  support  of  Hill,  which  promptly  went  into  action  on 
the  ridge  behind  the  line,  but  withdrew  to  cover  after 
losing  a  number  of  men.  As  the  enemy  again  advanced, 
Capt.  Miller,  dashing  forward  across  the  pike  with  the 
remaining  section  of  his  battery,  two  Napoleons,  went 
into  action  and  for  half  an  hour  delivered  an  effective 
fire  upon  the  enemy.  Again,  he  moved  forward,  al 
most  to  the  Piper  house,  ordering  a  sergeant  to  bring 
up  a  fresh  caisson  when  his  limbers  were  emptied. 
Joined  by  another  piece,  Miller's  three  guns,  supported 
by  a  handful  of  infantry  which  had  rallied  about  them, 
now  delivered  a  rapid  fire  with  canister.  But  the  gunners 
falling  rapidly,  Longstreet,  who  was  watching  the  bat 
tery,  ordered  his  own  staff  to  man  the  guns,  and  these 
gallant  officers,  firing  with  the  greatest  coolness  and 
rapidity,  succeeded  in  checking  the  enemy.  Miller  with 
ammunition  exhausted  was  at  this  juncture  relieved  by 
Boyce's  South  Carolina  Battery.  Exposed  to  both  a 
direct  and  reverse  fire  from  Pleasonton's  horse  batter 
ies  now  on  the  Boonsboro  pike,  and  those  in  front  of 
Porter  across  the  Antietam,  Boyce's  men  suffered 
heavily.  While  galloping  into  action,  a  caisson  ex 
ploded,  but,  unlimbering  within  a  few  yards  of  the  Fed 
eral  line,  the  gallant  battery  drove  it  back  with  a 


308  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

furious  discharge  of  canister,  firing  70  rounds  in  a  few 
minutes.  This  battery  lost  19  men  and  15  horses.  Noth 
ing  was  ever  more  gallant  than  its  conduct. 

The  Federals  retiring  to  the  ridge  from  which  they 
had  advanced,  now  brought  up  Robertson's  horse  and 
Graham's  light  batteries  to  drive  off  Boyce,  but  Hill 
had  repossessed  himself  by  1  p.  M.  of  the  Piper  house 
and,  aided  by  every  battery  which  could  be  brought  into 
action,  held  French  beyond  the  sunken  lane  and  Richard 
son  on  the  crest  beyond  the  orchard.  Thus,  with  7,000 
men  and  about  50  guns  in  action,  Hill  had  repelled  a 
force  of  not  less  than  10,000  Federals. 

About  this  time  Col.  Lee  was  forced  to  order  all  of 
the  batteries  in  action  behind  Hill  to  the  rear  to  refit, 
but  not  until  relieved  by  Capt.  Moorman  in  command 
of  Maj.  Saunders'  Battalion  of  four  batteries  of  R.  H. 
Anderson's  Division. 

While  this  change  was  being  effected  four  regular  bat 
teries  of  the  enemy  pushed  across  the  Boonsboro  bridge 
and  came  into  action  on  either  side  of  the  road. 
Squires'  and  Garden's  batteries  on  the  south  side  of 
the  road  at  once  uncovered  and  several  times  broke  the 
advancing  Federal  infantry  line  with  their  canister, 
but  the  enemy  renewed  his  attacks  again  and  again. 

In  the  meantime,  about  3  p.  M.,  Squires'  Battery  was 
relieved  by  12  pieces  of  Col.  Lee's  Battalion,  all  that 
could  be  refitted  after  the  wreck  of  the  morning,  which, 
returning  to  the  field,  were  posted  about  Sharpsburg. 
Moody's  Battery  now  moved  to  the  right,  two  pieces  of 
Parker's  and  two  of  Jordan's  Battery  were  placed  at  the 
left,  and  Rhett's  two  remaining  guns  went  into  action  on 
the  ridge  just  north  of  the  village.  These  batteries  as 
well  as  those  they  had  relieved  were  exposed  to  a  heavy 
fire  of  infantry  and  artillery,  the  skirmishers  of  the 
enemy  approaching  to  within  150  yards  of  them,  after 
having  been  driven  back  five  or  six  times  by  Moody's 
and  Squires'  batteries.  Finally,  Garnett's  Brigade, 
with  Moody's  Battery  firing  canister  while  advancing 
with  the  infantry,  drove  the  enemy  from  the  ridge  just 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  309 

northeast  of  the  village  which  they  had  taken,  and  the 
other  batteries  which  had  been  joined  by  Carter's  were 
now  moved  to  a  more  advanced  position  south  of  the 
Boonsboro  pike,  which  they  held  until  forced  to  fall 
back  by  Burnside's  success  on  their  right. 

Though  ordered  to  attack  at  9  A.  M.,  it  was  not  until 
1  P.  M.  that  Burnside  made  a  vigorous  effort  to  force 
the  bridge  in  his  front.  Upon  the  crossing,  Eubank's 
Battery  kept  up  a  plunging  fire  along  with  Richard 
son's  further  to  the  rear,  but  the  latter,  having  expended 
all  its  ammunition  and  having  one  of  its  two  Napoleons 
dismounted  by  Benjamin's  Battery  across  the  stream, 
withdrew  temporarily.  Meanwhile,  Eshleman  was  ply 
ing  with  case  and  canister  the  Federals  who  were  at 
tempting  to  cross  the  ford  below  the  bridge.  But,  in 
spite  of  the  desperate  resistance  of  the  four  brigades 
guarding  the  bridge,  Burnside  with  the  aid  of  Tidball's 
horse  battery  drove  the  Confederate  skirmishers  from  his 
front  and  forced  his  way  over.  Pushing  rapidly  over 
the  ridge  towards  Sharpsburg,  he  was  almost  unop 
posed,  except  by  Maj.  Frobel's  batteries  of  Hood's  Di 
vision,  which  were  now  returning  to  the  field.  Throw 
ing  Brown's  Battery  of  D.  R.  Jones'  Division  well 
forward,  Frobel  also  sent  one  of  Reilly's  sections  and 
Garden's  Battery  of  his  own  battalion  into  action  at  a 
range  of  not  over  100  yards  from  the  enemy,  and  thus 
checked  the  advance,  though  he  lost  most  of  his  horses 
and  many  of  his  men  in  so  doing.  In  a  few  minutes,  all 
but  three  pieces  were  disabled,  and  their  ammunition  was 
exhausted.  Running  the  disabled  pieces  to  cover  by 
hand,  the  gallant  gunners  were  now  ordered  to  retire 
them  as  the  Federal  Infantry  rapidly  occupied  and  then 
passed  the  position  the  batteries  had  abandoned.  As 
the  swarm  of  skirmishers  almost  overtook  the  guns, 
shooting  down  the  cannoneers  and  horses,  Lieut.  Ram 
say  with  the  2d  section  of  Reilly's  Battery  arrived  on 
the  scene  from  the  rear,  and  boldly  going  into  action 
in  a  field  on  the  right  of  the  road  from  the  bridge,  en 
filaded  the  enemy's  line  with  canister,  hurling  its  ex- 


310  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

treme  left  back  in  confusion.  To  oppose  the  Federals 
in  this  quarter,  there  being  no  available  infantry,  every 
battery  which  could  be  spared  from  other  sections  of 
the  field  was  ordered  to  the  right.  First  Carter,  gallop 
ing  along  the  east  side  of  the  village,  then  Poague,  came 
to  the  support  of  Ramsay.  At  this  instant  occurred 
one  of  those  incidents  which  make  war  grand.  As  a 
section  of  the  Rockbridge  Battery,  which  had  been  de 
tached  from  Pelham  on  Jackson's  left,  with  lathered 
horses  and  battle-stained  men  dashed  past  Gen.  Lee  on 
its  way  to  the  point  of  threatened  rout,  Robert  E.  Lee, 
Jr.,  the  youngest  son  of  the  great  Commander-in- 
Chief,  and  a  private  in  the  battery,  raising  himself  to  an 
erect  posture,  saluted  with  military  precision  his  noble 
father.  Where  in  all  the  history  of  war  is  such  another 
incident  to  be  found?  Where  such  material  for  the 
brush  of  a  Messonier?  The  kith  of  Bonaparte  bore  the 
baton,  but  the  kin  of  Lee  fought  at  the  muzzle  with 
hands  upon  the  rammer  staff. 

Truly  one  might  say  that  Sharpsburg  was  a  day  of 
glory  for  the  Confederate  Artillery.  Without  Pel- 
ham's  guns,  to  deny  the  approach,  never  could  Jackson 
have  withstood  the  shock  of  those  dense  masses  still 
ominously  banked  against  his  left.  Without  the  gallant 
Miller  and  Boyce  to  check  the  onrushing  columns  of 
Richardson,  and  Col.  Lee's  guns  to  hold  the  enemy  at 
bay,  D.  H.  Hill  had  been  swept  from  the  field.  And 
now,  when  the  thin  grey  lines  had  been  brushed  aside 
like  so  much  chaff  by  Burnside's  dense  and  ever-increas 
ing  force,  naught  but  the  shattered  remnants  of  his  bat 
teries  saved  Lee  from  utter  rout.  Like  bees  to  honey, 
the  batteries  from  left  and  center  now  swarmed  to  the 
post  of  danger.  Miller,  Eshleman,  Richardson,  Squires, 
Eubank,  Garden,  Reilly,  Bachman,  Brown,  and  Carter, 
regardless  of  the  hail  of  iron  poured  upon  them  by  Von 
Kleiser's,  Taft's,  Weed's,  Durell's,  Clark's,  Simmons', 
Benjamin's,  Muhlenberg's,  Cook's,  McMullen's,  and 
other  batteries  across  the  Antietam,  and  free  from  mo 
lestation,  heeded  only  the  task  assigned  them.  Not  a  one 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  311 

but  gladly  undertook  it,  willing  to  sacrifice  men,  guns, 
and  self,  if  only  the  surging  wave  of  blue  could  be 
momentarily  checked,  for  A.  P.  Hill  was  now  at  3:30 
p.  M.  arriving  with  his  veteran  light  division  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  Lindsay  Walker  with  four  batter 
ies  was  near  at  hand. 

Hill's  Division  had  marched  17  miles  in  8  hours.  His 
arrival  was  in  the  nick  of  time,  for  the  Confederate  bat 
teries  were  now  either  totally  disabled,  or  practically 
without  ammunition,  having  for  some  time  in  the  most 
exposed  positions  been  doing  the  work  of  infantry  while 
the  superbly  served  Federal  batteries  played  upon  them 
at  will.  The  village  of  Sharpsburg  was  all  but  taken, 
with  all  that  that  meant  to  Lee.  Toombs  alone,  with  a 
handful  of  men  in  support  of  the  batteries,  was  formed 
in  the  path  of  the  enemy.  Dashing  through  the  fields, 
Braxton's,  Pegram's,  Mclntosh's,  and  Crenshaw's  bat 
teries,  the  first  commanded  by  Lieut.  Marye,  heralded 
the  approach  of  Hill's  three  brigades  under  Gregg, 
Branch,  and  Archer,  and  going  into  action  within  a  few 
yards  of  the  Federal  flank,  at  once  became  involved  in  a 
desperate  struggle  for  existence.  In  fact,  Mclntosh  was 
soon  forced  to  abandon  his  pieces.  On  the  right  of  Mc 
lntosh  and  Crenshaw,  whose  positions  were  to  the  right 
of  Toombs'  rallied  line,  Pegram  had  also  been  pour 
ing  a  continuous  fire  of  canister  into  the  enemy's  lines, 
and  further  still  to  the  right  was  Braxton. 

Gathering  their  strength,  Toombs'  and  Archer's  bri 
gades  now  swept  forward  from  the  road,  striking  the 
Federal  left  in  flank,  recapturing  Mclntosh's  guns,  and 
driving  Rodman  back  upon  the  massed  guns  in  front  of 
the  bridge.  This  left  Wilcox's  Division  mainly  on  the 
north  side  of  a  ravine  separating  it  from  the  bridge. 
Quickly  perceiving  his  opportunity  Col.  Walker 
ordered  Pegram  with  the  only  one  of  his  pieces  for 
which  ammunition  was  left,  and  Braxton's  Battery,  to 
an  elevation  just  north  of  the  Snively  house  from  which 
they  poured  a  terrific  enfilade  fire  down  Wilcox's  line 
at  a  range  of  about  500  yards. 


312  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

To  the  left  and  in  advance  of  Crenshaw,  Carter's  and 
the  Donaldsonville  Battery  under  Lieut.  Elliott  now 
went  into  action,  Carter,  Elliott,  Crenshaw,  Pegram, 
and  Braxton,  almost  unaided  by  the  musketry  of  the 
infantry,  literally  driving  Wilcox  from  the  field  with 
their  fire  delivered  on  his  front  and  both  flanks.  From 
their  elevated  position  Pegram  and  Braxton  continued 
their  fire  with  splendid  effect  upon  the  Federals  near 
the  bridge  until  nightfall  closed  the  engagement,  the 
precision  of  their  practice  having  attracted  the  attention 
of  friend  and  foe. 

The  Confederates  made  no  attempt  to  follow  up  the 
success  which  had  attended  the  complete  overthrow  of 
Burnside,  and  as  darkness  enveloped  the  battlefield, 
worn  out  and  exhausted  by  eight  days  of  continuous 
marching  and  fighting,  dropped  to  the  ground  where 
they  stood  to  seek  repose  in  sleep.  But,  even  more  fa 
tigued  than  their  men,  the  division  commanders  now 
sought  Gen.  Lee  to  urge,  without  exception,  his  with 
drawal  during  the  night.  Unmoved  by  the  universal 
opinion,  and  relying  upon  his  confidence  in  McClellan's 
lack  of  heart  for  a  resumption  of  the  struggle,  the  great 
leader,  possessing  that  supreme  moral  courage  which  so 
few  possess,  even  though  lions  when  aroused,  merely 
ordered  his  generals  to  collect  their  remnants,  and 
strengthen  the  lines  for  a  possible  conflict  on  the  mor 
row. 

The  morning  of  the  18th,  Lee  turned  his  attention  to 
the  offensive  plan  which  Jackson  had  attempted  to  exe 
cute  the  preceding  day,  to  turn  the  extreme  Federal 
right,  which  Stuart  and  Pelham  had  failed  to  do,  re 
porting  the  task  impossible. 

Nothing  can  so  well  describe  the  situation  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th  as  the  account  of  Col.  S.  D.  Lee, 
whose  gallantry  and  heroic  efforts  the  day  before  had 
more  than  once  saved  the  Confederate  Army  from  de 
feat.  Sending  this  officer  to  make  a  reconnaissance  of 
the  Federal  right  with  Jackson,  who  had  supported  the 
views  of  Stuart  and  Pelham,  Gen.  Lee  patiently 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  313 

awaited  their  report,  continuing  to  urge  Gen.  Pendle- 
ton  to  send  forward  all  the  rifled  pieces  and  stragglers 
he  could  collect. 

Of  his  reconnaissance,  Col.  Lee  wrote:  "During  the 
morning  a  courier  from  headquarters  came  to  my  bat 
talion  of  artillery  with  a  message  that  the  commander- 
in-chief  wished  to  see  me.  I  followed  the  courier,  and 
on  meeting  Gen.  Lee,  he  said:  'Col.  Lee,  I  wish  you  to 
go  with  this  courier  to  Gen.  Jackson,  and  say  that  I 
sent  you  to  report  to  him.'  I  replied,  'General,  shall  I 
take  my  batteries  with  me?'  He  said:  'No,  just  say  that 
I  told  you  to  report  to  him,  and  he  will  tell  you  what  he 
wants.'  I  soon  reached  Gen.  Jackson.  He  was  dis 
mounted  with  but  few  persons  around  him.  He  said  to 
me :  'Col.  Lee,  I  wish  you  to  take  a  ride  with  me,'  and 
we  rode  to  the  left  of  our  lines  with  but  one  courier,  I 
think.  We  soon  reached  a  considerable  hill  and  dis 
mounted.  Gen.  Jackson  then  said,  'Let  us  go  up  this 
hill,  and  be  careful  not  to  expose  yourself,  for  the  Fed 
eral  sharpshooters  are  not  far  off.'  The  hill  bore  evi 
dence  of  the  fierce  fight  the  day  before.*  A  battery  of 
artillery  had  been  on  it,  and  there  were  wrecked  caissons, 
broken  wheels,  dead  bodies,  and  dead  horses  around. 
Gen.  Jackson  said:  'Colonel,  I  wish  you  to  take  your 
glasses  and  carefully  examine  the  Federal  line  of  bat 
tle.'  I  did  so,  and  saw  a  remarkably  strong  line  of 
battle,  with  more  troops  than  I  knew  Gen.  Lee  had. 
After  locating  the  different  batteries,  unlimbered  and 
ready  for  action,  and  noting  the  strong  skirmish  line 
in  front  of  the  dense  masses  of  infantry,  I  said  to  him: 
'General,  that  is  a  very  strong  position,  and  there  is  a 
large  force  there.'  He  said:  'Yes,  I  wish  you  to  take 
50  pieces  of  artillery  and  crush  that  force,  which  is  the 
Federal  right.  Can  you  do  it?'  I  can  scarcely  describe 
my  feelings  as  I  again  took  my  glasses,  and  made  an 
even  more  careful  examination.  I  at  once  saw  such  an 
attempt  must  fail.  More  than  50  guns  were  unlimbered 
and  ready  for  action,  strongly  supported  by  dense  lines 

"This  hill  as  suggested  by  Henderson  was  probably  the  one  held  by  Pelham 
on  the  17th. 


314  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

of  infantry  and  strong  skirmish  lines,  advantageously 
posted.  The  ground  was  unfavorable  for  the  location 
of  artillery  on  the  Confederate  side,  for,  to  be  effective, 
the  guns  would  have  to  move  up  close  to  the  Federal 
lines,  and  that,  too,  under  fire  of  both  infantry  and  ar 
tillery.  I  could  not  bring  myself  to  say  all  that  I  felt 
and  knew.  I  said:  'Yes,  General.  Where  will  I  get 
the  50  guns?'  He  said:  'How  many  have  you  ?'  Ire- 
plied:  'About  12  out  of  the  30  I  carried  into  action  the 
day  before.'  (My  losses  had  been  very  great  in  men, 
horses,  and  carriages.)  He  said:  'I  can  furnish  you 
some,  and  Gen.  Lee  says  he  can  furnish  some.'  I  re 
plied:  'Shall  I  go  for  the  guns?'  'No,  not  yet,'  he  re 
plied.  'Col.  Lee,  can  you  crush  the  Federal  right  with 
50  guns?'  I  said:  'General,  I  can  try.  I  can  do  it  if 
any  one  can.'  He  said:  'That  is  not  what  I  asked  you, 
sir.  If  I  give  you  50  guns,  can  you  crush  the  Federal 
right?'  I  evaded  the  question  again  and  again,  but  he 
pressed  it  home.  Finally  I  said:  'General,  you  seem  to 
be  more  intent  upon  my  giving  you  my  technical  opinion 
as  an  artillery  officer,  than  upon  my  going  after  the 
guns  and  making  an  attempt.'  'Yes,  sir,'  he  replied, 
'and  I  want  your  positive  opinion,  yes,  or  no.'  I  felt 
that  a  great  crisis  was  upon  me,  and  I  could  not  evade 
it.  I  again  took  my  glasses  and  made  another  examina 
tion.  I  waited  a  good  while,  with  Jackson  watching  me 
intently.  I  said:  'General,  it  can  not  be  done  with  50 
guns  and  the  troops  you  have  near  here.'  In  an  instant 
he  said:  'Let  us  ride  back,  Colonel.'  I  felt  that  I  had 
positively  shown  a  lack  of  nerve,  and  with  considerable 
emotion  begged  that  I  might  be  allowed  to  make  the 
attempt,  saying:  'General,  you  forced  me  to  say  what 
I  did  unwillingly.  If  you  give  the  50  guns  to  any  other 
artillery  officer  I  am  ruined  for  life.  I  promise  you  I 
will  fight  the  guns  to  the  last  extremity  if  you  will  only 
let  me  command  them.  Jackson  was  quiet,  seemed 
sorry  for  me  and  said:  'It  is  all  right,  Colonel.  Every 
body  knows  you  are  a  brave  officer,  and  would  fight  the 
guns  well,'  or  words  to  that  effect.  We  soon  reached 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  315 

the  spot  from  which  we  started.  He  said:  'Colonel,  go 
to  Gen.  Lee,  and  tell  him  what  has  occurred  since  you 
reported  to  me.  Describe  our  ride  to  the  hill,  your  ex 
amination  of  the  Federal  position,  and  my  conversation 
about  your  crushing  the  Federal  right  with  50  guns, 
and  my  forcing  you  to  give  your  opinion.' 

"With  feelings  such  as  I  never  had  before,  nor  ever 
expect  to  have  again,  I  returned  to  Gen.  Lee,  and  gave 
a  detailed  account  of  my  visit  to  Gen.  Jackson,  closing 
with  the  account  of  my  being  forced  to  give  my  opinion 
as  to  the  possibility  of  success.  I  saw  a  shade  come 
over  Gen.  Lee's  face,  and  he  said:  'Colonel,  go  and  join 
your  command.'  For  many  years,  I  never  fully  under 
stood  my  mission  that  day,  or  why  I  was  sent  to  Gen. 
Jackson.  When  Jackson's  report  was  published  of  the 
battle,  I  saw  that  he  stated  that  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
17th,  Gen.  Lee  had  ordered  him  to  move  to  the  left  with 
a  view  of  turning  the  Federal  right,  but  that  he  found 
the  enemy's  numerous  artillery  so  judiciously  posted  in 
their  front,  and  so  near  the  river,  as  to  render  such  an 
attempt  too  hazardous  to  undertake.  I  afterwards  saw 
Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart's  report,  in  which  he  says  that  it 
was  determined,  the  enemy  not  attacking,  to  turn  the 
enemy's  right  on  the  18th.  It  appears  Gen.  Lee  ordered 
Gen.  Jackson  on  the  evening  of  the  17th  to  turn  the 
enemy's  right,  and  Jackson  said  that  it  could  not  be 
done.  It  also  appears  from  Stuart's  report  and  from 
the  incident  I  relate,  that  Gen.  Lee  reiterated  the 
order  on  the  18th,  and  told  Jackson  to  take  50  guns 
and  crush  the  Federal  right.  Jackson  having  reported 
against  such  an  attempt  on  the  17th,  no  doubt  said  that 
if  an  artillerist,  in  whom  Gen.  Lee  had  confidence^ 
would  say  the  Federal  right  could  be  crushed  with  50 
guns,  he  would  make  the  attempt." 

The  incident  recounted  by  Col.  Lee  is  a  dramatic  one. 
The  temptation  offered  the  brave  artilleryman  to  al 
low  his  professional  duty  to  be  overborne  by  the  de 
sire  to  retain  the  approval  of  Jackson,  the  soldier  who 
had  never  flinched  from  even  the  seemingly  impossible, 


316  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

was  a  great  one.  Just  as  he  wrote,  Col.  Lee  could  not 
have  known  during  the  battle  that  Jackson's  views  coin 
cided  with  his  own.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  most 
natural  for  him  to  believe  that  Jackson  regarded  him  as 
unwilling  at  heart  to  essay  the  proposed  task. 

This  whole  affair  again  illustrates  those  tactical  views 
of  Jackson's  which  we  have  had  occasion  to  note  at 
White  Oak  Swamp  and  Cedar  Mountain.  He  realized 
the  futility  of  frontal  attacks  against  massed  batteries 
without  a  proper  artillery  preparation,  and  to  secure 
such  he  knew  was  quite  impossible  at  Sharpsburg  on  the 
17th  and  18th.  He  knew  that  even  had  the  Confederate 
batteries  been  fresh  and  full-manned,  instead  of  badly 
wrecked  as  they  were,  another  Malvern  Hill  stared  him 
in  the  face.  Yet,  no  doubt  sensible  of  the  criticism  to 
which  he  had  been  subjected  for  his  delay  at  White 
Oak  Swamp  while  seeking  to  subdue  the  fire  of  the 
hostile  guns,  in  order  not  to  sacrifice  his  infantry,  even 
though  confirmed  in  his  view  of  the  situation  by  Stuart 
and  Pelham,  the  latter  an  artilleryman  of  unquestioned 
intrepidity,  Jackson  threw  the  burden  of  the  decision 
upon  the  commander-in-chief  himself,  through  the 
medium  of  the  latter's  technical  adviser,  Col.  Lee.  In 
this  his  action  was  well  considered,  and  the  delicate  man 
ner  in  which  he  convinced  Gen.  Lee  of  the  error  in  which 
he  was  about  to  fall  beautifully  illustrates  Jackson's 
loyalty  to  his  chief. 

But  another  feature  is  to  be  noted,  and  that  is 
the  submission  by  Gen.  Lee  and  Gen.  Jackson  of  purely 
technical  questions  concerning  the  guns  to  skilled  ar 
tillerymen.  In  this  matter  the  change  for  the  better  is 
most  noticeable.  Never  once,  as  far  as  can  be  as 
certained,  had  the  infantry  assaults  of  the  Peninsula 
been  held  in  abeyance  pending  an  artillery  reconnais 
sance.  In  every  instance  until  now  the  columns  had 
been  furiously  hurled  against  all  but  impregnable 
positions  without  the  slightest  deference  being  paid  to 
the  professional  opinion  of  artillerymen;  nor  were  their 
views  even  sought.  But  now  we  first  find  Jackson  con- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  317 

salting  Pelham,  and  though  but  confirmed  by  the  latter 
in  his  views,  naively  suggesting  to  his  commander-in- 
chief  that  he,  too,  avail  himself  of  an  expert  technical 
opinion.  An  artilleryman,  and  one  in  whose  loyalty,  as 
well  as  in  whose  ability  and  courage,  the  highest  confi 
dence  is  reposed  by  him,  is  sent  to  make  the  reconnais 
sance,  and  the  ultimate  decision  withheld  pending  his 
finding.  No  longer  is  the  advice  of  the  "old  war  horse" 
alone  sought  on  artillery  matters,  as  at  Malvern  Hill. 
In  vain  did  Longstreet  urge  the  frontal  attack  on  the 
17th  as  the  proper  counter-stroke.  The  certain  fate  of 
such  a  move  was  painted  in  lurid  colors.  The  flashes 
of  a  hundred  guns  running  together  streaked  the  op 
posite  hillside  with  a  line  of  red,  through  which  no 
infantry  might  hope  to  pass.  Malvern  Hill  had  not 
been  lost  in  vain,  and  Gen.  Lee  turned  towards  his 
enemy's  flank,  waiting,  so  patiently  listening,  for  some 
news  of  Jackson's  success.  But  the  Federal  move  which 
baffled  Pelham  was  the  massing  in  a  single  group  of 
30  heavy  rifled  pieces  on  a  well-prepared  position,  about 
one  mile  north  of  the  west  wood,  and  900  yards  from  the 
river,  at  a  point  where  the  Hagerstown  pike  ascends  to 
a  commanding  ridge.  Opposed  to  this  great  battery, 
so  skillfully  placed,  the  damaged  guns  of  Pelham  would 
have  been  almost  as  useless  as  old  Brown  Bess. 

When  Gen.  Lee  received  from  the  lips  of  one  of  his 
ablest  artillerymen  a  confirmation  of  Jackson's  report, 
his  troops  still  lay  in  line  of  battle.  Not  a  halo  of 
smoke  had  hovered  above  the  guns,  not  a  rifle-shot  had 
broken  the  awful  stillness  of  the  morning.  With  bated 
breath  and  tense  with  anxiety,  the  two  armies  lay  watch 
ing  each  other  so  silent  it  almost  seemed  the  life  blood 
had  ebbed  from  their  veins.  The  stricken  hundreds 
which  held  the  foremost  lines  were  scarce  less  motion 
less  than  those  who  survived.  And  what  a  contrast  this 
the  night  hour  in  which  Lee  set  his  columns  in  motion 
for  Virginia  bore  to  that  when  but  recently,  with  bands 
playing  and  mid  cheers  from  40,000  throats,  the  sons 
of  the  South  crossed  to  the  land  of  their  foe.  Now,  as 


318  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

the  dejected,  battle-rent  regiments,  some  reduced  to 
mere  platoons,  waded  out  into  the  Potomac,  with  faces 
turned  southward,  even  the  splashing  of  feet  in  the 
water  jarred  upon  the  overwrought  nerves  of  the  men. 
The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  experiencing  a 
new  sensation,  for  though  its  resolve  was  never  higher, 
its  back  was  towards  the  enemy. 

We  find  those  who  speak  of  Sharpsburg  or  Antietam 
as  a  drawn  battle.  So  it  was  in  every  tactical  sense  of 
the  word.  Strategically,  however,  the  Maryland  cam 
paign  had  ended  in  defeat  and  the  great  battle  of  Sep 
tember  17  was  the  culmination.  Lee  had  crossed  the 
Potomac  with  the  intention  of  carrying  the  war  into 
the  enemy's  country.  He  had  scarce  crossed  before  he 
was  fighting  for  existence,  with  one  foot  of  his  army  at 
all  times  on  the  other  side  of  the  dividing  line.  Now 
he  was  returning  to  the  southern  shore,  even  thankful 
that  the  avenue  of  retreat  lay  open.  During  the  night 
of  the  18th,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  with  all 
its  trains  and  artillery,  had  recrossed  the  Potomac  at 
Boteler's  Ford.  As  the  rear  wagons  containing  the 
wounded,  and  the  splintered  remains  of  the  last  battery 
to  leave  its  position,  approached  the  ford,  Gen.  Lee,  still 
at  the  post  of  greatest  danger  near  the  north  shore,  with 
a  great  sigh  and  as  if  to  relieve  his  soul  of  pain,  ex 
pressed  his  thanks  to  God.  No  words  can  so  well  fix 
in  history  the  failure  of  the  First  Maryland  Invasion  as 
that  fervent  prayer  of  the  Confederate  leader  with  all 
that  it  meant.  In  connection  with  Gen.  Lee's  with 
drawal  from  Sharpsburg,  one  instinctively  recalls 
Moses,  the  deliverance  of  the  Israelites  and  of  the  Con 
federates  both  being  percarious  from  a  military  point  of 
view. 

No  serious  attempt  was  made  by  McClellan  to  press 
the  Confederates  until  the  next  day,  Fitz  Lee's  cavalry 
having  held  off  Pleasanton  until  the  crossing  was  ef 
fected.  Meanwhile,  Gen.  Pendleton,  with  Nelson's  re 
serve  battalion  of  artillery  crowning  the  heights  op 
posite  the  ford  with  its  guns,  had  been  collecting  other 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  319 

batteries  as  they  crossed  and  placing  them  in  position  to 
repel  the  enemy,  momentarily  expected  to  appear. 
Soon  44  guns  were  thus  secured,  Capt.  Maurin  with 
three  rifled  pieces  was  placed  to  the  right,  about  250 
yards  from  the  river,  and  Lieut.  Maddox  with  one  piece 
on  his  left.  Upstream  then  came  Milledge  with  four 
rifles  and  a  howitzer,  and  Chapman  with  one  rifle  and 
one  Napoleon.  On  the  brow  of  the  cliff  overlooking  the 
ford  so  as  to  rake  it  and  its  approaches,  Capt.  Marma- 
duke  Johnson,  with  two  6-pounders  and  two  howitzers, 
was  placed.  Above  the  road  leading  through  the  ravine 
from  the  ford,  Capt.  Kirkpatrick  with  two  6-pounders 
and  two  12-pounder  howitzers  occupied  the  brow  of  the 
cliff  from  which  position  he  was  able  to  cross  fire  with 
Johnson,  and  next  to  him  Capt.  Huckstep  took  position 
with  his  four  6-pounders.  To  the  left  of  Huskstep  was 
Braxton's  Battery,  and  further  along  Capt.  Barnwell, 
of  Pendleton's  staff,  placed  a  12-pounder  Whitworth 
and  two  10-pounder  Parrotts  under  Capt.  Hardaway; 
two  of  the  Washington  Artillery  batteries  were  also 
posted  on  the  brink  of  the  ravine  by  Col.  Long  of  Gen. 
Lee's  staff,  while  eleven  pieces  were  held  in  reserve  for 
an  emergency. 

About  8  A.  M.  on  the  19th,  Pleasanton  appeared  at 
the  ford  with  a  large  force  of  cavalry,  and  Gibson's, 
Tidball's  and  Robertson's  horse  batteries  with  their 
eighteen  pieces  opened  on  the  Confederates.  An  artil 
lery  duel  had  continued  for  about  two  hours  when  the 
Federal  5th  Corps  arrived.  The  Confederate  infantry 
support  of  about  600  men  left  with  Gen.  Pendleton  now 
replied  to  the  enemy  while  the  guns  economized  their  am 
munition  as  much  as  possible.  About  noon  the  Federal 
Infantry  took  cover  behind  a  canal  bank  on  the  north 
side  of  the  river,  from  which  their  sharpshooters  greatly 
harassed  the  Confederate  gunners.  The  situation  of  the 
isolated  batteries  was  now  critical  and  though  much 
criticism  of  Gen.  Pendleton  has  resulted  from  his  failure 
to  hold  the  ford,  it  is  not  suggested  by  Alexander  and 
others  how  it  should  have  been  done.  Pendleton  had  on 


320  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

the  18th  sent  Ancell's  Battery  to  Shepherd's  Ford,  four 
miles  above  Boteler's,  and  on  the  19th,  he  had  been 
forced  to  dispatch  200  men  of  his  infantry  to  its  sup 
port,  sending  an  equal  number  to  the  ford  below  him, 
opposite  which  the  enemy  had  appeared  with  a  number 
of  guns  and  commenced  to  shell  the  small  cavalry  force 
stationed  on  the  south  shore.  Lee  was  not  ignorant  of 
the  precarious  task  which  had  been  assigned  his  Chief 
of  Artillery,  for  on  the  19th  he  had  instructed  him  by 
letter  to  fall  back  that  evening  if  the  pressure  of  the 
enemy  became  too  great,  adding  that  a  few  guns  only 
need  be  left  with  the  cavalry,  which  had  been  ordered 
to  relieve  him.*  Col.  Munford,  with  his  cavalry  and 
Chew's  horse  battery,  had  promised  to  be  on  hand  by 
night.  So  any  suggestion  that  Pendleton  deserted  his 
post  is  an  improper  one. 

During  the  afternoon  the  battery  commanders  began 
to  report  their  ammunition  exhausted,  but  such  only 
as  were  able  to  withdraw  their  guns  unseen  by  the 
enemy  were  allowed  to  retire.  Shortly  after  nightfall, 
while  some  of  the  batteries  were  moving  off,  the  infan 
try  remaining  near  the  ford  broke  badly  and  fled  down 
the  road  from  the  river,  a  large  body  of  skirmishers 
having  rushed  across  the  stream  and  routed  them. 
Capt.  Maurin  was  now  compelled  to  spike  his  10- 
pounder  Parrott,  Capt.  Milledge  and  Johnson  each  a 
12-pounder  howitzer,  and  Capt.  Huskstep  one  of  his 
6-pounders,  all  of  which  were  abandoned. t  In  the  re 
tirement  the  Confederate  batteries  lost  7  men  and  26 
horses. 

While  the  batteries  were  moving  off  from  the  river 
as  best  they  could  in  the  night,  Gen.  Pendleton  sought 
in  vain  to  induce  Gen.  Pryor,  but  two  miles  inland,  to  re 
turn  and  cover  the  position  he  had  occupied,  but  Hood, 
the  division  commander,  not  being  found,  he  continued 
his  search  for  Gen.  Lee,  who  ordered  Jackson  to  take 

*Mcmoirs  of  W.  N.  Pendleton,  p.  225. 

tThe  piece  lost  by  Milledge  was  one  of  the  two  brass  howitzers  belonging  to 
the  Cadet  Battery  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  cast  by  order  of  President 
Taylor,  in  1855,  and  presented  to  the  Corps  of  Cadets.  The  mate  of  the  lost 
piece  is  now  the  evening  gun  of  the  Institute,  and  has  been  used  as  such  since 
1866. 


COLONEL  STEPHEN  DILL  LEE 

i  Transferred  from   the  Artillery  and  afterwards  Lieutenant-General 
Army  of  the  West) 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  321 

the  necessary  steps  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check.  The 
next  morning  Jackson  sent  A.  P.  Hill's  Division  to 
wards  the  river,  he  and  Pendleton  accompanying  it. 
As  Hill  moved  up  at  an  early  hour  in  two  lines,  he 
found  a  force  of  about  3,500  men  of  Porter's  Corps 
along  the  Charles  Town  road.  Under  cover  of  a  tremen 
dous  fire  of  artillery  from  the  north  shore,  the  Federals 
maintained  a  stubborn  resistance  along  the  crest  of  the 
ravine.  But  soon  Porter  ordered  Sykes  to  recross,  and, 
during  the  attempt  to  execute  the  movement,  Hill's  bri 
gades  made  a  superb  charge,  driving  the  remaining  regi 
ment  into  the  river,  this  single  command  suffering  a  loss 
of  282  men  out  of  800  present. 

Hill  had  not  a  single  gun  in  action.  His  divisional 
battalion  under  Col.  Walker  was  no  doubt  blocked  on 
the  narrow  roads  leading  south  when  his  orders  were 
received  to  drive  Porter  back,  and  there  was  no  time  to 
wait  for  them.  But  his  assault  on  the  Federal  position 
in  the  face  of  numerous  well-served  guns  cost  him  a  loss 
of  261  men  of  his  sorely-depleted  brigades.  The  affair 
indicates  that  Hill's  Infantry,  at  any  rate,  had  lost 
none  of  that  fierce  elan  for  which  the  Light  Division  had 
ever  been  famous. 

The  Federals  now  desisted  from  further  attempts  to 
overtake  Lee's  army,  McClellan's  attention  being 
wholly  devoted  to  Stuart's  threat  against  his  rear,  the 
latter  having  crossed  the  Potomac  near  Williamsport. 

The  actual  losses  of  the  Confederate  Artillery  in  ma 
terial  in  the  campaign  had  been  slight,  although  the 
batteries  were  veritable  wrecks,  over  half  of  their  horses 
having  succumbed  either  on  the  road  or  in  battle. 
Walton's  Battalion  had  abandoned  but  one  caisson  be 
fore  withdrawing  from  Sharpsburg,  and  that  had  been 
destroyed.  At  Crampton  Gap,  Capt.  Carlton,  of  Cab- 
ell's  Battalion,  had  lost  a  12-pounder  howitzer,  Read 
and  Lloyd  of  the  same  command  having  lost  elsewhere 
one  3-inch  rifle,  and  one  6-pounder  with  two  caissons,  re 
spectively.  In  Col.  Lee's  Battalion,  the  loss  was  com 
paratively  great,  Jordan  having  lost  a  howitzer  caisson, 
Rhett  a  howitzer  limber,  Parker  the  rear  chests  of  a 


21 


322  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

howitzer  caisson,  Moody  a  forge,  Woolfolk  a  12- 
pounder  howitzer  and  limber,  and  Moorman  two  10- 
pounder  Parrotts  with  part  of  a  caisson.  In  addition 
to  the  foregoing  were  the  losses  at  the  ford  by  Maurin, 
Milledge,  Johnson,  and  Huckstep,  viz.,  the  four  pieces, 
already  enumerated.* 

In  personnel,  Col.  Lee's  Battalion  alone  had  lost  2 
officers  and  8  men  killed,  and  2  officers  and  75  men 
wounded,  an  aggregate  loss  of  85,  not  less  than  25  per 
cent,  an  enormous  percentage  for  artillery.  Col. 
Walton's  Battalion  had  lost  4  men  killed,  and  3  officers 
and  27  men  wounded;  Jones'  Battery  of  Pierson's  Bat 
talion,  D.  H.  Hill's  Division,  had  suffered  a  loss  of  26 
men,  or  fully  50  per  cent  of  its  strength.  Maj.  Frobel's 
Battalion  of  Hood's  Division  sustained  a  loss  of  about 
23  men.  In  the  division  reports  of  casualties  the  Ar 
tillery  losses  are  in  many  cases  not  separately  enumer 
ated,  but  a  conservative  estimate,  based  on  those  re 
ported,  fixes  the  Artillery  losses  at  not  less  than  300  of 
ficers  and  men.f  Among  the  former  were  Capt.  J.  S. 
Taylor,  of  Col.  Lee's  staff,  and  Lieuts.  Dabney  and 
Pringle  of  Carter's  and  Garden's  batteries,  respec 
tively,  all  of  whom  fell  mortally  wounded  while  per 
forming  their  duty  with  great  gallantry. 

But,  as  has  been  remarked  before,  artillery  losses  do 
not  spell  artillery  efficiency  and  service  rendered.  In 
fact,  there  is  little  relation  between  them.  Had  the 
Confederate  batteries  been  able  to  beat  down  the  fire  of 
the  powerful  Federal  guns,  especially  those  of  Hunt, 
they  would  have  saved  the  infantry  hundreds  of  men. 
As  it  was,  they  were  unable  to  do  this,  and,  in  repelling 
the  infantry  columns  of  the  enemy,  were  exposed  to 
more  serious  losses  than  if  they  had  for  the  most  part 
merely  engaged  in  an  artillery  duel.  Surveying  the 
battlefield  on  the  16th,  such  men  as  Cols.  Lee  and 
Walton,  Majs.  Cutts,  Jones,  Pierson,  and  Frobel,  had 
all  realized  at  a  glance  what  was  before  them.  They 

*For  above  see  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  I,  p.  844,  and 
Pendleton's  and  Barnwell's  reports.  Ibid.,  pp.  834,  837. 

fSee  Guild's  report,  Longstreet's  return,  Ewell's  return,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  I, 
pp.  810,  843,  and  074,  respectively,  also  individual  reports  of  Walker,  Walton, 
Lee,  Frobel,  and  others. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  323 

saw  at  once  that  the  work  of  the  gunners  was  to  be 
a  task  of  self-sacrifice.  If  they  were  to  render  the 
infantry  that  service  of  which  they  were  alone  capable, 
the  artillery  of  the  enemy  must  be  in  large  measure 
ignored  by  them,  for  in  a  duel  with  the  superior  ordnance 
of  McClellan,  their  guns  would  be  completely  out 
matched.  With  firm  resolve,  they  therefore,  determined 
to  devote  their  energies  to  the  attacking  infantry,  heed 
less  of  the  exposure  to  the  hostile  artillery.  Trans 
mitted  to  the  men  and  officers  of  their  commands,  such 
was  the  spirit  which  animated  the  Confederate  Artillery 
in  this  great  battle  which  Col.  Lee  afterwards  character 
ized  as  " Artillery  Hell."  How  well  the  gunners  carried 
out  their  resolve  has  been  shown.  In  every  quarter  of 
the  battlefield  they  saved  the  day  for  Gen.  Lee.  With 
Hill  in  the  center,  the  Artillery  at  one  critical  instant 
alone  remained  in  action  to  check  the  enemy  and  save 
that  portion  of  the  line  from  rout.  Later  Burnside's 
advance  was  stayed  by  the  Artillery  unsupported  ex 
cept  by  Toombs'  shattered  brigade,  utterly  incapable  of 
further  effective  resistance,  and  dashing  upon  the  field 
the  batteries  of  Walker's  Battalion,  coming  to  the  re 
lief  of  those  already  in  action,  had  hurled  Rodman,  then 
Wilcox,  back  from  Sharpsburg.  Their  share  in  saving 
Lee's  right  is  well  attested  by  the  insignificant  losses 
which  the  infantry  of  A.  P.  Hill's  Division  suffered  in 
cooperating  with  them,  and  again  by  the  Federal  re 
ports  which  repeatedly  refer  to  the  Confederate  bat 
teries  as  the  cause  of  the  withdrawal  of  Burnside's  di 
visions. 

In  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  necessity  developed  a 
mobility  among  the  light  batteries  which  was  surpris 
ing.  A  study  of  the  reports  shows  that  the  same  battery 
was  engaged  in  widely-separated  positions,  in  spite  of 
enormous  losses  and  deficiencies  in  horses.  We  have 
seen  how  Carter  moved  from  point  to  point  under  a 
tremendous  fire,  as  occasion  required.  And  again,  how 
Poague,  after  incurring  severe  losses  in  the  morning  on 
the  extreme  left  with  Jackson  and  Pelham,  reappeared 
in  action  in  the  afternoon  at  the  threatened  point  on  the 


324  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

extreme  right.  These  rapid  changes  of  position  were 
typical  of  many  of  the  batteries  engaged,  for  the  groups 
which  were  originally  established  were  essentially  un 
stable  by  reason  of  the  superiority  of  the  enemy's  ar 
tillery  fire,  which  forced  them  to  dissolve  whenever  they 
opened.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  for  batteries  to 
be  constantly  shifted  about  and  detached  from  their 
own  battalions  and  groups  in  order  to  close  with  the 
attacking  infantry.  Dispersed,  these  batteries  were 
able  to  assist  in  repelling  the  enemy  with  their  canister, 
drawing  upon  themselves  only  a  portion  of  the  hostile 
artillery  fire  when  they  went  into  action.  Massed,  they 
were  overwhelmed  by  the  concentrated  fire  of  superior 
guns.  We  therefore  find  the  usual  order  of  things  re 
versed,  due  to  the  undisputed  fire  of  Hunt's  masses.  At 
Sharpsburg,  the  Confederate  batteries  were  more  ef 
fective  individually  than  grouped,  because  they  were 
forced  to  devote  their  energies  to  the  hostile  infantry 
wherever  it  threatened  and  because  by  dispersing  they 
so  divided  the  attention  of  Hunt  that  much  of  the  con 
centrated  effect  of  his  guns  was  lost.  Upon  whatever 
point  the  great  Federal  masses  of  guns  shifted  their 
sheaves  of  fire,  from  some  other  quarter  a  Confederate 
battery  sprung  into  action  relieved  for  a  time  at  least 
of  the  merciless  hail  of  iron  soon  sure  to  be  directed 
upon  it.  But  meanwhile  these  isolated  batteries  had 
individually  inflicted  terrific  losses  upon  the  attacking 
infantry. 

Sharpsburg,  at  which  the  Federals  hurled  their 
masses  upon  the  Confederate  positions,  was  in  no  way 
similar  to  Malvern  Hill.  In  the  latter  battle  the  ar 
tillery  superiority  rested  with  the  defenders  whose  guns 
completely  prevented  the  artillery  preparation  for 
the  infantry  attack  by  sweeping  the  hostile  batteries 
from  the  field.  At  Sharpsburg,  on  the  contrary,  the  at 
tack  retained  its  artillery  superiority  throughout,  and 
yet,  though  the  effect  of  the  artillery  preparation  was 
tremendous,  the  infantry  was  unable  to  press  home. 
From  a  tactical  standpoint,  this  anomaly  is  solely  ex 
plainable  (since  the  courage  of  the  Federal  Infantry 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  325 

was  superb)  by  the  unsparing  support  which  the  infan 
try  of  the  defense  received  from  its  batteries,  the  guns 
of  which  invariably  reopened  when  the  hostile  guns 
were  masked  by  the  assaulting  columns.  This  was  made 
possible  only  by  the  Confederate  batteries  moving  into 
the  closest  proximity  with  the  enemy;  and,  being  will 
ing  and  able  to  do  that,  their  ordnance,  comparatively  in 
ferior  in  point  of  range,  was  almost  as  effective  upon 
infantry  masses  with  case  and  canister  as  the  superior 
material  of  the  enemy  would  have  been  in  their  hands. 
In  fact  6-pounders  and  light  howitzers  were  even  more 
effective  with  canister  at  ranges  from  150  to  300  yards, 
than  the  heavier  rifled  pieces  with  shell  would  have  been. 
All  these  matters  are  worthy  of  much  consideration. 
It  is  such  factors  that  enter  into  the  problems  presented 
by  many  battles. 

We  have  seen  that  the  number  of  guns  borne  on 
Lee's  muster  rolls  at  this  time  aggregated  about  300, 
giving  a  proportion  on  paper  of  between  9  and  10 
pieces  per  1,000  men  of  the  infantry.  But  no  such  pro 
portion  was  to  be  found  on  the  battlefield  of  Sharps- 
burg.  A  number  of  batteries  were  still  on  the  road  from 
Harper's  Ferry  with  Crutchfield  when  the  battle 
closed;  others  remained  at  Harper's  Ferry;  some  had 
been  left  at  Richmond,  or  sent  to  Winchester.  In  ad 
dition  to  these,  the  batteries  of  Col.  Brown's  regiment 
and  Maj.  Nelson's  battalion  of  the  reserve  took  no  part 
in  the  action.  Yet  these  two  commands  were  being  em 
ployed  for  a  purpose  closely  connected  with  the  ma 
neuvers  of  the  Army,  and  should  not  be  excluded  for 
that  reason.  Actively  employed,  then,  whether  actually 
engaged  or  not,  were  not  less  than  200  guns,  which,  con 
sidered  in  connection  with  an  infantry  force  of  30,000 
men  on  the  field  of  battle,  gave  a  proportion  of  between 
6  and  7  pieces  of  artillery  per  1,000  men  of  the  other 
arms,  still  an  unusually  large  proportion,  to  which  the 
repulse  of  McClellan's  superior  force  was  in  great  meas 
ure  due. 

As  to  the  expenditures  of  the  various  batteries  at 
Sharpsburg,  we  have  no  record.  The  recordation  of 


326  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

such  matters  was  a  refinement  little  known  or  ap 
preciated  by  the  gunners  of  1862.  They  were  more  con 
cerned  with  a  multitude  of  other  matters  which  de 
manded  their  attention  than  with  statistics  for  future 
study,  and  most  of  the  gallant  battery  commanders  who 
fought  their  guns  at  Sharpsburg  were  as  unable  im 
mediately  after  the  battle  as  the  survivors  are  to-day  to 
state  with  any  degree  of  accuracy  whether  they  ex 
pended  200,  300,  or  500  rounds  on  the  17th  of 'Sep 
tember.  But  every  circumstance  points  to  an  immense 
expenditure  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  batteries  en 
gaged,  and  it  is  not  extravagant  to  believe  it  equaled, 
if  it  did  not  exceed,  the  average  of  Second  Manassas. 

With  the  final  episode  of  the  first  invasion  of  the 
North,  the  Confederate  Artillery  already,  since  Second 
Manassas,  highly  regarded,  sprang  into  a  position  of 
preeminence  among  its  sister  arms.*  The  distinguished 
reputation  which  the  artillery  branch  of  the  Confeder 
ate  service  had  acquired,  rested  not  upon  its  compara 
tive  efficiency  with  the  same  branch  of  the  Federal 
Army,  for  all  recognized  the  superiority  of  the  latter,  in 
organization,  drill,  discipline,  material,  and  equipment. 
It  was  but  the  direct  result  of  the  personal  character  of 
its  officers  and  men,  who,  except  in  courage,  were  over- 
weighed  in  all  that  made  for  the  force  of  their  blows. 
In  other  branches  of  the  Confederate  service  there  were 
few  names  among  the  subordinate  officers  as  well  known 
as  those  of  Stephen  D.  Lee,  Stapleton  Crutchfield, 
John  B.  Walton,  and  Lindsay  Walker,  and  those  of 
gentle  Tom  Carter,  bold  Preston  Chew,  stern  Poague, 
youthful  Willie  Pegram,  and  dashing  John  Pelham  had 
become  by- words  in  every  Southern  household.  Few 
armies  have  ever  boasted  such  a  brilliant  galaxy  of 
gunners,  combining  as  they  did  the  unflinching  resolve 
of  maturer  manhood  with  the  bravery  of  youth,  as  was 
to  be  found  towards  the  close  of  1862  in  Lee's  field 
artillery. 

"In  a  letter  from  Gen.  T.  T.  Munford,  himself  a  cavalryman,  to  the  author, 
he  declares  the  artillery  to  have  been  the  most  distinguished  branch  of  the 
Confederate  service. 


CHAPTER  XX 

REORGANIZATION.      FROM  SHARPSBURG  TO 
FREDERICKSBURG 

AFTER  his  retreat  from  the  Potomac  Gen.  Lee  rested 
his  army  between  Winchester  and  Bunker  Hill,  a 
section  still  rich  in  food  supplies,  while  the  Cavalry 
watched  the  enemy.  At  last  his  worn  men  were  given 
a  chance  to  recuperate  their  strength,  and  in  the  vast 
rolling  meadows  of  the  Valley,  with  grasses  still  green 
and  sweet,  the  weary  animals  of  the  Artillery  found  rest 
and  invigorating  food. 

The  base  of  supplies  of  the  Army  was  now  Staunton, 
more  than  100  miles  distant,  but  passing  back  and  forth 
over  the  metalled  highway  of  the  Valley,  the  wagon 
trains  were  kept  busy  bringing  ammunition,  food,  and 
clothing,  until  the  Army  was  again  placed  on  a  footing 
of  preparedness  for  further  campaigning.  But  horses 
and  wagons  were  particularly  scarce,  in  spite  of  all  that 
Maj.  Richardson  and  the  other  artillery  officers  sent  to 
Winchester  from  Leesburg  had  been  able  to  do.  As 
late  as  October  20,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  alone  reported 
a  deficit  of  55  wagons  with  their  teams  for  Longstreet's 
reserve  ordnance  train,  and  41  for  that  of  Jackson's 
Corps,  and  in  nearly  every  report  and  communication 
of  the  battalion  and  battery  commanders  at  this  time, 
the  scarcity  of  horses  for  their  batteries  is  mentioned. 
Just  after  the  Maryland  campaign  the  general  con 
dition  of  the  field  artillery  in  point  of  personnel,  ma 
terial,  horses,  and  equipment,  was  distressing. 

On  September  22,  Col.  Crutchfield  reported  every 
battery  of  Maj.  Pierson's  Battalion,  D.  H.  Hill's  Divi 
sion,  as  unfit  for  duty,  and  ordered  them  to  Martinsburg 
to  refit,  and  to  rest  and  reshoe  the  horses.  In  Jackson's 
old  division  the  condition  of  Maj.  Shumaker's  Bat 
talion,  composed  of  Poague's,  Carpenter's,  Cutshaw's, 
Caskie's,  Rice's,  Wooding's,  Brockenbrough's,  and 


328  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Raine's  batteries,  was  even  worse.  For  the  28  guns  of 
these  eight  batteries,  not  less  than  128  horses  were  neces 
sary  to  make  them  really  serviceable,  and  204  were 
needed  to  properly  mount  the  batteries.  Some  of  these 
batteries  had  actually  less  than  20  animals  available  for 
duty,  and  their  harness  was  particularly  defective, 
others  being  equipped  with  12-pounder  howitzers  drawn 
by  6-pounder  limbers. 

Of  Maj.  Courtney's  Battalion,  Swell's  Division,  few 
of  the  batteries  had  been  present  at  Sharpsburg. 
Crutchfield  reported  three  batteries  in  excellent  order, 
having  been  refitted  by  him  at  Harper's  Ferry,  two 
others  in  fair  condition  but  needing  better  guns,  and  two 
disabled.  The  last  two  were  also  sent  to  Martinsburg 
to  refit,  and  for  them  alone  30  horses  were  needed. 

In  A.  P.  Hill's  Division,  such  of  Maj.  Lindsay 
Walker's  batteries  as  had  been  refitted  at  Harper's 
Ferry  were  in  fair  condition,  in  spite  of  their  service 
at  Sharpsburg. 

The  condition  of  the  artillery  of  Longstreet's  Corps 
was  undoubtedly  worse  than  in  Crutchfield' s  battalions, 
for  nearly  all  the  batteries  of  Cols.  Lee,  Walton,  and 
Cabell,  and  of  Majs.  Jones,  Cutts,  Frobel,  and  Saun- 
ders,  had  been  exposed  to  a  terrific  punishment  at  the 
hands  of  Hunt.  In  fact  a  number  of  the  batteries  were 
individually  reported  totally  disabled,  as  was  Cabell's 
entire  battalion. 

In  point  of  personnel,  the  extent  of  the  depletion  of 
the  batteries  in  general  may  be  estimated  from  the  re 
turn  of  the  strength  of  Lee's  and  Walton's  battalions 
on  September  22,  at  which  time  the  ten  batteries  included 
in  the  report  mustered  39  officers  and  632  men  present 
for  duty,  an  average  battery  strength  of  but  64  men. 
Yet,  the  minimum  strength  of  a  battery  was  prescribed 
by  law  to  be  80  men. 

Within  one  week,  however,  the  return  of  stragglers 
and  absentees  brought  the  strength  of  Walton's  Bat 
talion  up  to  281  officers  and  men  present  for  duty,  with 
an  aggregate  present  and  absent  of  355,  or  a  battery 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  329 

average  of  nearly  90  men.  In  Lee's  Battalion,  433  of 
ficers  and  men  were  reported  present  for  duty,  with  an 
aggregate  present  and  absent  of  561,  or  a  battery  aver 
age  of  93  men.  At  the  same  time,  the  personnel  of 
about  20  reserve  batteries  was  reported  as  55  officers 
and  716  men  present,  with  an  aggregate  of  1,027  present 
and  absent,  which  shows  an  average  battery  strength  of 
but  50  men. 

The  7  batteries  of  Courtney's  Battalion,  Swell's  Divi 
sion,  reported  an  average  strength  at  this  time  of  but 
49  men  present,  but  of  72  present  and  absent. 

Such  conditions  demanded  an  immediate  remedy,  and 
steps  were  at  once  taken  to  place  the  Artillery  on  a 
better  footing. 

As  early  as  the  26th  the  batteries  of  Carpenter  and 
Cutshaw,  under  command  of  the  former,  were  con 
solidated,  and  Wooding  was  given  command  of  Rice's 
Battery  consolidated  with  his  own;  four  guns  were  al 
lowed  each  battery,  and  any  that  remained  were  ordered 
to  be  turned  over  to  the  reserve.  Capt.  Cutshaw  had 
been  badly  wounded  and  Rice  had  resigned.  But  further 
than  this  Gen.  Lee  had  not  cared  to  go  without  express 
authority  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  upon  whom  he 
called,  September  28,  for  instructions  to  reorganize  and 
reconstruct  all  the  unserviceable  batteries  and  to  dispose 
of  surplus  officers  according  to  their  merits.*  Gen. 
Lee's  communication  to  the  Secretary  of  War  was  at 
once  referred  to  the  President,  the  latter's  attention  be 
ing  called  in  the  endorsement  to  the  fact  that  Congress 
had  refused  to  authorize  the  consolidation  of  companies, 
even  objecting  to  the  disbanding  of  them,  and  that  in 
consolidating  batteries  it  was  difficult  to  select  the  best 
officers  to  remain  in  the  service.  But  the  President 
wisely  declared  legislation  on  this  point  by  Congress  un 
necessary  and  sanctioned  Gen.  Lee's  action. 

To  bring  the  animals  of  the  Army  up  to  a  state  of 
efficiency  Gen.  Lee  now,  in  a  general  order,  which  is  a 
model  of  its  kind,  established  definite  and  rigid  regu- 

*SPO  Itcbcllion  Rrcords.  Series  I.  Vol.  XIX,  Part  II,  pp.  629  and  632  S  O 
No.  201,  September  26,  1862,  and  letter  of  Lee  to  Randolph,  September  28,  1862! 


330  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

lations  for  their  use  and  care.  Inasmuch  as  it  shows 
both  the  importance  which  the  deficiency  of  horses  had 
assumed,  as  well  as  the  methods  pursued  in  the  Artillery 
for  husbanding  the  strength  of  the  indispensable  com 
panion  of  the  gunner,  the  order  is  given  in  full.* 

"HEADQUARTERS,,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,, 

"October  1,  1862. 
"ORDERS — No.   115. 

"II.  The  general  commanding  desires  to  impress  upon  all 
officers  in  charge  of  horses  of  the  army  the  urgent  necessity  of 
energetic  and  unwearied  care  of  their  animals,,  and  of  preventing 
their  neglect  and  abuse.  Officers  in  charge  of  wagon  trains  will  be 
held  to  a  rigid  accountability  for  permitting  their  teams  to  be 
overdriven,  misused,  or  neglected.  Division  quartermasters  and 
commissaries  will  report  all  instances  of  the  kind  in  trains  under 
their  charge. 

"III.  Artillery  horses  especially  must  be  kept  in  good  condi 
tion.  To  this  end  the  Chief  of  Artillery  will  personally  supervise 
all  the  reserve,  and  see  that  all  instances  of  neglect  are  corrected, 
by  penalty  when  deserved,  and  by  suitable  provisions  when  the 
evil  has  resulted  from  necessity.  He  will  cause  every  practical 
arrangement  to  be  made  for  supplying  the  horses  of  his  command 
with  sufficient  and  suitable  food,  sparing  no  effort  or  reasonable 
expense. 

"IV.  Division  commanders  are  reminded  of  their  responsibility 
for  the  condition  of  their  artillery,  and  especially  of  its  horses. 
On  the  march,  they  will  see  that  the  halting  places  are  selected  for 
their  batteries  where  water  and  food  can  be  obtained.  They  will 
charge  their  Chiefs  of  Artillery  to  secure,  by  rigid  personal  atten 
tion,  adequate  supplies  of  forage  from  the  quartermasters  to  whom 
that  duty  is  committed.  They  will  see  that,  when  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  enemy,  every  possible  opportunity  is  improved  for  resting, 
watering,  and  feeding  their  horses.  When  the  army  is  quiet, 
division  artillery  will  be  diligently  cared  for  by  division  com 
manders  and  their  Chiefs  of  Artillery.  Their  batteries  must  be 
kept  under  control,  and  not  allowed  to  scatter  at  will.  If  scarcity 
of  forage  renders  impracticable  a  full  supply  for  the  horses  re 
tained  with  divisions,  and  it  becomes  necessary  to  send  batteries 
elsewhere  for  sufficient  food,  they  must  go  together  with  proper 
officers  to  supply  and  supervise  them,  and  report  statedly  to  their 
division  commander,  or  they  must  be  sent  to  the  reserve  camp  to 
be  there  supplied,  and  report  immediately  to  the  general  Chief  of 
Artillery. 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  II,  p.  642. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  331 

"V.  Horses  worn  down,,  past  recovery,  will  be  turned  in  to  the 
chief  quartermaster,  who  will  send  them  off  immediately,  under 
proper  regulations,  to  good  pasturage,  where  they  must  be  attended 
to  and  cared  for  under  the  supervision  of  responsible  agents. 

"VI.  Battery  horses  will  in  no  instance  be  ridden,  except  while 
in  use  by  the  usually  mounted  non-commissioned  officers  of  the 
company,  and  by  them  only  on  duty.  Their  use,  except  with  the 
battery,  and  then  in  battery  service,  is  strictly  prohibited,  and 
Chiefs  of  Artillery  will  arrest  and  bring  to  trial  all  violating  this 
order. 

"By  order  of  Gen.  R.  E.  Lee. 

R.   H.   CHILTON, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General/' 

The  foregoing  order  not  only  gives  us  an  insight  into 
the  abuses  of  the  past,  but  also  into  the  system  adopted 
for  the  care  and  preservation  of  the  animals  during  sub 
sequent  campaigns.  In  all  green  armies,  the  abuse  of 
horses  is  a  constant  source  of  annoyance  to  the  authori 
ties,  and  one  not  familiar  with  the  mounted  service  can 
scarcely  realize  how  very  greatly  their  neglect  cripples 
the  efficiency  of  the  troops.  The  Confederate  Army 
was  fortunate  in  this  respect,  inasmuch  as  the  teamsters 
and  drivers  were  generally  quite  accustomed  to  the 
handling  of  horses.  In  the  South  nearly  every  soldier, 
whether  in  the  infantry,  cavalry,  or  artillery,  had  been 
a  horseman  from  early  youth,  and  they  only  needed  to 
be  directed  and  controlled  in  order  to  get  the  best  re 
sults  from  their  teams  and  mounts.  Then,  too,  the 
Southern  horse  was  generally  of  a  better  breeding  and 
hardier  stock  than  the  heavier  animals  of  the  North,  and 
Northwest,  in  which  draft  blood  preponderated.  Es 
pecially  was  this  true  in  Virginia,  where  many  blooded 
sires  were  owned  by  the  gentry.  Hardly  a  farmer  in 
the  State  but  owned  a  number  of  superior  horses.  The 
great  sport  of  the  people,  since  early  colonial  days  had 
been  fox-hunting,  and  therefore  the  original  supply  of 
horses  was  drawn  from  those  trained  in  cross-country 
runs,  and  inured  to  the  hardships  of  field  and  forest. 
Such  animals  were  peculiarly  fitted  for  military  usage 
when  properly  fed  and  cared  for,  and  largely  accounted 


332  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

for  the  effectiveness  of  the  mounted  men  of  Lee's  army 
before  the  animals  were  exhausted  by  the  strain  of  con 
tinuous  campaigning. 

For  the  trains  a  large  supply  of  mules  was  available, 
animals  especially  adapted  to  the  rough  work  exacted 
of  them,  and  requiring  far  less  forage  and  attention  than 
horses.  Yet  the  supply  was  not  unlimited,  and  became 
scarcer  and  scarcer  as  the  war  progressed  and  suc 
cesses  enabled  the  enemy  to  take  from  the  Confederacy 
the  great  breeding  grounds  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi, 
Alabama,  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri. 

So  far  the  field  artillery  had  been  little  troubled  with 
the  disease  known  as  "sore  tongue  and  soft  hoof,"  which 
was  ravaging  the  horses  of  McClellan's  Cavalry,  and 
which  early  in  November  had  attacked  Stuart's  mounts 
to  such  an  extent  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  a 
letter  to  the  latter  took  occasion  to  refer  to  the  matter 
in  a  spirit  of  particular  concern.* 

As  early  as  November  14  the  necessity  of  purchasing 
horses  in  Texas  for  Stuart's  Cavalry  had  impressed  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  before  the  20th,  Maj.  Hart  had 
been  directed  to  secure  1,000  in  that  quarter.  These 
small  animals  were  of  course  unsuited  for  artillery 
draught  purposes,  but  their  purchase  tended  to  relieve 
the  situation  in  Virginia  by  leaving  the  heavier  horses 
for  the  light  batteries. 

On  October  2,  obedient  to  the  instructions  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Gen.  Pendleton  made  an  ex 
tensive  report  on  the  condition  of  the  Field  Artillery. 
Declaring  the  number  of  light  batteries  too  large,  some 
he  stated  to  be  inadequately  officered,  and  some,  though 
well  commanded  and  entitled  to  the  highest  respect  for 
the  honorable  service  they  had  rendered,  so  reduced  in 
personnel  and  horses  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of 
restoring  them  to  efficiency  by  reason  of  the  expense 
and  enormous  number  of  horses  such  a  step  would  en 
tail.  He  proposed  that  the  fairest  possible  standard  be 
adopted  to  determine  which  batteries  should  be  dis- 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  II,  p.  703. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  333 

banded,  their  officers  relieved  from  duty,  and  their  men, 
horses,  and  equipment  distributed  among  those  batteries 
retained  in  service.  The  proposed  test  to  be  applied 
consisted  of:  First,  services  rendered;  second,  the  effi 
ciency  of  the  officers ;  and  third,  the  existing  conditions 
and  prospects  of  the  battery  as  a  whole.  In  summing 
up  his  recommendations  in  this  respect,  he  wrote: 

"1st.  Laudable  service  undoubtedly  entitles  a  company  to 
honorable  continuance,  provided  it  be  not  forbidden  under  one  or 
both  of  the  other  conditions. 

"2d.  Officers  thoroughly  efficient  have  a  prior  claim.  Good 
service  for  a  season,  under  special  circumstances,  may  have  been 
rendered  where  some  essential  requisites  for  maintaining  a  battery 
through  protracted  difficulties  are  lacking.  To  pass  upon  such 
characteristics  is  delicate,  yet,  under  existing  responsibilities, 
essential. 

"3d.  Where  the  two  preceding  conditions  concur,  it  is  probably 
best  to  invigorate  a  battery  to  the  utmost  practicable;  but  if  either 
fails,  in  case  of  a  company  much  reduced  below  the  service  standard, 
it  would  seem  right  to  merge  it  in  some  others."* 

In  pursuance  of  such  views,  the  Chief  of  Artillery 
then  recommended  that  the  four  companies  of  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery  of  Louisiana  be  consolidated  into  two 
6-gun  batteries,  for  the  reason  that,  in  spite  of  their 
gallant  and  meritorious  service  and  the  generally  high 
character  of  the  officers,  there  seemed  little  prospect  of 
recruiting  them  up  to  the  minimum  strength  allowed 
with  volunteers  and  conscripts  from  other  States.  Al 
ready,  before  entering  Maryland,  it  had  been  necessary 
to  attach  to  Walton's  Battalion  while  at  Leesburg,  32 
Virginians,  5  from  Leake's  Battery,  and  27  from 
Anderson's,  and  these  men  were  urgently  needed  for 
the  batteries  of  their  own  State.  Without  these  there 
remained  but  212  men  present  and  227  present  and  ab 
sent  for  the  four  Louisiana  batteries,  or  an  average 
strength  at  best  of  but  57  men.  Under  the  existing  bat 
talion  organization  of  four  4-gun  batteries,  with  a  forge 
and  a  battery  wagon,  and  three  escort  wagons  for  each 
battery,  310  horses  were  required,  in  addition  to  those 

*RebelUon  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  II,  p.  647. 


334  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

for  battalion  headquarters,  whereas  if  consolidated,  210 
horses  would  suffice,  and  the  two  resulting  batteries  with 
a  strong  personnel  and  12  guns  would  be  more  effective 
than  16  pieces  distributed  among  four  weak  batteries. 

The  ten  batteries  of  Col.  Brown's  reserve  command, 
or  the  First  Virginia  Regiment,  were  recommended  to 
be  consolidated  into  six  batteries  by  disbanding 
Wyatt's,  Young's,  Ritter's,  and  Coke's  batteries,  the 
first  three  of  which  were  on  duty  in  Richmond.  It  was 
urged  that  1st  Lieuts.  Thurmond,  Pendleton,  and 
Robertson,  of  Wyatt's,  Coke's,  and  Ritter's  batteries, 
respectively,  should  be  by  all  means  retained  in  the  Ar 
tillery,  as  also  2d  Lieut.  S.  H.  Hawes,  of  Coke's. 

In  Jones'  reserve  battalion,  it  was  proposed  to  con 
solidate  the  four  batteries  into  two,  by  disbanding 
Wimbish's,  and  Turner's  batteries  for  inefficiency.  In 
this  battalion,  Capt.  Peyton  of  the  Orange  Battery  was 
recommended  to  be  dropped  for  continued  absence  and 
unfitness  for  command,  1st  Lieut.  Fry  to  be  promoted 
to  succeed  him.  Certain  other  promotions  and  dismissals 
among  the  officers  were  recommended. 

Lieut.-Col.  Cutts'  Battalion  of  four  batteries  was  pro 
posed  to  be  consolidated  into  three,  by  relieving  the  of 
ficers  of  Capt.  James  A.  Blackshear's  Georgia  battery 
and  distributing  22  of  his  men  to  Ross's,  29  to  Lane's, 
and  42  to  Patterson's  batteries,  of  the  Sumter  Battalion, 
thus  raising  the  personnel  of  each  to  150  men  present 
for  duty.  The  Sumter  Battalion  was  one  of  the  strong 
est  in  personnel  in  the  Army  at  this  time. 

Nelson's  reserve  battalion,  of  four  batteries,  it  was 
also  thought,  should  be  reduced  to  three  by  disbanding 
Ancell's  Fluvanna  Battery,  and  by  dropping  Capt. 
C.  T.  Huckstep,  retaining  1st  Lieut.  John  L.  Massie, 
an  admirable  officer,  and  promoting  him  captain  in 
Huckstep's  place,  while  1st  Lieut.  B.  F.  Ancell  was 
recommended  to  be  assigned  to  duty  with  the  resulting 
battery.  Many  other  changes  in  the  officers  of  the  bat 
talion  were  recommended. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  335 

Thompson's  Battery,  or  Grimes'  of  Portsmouth,  was 
also  reported  below  the  standard,  and  it  was  proposed 
to  consolidate  it  with  the  other  two  batteries,  Moorman's 
and  Huger's,  of  Saunders'  Battalion,  R.  H.  Anderson's 
Division. 

In  every  case  the  battalion  commanders  were  to  select 
for  the  batteries  retained  the  best  material,  horses,  and 
equipment  of  the  disbanded  units,  turning  in  any  sur 
plus  that  might  remain. 

In  the  case  of  other  batteries  to  be  disbanded,  the 
recommendations  were  as  follows : 

For  unfitness  for  their  duties  all  the  officers  of 
Lloyd's  Battery,  of  Cutts'  Battalion,  were  to  be  re 
lieved  and  of  his  85  men,  55  to  be  assigned  to  Manley's 
Battery  of  Moore's  Battalion,  McLaws'  Division,  and 
28  to  Reilly's  Battery,  Frobel's  Battalion,  Hood's  Divi 
sion,  these  batteries  being  all  from  North  Carolina. 

Chapman's  Dixie  Battery,  mustering  but  32  men 
present  for  duty,  was  to  be  disbanded  and  its  men  and 
horses  assigned  to  Pegram's  Battery  of  Walker's  Bat 
talion,  A.  P.  Hill's  Division. 

The  Wise  County  Battery,  or  Brown's,  having  but 
48  men  on  the  rolls,  and  its  gallant  captain  having  been 
seriously  wounded,  was  to  be  disbanded  and  its  men  and 
horses  transferred  to  Col.  Lee's  Battalion.  The  record 
of  this  battery  was  especially  fine.  It  had  served  with 
distinction  in  every  battle  from  Bull  Run  to  date,  and 
lost  two  commanders,  Capts.  Alburtis  and  Brown. 

The  Hanover  Battery,  or  G.  W.  Nelson's,  with  but 
60  men,  was  also  to  be  disbanded,  20  of  the  men  going 
to  Kirkpatrick's  Amherst  Battery  of  Nelson's  reserve 
battalion,  and  40  to  Woolfolk's  Ashland  Battery  of 
Lee's  Battalion.  Capt.  George  Washington  Nelson, 
though  highly  regarded  as  a  fighter  by  his  superiors,  was 
thought  to  be  better  fitted  for  duty  as  a  cavalry  aide 
than  as  a  battery  commander. 

With  52  men  and  50  horses  on  its  rolls,  J.  R.  John 
son's  Battery,  of  Bedford  County,  but  recently 
organized,  instead  of  being  given  the  48  horses 


336  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

called  for  by  its  captain,  was  to  be  disbanded  and  its 
men  equally  distributed  to  Dearing's  and  Stribling's 
batteries. 

Rogers'  Loudoun  Battery,  though  having  rendered 
good  service,  was  to  be  disbanded  since  its  captain  was 
absent,  its  lieutenants  indifferent,  and  its  prospects  poor. 
Its  45  men  were  also  to  be  transferred  to  Stribling's 
Fauquier  Battery. 

The  Thomas  Artillery,  or  Anderson's  Battery,  an 
organization  with  a  splendid  record,  had  become  so 
reduced  in  efficiency  that  it  had  not  been  allowed  to  ac 
company  the  Army  into  Maryland.  The  29  men  still 
on  duty  with  this  battery,  and  the  27  to  be  returned  to 
it  by  the  Washington  Artillery  Battalion,  with  its  22 
remaining  horses,  and  two  senior  lieutenants,  were  to  be 
assigned  to  Caskie's  Hampden  Battery. 

Capt.  Leake's  Battery,  its  service  having  been 
principally  on  the  South  Carolina  coast,  bearing  but  48 
men  and  58  horses  on  its  rolls,  all  in  poor  condition,  was 
to  be  consolidated  with  Carter's  King  William  Battery. 

The  Magruder,  or  T.  J.  Page's  Battery,  was  to  be 
disbanded,  its  45  men  and  25  horses  being  assigned  to 
Col.  Lee's  Battalion.  Capt.  Page  himself  was  recom 
mended  for  duty  on  Col.  Lee's  staff,  and  Lieut.  Ma 
gruder  for  retention  in  the  service. 

Though  eulogized  by  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  and  his  Chief 
of  Artillery  for  the  service  it  had  rendered  in  several 
actions,  Fleet's  Middlesex  Battery  was  to  be  broken  up, 
46  of  its  men  having  been  assigned  to  Woolfolk's,  An- 
cell's  and  Marmaduke  Johnson's  batteries  at  Leesburg. 
For  insubordination,  and  misconduct,  its  officers  were 
still  under  arrest  and  awaiting  trial  by  court-martial. 
The  payrolls,  descriptive  lists,  horses  and  material  had 
all  been  greatly  neglected,  and  50  of  its  men  reported 
sick  when  but  four  were  actually  unfit  for  service.  It  had 
no  sergeants  and  no  roll  existed  when  the  men  were 
transferred. 

Stribling's  and  Bondurant's  batteries  required  much 
work  to  place  them  in  serviceable  condition. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  337 

The  changes  thus  proposed  and  already  effected  by 
the  Chief  of  Artillery  involved  a  reduction  of  the  Ar 
tillery  by  19  batteries.  The  entire  number  borne  on  the 
rolls  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  been  73, 
so  that  under  the  proposed  reorganization  but  54  bat 
teries  were  contemplated  in  addition  to  the  horse 
artillery. 

When  the  unusually  hard  service  which  Lee's  ar 
tillery  had  experienced,  the  general  unpreparedness  of 
the  Confederate  government  for  the  arming  and  equip 
ping  of  such  a  large  number  of  batteries,  the  peculiar  re 
quirements  of  the  arm  and  the  utter  lack  of  training  on 
the  part  of  all  its  men  and  many  of  its  officers  are  taken 
into  consideration,  one  is  not  surprised  at  the  recom 
mendations  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery.  On  the  contrary, 
the  condition  of  the  Artillery  at  this  time  in  many  re 
spects  is  surprising  and  argues  well  for  those  who  had 
charge  of  its  organization  and  equipment,  and  especially 
for  the  officers  who  had  led  the  batteries  in  battle.  The 
fact  that  so  few  officers  had  proved  unsuitable  to  the 
artillery  service,  a  service  most  exacting  in  its  many 
requirements,  is  a  high  tribute  to  the  character  of  the 
Southern  soldier.  But  as  has  been  pointed  out  before, 
the  men  of  the  South  were  peculiarly  adapted  to 
mounted  service  in  the  field,  and  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  was  exceptionally  favored  by  circumstances  in 
having  a  large  number  of  officers  available  who  by  no 
means  were  mere  untrained  volunteers.  In  addition  to 
numbers  of  efficient  artillerymen  of  the  Old  Army,  such 
as  Magruder,  Alexander,  Lee,  and  Pelham,  were  a 
great  many  who  had  received  superior  instruction  in 
gunnery  at  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  under 
Gilham  and  Jackson,  such  as  Crutchfield,  Walker, 
Carter,  Carpenter,  Cutshaw,  Chew,  Truehart,  Latimer, 
and  many  others.  With  a  backbone  of  officers  of  this 
character,  the  efficiency  of  the  Field  Artillery  was 
readily  to  be  accounted  for.  It  was  perhaps  more 
favored  than  any  other  branch  of  the  service  in  the 
quality  of  its  officers,  with  respect  to  the  junior  as  well 


338  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

as  the  senior  grades.  Among  the  lieutenants  of  the 
Field  Artillery  were  to  be  found  many  trained  and  able 
officers  who  could  not  have  been  induced  to  transfer  even 
with  advanced  rank  from  the  service  of  the  guns,  which 
held  for  them  a  peculiar  fascination.  For  this  reason, 
men  like  "Jimmie"  Thomson,  the  Carpenters,  Milton 
Rouse,  Huger,  and  Breathed,  were  found  for  years 
serving  as  mere  subalterns  in  the  Artillery. 

The  recommendations  of  Gen.  Pendleton  were  al 
most  immediately  adopted,  the  only  departure  from 
them  being  with  respect  to  the  reduction  of  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery  Battalion  in  deference  to  Col.  Walton's 
objections,  who  represented  that  the  circumstances  at 
tending  the  organization  of  his  battalion,  and  its  ac 
ceptance  into  the  service  of  the  Confederate  States  in 
its  original  form  were  peculiar.  Unwilling  to  violate 
any  arrangement  or  agreement  which  might  have  been 
made  in  the  past,  Gen.  Lee  decided  to  retain  the  bat 
talion  intact,  except  that  the  weakest  section  of  Miller's 
Battery  was  directed  to  turn  in  its  guns  to  the  Ordnance 
Department.  Special  Orders  No.  209,  A.  N.  V., 
October  4,  1862,  in  which  the  proposed  changes  were 
made  effective,  were  then  forwarded  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  and,  his  attention  being  called  to  the  fact  that  the 
measure  was  imperatively  necessary,  his  approval  was 
requested.  The  reduction  of  Walton's  Battalion  to 
three  batteries  was  urged  if  it  could  be  done  without 
breach  of  faith,  and  the  meritorious  officers  relieved 
from  duty  recommended  to  be  retained  in  their  present 
grades,  and,  if  necessary,  commissioned  in  the  Pro 
visional  Army  as  ordnance  or  artillery  officers. 

To  insure  the  speedy  and  proper  reorganization  of 
the  Artillery  as  ordered  the  Chief  of  Artillery  was 
authorized  and  directed  to  associate  with  himself  in  the 
work  Cols.  J.  Thompson  Brown  and  Stephen  D.  Lee. 

On  October  8,  the  Secretary  of  War  advised  Gen. 
Lee  that  his  action,  though  supported  by  the  Adjutant- 
General,  was  in  his  own  opinion  without  authority  of 
law,  but  that  in  view  of  the  imperative  necessity  there- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  339 

for,  he  had  induced  the  President  to  recommend  legisla 
tion  to  supply  the  defect,  meanwhile  withholding  his 
own  decision.  The  question,  a  purely  political  one, 
fortunately  resulted  in  no  embarrassments  to  Gen.  Lee, 
who  was  firmly  supported  by  the  President  and  the  Ad 
jutant-General.  But  one  may  rest  assured  the  reorgani 
zation  met  with  serious  objections,  and  produced  many 
heart-burnings,  on  the  part  of  those  most  affected, 
namely,  the  inefficient  officers  who  were  thereby  re 
lieved  from  duty.  Upon  some  of  the  officers  whose  com 
mands  were  disbanded  necessary  hardships  were  of 
course  entailed,  and  such  was  the  case  with  Capt. 
John  R.  Johnson.* 

The  tri-monthly  return  of  October  10  shows  an  en 
couraging  increase  in  the  number  of  men  with  the  bat 
teries.  On  that  date,  for  Lee's  and  Walton's  battalions, 
together  containing  10  batteries,  the  personnel  is  given 
as  35  officers,  738  men  present  for  duty,  with  an  aggre 
gate  present  and  absent  of  1,107  men.  The  average 
effective  battery  strength  was,  therefore,  over  70  men, 
and  on  paper  about  110. t  But  Col.  Brown's  six  bat 
teries  mustered  at  this  time  only  13  officers  and  311  men, 
or  an  average  strength  of  but  51  men  present,  the  same 
on  paper  being  nearly  90  men.  In  the  Reserve  Artillery, 
that  is  in  Cutts',  Jones',  and  Nelson's  battalions,  com 
posed  of  8  batteries,  a  total  of  54  officers  and  858  men 
was  reported  present  with  an  aggregate  of  1,027  present 
and  absent.  The  average  effective  strength  of  the  re 
serve  batteries  was  therefore  about  107  men.  A  con 
siderable  increase  in  the  number  of  Brown's  effectives, 
that  is  8  officers  and  about  100  men,  appears  in  the  re 
turn  of  November  10. 

Before  the  middle  of  October  and  before  the  con 
solidation  of  the  batteries  and  the  turning  in  of  the 
surplus  guns,  some  40  in  number,  had  been  effected,  the 
activity  of  the  enemy  became  noticeable  and  in  the 
midst  of  his  work  Gen.  Pendleton  was  ordered  to  pre- 

*RebelUon  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  II,  p.  662.     See  Gen.  Lee's  letter 
to  Gen.  Early  on  the  subject  of  Capt.  Johnson, 
flbid.,  p.  660. 


340  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

pare  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice  since  it  was  not  de 
signed  to  give  battle  about  Winchester.  But  fortunately 
a  further  respite  ensued  and  the  work  of  reorganization 
and  equipment  continued. 

The  fine  ordnance  captured  at  Harper's  Ferry  proved 
a  great  bone  of  contention  among  the  battery  com 
manders.  Enough  requests  for  McClellan's  73  field 
pieces  were  received  to  have  made  the  issue  of  double 
the  number  necessary  in  order  to  fill  all  the  demands. 
The  material  of  the  Artillery  was  quite  deficient,  and 
was  a  cause  of  much  anxiety  to  all  concerned.  As  late 
as  December  5,  Gen.  Lee  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War, 
that  during  the  past  campaigns  he  had  been  much  handi 
capped  by  the  superiority  of  the  Federal  artillery  over 
his  own,  a  fact  which  he  attributed  in  part  to  the 
greater  experience  of  the  enemy's  gunners  but  princi 
pally  to  the  better  quality  of  their  ammunition  and 
ordnance.  Though  these  advantages  were  being  rapidly 
diminished  by  the  increasing  efficiency  of  his  artillery 
personnel  and  the  substitution  of  heavier  guns  for  the 
light  pieces  with  which  his  batteries  were  originally 
armed,  yet  the  disparity  was  still  keenly  felt.  The  am 
munition,  he  stated,  was  being  more  carefully  prepared, 
and  captured  ordnance  had  been  made  full  use  of,  but 
long-range  pieces  were  urgently  needed.  If  sufficient 
metal  could  not  otherwise  be  secured  for  their  manu 
facture,  he  recommended  that  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
melt  up  the  old  bronze  6-pounders,  and  if  necessary  a 
part  of  the  12-pounder  howitzers  for  the  purpose  of 
recasting  12-pounder  Napoleons.  The  best  material  for 
field  service  in  his  opinion  were  12-pounder  Napoleons, 
10-pounder  Parrotts,  and  the  improved  3-inch  rifles. 
Batteries  armed  with  such  pieces  would,  he  declared, 
greatly  simplify  the  question  of  ammunition  supply  by 
reducing  the  number  of  calibers  in  use,  and  the  weight 
of  metal  to  be  transported.  For  special  service,  he  re 
quested  to  be  supplied  with  additional  20-  and  30- 
pounder  Parrotts,  closing  his  communication  with  an 
urgent  recommendation  that  the  subject  of  field  ar- 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  341 

tillery  material  receive  the  immediate  consideration  of 
the  War  Department,  and  the  remark  that  "the  contest 
between  our  6-pounder  smooth-bores  and  the  12- 
pounder  Napoleons  of  the  enemy  is  very  unequal,  and, 
in  addition,  is  discouraging  to  our  artillerists."* 

This  communication  was  at  once  referred  to  Col. 
Gorgas,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  who  returned  a  circular  of 
his  department  showing  that  J.  R.  Anderson  &  Co., 
of  the  Richmond  Tredegar  Works,  had  already  been 
given  directions  to  work  night  and  day  to  turn  out  ma 
terial  such  as  Gen.  Lee  desired,  and  that  Col.  Baldwin, 
Chief  of  Ordnance,  A.  1ST.  V.,  had  been  requested  to 
turn  in  all  the  discarded  pieces  both  at  Staunton  and 
with  the  Army  to  be  recast.  This  circular,  dated 
November  13,  1862,  was  as  follows: 

"Until  further  order,  no  artillery  will  be  made  except  the 
following  caliber: 

"Bronze — Light  12-pounder  Napoleon  guns;    caliber,  4.62. 

"Iron — For  field  battery  of  maneuver,  10-pounder  Parrotts, 
banded;  caliber,  2.9.  For  field  battery  of  reserve,  20-pounder 
Parrotts  on  12-pounder  carriages;  caliber,  3.67.  For  siege  guns, 
30-pounder  Parrotts  on  18-pounder  siege  carriages;  caliber,  4.2."f 

These  guns  were  to  be  forwarded  to  the  Army  as 
rapidly  as  completed,  and,  as  we  shall  see,  a  few  of  the 
heavier  ones  were  received  during  the  first  days  of 
December. 

Early  in  October  a  court  of  inquiry  was  appointed  to 
investigate  the  circumstances  connected  with  the  dis 
orderly  withdrawal  of  the  two  infantry  regiments  of 
Lawton's  command,  which  had  been  left  as  a  support 
for  the  Reserve  Artillery  at  Shepherdstown.  But  in  the 
records  no  suggestion  of  misconduct  on  the  part  of  the 
artillery  officers  is  to  be  found,  a  significant  fact  for 
those  who  insinuate  lack  of  persistence  on  the  part  of 
Gen.  Pendleton  and  his  subordinate  commanders.  If 
at  any  time  during  the  months  of  September  and 

*Relellion  Records,   Series   I,   Vol.   XXI,   pp.   1046-7.      Letter  of  Gen.   Lee  to 
Secretary  of  War.     Also  see  Ibid.,  p.  1048,  Lee  to  Gorgas. 
tlbid. 


342  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

October  the  Chief  of  Artillery  appeared  to  be  lacking 
in  energy,  despite  the  results  he  actually  accomplished 
in  the  matter  of  collecting  material,  horses,  and  strag 
glers,  in  addition  to  his  routine  duties  during  the  cam 
paign,  and  in  looking  up  woolen  mills  and  arranging  for 
the  manufacture  of  clothing  and  equipment,  subsequent 
thereto,  along  with  the  labor  of  personally  directing  the 
reorganization  of  the  Artillery,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
state  that  every  communication  of  Gen.  Lee  bears  the 
imprint  of  his  undiminished  confidence  in  Gen.  Pendle- 
ton,  whose  unfortunate  physical  condition  was  never 
theless  well  known  to  the  Commander-in-Chief.  While 
on  the  Peninsula,  he  had  contracted  a  severe  case  of 
malaria,  which  would  have  justly  entitled  him  to  a  leave 
of  absence  from  field  duty  while  recuperating.  The 
anxiety,  exposure,  and  loss  of  rest  during  the  days  and 
nights,  especially  from  the  14th  to  the  20th  of  Sep 
tember  had  brought  on  him  a  return  of  his  debilitating 
malady.  But  despite  much  actual  suffering  and  fre 
quent  enforced  prostration,  the  old  officer  refused  to  re 
linquish  his  labors  and  kept  bravely  at  his  post. 

That  Gen.  Pendleton  did  not  possess  the  vigor  of 
youth  and  the  initiative  which  goes  with  it  is  undoubt 
edly  true,  and  there  were  no  doubt  those  in  the  service 
who  would  have  brought  to  the  office  he  filled  superior 
qualities  in  many  respects.  Pendleton  certainly  did  not 
possess  the  forceful  character  of  Gen.  Hunt,  the  Fed 
eral  Chief  of  Artillery,  but  he  did  possess  a  conserva 
tive  and  mature  judgment  which  Gen.  Lee  evidently 
highly  valued.  Although  but  53  years  of  age  at  this 
time,  Gen.  Pendleton  was  aged  beyond  his  years,  and 
an  old  man  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  where  the 
greatest  were  so  young.  Jackson,  the  Hills,  Hood,  Mc- 
Laws,  and  even  Longstreet,  were  many  years  his  juniors, 
and  in  his  association  with  his  Chief  of  Artillery,  a  man 
of  the  most  intellectual  temperament  and  Christian 
character,  Gen.  Lee,  himself  senior  in  point  of  age  to 
most  of  his  officers,  must  have  found  much  agreeable 
relief  from  the  cares  and  harassments  of  his  awful  re 
sponsibility. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  343 

Then  there  was  another  factor  entering  into  Pendle 
ton's  retention  in  a  position  of  so  great  importance  and 
for  which,  in  the  opinion  of  many  a  man  of  greater  pro 
fessional  aptitude,  and  more  forceful  traits  of  character, 
mental  and  physical,  might  have  seemed  better  suited. 
Pendleton  was  the  senior  in  age  of  all  others  in  his  arm 
of  the  service,  senior  even  to  Walton.  Besides,  he  was 
a  graduate  of  West  Point,  which  fact  added  to  the 
priority  of  his  claim.  Should  he  have  been  relieved  from 
active  command,  as  he  might  well  have  been  by  reason  of 
his  physical  condition,  a  serious  question  as  to  his  suc 
cessor  would  at  once  have  arisen  and  a  host  of  as 
pirants  would  have  entered  into  the  jealous  turmoil  in 
cident  to  the  necessity  of  such  a  selection.  The 
retention  of  Pendleton  as  Chief  of  Artillery  by  Gen. 
Lee  is  but  another  evidence  of  the  latter 's  sagacity,  for 
he  realized  that  he  was  still  free  to  assign  those  duties 
requiring  the  vigorous  qualities  of  youth  to  Pendleton's 
lieutenants  whenever  circumstances  seemed  to  demand 
it,  and  yet  retain  the  many  admirable  qualities,  es 
pecially  as  an  administrator,  possessed  by  the  senior. 

There  were  covert  insinuations  made  during  the  war 
that  Gen.  Pendleton  was  lacking  in  courage,  and 
similar  suggestions  have  recurred  since  its  close.  In 
stead  of  combating  such  a  belief  on  the  part  of  those 
who  gave  credence  to  it,  Gen.  Alexander  has  strength 
ened  the  voice  of  the  scandal-mongers  by  never  failing 
to  take  a  slap  at  his  own  chief.  It  is  not  intended  here 
to  assert  that  Gen.  Alexander  ever  declared  Pendleton 
to  have  lacked  courage,  but  he  does  expressly  charge 
him  in  his  book  with  inactivity  both  in  the  Peninsula 
and  in  the  Maryland  campaign  in  such  words  as  to 
leave  a  loop-hole  for  those  maliciously  inclined.  He,  of 
all  others,  must  have  known  that  Gen.  Pendleton  was 
not  a  coward.  The  Army  gossip  was  well  known  to 
him,  and  it  was  his  duty  to  express  himself  in  unequiv 
ocal  terms,  if  not  to  defend  his  former  commander. 
The  writer  has  made  it  his  duty  to  discuss  the  matter  of 
Gen.  Pendleton's  bearing  with  many  of  the  latter's 


344  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

former  subordinates,  and  no  evidence  of  the  truth  of 
the  scandalous  charges  has  been  found.  On  the  con 
trary,  Capt.  William  T.  Poague,  a  man  of  the  most 
dauntless  courage  and  of  the  highest  Christian  character, 
declare  that  on  a  number  of  occasions  when  exposure 
was  necessary  he  witnessed  the  bearing  of  Gen.  Pendle- 
ton  under  fire,  and  that  he  was  as  calm,  self-possessed, 
and  apparently  as  courageous,  as  any  man  could  well 
be.  Capt.  William  Gordon  McCabe,  as  intrepid  an 
officer  as  was  to  be  found  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  and  possessing  those  qualities  which  made  him 
the  adjutant  and  fit  companion  of  Pegram,  also  denies 
from  personal  observation  that  Gen.  Pendleton  was 
lacking  in  courage. 

That  Pendleton  possessed  ample  courage  is  a  fact 
exceptionally  well  established  by  Lee's  regard  for  him. 
Gen.  Lee  did  not  gather  about  him,  in  offices  of  high 
trust,  men  with  weak  hearts,  but  that  Pendleton  was 
not  given  to  unnecessarily  exposing  himself  and  that 
he  was  not  a  man  with  the  reckless  bravery  of  youth  is 
no  doubt  true.  So  much  by  way  of  defense  of  an  able 
and  courageous  officer. 

While  the  Artillery  had  been  resting  and  recruiting  in 
camp  near  White  Post,  its  reorganization  was  com 
pleted,  the  guns  captured  at  Harper's  Ferry  equitably 
distributed  among  the  batteries,  including  the  two  20- 
pounder  Parrotts,  and  in  addition  two  Whitworth  rifles, 
the  latter  brought  up  from  Richmond.  These  im 
portant  pieces  were  credited  with  a  range  of  five  miles. 

The  batteries  were  now  formed  into  organized  bat 
talions  as  fully  as  possible.  The  battalions  previously 
formed  really  possessed  little  organization  as  tactical 
units,  but  were  merely  collections  or  groups  of  battery 
units  possessing  practically  no  tactical  cohesion.  The 
divisional  batteries  fell  under  the  control  of  a  senior 
officer  simply  in  his  capacity  of  chief  of  artillery,  and 
his  functions  were  administrative  rather  than  tactical. 

On  November  7,  the  returns  of  the  Army  showed  the 
following  assignment  of  the  Artillery: 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  345 

With  the  First  Corps,  in  command  of  which  Long- 
street  had  been  retained  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant-gen 
eral,  were  30,319  infantry,  and  about  1,620  artillery, 
with  112  guns,  of  which  54  were  light  smooth-bore 
pieces. 

In  the  Second,  or  Lieut.-Gen.  Jackson's  Corps,  were 
30,054  infantry  and  about  1,740  artillery,  with  123  guns, 
of  which  53  were  also  light  smooth-bore  pieces. 

The  Reserve  Artillery,  consisting  of  Brown's,  Cutts', 
and  Nelson's  battalions  of  12  batteries,  16  rifled,  and  20 
smooth-bore  pieces,  mustered  at  this  time  an  aggregate 
personnel  of  900. 

The  horse  batteries  were  with  the  cavalry  division  of 
7,176  men. 

The  aggregate  of  Lee's  Army  November  17  was, 
therefore,  71,809  men  and  291  guns. 

Within  the  next  two  weeks,  however,  a  considerable 
change  in  the  Artillery  occurred,  for  the  returns  of 
November  20  show  a  different  organization,  as  follows: 

In  the  First  Corps  were  5  divisions  under  McLaws, 
R.  H.  Anderson,  Pickett,  Hood,  and  Walker,  with  2 
reserve  battalions  of  artillery  of  6  and  4  batteries,  re 
spectively,  and  a  personnel  of  623  men. 

The  divisional  artillery  of  the  First  Corps  was  as 
signed  as  follows:  McLaws'  Division,  Cabell's  Bat 
talion,  4  batteries,  18  guns;  Anderson's  Division,  4  bat 
teries,  unorganized,  18  guns;  Pickett's  Division,  3 
batteries,  unorganized,  14  guns;  Walker's  Division,  no 
artillery.  Thus  in  the  First  Corps  with  28,453  infantry, 
we  find  24  batteries  with  a  total  personnel  of  about  1,463 
men,  and  99  guns,  or  a  proportion  of  a  little  over  3  guns 
per  1,000  men  of  the  infantry. 

In  the  Second  Corps  were  4  divisions  under  Ewell, 
D.  H.  Hill,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  Taliaferro,  respectively, 
with  Latimer's  Battalion  of  6  batteries  and  26  guns  as 
signed  to  Ewell;  Jones'  Battalion  of  5  batteries  and  22 
guns  to  D.  H.  Hill,  Walker's  Battalion  of  7  batteries 
and  28  guns  to  A.  P.  Hill;  Brockenbrough's  Battalion 
of  5  batteries  and  22  guns  to  Taliaferro.*  With  the 

*The  battery  assignments  will  be  given  later. 


346  THE  LONG  AEM  or  LEE 

30,312  infantry  of  the  Corps,  there  were  then  23  bat 
teries  with  a  total  personnel  of  1,380  and  98  guns,  or 
about  the  same  proportion  of  guns  to  infantry  as  in  the 
First  Corps. 

The  Reserve  Artillery  consisted  of  Brown's  Battalion 
with  6  batteries,  Cutts'  with  3  batteries,  and  Nelson's 
with  3  batteries,  with  a  total  personnel  of  718  men  and 
36  guns. 

With  the  entire  Army  of  38  brigades  of  infantry,  ag 
gregating  58,765  men,  we  therefore  find  59  batteries 
with  233  guns,  or  a  general  proportion  of  about  4  guns 
per  1,000  infantry. 

Two  additional  batteries  of  horse  artillery  had  now 
been  raised,  to  the  commands  of  which  Capts.  M.  W. 
Henry  and  M.  N.  Moorman  were  assigned.*  Pelham 
had  meanwhile  been  promoted,  taking  command  of  the 
battalion  of  5  horse  batteries,  the  old  Stuart  Horse 
Artillery  falling  to  his  former  lieutenant,  Capt.  James 
Breathed,  than  whom  no  more  gallant  gunner  ever 
pulled  a  lanyard.  With  Pelham's  5  batteries,  viz., 
Chew's,  Breathed's,  Hart's,  Moorman's,  and  Henry's, 
were  22  pieces,  a  number  of  them  imported  Blakelys. 
To  the  8,846  men  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,  the  horse  artillery 
with  a  personnel  of  about  300  men,  bore  a  proportion  of 
about  2l/2  guns  per  1,000. 

With  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  November  20, 
1862,  composed  of  58,765  infantry,  and  8,846  cavalry, 
there  were  63  batteries  with  a  total  personnel  of  3,861, 
and  252  guns,  in  by  far  the  highest  state  of  efficiency, 
except  as  to  horses  and  clothing  for  the  men,  yet  at 
tained  by  Lee's  artillery. 

Forage  being  all  but  exhausted  around  Winchester 
late  in  October,  Gen.  Pendleton,  who  had  completed 
the  work  of  reorganization,  was  sent  by  Gen.  Lee  to  ex 
plore  the  routes  over  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains  and  as 
certain  the  capacity  of  Fauquier  and  Loudoun  counties 
to  the  east  for  maintaining  the  Army. 

*Henry's  Battery  was  formed  by  dividing  Pelham's  original  battery.  Henry 
was  soon  promoted  major  and  succeeded  in  command  of  this  battery  by 
McGregor.  Moorman's  Battery  was  simply  converted  from  a  light  to  a  horse 
battery. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  347 

Now  let  us  go  back  and  follow  the  operations  of  the 
cavalry,  in  which  the  horse  artillery  had  of  course  been 
engaged. 

Only  two  days  of  rest  were  allowed  Stuart's  command 
after  his  return  from  Chambersburg,  for  on  the  16th  of 
October  two  Federal  columns  had  advanced,  one  under 
Humphreys  from  Shepherdstown  to  Smithfield,  com 
posed  of  6,000  infantry,  500  cavalry  and  a  horse  battery, 
and  the  other  under  Hancock  from  Harper's  Ferry  to 
Charles  Town,  consisting  of  1^  divisions  of  infantry,  4 
regiments  of  cavalry,  and  4  pieces  of  artillery.  The 
purpose  of  the  Federal  reconnaissance  was  to  develop, 
if  possible,  during  Stuart's  supposed  absence,  the  where 
abouts  of  Lee's  army. 

Humphreys'  force  was  skillfully  opposed  by  Stuart 
in  person  with  Fitz  Lee's  Brigade,  reenforced  at 
Kearneysville  near  Shepherdstown  by  Winder's  Brigade 
of  infantry,  where  only  a  most  determined  attack  on  the 
part  of  the  Federals  succeeded  in  forcing  the  Confed 
erates  back.  On  the  following  day  Stuart  was  joined 
by  Hampton's  Brigade,  and  after  reaching  Leetown, 
from  which  point  Humphreys  reconnoitered  towards 
Smithfield,  the  Federal  column  retraced  its  steps. 

Hancock's  column  had,  meanwhile,  been  opposed  by 
Col.  Munford  with  several  regiments  of  cavalry,  one 
piece  of  Chew's  horse  battery,  and  three  pieces  of  the  3d 
Company  of  Richmond  Howitzers  under  Capt.  B.  H. 
Smith,  Jr.  The  most  stubborn  resistance  on  Munford' s 
part  failed  to  prevent  Hancock  from  occupying  Charles 
Town  where  he  remained  until  noon  on  the  17th,  when 
he  returned  to  Harper's  Ferry.  In  the  report  of  his 
operations,  Col.  Munford  made  special  mention  of  the 
gallantry  of  Capt.  Smith,  who  lost  a  foot  and  was 
captured  in  Charles  Town  as  his  last  piece  was  retiring 
from  the  field.  He  also  commended  Lieut.  J.  W. 
Carter,  of  Chew's  Battery,  who  although  wounded  early 
in  the  day  returned  to  his  gun  as  soon  as  his  wound  was 
dressed. 


348  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Having  ascertained  by  means  of  this  reconnaissance 
that  the  Confederate  Army  was  still  in  the  Valley,  Mc- 
Clellan  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Harper's  Ferry  with  two 
divisions  of  the  9th  Corps  and  Pleasonton's  Cavalry 
and  pushed  back  the  hostile  pickets  east  of  the  moun 
tains  as  far  as  Snicker's  gap.  While  Gen.  Lee  was  pre 
paring  to  meet  the  Federal  advance,  Stuart  with  Fitz 
Lee's  Brigade,  and  Breathed's  and  Henry's  horse  bat 
teries  with  6  guns  under  Maj.  Pelham,  crossed  over  the 
mountains  into  Loudoun  County,  bivouacking  near 
Bloomfield  on  the  night  of  the  30th.  So  depleted  was 
the  cavalry  by  the  disease  known  as  "greased  heel" 
among  the  horses,  that  the  brigade  numbered  less  than 
1,000  men.  After  driving  a  small  force  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  from  Mountville  on  Goose  Creek,  Stuart  pur 
sued  to  Aldie,  where  he  met  the  head  of  Bayard's 
Cavalry  Brigade  coming  from  Washington,  which  he 
defeated  in  a  sharp  encounter,  driving  it  to  the  cover  of 
its  artillery  well  posted  on  a  line  of  hills  east  of  the 
village.  Pelham' s  batteries  had  not  been  able  to  keep 
up  with  Stuart,  but  soon  arrived  and,  dashing  into 
position,  engaged  the  Federal  guns.  Bayard  was  soon 
forced  out  of  his  position,  and  during  the  night,  after 
a  vain  effort  to  make  a  stand,  fell  back  to  Chantilly. 

While  these  movements  were  in  progress,  D.  H. 
Hill's  Division  of  Jackson's  Corps  had  been  dispatched 
by  Gen.  Lee  to  the  vicinity  of  Paris  and  Upperville, 
via  Ashby's  Gap,  and  on  November  1  Stuart  disposed 
his  troops  to  cover  its  front.  Learning  that  Pleasonton 
was  advancing  upon  Philemont,  he  moved  through 
Union  to  meet  him.  Pleasonton  drove  in  Stuart's  ad 
vanced  guard,  but  declined  to  attack  his  main  column. 
On  the  2d  of  November,  Pleasonton's  cavalry  brigade 
with  Pendleton's  horse  battery  was  reenforced  by  a 
brigade  of  Doubleday's  infantry  division  and  a  New 
Hampshire  battery,  thus  giving  the  Federals  the  pre 
ponderance  of  artillery  in  the  proportion  of  12  to  6 
pieces,  a  circumstance  which  gave  Stuart  much  concern. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  349 

The  successful  resistance  he  had  been  able  to  oppose  to 
the  enemy  was  in  large  measure  due  to  the  skillful  hand 
ling  of  his  guns  upon  which  he  constantly  depended. 
Maj.  McClellan,  Stuart's  Chief -of -Staff,  writes:  "Two 
spirits  more  congenial  than  Stuart  and  Pelham  never 
met  on  the  field  of  battle.  Stuart's  fondness  for  the  use 
of  artillery  was  almost  excessive;  Pelham's  skill  in  its 
management  amounted  to  genius.  Stuart  and  Pelham 
imparted  to  the  horse  artillery  an  independence  of 
action  and  celerity  of  movement  which  characterized  it 
to  the  end  of  the  war,  and  which  was  nowhere  equalled 
or  imitated,  except  in  the  same  arm  of  the  Federal  serv 
ice.  The  achievements  of  the  batteries  attached  to  both 
the  Federal  and  Confederate  cavalry  are  worthy  of  a 
separate  record,  and  of  the  careful  attention  of  military 
men."* 

Such  were  the  views  of  the  Confederate  cavalrymen 
regarding  their  horse  batteries  and  gunners  and  when 
expressed  by  the  Chief -of -Staff  himself  they  bear 
particular  weight. 

Just  what  Chew  was  to  Jackson  and  Ashby,  Pelham 
was  to  Stuart.  "It  is  doubtful,"  says  Gen.  Munford  in 
a  letter  to  the  author,  "if  either  could  have  accomplished 
what  they  did  without  these  remarkable  artillerymen." 

Notwithstanding  Pleasonton's  superior  force,  Stuart 
offered  him  resistance  near  Fleetwood  on  November  2. 
About  8  A.  M.  the  Federals  began  to  deploy  both  their 
infantry  and  cavalry  and  some  6  or  8  pieces  of  artillery 
in  his  front,  and  Stuart,  dismounting  his  troopers,  took 
position  behind  the  stone  fences  which  were  very 
numerous  in  that  section,  affording  both  sides  excellent 
cover.  "Having  to  watch  all  the  avenues  leading  to  my 
rear,  my  effective  force  for  fighting  was  very  much  di 
minished,  but  the  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  under  the  in 
comparable  Pelham,  supported  by  the  cavalry  sharp 
shooters,  made  a  gallant  and  obstinate  resistance,  main 
taining  their  ground  for  the  greater  part  of  the  day, 
both  suffering  heavily,  one  of  our  caissons  exploding 
from  the  enemy's  shot."t 

*The  Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,  McClellan,  p.  173. 
fStuart's  Report. 


350  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

It  was  during  this  engagement  that  Pelham  per 
formed  a  feat  of  arms  second  only  to  that  which  he  was 
soon  destined  to  accomplish  at  Fredericksburg.  Con 
ducting  a  howitzer  some  distance  in  advance  of  his 
cavalry  supports  to  a  hill,  and  concealing  the  piece,  he 
opened  fire  upon  a  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  the 
valley  beneath  him,  putting  it  to  flight,  and  then  pur 
suing  the  panic-stricken  men  actually  captured  their 
standard,  a  number  of  their  arms,  equipments,  horses, 
and  some  prisoners  as  well,  without  the  loss  of  a  single 
gunner  or  horse  of  his  own  battery. 

But,  in  spite  of  Pelham's  prowess,  the  enemy  re 
turned  and  enveloped  the  Confederate  position  which 
compelled  Stuart's  withdrawal  to  Seaton's  Hill,  about 
a  mile  in  rear,  where  the  Federals  were  held  at  bay  until 
dark.  Repeatedly  assailing  this  position,  Pleasonton 
was  each  time  repulsed  by  the  fire  of  Pelham's  guns, 
the  latter  sighting  the  pieces  himself.  And  such  was 
the  accuracy  of  Pelham's  aim  that  on  one  occasion  he 
struck  down  a  color  bearer  with  a  single  shot  at  a  range 
of  800  yards. 

During  the  night  Stuart  withdrew  his  command  to 
Upperville,  where  he  proposed  to  offer  further  resist 
ance  on  the  3d.  Pleasonton  was  again  reenforced,  this 
time  by  Averell's  Cavalry  Brigade  and  Tidball's  Horse 
Battery,  whereas  the  only  reinforcements  acquired  by 
Stuart  was  Hardaway's  Battery,  with  a  Whitworth  gun 
from  D.  H.  Hill's  Division,  which  had  moved  back 
through  the  gap  toward  Front  Royal. 

About  9  A.  M.  Pleasonton  attacked  Stuart,  who  re 
sisted  him  as  upon  the  preceding  day  until  late  in  the 
afternoon,  when  the  Confederates  withdrew.  As  the 
Federals  approached  Paris  and  Ashby's  Gap,  Harda 
way's  Whitworth  opened  upon  them  at  long  range,  one 
of  its  shells  killing  Gen.  George  D.  Bayard,  of  the  Fed 
eral  Cavalry.  This  same  gun,  under  the  same  officer, 
was  later  stationed  on  the  extreme  right  near  the  Yerby 
house  at  Fredericksburg,  and  all  through  the  battle 
greatly  annoyed  Burnside's  troops  on  the  plain  below. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  351 

Meanwhile,  the  fact  had  been  discovered  that  Mc- 
Clellan's  whole  army  was  advancing  southward,  and  on 
October  27,  Longstreet's  Corps  had  been  set  in  motion 
to  confront  it,  while  Jackson  remained  about  Millwood 
keeping  D.  H.  Hill  opposite  Ashby's  Gap.  The  Re 
serve  Artillery  was  ordered  to  follow  Longstreet  at  a 
convenient  distance  and  to  encamp  upon  its  arrival  at 
Culpeper.  The  reserve  ammunition  train  under  Col. 
Alexander  accompanied  Pendleton.  Moving  on  the 
1st  of  November,  and  marching  via  Nineveh,  Front 
Royal,  Chester  Gap,  Games'  Cross-Roads,  and  Sperry- 
ville,  the  column  reached  camp  at  Culpeper  on  No 
vember  4.  On  the  6th,  Col.  S.  D.  Lee,  who  had  acquired 
a  distinguished  reputation  as  an  artillerist,  and  to 
whose  advice  at  Sharpsburg  the  Commander-in-Chief 
had  himself  deferred,  was  relieved  from  the  command  of 
his  battalion  of  artillery  and  ordered  to  Richmond,  re 
ceiving  there  his  promotion  as  a  brigadier-general  of 
infantry,  and  assigned  to  duty  at  Vicksburg,  Miss. 
The  following  day,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  P.  Alexander,  Chief 
of  Ordnance,  A.  N.  V.,  was  placed  in  command  of  Col. 
Lee's  Battalion,  but  retained  immediate  charge  of  the 
reserve  ordnance  train,  until  relieved  of  ordnance  duty 
and  permanently  transferred  to  the  Artillery  on 
December  4.  On  that  date,  Lieut-Col.  Briscoe  G. 
Baldwin,  a  graduate  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute, 
who  had  served  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  as  as 
sistant  ordnance  officer,  was  promoted  Chief  of 
Ordnance,  A.  N.  V.,  vice  Alexander  relieved.  Until 
the  surrender  at  Appomattox,  Col.  Baldwin  fulfilled 
his  responsible  office  with  great  success.* 

The  transfer  of  Alexander  in  reality  entailed  only  a 
slight  promotion,  but  in  effect  it  was  more  than  the  mere 
advancement  incident  thereto.  His  abilities  as  an 
organizer,  and  his  reputation  as  a  youthful  officer  with 
exceptionally  mature  judgment,  as  one  possessing  un 
usual  professional  learning,  coupled  with  wide  ex 
perience  in  many  branches  of  the  service,  and  as  a  man 

*Rel)ellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXI,  p.  1046. 


352  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

of  great  initiative,  and  yet  not  too  bold,  was  well  known 
to  the  Army.  The  apparent  desire  on  the  part  of  Gen. 
Lee  was  to  secure  to  himself  an  artilleryman  as  good  as, 
if  not  better  than,  the  one  whom  justice  required  him  to 
relieve,  for  the  reward  given  Col.  Lee  by  promoting 
him  was  a  well-deserved  one. 

Upon  the  occupation  of  Upperville  by  Pleasonton, 
Stuart  had  divided  his  force,  sending  Col.  Douglas  with 
three  of  his  regiments  to  Piedmont,  as  a  rear-guard  for 
his  trains,  and  moving  his  remaining  two  regiments  back 
to  Ashby's  Gap,  where  he  joined  Hardaway's  detach 
ment  supported  by  a  small  infantry  force  left  with  him 
by  D.  H.  Hill.  Pleasonton,  though  showing  little  dis 
position  to  advance  upon  the  Gap,  had  sent  Averell's 
Brigade  after  Stuart's  trains,  forcing  the  latter  to  dis 
patch  Rosser  with  his  two  remaining  regiments  to  the 
support  of  Douglas,  while  he  repaired  to  Millwood  for 
instructions  from  Jackson.  Stuart  was  directed  to  re 
main  in  the  Valley,  so  as  to  be  on  McClellan's  flank, 
instead  of  following  Longstreet. 

Rosser  joined  Douglas  on  the  evening  of  the  3d  of 
November  at  Markham's,  to  which  point  the  latter  had 
retired,  leaving  Averell  in  possession  of  Piedmont.  The 
following  morning  Rosser  offered  the  Federals  battle. 
The  engagements  which  ensued  resulted  in  the  Con 
federates  withdrawing  after  a  stiff  fight  during  which 
reinforcements  for  Averell  were  sent  up  by  Pleasonton. 
As  an  artillery  affair,  the  action  at  Markham's  is  not 
able  on  account  of  the  superb  gallantry  of  Henry's 
horse  battery.  Averell  reported  that  he  actually 
captured  300  of  Rosser's  men,  and  two  of  Henry's  guns, 
but  was  forced  to  relinquish  them,  which  accords  with 
an  unwritten  tradition  among  the  Confederate  Cavalry 
that  on  this  occasion  two  of  Henry's  guns,  one  of  which 
was  the  Napoleon  with  which  Pelham  distinguished 
himself  at  Fredericksburg,  were  most  gallantly  handled. 
These  pieces  were  manned  by  the  famous  "French  De 
tachment,"  which,  though  surrounded  by  the  Federal 
cavalry,  and  attacked  at  the  same  time  both  in  front 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  353 

and  rear,  kept  their  guns  in  action  while  the  gunners 
sang  the  Marseillaise  Hymn,  being  finally  relieved  by  a 
charge  of  one  of  Rosser's  regiments.  Though  the  inci 
dent  is  not  officially  recorded,  the  story,  resting  entirely 
upon  tradition,  but  circumstantially  corroborated  by 
Averell's  statement,  is  a  pretty  one  and  should  be  pre 
served.  At  any  rate  we  know  that  Henry's  Battery 
played  an  important  part  in  the  affair. 

Rosser  now  retired  to  Barbee's  Cross  Roads,  where 
he  was  joined  by  Stuart  and  Hampton's  Brigade  on 
the  night  of  the  4th,  and  here  Stuart  determined  to 
make  a  stand.  Occupying  the  crest  of  the  hill  im 
mediately  north  of  the  town  with  his  artillery  and 
sharpshooters,  he  held  his  main  body  at  the  Cross  Roads. 
The  enemy  attacked  at  9  A.  M.  and  a  brisk  artillery  duel 
ensued,  lasting  some  hours.  But  Stuart,  having  been 
informed  that  the  enemy  had  reached  Warrenton,  con 
cluded  that  the  attack  upon  him  was  but  a  feint,  and  at 
once  withdrew  along  the  Flint  Hill  and  Orleans  roads, 
the  enemy  not  pursuing. 

On  November  7,  Pleasonton  attacked  Stuart  at 
Amissville,  where  he  claimed  to  have  captured  two  guns. 
Gen.  Stuart,  however,  makes  no  mention  of  this  loss. 
Moreover,  in  his  report  of  the  battle  near  Middleburg, 
on  June  19,  1863,  he  distinctly  declares  that  the  Blakely 
gun,  which  he  was  compelled  to  abandon  on  that  field, 
was  the  first  which  the  horse  artillery  had  lost  during  the 
war. 

Pleasonton,  following  up  Stuart  on  the  8th  and  9th 
of  November,  came  in  contact  with  Longstreet's  Corps 
at  Corbin's  Cross  Roads  on  the  10th.  Meanwhile,  on 
the  7th,  Burnside  had  relieved  McClellan  and  soon  the 
Federay  Army  was  set  in  motion  towards  Fredericks- 
burg,  only  to  find  itself  again  confronted  by  its  vigilant 
adversary.  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Cavalry  Brigade  guarded 
the  lower  Rappahannock,  while  Hampton  and  Fitz 
Lee  picketed  the  river  above. 

In  all  Stuart's  operations  up  to  this  point,  and  in  the 
reconnaissances  that  preceded  the  battle  of  Fredericks- 


23 


354  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

burg,  in  which  the  command  was  almost  constantly  en 
gaged,  either  in  fighting  or  marching,  the  Artillery  took 
an  important  part.  Again  Stuart  pays  his  tribute  to 
Pelham.  "The  Stuart  Horse  Artillery  comes  in  for  a 
full  share  of  this  praise,  and  its  gallant  commander, 
Maj.  John  Pelham,  exhibited  a  skill  and  courage  which 
I  have  never  seen  surpassed.  On  this  occasion  (Corbin's 
Cross  Roads,  November  10,  1862),  I  was  more  than 
ever  struck  with  that  extraordinary  coolness  and 
mastery  of  the  situation,  which  more  eminently  charac 
terized  this  youthful  officer  than  any  other  artillerist 
who  has  attracted  my  attention.  His  coup  d'oeil  was 
accurate  and  comprehensive,  his  choice  of  ground  made 
with  the  eye  of  military  genius,  and  his  dispositions  al 
ways  such  in  retiring  as  to  render  it  impossible  for  the 
enemy  to  press  us  without  being  severely  punished  for 
his  temerity."  These  are  words  which  any  soldier  might 
be  proud  to  have  used  in  connection  with  his  name,  and 
when  we  consider  that  they  occur  in  the  report  of  a 
cavalry  commander,  they  should  be  all  the  more  dear 
to  the  artilleryman.  In  the  same  breath  Stuart  had  to 
say  of  the  cavalry  the  following:  "In  all  these  opera 
tions,  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  bear  testimony  to  the  gallant 
and  patient  endurance  of  the  cavalry,  fighting  every 
day  most  unequal  conflicts,  and  successfully  opposing 
for  an  extraordinary  period  the  onward  march  of  Mc- 
Clellan."  It  should  be  observed  that  he  does  not 
mention  by  name  a  single  officer  in  his  corps  for  especial 
commendation,  except  the  "incomparable  Pelham." 
This  fact  gives  us  some  insight  into  the  value  he  placed 
upon  the  latter's  services. 

The  camp  selected  for  the  Reserve  Artillery  at  Cul- 
peper,  was  an  excellent  one  about  a  mile  from  the  town, 
where  clear  streams  furnished  water,  and  kept  the  mead 
ows  fresh  late  into  the  winter,  and  where  woods  sheltered 
the  animals  from  the  bleak  north  winds.  A  brief  though 
welcome  rest  was  here  secured  for  the  men  and  animals. 

About  this  time  the  field  batteries  were  inspected,  and 
in  order  to  show  the  thoroughness  of  the  system  of  in- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  355 

spection,  the  following  abstract  from  Gen.  Lee's  com 
ments  on  the  report  of  Col.  Edwin.  J.  Harvie, 
Inspector-General,  A.  N.  V.,  concerning  Frobel's  Bat 
talion,  of  Hood's  Division,  is  quoted:  "Capt.  Reilly's 
Battery  is  spoken  of  as  being  in  very  fine  condition, 
showing  intelligence  and  highly-commendable  pride  in 
officers  and  men,  that  care  having  been  bestowed  upon 
horses,  guns,  etc.,  which  secures  true  efficiency,  and 
gives  evidence  that  a  due  regard  for  the  interests  of  the 
service  and  a  proper  attention  on  the  part  of  officers 
will  keep  artillery  horses  in  good  order  and  guns  and 
equipment  serviceable. 

"Captain  Bachman's  German  Artillery  is  reported, 
with  exception  of  6  horses  greatly  reduced,  as  in  fair 
condition;  leather  equipment,  however  hard  and  stiff, 
requiring  Capt.  Reilly's  system  to  soften  and  supple 
them,  the  use  of  Neat's  foot-oil,  which  he  obtains  from 
cattle-feet  thrown  aside  at  commissary  pens. 

"Capt.  Garden's  Palmetto  Light  Artillery  reported 
as  inferior  to  Capt.  Bachman's,  the  horses  showing 
neglect,  axles  of  pieces  and  harness  requiring  grease. 
This  battery,  however,  is  reported  as  improving  under 
your  orders."* 

Such  sidelights  as  these  are  very  interesting  to  the 
artilleryman.  They  present  a  familiar  view  of  great 
value  as  well,  and  it  would  seem  that  the  orders  on  the 
subject  of  the  horses  were  being  closely  followed  up. 
But  while  the  equipment  of  the  batteries  was  being  care 
fully  preserved,  the  necessities  of  the  men  were  very 
pressing.  Maj.  John  J.  Garnett,  appointed  Inspector 
of  Ordnance  and  Artillery  of  Longstreet's  Corps, 
November  14,  1862,  reported  on  that  date  95  of  Col. 
Alexander's  360,  and  64  of  Col.  Walton's  225  men, 
barefooted. f  Yet,  on  the  19th,  these  battalions  and 
the  Reserve,  the  men  of  which  were  in  an  equally  de 
plorable  condition,  were  ordered  to  break  camp  and 
march  over  muddy,  half-frozen  roads  towards  Fred- 
ericksburg,  special  injunctions  against  straggling  be- 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  II,  p.  719. 
flbid.,  Vol.  XIX,  Part  II,  p.  721,  and  Vol.  LI,  Part  II,  p.  645. 


356  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

ing  announced,  and  the  gunners  were  directed  to 
dismount  and  assist  the  horses  by  hand  in  all  difficult 
places.* 

Meanwhile,  in  the  absence  of  Col.  Walton,  Col.  Alex 
ander  had  been  acting  Chief  of  Artillery,  Longstreet's 
Corps,  Col.  Walton  not  returning  from  sick  leave  until 
December  8.  Capt.  Eshleman  commanded  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery  Battalion  in  his  absence. 

After  a  rough  march,  extending  over  five  days,  the 
Reserve  Artillery  arrived  in  camp  near  Fredericksburg 
on  November  23.  Winter  had  set  in  unusually  early 
and  with  great  severity.  Provisions  were  scarce,  and 
often  there  were  short  nations  even  for  headquarters. 
But  the  men,  though  barefooted  and  without  heavy 
clothing,  were  in  excellent  spirits  and  bore  their  priva 
tions  with  cheerful  fortitude,  and  they  made  every  effort 
by  building  shelters  to  save  their  horses.  It  was  a  noble 
but  pathetic  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  these  men,  with  half- 
frozen  feet,  to  plod  about  the  hillsides  and  thickets 
cutting  brush  in  order  that  the  teams  might  rest  and 
be  protected  from  the  bitter  night  winds.  Similar  per 
formances  are  rarely  recorded  even  in  the  history  of 
war. 


*Ibid.,  Vol.  LI,  Part  II,  pp.  649,  650. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

FREDERICKSBURG 

ON  November  7,  the  six  Federal  corps  comprising 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  lay  between  the  Bull 
Run  Mountains  and  the  Blue  Ridge,  contained  125,000 
officers  and  men  present  for  duty,  with  320  field  pieces.* 
Accompanying  the  order  of  this  date  superseding  Mc- 
Clellan  with  Burnside,  were  urgent  suggestions  that 
something  be  done  by  the  latter.  Organizing  his  army 
into  three  Grand  Divisions  under  Sumner,  Franklin, 
and  Hooker,  the  new  Federal  commander  promptly  is 
sued  his  orders,  and  Sumner  moved  towards  Fredericks- 
burg  on  the  15th,  reaching  Falmouth  just  opposite  the 
town  two  days  later.  The  remainder  of  Burnside's 
army  took  up  the  march  on  the  16th,  concentrating  in 
rear  of  Sumner  on  the  19th. 

The  batteries  of  Lee's  army  were  at  this  time  as 
signed  as  follows: 

IST  CORPS   (Longstreet) 

Col.  J.  B.  Walton,  Chief  of  Artillery 
R.  H.  ANDERSON'S  DIVISION 

1.  Donaldsonville   Battery,  Capt.  Victor  Maurin. 

2.  Norfolk   Blues   Battery,  Capt.  C.  R.  Grandy. 

3.  Norfolk  Battery,  Capt.  Frank  Huger. 

4.  Pittsylvania  Battery,  Capt.  John  W.  Lewis. 

McLAws'  DIVISION 
Col.  H.  C.  Cabell,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Manly's  North  Carolina  Battery,  Capt.  B.  C.  Manly. 

2.  Pulaski  (Ga.)   Battery,  Capt.  J.  P.  W.  Read. 

3.  1st  Co.   Richmond  Howitzers.  Capt.  E.  S.  McCarthy. 

4.  Troup   (Ga.)   Battery,  Capt.  H.  H.  Carlton. 

*The  strength  of  Lee's  army  at  this  time  we  have  seen  was  71,809  men  with 
275  guns,  the  latter  soon  reduced  to  255. 


858  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

PICKETT'S  DIVISION 
Capt.  James  Bearing,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  James  Bearing. 

2.  Richmond  Fayette  Battery,  Capt.  Miles  C.  Macon. 

3.  Fauquier  Battery,  Capt.  R.  M.  Stribling. 

HOOD'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  B.  W.  Frobel,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Charleston  German   Battery,          Capt.  W.  K.  Bachman. 

2.  Palmetto  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  H.  R.  Garden. 

3.  Rowan  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  James  Reilly. 

RANSOM'S  DIVISION 

1.  Petersburg  Battery,  Capt.  J.  R.  Branch. 

2.  Stafford  Battery,  Capt.  R.  L.  Cooper. 

CORPS  RESERVE 

IST  RESERVE  BATTALION 

Col.  J.  B.  Walton 

1.  1st  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Squires. 

2.  2d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  B.  Richardson. 

3.  3d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  M.  B.  Miller. 

4.  4th  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  B.  F.  Eshleman. 

2D  RESERVE  BATTALION 
Lieut. -Col.  E.  Porter  Alexander 

1.  Bedford  Battery,  Capt.  Tyler  C.  Jordan. 

2.  Bath  Battery,    '  Capt.  J.  L.  Eubank. 

3.  Madison   (La.)   Battery,  Capt.  George  V.  Moody. 

4.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Parker. 

5.  Brooks   (S.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  A.  B.  Rhett. 

6.  Ashland  Battery,  Capt.  P.  Woolfolk,  Jr. 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  359 

2o  CORPS  (Jackson) 

Col.  Stapleton  Crutchfield,  Chief  of  Artillery 

EWELL'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  A.  R.  Courtney,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Charlottesville   Battery,  Capt.  James  McD.  Carrington. 

2.  4th  Md.  or  Chesapeake  Battery,  Capt.  Wra.  D.  Brown. 

3.  Henrico  or  Courtney  Battery,  Capt.  J.  W.  Latimer. 

4.  1st  Maryland  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  F.  Dement. 

5.  Louisiana  Guard  Battery,  Capt.  Louis  E.  D'Aquin. 

6.  Staunton  Battery,  Capt.  W.  L.  Balthis. 

D.  H.  HILL'S  DIVISION 
Maj.  Hilary  P.  Jones,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Hardaway's  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  R.  A.  Hardaway. 

2.  Jeff  Davis  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  J.  W.  Bondurant. 

3.  King  William  Battery,  Capt.   Thomas   H.   Carter. 

4.  Morris  Louisa  Battery,  Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page. 

5.  Richmond  Orange  Battery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Fry. 

A.  P.  HILL'S  DIVISION 
Lieut.-Col.  R.  L.  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Branch  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  A.  C.  Latham. 

2.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  G.  Crenshaw. 

3.  Fredericksburg  Battery,  Capt.  Carter  M.  Braxton. 

4.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Marmaduke  Johnson. 

5.  Richmond  Letcher  Battery,  Capt.  Greenlee  Davidson. 

6.  Pee  Dee  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  D.  G.  Mclntosh. 

7.  Richmond  Purcell  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  J.  Pegram. 

TALIAFERRO'S  DIVISION 
Capt.  J.  B.  Brockenbrough,  Chief  of  Artillery 

1.  Alleghany  Battery,  Capt.  Joseph  Carpenter. 

2.  Danville  Battery,  Capt.  George  W.  Wooding. 

3.  Richmond  Hampden  Battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Caskie. 

4.  Lee  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  J.  Raine. 

5.  2d  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  J.  A.  M.  Lusk. 


360  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

2D  CORPS  RESERVE  BATTALION 

IST  RESERVE  BATTALION 

Col.  J.  Thompson  Brown 

1.  Warrenton  Battery,  Capt.  James  V.  Brooke. 

2.  Powhatan  Battery,  Capt.  Willis  J.  Dance. 

3.  2d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  David  Watson. 

4.  3d  Co.   Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Benj.  H.  Smith. 

5.  1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  William  T.  Poague. 

6.  Salem  Battery,  Capt.  A.  Hupp. 

ARMY  RESERVE  ARTILLERY 

Brig.-Gen.  William  Nelson  Pendleton 

IST  RESERVE  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  A.  S.  Cutts 

1.  "A"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,    Capt.  H.  M.  Ross. 

2.  "B"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,    Capt.  George  M.  Patterson. 

3.  "C"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,    Capt.   John  Lane. 

2o  RESERVE  BATTALION 
Maj.  William  Nelson 

1.  Amherst  Battery,  Capt.   Thomas   J.   Kirkpatrick. 

2.  Fluvanna  Battery,  Capt.  John  L.  Massie. 

8.  Georgia  Regular  Battery,  Capt.  John  Milledge,  Jr. 

MISCELLANEOUS  BATTERIES 

1.  Ellis'  Georgia  Battery,  Lieut.  W.  F.  Anderson. 

2.  Hanover  Battery,  Capt.  George  W.  Nelson. 

From  the  foregoing  schedule  of  assignments,  it  is 
seen  that  during  the  Fredericksburg  campaign  not  less 
than  63  batteries,  exclusive  of  the  five  horse  batteries, 
were  with  Lee's  army. 

On  December  20,  the  six  batteries  of  Brown's  Bat 
talion,  which  was  early  taken  from  the  General  Reserve 
and  assigned  as  the  corps  reserve  of  Jackson's  Corps, 
mustered  20  officers  and  434  men  present,  and  reported 
an  aggregate  of  684  present  and  absent.  The  average 
effective  battery  strength  was  therefore  about  75,  and 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  361 

on  paper  114.  Walton's  and  Alexander's  battalions, 
with  a  total  of  10  batteries,  mustered  41  officers  and 
629  men  present  and  reported  an  aggregate  present  and 
absent  of  966.  The  effective  battery  strength  was  there 
fore  67,  and  on  paper  96.  The  eight  batteries  of  the 
General  Reserve  reported  an  effective  strength  of  42  of 
ficers  and  683  men,  which  gives  an  average  effective 
battery  strength  of  about  90  men,  and  on  paper  there 
appeared  an  average  strength  of  120. 

Taking  the  average  effective  battery  strength 
throughout  the  Army  at  3  officers  and  70  men,  there 
must  have  been  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  an 
effective  artillery  personnel  of  about  200  officers  and 
4,500  men,  while  on  paper  the  strength  of  the  Field 
Artillery  was  not  far  from  7,000  officers  and  men.  But 
for  all  practical  purposes  a  minimum  of  4,500  should 
be  deducted  from  the  figures  given  for  Lee's  Infantry, 
wThich  generally  included  the  Artillery  personnel. 

Had  Burnside  upon  reaching  Falmouth  on  the  17th 
immediately  crossed  the  river  and  taken  possession  of 
the  hills  along  the  southern  bank  of  the  Rappahannock, 
as  he  might  have  done,  Gen.  Lee  would  have  been  com 
pelled  to  take  up  a  defensive  position  nearer  Richmond. 
That  the  possibility  of  having  to  fight  nearer  Richmond 
was  considered  by  Lee  as  late  as  the  23d  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  Maj.  Moore's  Third  North  Carolina  Artillery 
Battalion  which  had  reported  to  Pendleton  for  duty, 
and  which  he  had  ordered  on  the  22d  to  rejoin  G.  W. 
Smith's  command  at  Richmond,  was  on  the  former  date 
directed  to  occupy  a  strong  position  on  the  south  side 
of  the  North  Anna,  and  commanding  the  important 
railroad  bridge  between  Fredericksburg  and  Rich 
mond.*  Moore  reached  Richmond  before  receiving  the 
modification  of  his  orders,  but  at  once  retraced  his 
steps,  occupying  the  designated  position  on  the  28th. 

Instead  of  seizing  the  southern  bank,  however,  Burn- 
side  simply  occupied  the  Stafford  Heights,  or  the  hills 
on  the  north  side  of  the  river  overlooking  the  plain  of 

*The  horses  of  this  battalion  were  in  poor  condition,  and  Maj.  Moore  was 
directed  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  make  them  more  serviceable. 


362  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Fredericksburg,  crowning  them  with  his  heavy  guns 
under  protection  of  which  he  began  the  construction 
of  bridges  for  his  crossing.  The  narrowness  of  the 
Rappahannock,  its  winding  course,  and  deep  bed  pre 
sented  opportunities  to  accomplish  this  work  practically 
unopposed  by  the  Confederates,  unless  they  should  elect 
to  sacrifice  their  men  and  guns  to  the  overwhelming  fire 
of  Burnside's  batteries. 

There  were  only  three  Confederate  cavalry  regiments 
under  Col.  Ball  guarding  the  river  at  Fredericksburg 
when  Burnside  commenced  his  movement  in  that 
direction,  but  on  the  15th  Gen.  Lee  ordered  a  regiment 
of  infantry  and  Lewis'  Battery  from  near  Richmond 
to  reinforce  this  small  force.  Reaching  Fredericksburg 
on  the  17th,  just  before  Sumner's  advance  guard  ar 
rived  at  Falmouth,  a  spirited  duel  occurred  between 
Lewis'  Battery  and  a  rifled  battery  under  Capt.  Petitt, 
the  latter  having  decidedly  the  best  of  it  as  his  adversary 
had  but  four  very  inferior  guns. 

Upon  reaching  Falmouth,  Sumner  had  favored  an 
immediate  crossing,  but  Burnside  would  not  consent 
thereto,  and  for  three  weeks  delayed  while  the  Confeder 
ates  each  day  rendered  his  ultimate  move  less  probable 
of  success.  "Opportunity  in  war  is  like  a  woman,"  Na 
poleon  said.  "If  you  fail  to  meet  her  to-day,  you  need 
not  expect  her  to  meet  you  to-morrow."  Burnside's 
golden  opportunity,  offended  by  his  neglect  to  keep  the 
tryst,  had  eluded  him  forever. 

On  the  20th,  his  whole  army  was  near  Fredericksburg. 
Longstreet  on  the  day  before  reached  the  town,  via 
Raccoon  and  Morton's  fords,  and  rapidly  disposed  two 
of  his  divisions  with  their  artillery  on  the  hills  to  the 
west  and  southwest  of  the  place.  On  the  21st,  Sumner 
summoned  the  town  to  surrender  before  5  p.  M.,  under 
penalty  of  being  bombarded  the  next  day.  Of  this  Gen. 
Lee  wrote:  "The  weather  had  been  tempestuous  for 
two  days,  and  a  storm  was  raging  at  the  time  of  the  sum 
mons.  It  was  impossible  to  prevent  the  threat  to  shell 
the  city,  as  it  was  completely  exposed  to  the  batteries 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  363 

on  the  Stafford  hills,  which  were  beyond  our  reach.  The 
city  authorities  were  informed  that  while  our  forces 
would  not  use  the  place  for  military  purposes,  its  oc 
cupation  by  the  enemy  would  be  resisted,  and  directions 
were  given  for  the  removal  of  the  women  and  children 
as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  threatened  bombardment 
did  not  take  place;  but  in  view  of  the  imminence  of  the 
collision  between  the  two  armies,  the  inhabitants  were 
advised  to  leave  the  city,  and  almost  the  entire  popula 
tion,  without  a  murmur,  abandoned  their  homes. 
History  presents  no  instance  of  a  people  exhibiting  a 
purer  and  more  unselfish  patriotism,  or  a  higher  spirit 
of  fortitude  and  courage,  than  was  evidenced  by  the 
citizens  of  Fredericksburg.  They  cheerfully  incurred 
great  hardships  and  privations,  and  surrendered  their 
homes  and  property  to  destruction,  rather  than  yield 
them  into  the  hands  of  the  enemies  of  their  country."* 

Although  the  weather  was  most  inclement,  the  ther 
mometer  being  near  zero,  almost  the  whole  population 
removed  and  found  the  best  shelters  they  could,  cheer 
fully  giving  up  their  homes  to  the  battlefield.  The 
neighboring  country  homes  and  churches  were  filled, 
some  times  with  dozens  of  families,  to  whom  rations 
were  issued  by  the  commissaries,  and  many  women  and 
children  encamped  in  the  forest  in  brush  and  blanket 
shelters,  where  the  sight  of  their  cheerfully  borne  suffer 
ings  nerved  many  a  heart  for  the  coming  struggle. 
Though  the  Federals  did  not  shell  the  town  after  certain 
representations  were  made  by  the  Mayor,  it  was  inferred 
from  the  negotiations  that  the  bombardment  would 
simply  be  postponed,  and  this  understanding  was 
responsible,  Gen.  Alexander  tells  us,  for  the  construc 
tion  of  many  of  the  earthworks  which  contributed  to 
the  repulse  of  Burnside's  assaults  on  Marye's  Hill.f 

By  November  22,  Longstreet's  other  two  divisions, 
with  Lane's  Battery,  had  arrived  and  the  First  Corps 
extended  its  line  along  the  southern  heights,  overlooking 
the  town,  from  Banks'  Ford  on  the  west  to  Hamilton's 
Crossing  on  the  east. 

* Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXL,  p.  551,  Lee's  Report. 
tGen.  E.  P.  Alexander's  Southern  Historical  Papers,  Vol.  X,  p.  383. 


364  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Lee  and  Jackson  had  both  originally  opposed  resist 
ing  Burnside's  advance  at  this  point,  by  reason  of  the 
fact  that  in  case  he  was  defeated  the  Stafford  Heights, 
which  he  would  undoubtedly  hold  with  a  strong  rear 
guard,  afforded  him  too  free  an  escape,  whereas  if  he 
were  overthrown  at  such  a  point  as  the  North  Anna, 
with  lengthened  communications,  his  retreat  would  be 
far  more  difficult.*  But  Burnside's  procrastination 
enabled  Lee  to  so  strengthen  the  Rappahannock  position 
that  he  deemed  it  wise  to  avail  himself  of  it  for  defense 
in  preference  to  the  weaker  one  on  the  North  Anna,  in 
spite  of  the  foregoing  objections  and  Jackson's  reiter 
ated  protests.  The  developments  had  simply  com 
mitted  the  Confederates  to  the  line  along  which  they 
had  gradually  by  circumstances  been  led.  The  Fed 
erals  had  placed  themselves  behind  a  broad  river,  and  it 
is  an  established  fact  that  rivers  influence  military 
operations  mainly  in  that  they  delay  the  movements  of 
the  attacker,  and  during  the  passage  afford  the  defender 
an  opportunity  of  engaging  the  attacking  troops  in  de 
tail.  Gen.  Lee  knew  this  and  could  not  bring  himself  to 
relinquish  what  he  perceived  to  be  a  real,  present  ad 
vantage  for  those  advantages  which  might  develop  later 
on,  provided  war  with  its  uncertainties  played  him  no 
tricks.  He  also  saw  that  in  failing  to  seize  the  southern 
bank  of  the  river,  Burnside  had  placed  it  in  his  power  to 
occupy  it  in  force,  the  time  allowed  him  further  enhanc 
ing  his  advantage  by  enabling  the  development  of  com 
munications  which  only  served  to  increase  the  mobility 
of  the  defense. 

Lee's  principal  fear,  and  also  Jackson's,  was  that,  in 
view  of  the  difficulty  of  the  attack  on  a  well-defended 
river  line,  which  is  rarely  attempted,  Burnside  would 
refrain  from  making  an  effort  to  force  the  Confederate 
position,  and  resort  to  a  turning  movement.  But  Lee  in 
dealing  with  the  Federals  always  minimized  the  proba 
bility  of  their  acting  upon  the  soundest  strategical 
principles.  He  had  learned  by  experience  that  they 

^Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,   p.   287. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  365 

were  prone  to  disregard  the  rules  of  war,  and  was  ever 
willing  to  take  advantage  of  their  neglects.  Thus  he 
had  divided  his  army  before  Pope,  and  again  in  the 
Maryland  campaign,  where  he  also  fought  the  battle  of 
Sharpsburg  with  his  back  against  the  Potomac,  and 
with  but  one  avenue  of  retreat,  and  that  one  behind  an 
exposed  flank,  and  later  he  indulged  in  a  most  risky  di 
vision  of  force  at  Chancellorsville.  Lee's  strategy  was 
based  upon  his  own  moral  supremacy  over  his  ad 
versaries.  In  declining  to  be  bound  by  established 
principle,  he  simply  availed  himself  of  that  supremacy, 
increasing  it  by  success,  instead  of  neglecting  an  ele 
ment  which  made  it  possible  for  him  to  disregard  the 
dictates  of  the  most  approved  general  principles.  With 
an  army  possessing  great  cohesion,  in  addition  to  the 
utmost  mobility  of  its  parts,  a  change  in  tactics  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy  is  possible,  although  the  whole  has 
been  seemingly  committed  to  the  original  plan  of  attack. 
But  Lee  knew  full  well  from  experience  that  the  ever 
present  bungling  of  his  opponents,  even  when  in  the  exe 
cution  of  a  prearranged  plan,  would  render  unsuccess 
ful  any  extemporaneous  maneuvers  on  their  part,  how 
ever  brilliantly  conceived.  At  any  rate,  he  felt  that 
tactical  surprises,  if  attempted,  would  be  more  apt  to 
present  him  with  opportunities  than  to  take  him  un 
awares.  We  should  not  attempt  to  solve  Lee's  strategy 
by  cut  and  dried  formulae.  The  controlling  factor  in 
his  problems  was  the  character  of  his  adversary,  and  of 
that  factor  he  never  lost  sight.  Pitted  against  a  Na 
poleon  and  a  Moltke,  Lee  would  never  have  fought  the 
battles  of  Second  Manassas,  Sharpsburg,  Fredericks- 
burg,  and  Chancellorsville. 

Finding  the  Confederates  determined  to  contest  his 
crossing  at  Fredericksburg,  the  Federal  commander  en 
deavored  to  effect  one  at  Skinker's  Neck,  about  15 
miles  below  the  town,  but  the  premature  appearance  of 
a  number  of  gunboats  near  Port  Republic  and  other 
movements  in  that  direction  disclosed  his  design,  and 
D.  H.  Hill's  and  Early's  divisions  were  ordered  up 


366  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

from  Orange  Courthouse  to  oppose  the  projected  cross 
ing.  When  Burnside  endeavored  to  push  across  on  the 
5th,  he  found  it  impossible,  Hill's  and  Stuart's  artillery 
having  driven  off  his  gunboats.  In  this  work  Pelham's 
horse  batteries  and  Milledge's  and  a  section  of  Poague's 
Battery,  were  most  effective,  in  spite  of  Gen.  D.  H. 
Hill's  sarcasm  directed  at  the  gunners.  These  batteries 
were  provided  with  very  poor  ammunition,  and  the 
flight  of  the  heavy  projectiles  were,  therefore,  most 
erratic.  As  they  tumbled  short,  or  burst  in  air,  or  failed 
to  burst  altogether,  the  remarks  of  "Old  Raw-Hide" 
were  extremely  biting.* 

When  Burnside's  balloonists  reported  Jackson's  divi 
sions  massed  behind  the  guns,  he  abandoned  his  project 
in  this  quarter  and  determined  to  effect  his  crossing  at 
Fredericksburg.  His  plan  was  now  to  cross  at  the 
town,  also  to  push  a  force  around  Lee's  right  at 
Hamilton's  crossing,  thus  interposing  between  the  main 
Confederate  force  and  that  at  Skinker's.  Something 
had  to  be  done,  and  he  could  no  longer  delay  in  making 
his  effort. 

On  December  10,  Burnside  finally  issued  his  orders 
for  an  attack.  In  his  report  he  said:  "I  concluded  that 
the  enemy  would  be  more  surprised  at  a  crossing,  at  or 
near  Fredericksburg,  where  we  were  making  no  prepa 
rations,  than  by  crossing  at  Skinker's  Neck,  and  I  de 
termined  to  make  the  attempt  at  the  former  place.  It 
was  decided  to  throw  four  or  five  pontoon  bridges  across 
the  river,  two  at  a  point  near  the  Lacy  house,  one  near 
the  steamboat  landing  at  the  lower  part  of  the  town, 
one  about  a  mile  below,  and  if  there  were  pontoons  suffi 
cient,  two  at  the  latter  point. "t 

The  pontoon  trains  were  to  arrive  at  their  designated 
positions  by  3  A.  M.  December  11,  and  at  daylight  the 
construction  of  the  bridges  commenced.  It  was  esti 
mated  that  these  bridges,  from  400  to  440  feet  long, 
with  the  thermometer  at  24  degrees  above  zero,  would 

*Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  a  man  of  much  dry  wit  and  very  outspoken,  an  able  officer 
whose  opportunities  were  unequal  to  his  abilities,  had  received  the  name  of 
"Raw-Hide"  by  reason  of  his  having  shod  numbers  of  his  men  with  moccasins. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXL,  p.  87. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  367 

be  completed  in  between  two  and  three  hours,  the  work 
ing  parties  being  screened  from  the  Confederate  fire  by 
the  town.  On  the  Stafford  hills  above  the  plain  179 
Federal  guns  were  placed  in  position  during  the  night 
to  cover  the  proposed  crossing,  and  to  keep  down  any 
hostile  musketry  fire  from  the  opposite  bank.  Where 
two  bridges  were  thrown,  one  was  to  be  reserved  for  the 
batteries. 

Among  the  Federal  guns  which  crowned  the  Stafford 
Heights,  from  Falmouth  to  Pollock's  Mill,  a  distance 
of  some  3^/2  miles,  were  six  20-pounder  Parrotts,  and 
seven  4.5-inch  siege  guns  so  placed  as  to  be  able  to  sweep 
the  town  of  Fredericksburg  arid  the  plain,  and  to  bring 
to  bear  a  formidable  fire  upon  the  most  distant  heights 
occupied  by  the  Confederates. 

The  Federal  commander  had  not  reckoned  upon  the 
all  but  impregnable  character  of  Lee's  position.  It 
might  have  been  turned,  as  pointed  out  by  Jackson,  by 
way  of  the  upper  fords,  but  a  frontal  attack  was 
destined  to  fail.  The  Rappahannock,  navigable  to 
Fredericksburg,  is  there  about  140  yards  wide.  The 
Stafford  Heights  along  the  north  side  have  an  elevation 
of  about  150  feet,  and  completely  command  the  plain 
below  and  across  the  river.  On  the  southern  side  is 
Taylor's  Hill  close  to  the  river  and  l1/^  miles  upstream 
and  across  from  Falmouth.  From  Taylor's  Hill  an 
irregular  ridge  extends  southeastward,  which  leaves  be 
tween  it  and  the  river  a  plain  gradually  spreading  out 
to  a  width  of  a  mile  at  Fredericksburg,  and  increasing 
below  the  town.  This  plain,  with  an  elevation  of  about 
30  feet  above  the  river,  is  intersected  by  Hazel  Run  just 
below,  Deep  Run  about  half  a  mile,  and  the  Massa- 
ponax  River  some  four  miles  beyond  the  town,  all  flow 
ing  through  deep,  ravine-like  banks  from  the  highland 
across  the  plain  to  the  river.  Lengthwise,  and  near  the 
middle  from  end  to  end,  the  flats  were  intersected  by  a 
broad,  unpaved,  worn-out  stage  road,  which  descending 
into  the  plain  from  Taylor's  Hill  passed  through  the 
town,  and  bifurcated  just  short  of  the  Massaponax,  its 


368  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

branches  leading  to  Port  Republic  and  Richmond 
respectively.  This  hollowed-out  roadway  was  bordered 
by  ditches  and  low  cedar  hedges  which  afforded  excellent 
cover  for  infantry.  Not  far  from  the  base  of  the  foot 
hills  southeast  of  the  town,  and  almost  parallel  to  the 
stage  road,  ran  the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  Rail 
road,  with  an  embankment  about  3  feet  high,  almost 
parallel  to  the  stage  road  until  it  reached  Hamilton's 
Crossing,  at  which  point  it  turned  southward  towards 
Richmond. 

The  northern  end  of  the  ridge  or  that  portion  con 
sisting  of  Taylor's,  Stanbury's,  and  Marye's  Hills, 
was  for  the  most  part  open,  though  much  cut  up  by  the 
headwaters  of  Hazel  Run.  The  center  and  southern 
portions,  consisting  of  Lee's  Hill,  the  Howison  house 
ridge,  and  Prospect  Hill,  were  covered  with  a  dense 
wood,  which  nowhere  extended  into  the  plain,  except 
between  Deep  Run  and  Hamilton's  crossing  where  the 
swampy  sources  of  a  small  stream  were  covered  with 
brush  and  timber  to  a  point  midway  between  the  rail 
road  and  the  stage  route.  Low  in  front,  with  an  ele 
vation  above  the  plain  of  between  40  and  50  feet,  with 
many  indentures  sloping  towards  the  river,  the  ridge 
gradually  rises  to  a  crest,  lower  in  elevation  than  that 
of  the  Stafford  Heights,  and  then  falls  towards  the 
south  and  the  Massaponax.  About  one  mile  from  the 
northern  limit  of  the  plain,  and  directly  east  of  Stans- 
bury's  and  Marye's  hills,  was  the  main  part  of  Fred 
ericksburg,  a  town  of  about  4,500  inhabitants,  extend 
ing  halfway  back  to  the  base  of  the  ridge  from  the 
southern  bank  of  the  river.  On  the  north  edge  of  the 
town  was  a  mill,  to  which  two  branches  of  a  canal  flowed, 
one  from  the  river  at  the  base  of  Taylor's  Hill,  and  one 
from  the  river  immediately  opposite  Falmouth.  Leav 
ing  the  western  branch  of  the  canal  at  a  point  just  in 
front  of  Stansbury's  Hill,  a  race  or  ditch  ran  almost 
parallel  to  the  river  and  behind  the  town  into  Hazel 
Run.  This  ditch  lay  in  a  depression,  the  south  bank 
of  which  also  afforded  cover  for  troops.  Leaving  the 


COLONEL   WILLIAM   NELSON 
ACTING  CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY,   SECOND  CORPS 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  369 

center  of  the  town  in  a  direction  perpendicular  to  the 
river,  the  Plank  Road  to  Orange  Courthouse,  crossing 
the  mill  race,  passed  over  Marye's  Hill.  The  Telegraph 
road,  leaving  the  town  just  below  the  former,  continued 
parallel  with  it  until  it  reached  the  foot  of  Marye's  Hill, 
when  it  followed  the  base  around  to  its  right  for  half  a 
mile  to  Hazel  Run,  which  it  crossed,  then  ascended  Lee's 
Hill,  whence  it  took  a  southeasterly  course  toward 
Richmond.  At  the  circular  base  of  Marye's  Hill,  this 
road,  hollowed  out  by  long  use,  was  bounded  by  stone 
fenses. 

The  Confederate  position  was  well  taken  along  the 
ridge  to  the  south  and  west  of  Fredericksburg,  that  is 
from  Taylor's  Hill  to  the  Massaponax.  Realizing  the 
inequality  of  the  contest  which  he  would  be  called  upon 
to  wage  when  activities  were  resumed,  Lewis  on  the  ex 
treme  left  had,  on  the  night  of  the  23d,  taken  up  a 
position  on  the  plateau  to  the  right  of  and  below  the 
summit  of  Taylor's  Hill  and  had  begun  to  construct 
gun-pits  and  epaulments  for  his  guns.  Meantime, 
Grandy's  Battery  of  Anderson's  Division  had  also  ar 
rived,  coming  up  from  Richmond,  and  prepared  a  posi 
tion  in  like  manner  on  Lewis'  right.  On  the  17th,  Gen. 
Lee,  learning  of  Sumner's  movement,  had  ordered 
Longstreet  with  McLaws'  and  Ranson's  divisions,  with 
Cabell's  Battalion  of  the  former,  and  Branch's  and 
Cooper's  batteries  of  the  latter,  to  Fredericksburg,  and 
Lane's  Battery  of  the  General  Reserve  with  its  two  20- 
pounder  Parrotts,  was  sent  forward  with  them.  Lane  at 
once  intrenched  on  the  heights  overlooking  the  bend  of 
the  river  above  Falmouth,  retaining  his  position  on  the 
extreme  Confederate  left.  Overruling  Col.  Cabell's  ad 
vice  to  occupy  Taylor's  Hill  with  his  artillery,  McLaws 
placed  his  batteries  on  the  crest  of  the  hill  between  the 
Telegraph  road  and  Howison's  barn.  In  this  position 
Read,  with  one  10-pounder  Parrott,  one  12-pounder 
howitzer,  and  one  3-inch  rifle;  Manly  with  three  6- 
pounders,  one  3-inch  rifle  and  two  12-pounder 
howitzers;  Carlton  with  two  10-pounder  Parrotts;  and 


•24 


370  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

McCarthy  with  two  3-inch  rifles,  at  once  intrenched, 
while  the  less  effective  pieces  of  their  batteries  were  held 
under  cover  only  to  be  used  against  attacking  infantry. 
Cooper's  and  Branch's  batteries  of  Ransom's  Division 
joined  Cabell's  batteries,  the  former  with  three  10- 
pounder  Parrotts  also  intrenching. 

On  the  19th,  the  remaining  divisions  of  Longstreet's 
Corps  were  ordered  up,  the  Reserve  Artillery  and  the 
ordnance  train  following.  At  the  same  time  Jackson 
was  directed  to  proceed  to  Orange  Courthouse  with  all 
dispatch.  Leaving  his  old  camp  on  the  19th,  he  set  out 
from  Winchester  on  the  22d.  He  passed  through  Stras- 
burg  on  the  25th,  and  Madison  Courthouse  on  the  26th, 
and  reached  his  appointed  rendezvous,  without  a 
straggler,  the  following  day,  having  marched  120  miles 
over  execrable  roads  in  eight  days,  two  of  which  were 
devoted  to  rest. 

On  the  29th,  Lieut.  W.  F.  Anderson  in  command  of 
Ellis'  Georgia  Battery  arrived  from  Richmond  with 
two  "Long  Toms,"*  or  30-pounder  Parrotts,  sent  for 
ward  by  Col.  Gorgas,  and  pits  were  constructed  for 
them  near  the  Howison  house  group  under  Col.  Cabell, 
and  his  assistant,  Maj.  S.  P.  Hamilton. 

In  the  meantime  the  two  remaining  batteries  of  An 
derson's  Division,  Maurin's  and  Huger's,  came  up  and 
intrenched  immediately  north  of  the  Plank  Road,  and 
Moorman's,  Macon's,  and  Stribling's  batteries  of 
Pickett's  Division,  joined  Cabell's  group  on  the  ridge 
behind  McLaws'  Division,  all  except  one  10-pounder 
Parrott  of  Macon's  and  a  similar  piece  of  Moorman's 
being  well  retired.  Frobel's  Battalion  of  Hood's  Divi 
sion,  consisting  of  Reilly's,  Bachman's,  and  Garden's 
batteries,  intrenched  along  the  northern  part  of  the 
ridge,  running  from  Deep  Run  to  Hamilton's  Crossing, 
the  guns  commanding  the  valley  of  the  stream. 

Of  Walton's  reserve  battalion  which  occupied  Marye's 
Hill  from  the  Telegraph  to  the  Plank  Road,  two  3-inch 

*"Long  Tom"  was  the  name  given  the  big  30-pounder  Parrott  captured  at 
First  Manassas.  The  name  was  also  used  by  the  Boers  in  1899  to  designate 
their  big  guns. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  371 

rifles  and  one  10-pounder  Parrott  of  Squire's  1st  Com 
pany,  two  12-pounder  Napoleons  of  Miller's  3d  Com 
pany,  and  two  12-pounder  howitzers  and  two  12- 
pounder  Napoleons  of  Eshleman's  4th  Company,  or  nine 
pieces  in  all,  were  placed  in  individual  pits  and  epaul- 
ments  on  the  military  crest.  Richardson's  2d  Company 
was  on  detached  duty  with  Pickett's  Division.  Further- 
to  the  left  and  beyond  Maurin  and  Huger,  Alexander's 
reserve  battalion  occupied  the  Stansbury  Hill,  Rhett's 
Battery,  however,  being  established  south  of  the  Plank 
Road;  two  rifles  of  Parker's  Battery  occupied  pits  in 
front  of  the  Stansbury  house,  while  his  two  howitzers 
were  concealed  behind  the  buildings  for  use  against  the 
infantry  columns  of  the  enemy.  The  batteries  of 
Jordan,  Woolfolk,  and  Moody  were  also  held  behind  the 
rear  crest  of  the  plateau,  from  which  position  they  could 
move  into  pits  on  the  forward  crest,  or  be  sent  to  the 
most  threatened  points  as  needed.  The  sixth  battery  of 
the  battalion,  or  Eubank's,  joined  Cabell's  group  behind 
McLaws,  as  did  the  General  Reserve.  The  batteries 
under  Alexander  and  Walton  and  those  of  R.  H. 
Anderson's  Division  thus  commanded  the  entire  plain 
from  Hazel  Run  northward  to  the  westward  bend  of 
the  river,  as  well  as  the  opposite  bank,  at  a  range  of  1^ 
miles,  while  Cabell's  group  of  nearly  50  pieces  could 
sweep  the  flats  from  Fredericksburg  southward,  cross 
ing  fire  with  Frobel's  guns  beyond  Deep  Run.  The 
distribution  of  the  artillery  was  excellent  in  every 
respect,  and  illustrates  the  correct  method  of  guarding 
a  line  of  river  by  a  series  of  strong  artillery  groups  so 
placed  as  to  be  able  to  concentrate  their  fire  on  the 
various  approaches  to  the  position  to  be  held.  Further 
more,  the  tactics  employed  were  far  superior  to  those 
at  Antietam,  for  at  Fredericksburg  the  inferior  ar 
tillery  was  not  ruthlessly  exposed,  but  held  entirely 
under  cover  until  it  could  be  effectively  brought  into 
action,  thus  concealing  as  well  as  protecting  the  lighter 
pieces  from  the  superior  fire  of  the  enemy  while  the 


872  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

heavier  guns,  necessarily  placed  in  position,  were  in 
trenched.  The  whole  plan  was  most  skillfully  con 
ceived. 

Its  main  features  were  as  follows:  the  long  range 
pieces,  protected  by  intrenchments,  would  engage  in 
the  preliminary  action,  conserving  their  ammunition 
and  refraining  from  any  waste  in  a  useless  duel  with  the 
superior  artillery  of  the  enemy.  These  guns  were  to 
inflict  as  much  damage  as  possible,  however,  on  the 
enemy  while  crossing  the  river  and  forming  for  attack, 
and  to  take  advantage  of  all  exposures  on  his  part  in 
whatever  quarter  of  the  field.  In  so  doing  they  would 
necessarily  disclose  their  positions.  It  was  not  expected 
that  they  could  subdue  to  any  great  extent  the  hostile 
artillery  fire.  When  the  infantry  columns  of  the  enemy 
with  their  light  batteries  advanced  to  the  assault  and 
came  within  range  of  the  lighter  pieces,  they  would 
move  into  hitherto  undisclosed  positions,  and  open  with 
the  maximum  effect,  assisting  in  the  overthrow  of  the 
attacking  columns,  before  they  were  silenced  by  the 
guns  of  the  enemy.  So  soon  as  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  of  position  were  shifted  to  the  fresh  batteries, 
the  heavier  Confederate  guns  would  be  free  again  to 
play  upon  the  hostile  groups,  shaking  their  fire,  or  to 
assist  in  the  repulse  of  the  infantry,  as  circumstances 
dictated  to  be  best. 

By  reason  of  the  character  of  the  terrain,  Gen.  Lee 
had  wisely  determined  only  to  resist  the  enemy  after  he 
had  effected  his  crossing,  and  as  the  southern  hills  were 
commanded  by  the  opposite  heights,  it  became  neces 
sary  to  construct  earthworks  for  his  artillery.  The 
work  of  locating  the  Confederate  batteries  had  been 
assigned  to  Gen.  Pendleton,  who  with  the  skillful  aid 
of  Cols.  Cabell  and  Alexander  and  Capt.  S.  R.  John 
son,  of  the  Engineers,  after  making  a  most  compre 
hensive  reconnaissance,  prepared  the  general  plan  of 
defense.  In  this  work  the  services  of  Col.  Alexander 
were  of  course  invaluable.  Both  an  engineer  and  an 
artilleryman  of  experience,  he  had  constantly  before 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  373 

him  the  necessities  of  communication,  necessarily  fore 
most  in  the  mind  of  one  so  familiar  with  the  duty  of  am 
munition  supply.  The  Confederate  dispositions  were 
hence  most  judicious. 

Until  Lee's  army  was  concentrated  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  the  burden  of  the  defense  had  fallen  upon  the 
Artillery.  While  Burnside's  men  were  working  like 
beavers  planting  their  heavy  batteries,  Pendleton  and 
his  artillery  officers  had  also  been  busily  at  work.  The 
Confederate  batteries,  such  as  they  were,  were  carefully 
classified  and  marked  so  that  every  staff  officer  might 
readily  find  them.  So  placed  that  the  maximum  field 
of  fire  might  be  secured  to  the  guns,  the  best  possible 
lateral  communications  were  prepared  by  the  engineers. 
In  the  preparation  of  the  position,  the  services  of  the 
infantry  as  well  as  of  the  gunners  were  utilized  to  the 
utmost,  and  gangs  of  negroes  were  brought  up  to  assist 
in  the  work  of  intrenching. 

The  weather  was  extremely  severe  during  all  this 
work.  Lack  of  tools  and  frozen  ground  made  the  work 
slow,  and  when  Burnside  finally  attacked,  individual 
pits  for  about  40  guns  had  been  dug,  but  these  were 
without  shelter  for  ammunition  or  infantry  supports. 
Along  the  Telegraph  road  at  the  base  of  Marye's  Hill 
a  ditch  had  been  dug  on  the  lower  side  of  the  road  and 
the  dirt  thrown  forward  and  banked  against  the  stone 
fence  which  bounded  it.  A  work  was  constructed  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Massaponax,  in  which  Capt.  Ross's 
Battery  of  the  Reserve  was  placed  to  stop  any  gunboat 
which  might  pass  Pelham's  guns  further  down  the 
river.  Little  artificial  cover  could  be  provided  for  the 
infantry,  in  view  of  the  labor  that  intrenching  entailed 
under  the  existing  conditions.  In  this  execrable  weather 
the  only  shelter  for  the  men,  a  few  still  without  shoes, 
and  most  of  them  totally  unprovided  with  adequate 
clothing,  consisted  of  "lean-to's"  constructed  by  throw 
ing  tarpaulins  and  blankets  over  poles,  or  fashioned 
Avith  brushwood,  leaves,  and  mud.  But  fire-wood  was 
plentiful  and  in  some  way  the  men  managed  to  keep 


374  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

the  blood  coursing  through  their  veins.  Provisions 
were  none  too  bountiful.  Beef  on  the  hoof,  cornmeal, 
and  black-eyed  peas  comprised  the  great  bulk  of  the 
commissary  issues,  coffee  and  hog  meat  being  rare 
treats  even  for  the  general  officers  and  their  staffs. 

On  the  morning  of  the  llth,  Longstreet's  Corps  held 
the  ridge  in  rear  of  Fredericksburg,  with  Anderson's, 
McLaws',  Ransom's,  Hood's,  and  Pickett's  divisions, 
aggregating  33,400  infantry,  and  about  1,500  artillery 
men,  with  about  100  guns.*  Of  Jackson's  Corps,  A.  P. 
Hill's  Division  of  11,533  infantry,  and  about  450  ar 
tillerymen,  with  7  batteries,  was  near  Yearly's  house, 
five  miles  south  of  Fredericksburg;  Taliaferro's  Divi 
sion  of  4,690  infantry,  and  about  325  artillerymen  with 
22  guns,  was  at  Guiney  Station,  nine  miles  south  of 
Fredericksburg;  Early's  Division  of  7,340  infantry, 
and  380  artillerymen,  with  26  guns,  was  at  Skinker's 
Neck,  12  miles  down  the  river;  and  D.  H.  Hill's  Divi 
sion  of  8,627  infantry  and  325  artillerymen,  with  22 
guns,  was  at  Port  Royal,  18  miles  below  the  town. 

Pendleton  with  the  Reserve  Artillery,  less  Brown's 
Battalion,  now  assigned  as  reserve  of  the  Second  Corps, 
with  752  officers  and  men,  and  about  20  guns,  was  in 
rear  of  Longstreet's  line. 

Of  the  cavalry  division  under  Stuart,  aggregating 
9,146  present  for  duty,  Hampton's  Brigade  was  im 
mediately  on  the  left  of  Longstreet  along  the  river  and 
watching  Banks'  and  United  States  fords;  Fitz  Lee's 
Brigade  was  with  Longstreet ;  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Brigade 
was  along  the  river  near  Port  Royal,  and  Rosser's  Bri 
gade  was  in  rear  near  the  Wilderness  Tavern,  watching 
the  left  flank  and  upper  fords. 

Including  the  staffs  and  the  five  horse  batteries  the 
grand  total,  present  for  duty,  December  10,  was  78,513 
and  about  250  guns,  the  largest  concentrated  army  Gen. 
Lee  had  yet  handled. 

*The  return  of  the  1st  Corps  for  December  10  shows  a  total  of  34,044 
officers  and  men  present  for  duty.  See  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXI, 
p.  1057.  Of  this  number  there  were  37  officers  and  586  men  in  Walton's  and 
Alexander's  reserve  batteries,  and  there  were  14  divisional  batteries  besides, 
with  a  total  of  not  less  than  50  officers  and  840  men  present  for  duty.  Deduct 
ing  the  artillery  personnel  of  about  1,500  officers  and  men  from  the  total  present 
*or  duty  we  have  about  33,400  as  the  strength  of  Longstreet's  Infantry. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  375 

Opposed  to  him  was  an  army  of  118,952  men  and 
324  guns,  with  reinforcements  aggregating  27,724  men 
near  at  hand  and  actually  en  route,  and  in  addition  a 
force  about  Washington  of  51,970  with  284  guns  of 
position  and  120  field  pieces.  For  the  advance  upon 
Richmond  and  the  defense  of  Washington,  the  Fed 
erals  had,  therefore,  198,546  men  present  for  duty  and 
about  900  guns.  If  Burnside  should  defeat  Lee,  Rich 
mond  would  be  lost.  But  if  Lee  defeated  Burnside  and 
captured  his  entire  army,  the  most  serious  part  of  his 
work  would  not  have  begun. 

Burnside's  attempt  to  cross  the  river  in  his  front  had 
been  expected  for  some  days,  notice  of  which  was  to  be 
given  the  Confederates  by  the  firing  of  two  guns  of  Ca- 
bell's  group.  At  2  A.  M.  on  the  llth,  the  pickets  re 
ported  that  pontoon  trains  could  be  heard  in  motion, 
and  at  4 :30  A.  M.  the  Federal  working  parties  had  com 
menced  to  throw  their  bridges.  About  5  A.  M.  the 
signal  guns  were  fired  and  the  Confederate  brigades 
and  batteries  at  once  moved  into  their  appointed  po 
sitions,  the  latter  having  been  held  behind  the  crest  of 
the  ridge,  so  as  not  to  disclose  their  whereabouts  until 
they  actually  opened  fire. 

Gen.  Lee  had  committed  the  task  of  resisting  the 
crossing  to  Barksdale's  Mississippi  Brigade  supported 
by  a  regiment  or  two  from  Anderson's  Division.  At 
Deep  Run,  the  Confederate  skirmishers  having  little  or 
no  shelter  from  the  hostile  guns,  were  capable  of  but 
little  resistance,  and  before  noon  the  Federals  had  com 
pleted  two  bridges  at  that  point.  At  the  town  Barks- 
dale's  men,  under  cover  of  the  houses,  were  more  suc 
cessful,  repeatedly  driving  off  the  working  parties  until 
at  last,  about  11  A.  M.,  the  engineers  abandoned  the 
task.  Burnside  now  ordered  every  gun  in  range  to  fire 
50  rounds  into  the  town.  About  100  pieces  responded 
with  terrific  effect  upon  the  buildings,  many  of  which 
were  either  completely  demolished,  or  set  on  fire,  but 
none  of  the  Confederates  were  injured.  The  bombard 
ment  was  simply  one  of  those  useless  expenditures  of 


376  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

ammunition  resorted  to  for  lack  of  more  effective  meas 
ures.  The  heavy  fog  of  the  morning  had  now  almost 
disappeared,  and  the  panoramic  view  from  the  Con 
federate  position  was  superb.  Gen.  Alexander  thus 
describes  it:  "The  city,  except  its  steeples,  was  still 
veiled  in  mist,  which  had  settled  in  the  Valley.  Above 
it  and  in  it  incessantly  showed  the  round  white  clouds 
of  bursting  shells,  and  out  of  its  midst  there  soon  rose 
three  or  four  columns  of  dense  black  smoke  from  houses 
set  on  fire  by  the  explosives.  The  atmosphere  was  so 
perfectly  calm  and  still  that  the  smoke  rose  vertically 
in  great  pillars  for  several  hundred  feet  before  spread 
ing  outward  in  black  sheets.  The  opposite  bank  of  the 
river,  for  two  miles  to  the  right  and  left,  was  crowned  at 
frequent  intervals  with  blazing  batteries,  canopied  in 
clouds  of  white  smoke. 

"Beyond  these,  the  dark  blue  masses  of  over  100,000 
infantry,  in  compact  columns,  and  numberless  parks  of 
white-topped  wagons  and  ambulances  massed  in  orderly 
ranks,  all  awaited  the  completion  of  the  bridges.  The 
earth  shook  with  the  thunder  of  the  guns,  and  high 
above  all,  a  thousand  feet  in  air,  hung  two  immense 
balloons.  The  scene  gave  impressive  ideas  of  the  disci 
plined  power  of  a  great  army,  and  of  the  vast  resources 
of  the  nation  which  had  sent  it  forth." 

But  the  grand  cannonade  failed  to  drive  Barksdale's 
men  from  their  posts  of  vantage,  and  again  they  opened 
fire  upon  the  returning  bridge  builders.  At  last,  at 
the  suggestion  of  Gen.  Hunt,  still  Chief  of  Artillery, 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  volunteers  crossed  the  completed 
bridges  under  cover  of  the  artillery  fire,  and  approach 
ing  the  town  occupied  the  Confederate  sharpshooters 
sufficiently  to  enable  the  bridges  opposite  the  town  to 
be  completed,  the  attempt  being  resumed  about  4:30 
p.  M.  During  the  continuance  of  Barksdale's  street 
fighting,  which  lasted  until  after  dark,  the  Confederate 
batteries  had  for  the  most  part  remained  silent  by  rea 
son  of  the  fog,  which  hid  the  crossings  from  view  during 
the  morning,  making  good  practice  impossible.  The 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  377 

orders  against  wasting  ammunition  in  useless  cannon 
ades  were  most  stringent.  This  was  left  to  the  enemy 
who  fired  intermittently  throughout  the  day  upon  the 
Confederate  position,  inflicting  only  slight  damage 
upon  the  men  and  guns  by  reason  of  the  works  which 
sheltered  them. 

Late  in  the  day,  observing  a  small  column  of  hostile 
infantry  approach  the  upper  pontoon  bridge,  Lewis' 
Battery  opened  fire  and  drove  the  enemy  behind  the 
Lacy  house,  and  shortly  afterwards  it  again  fired  upon 
some  cavalry  and  artillery  which  made  its  appearance 
across  the  river,  but  the  action  of  this  battery  was  not 
unnecessarily  prolonged.  Maurin's  Battery  near  the 
Plank  Road  also  fired  a  few  shots  towards  evening. 

About  7  P.  M.,  the  Federals  having  occupied  Fred- 
ericksburg,  Col.  Walton  was  directed  to  make  his  prep 
arations  to  rake  the  streets  of  the  town  at  the  first  signal 
of  their  advance,  and  Ransom,  who  had  posted  his  two 
batteries,  Branch's  and  Cooper's,  on  the  Telegraph 
Road,  was  ordered  to  do  the  same,  also  being  directed 
to  secure  tools  from  Gen.  McLaws  and  connect  the 
small  gun  pits  in  his  front  with  rifle-trenches.*  Not  a 
gun  was  fired  by  Alexander's,  Walton's,  Cabell's,  and 
Frobel's  groups  during  the  day,  though  they  had  all 
received  orders  during  the  early  morning  to  do  what 
they  could  to  impede  the  construction  of  the  bridges. 

Thus  passed  away  Thursday,  the  llth,  on  which  day 
Burnside  only  succeeded  in  throwing  his  six  bridges,  his 
artillery  utterly  failing  to  uncover  the  Confederate  bat 
teries.  Lee  now  ordered  A.  P.  Hill  and  Taliaferro  to 
come  up  from  the  rear  and  relieve  Hood  and  Pickett, 
who  were  to  close  on  the  center  and  hold  the  ground 
between  Deep  and  Hazel  runs.  During  the  night,  with 
the  thermometer  26  degrees  above  zero,  Hill  and  Talia 
ferro  completed  their  preparations,  and,  breaking  camp 
before  daybreak,  arrived  at  their  designated  positions 
about  noon  on  the  12th.  Col.  Crutchfield,  who  had  pre 
ceded  the  movement  of  these  divisions  and  reconnoitered 

"Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  LI,  Part  II,  pp.  661,  662. 


378  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

the  position  assigned  them,  directed  Col.  Walker  to 
select  positions  for  his  guns  along  the  ridge  from 
Hamilton's  Crossing  to  Deep  Run.  As  soon  as  they 
arrived,  Col.  Walker  placed  Macintosh's  and  Pegram's 
batteries  with  sections  from  Crenshaw's,  Latham's,  and 
M.  Johnson's  batteries,  the  latter  commanded  by  Lieuts. 
Clutter,  Potts,  and  Ellett,  respectively,  or  a  total  of  14 
guns,  on  the  height  immediately  above  the  railroad  on 
the  extreme  right  of  the  ridge  known  as  Prospect  Hill. 

Braxton's  Battery  in  command  of  Lieut.  Marye  with 
5,  and  Davidson's  with  4  guns  were  sent  to  the  left  of 
the  line,  where  they  were  mingled  with  those  of  Talia- 
ferro's  Division.  The  21  guns  assigned  to  the  left  were 
placed  in  position  as  follows:  just  at  Bernard's  cabins 
and  to  their  left  9  guns,  consisting  of  6  rifles,  2  Na 
poleons,  and  one  6-pounder  of  the  batteries  of  Raine, 
Caskie,  and  Braxton,  all  under  the  immediate  charge  of 
Capt.  Davidson,  and  about  200  yards  in  front  of  these, 
to  their  right  and  across  the  railroad,  6  rifles,  3  Na 
poleons,  and  three  6-pounders  from  the  batteries  of 
Carpenter,  Wooding,  and  Braxton,  all  under  the  im 
mediate  command  of  Capt.  J.  B.  Brockenbrough. 
Hood's  three  batteries  meanwhile  moved  from  their  po 
sition  on  the  northern  salient  ridge  south  of  Deep  Run 
to  one  at  the  base  of  the  hills  north  of  the  run  and  im 
mediately  across  from  Franklin's  bridge.* 

During  the  12th,  Sumner  at  the  town  and  Franklin 
at  the  Deep  Run  bridges  took  over  their  grand  divi 
sions,  which,  when  in  line,  extended  from  the  center  of 
the  town  towards  Deep  Run  about  parallel  to  the  river 
and  between  it  and  the  Richmond  road.  No  attempt 
was  made  by  the  Federals  on  the  Confederate  position, 
nor  did  Gen.  Lee  make  any  serious  opposition  to  the 
crossing,  though  the  long-range  guns  were  again  ordered 
to  inflict  as  much  damage  as  they  could  upon  the 
enemy. t  Rhett's  and  Parker's  batteries  from  their 

"Henderson  is  mistaken  as  to  the  number  of  guns  with  the  Light  and 
Taliaferro's  divisions.  He  shows  a  disposition  of  47  guns  ;  there  were  but  35. 
He  counted  Brockenbrough's  group  twice.  See  Crutchfield's  Report,  Rebellion 
Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXI,  p.  636.  Henderson  merely  copied  the  error  of  Allan. 
Alexander  also  copied  the  error. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  LI,  Part  II,  p.  661. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  379 

positions  near  the  Plank  Road  and  the  Stansbury  house, 
respectively,  fired  upon  the  town,  enfilading  the  main 
streets,  but  always  drawing  upon  themselves  a  storm 
from  the  opposite  bank.  During  the  day  one  of  Col. 
Cabell's  batteries,  discovering  a  light  battery  in  position 
along  the  enemy's  line,  drove  it  beyond  Deep  Run, 
where  it  joined  a  number  of  others,  all  too  far  removed 
from  the  Confederate  position  to  be  harmful.  Lewis' 
Battery  on  the  extreme  left  of  Longstreet's  line  was  also 
engaged  about  3  p.  M.,  firing  upon  an  infantry  brigade, 
and  later  upon  a  cavalry  column,  which  made  their  ap 
pearance  at  the  ford  opposite  his  position,  and  Maurin's 
Battery  dropped  a  few  10-pounder  shells  among  some 
skirmishers  near  the  town,  and  occasionally  fired  upon 
the  masses  across  the  river. 

About  2  p.  M.,  the  fog  having  lifted  sufficiently  to  en 
able  Col.  Walton's  gunners  to  see  as  far  as  the  river, 
his  batteries  fired  upon  a  column  of  the  enemy  below  the 
town  for  a  few  minutes  until  it  dispersed  and  sought 
cover  behind  the  inequalities  of  the  ground.  Hundreds 
of  rounds  of  ammunition  were  wasted  by  the  enemy  in 
a  one-sided  cannonade  during  the  12th.  That  night  the 
various  artillery  commanders  were  informed  that  the 
enemy  was  expected  to  attack  Longstreet's  right  and 
Jackson's  front  in  the  morning.  Jackson  was  now 
ordered  to  Fredericksburg  with  Early 's  and  D.  H. 
Hill's  divisions,  both  of  which  with  their  artillery  ar 
rived  at  Hamilton's  Crossing  about  dawn  on  the  13th, 
Hill  having  marched  18  and  Early  12  miles  during  the 
night.  Upon  arriving,  Capt.  Latimer,  Acting  Chief  of 
Artillery,  Early's  Division,  reported  to  Col.  Crutchfield 
and  was  ordered  to  hold  his  six  batteries  under  cover  in 
rear.  Behind  D.  H.  Hill's  Division  on  the  extreme 
right,  Capt.  Carter,  Acting  Chief  of  Artillery,  also 
held  his  five  divisional  batteries  in  readiness  to  relieve 
those  under  Col.  Walker  on  Prospect  Hill,  and  Col. 
Brown's  Corps  Reserve  was  kept  under  cover  in  the  rear. 
Across  the  railroad  from  Prospect  Hill  were  two  of 
Stuart's  cavalry  brigades,  and  Maj.  Pelham  with  sev- 


380  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

eral  horse  batteries,  and  Milledge's  and  Lane's  bat 
teries  of  the  General  Reserve,  the  latter  with  two  20- 
pounder  Parrotts.  In  all,  Pelham  had  18  guns.  An 
imported  Whitworth  rifle  of  large  caliber  and  great 
range  was  posted  on  the  wooded  heights  northeast  of  the 
Yerby  house  in  charge  of  Capt.  Hardaway. 

During  the  night  Ross's  Battery  returned  from  its 
position  below  the  Massaponax,  and  was  assigned  to 
Maj.  S.  P.  Hamilton's  group  of  Cabell's  guns  on  the 
hill  behind  McLaws.  A  section  of  6-pounders  from  this 
battery  with  Patterson's  Battery  of  Cutts'  Battalion 
was  dispatched  to  Hood's  front  in  charge  of  Maj.  T.  J. 
Page,  Jr.  Capts.  Barnwell  and  G.  W.  Nelson  were 
now  placed  in  charge  of  the  two  30-pounder  Parrotts 
of  Ellis'  Battery  on  Lee's  Hill.  With  Kirkpatrick's 
and  Massie's  batteries,  Maj.  Nelson  was  then  directed 
by  Gen.  Pendleton  to  take  up  a  position  near  the  Tele 
graph  Road,  in  rear  of  and  commanding  the  plateau  of 
Marye's  Hill,  so  that  it  could  be  swept  if  carried  by  the 
enemy.  Rhett's  Battery  was  similarly  stationed  near 
the  Plank  Road. 

Burnside's  belated  plan  was  now  to  seize  Prospect 
Hill  with  Franklin's  Corps,  and  Marye's  Hill  as  well 
as  the  heights  occupied  by  Cabell's  and  Hamilton's  bat 
teries  with  Sumner's  Corps.  Franklin  was  to  move 
around  to  the  right  of  Hamilton's  Crossing  and  sweep 
along  the  avenues  of  communication,  which  the  Con 
federates  had  prepared  in  rear  of  their  position,  from 
Prospect  Hill  to  the  Telegraph  Road,  thus  connecting 
with  Sumner.  The  plan,  if  successful,  would  not  only 
cause  the  Confederates  to  evacuate  their  strong  lines  in 
the  woods  along  the  base  of  the  hills  and  behind  the  rail 
road  embankment,  but  would  prevent  the  withdrawal  of 
the  artillery  groups  under  Walker,  Carter,  Latimer, 
Davidson,  and  Brockenbrough,  in  position  along  the 
forward  crest  of  the  ridge.  Hooker  was  to  hold  four  divi 
sions  in  support  of  Sumner  and  to  send  two  to  Franklin. 

Burnside  had  detected  the  weakest  point  in  the  Con 
federate  line,  which  was  in  A.  P.  Hill's  front  about  op- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  381 

posite  the  middle  of  the  ridge  from  Hamilton's  Cross 
ing  to  Deep  Run.  Although  Jackson  held  a  line  of  but 
2,600  yards  with  30,000  men  or  about  11  men  to  the 
yard,  his  formation  was  very  deep  and  not  dense  in  the 
front  line  held  by  A.  P.  Hill.  Just  to  the  left  of  Walker's 
batteries,  posted  in  a  trench  within  the  edge  of  the 
woods,  was  Archer's  Brigade  of  Hill's  Division  with  its 
left  resting  on  a  coppice  extending  well  forward  into 
the  flats.  Beyond  the  coppice,  but  nearer  the  railroad 
embankment,  lay  Lane's  Brigade  of  the  same  division 
with  its  right  about  600  yards  from  Archer's  left.  In 
the  gap  behind  the  coppice  was  an  open  field  200  yards 
in  breadth.  About  500  yards  in  rear  of  the  gap,  along 
the  military  road  constructed  by  the  Artillery  as  a 
lateral  communication,  lay  Gregg's  Brigade.  On 
Lane's  left  rear  was  Fender's  Brigade,  in  front  of  which 
was  Capt.  Davidson's  group  of  9  guns,  the  12  pieces 
under  Brockenb rough  being  in  front  of  and  across  the 
embankment  from  Lane.  Field's  Brigade  supported 
Walker's  group  on  the  extreme  right  and  Thomas'  Bri 
gade  was  held  in  rear  of  Fender's  right  and  Lane's  left. 
Across  Deep  Run  was  Hood's  Division,  with  Frobel's 
artillery  group.  Jackson's  disposition  had  been  made 
before  Early  and  D.  H.  Hill  came  up  and  they  with 
Taliaferro  were  left  in  the  third  line  farther  back  even 
than  Gregg,  a  change  under  fire  being  deemed  hazard 
ous.  His  position  was  very  similar  to  that  occupied  by 
him  at  Second  Manassas.  In  his  front  was  the  rail 
road  embankment,  in  his  rear  were  the  wooded  heights, 
upon  his  flanks  were  the  massed  batteries  under  the  gen 
eral  supervision  of  Crutchfield,  and  opposite  his  center 
was  the  wood  projecting  beyond  the  embankment,  form 
ing  the  same  defect  from  which  he  was  again  to  suffer. 
Maj.  Von  Borcke,  a  Prussian  officer  of  Stuart's  staff, 
had  on  the  12th  seen  the  danger  lurking  in  the  gap  and 
had  suggested  that  the  thicket  should  be  levelled,  but  it 
was  considered  too  miry  to  be  passable  and  no  steps  were 
taken  to  correct  the  evil.  Col.  Crutchfield,  who  saw 
that  a  space  of  800  to  1,000  yards  of  Jackson's  front 


382  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

was  undefended  by  direct  artillery  fire,  examined  the 
wood  most  carefully  with  a  view  to  establishing 
howitzer  batteries  behind  it,  which  by  canister  fire 
might  keep  it  clear,  but  found  it  impracticable  to  do 
so  in  the  time  left  him  before  the  action,  but  he  in 
structed  Capts.  Brockenbrough  and  Davidson  to  re 
serve  their  fire  until  the  enemy's  infantry  had 
approached  to  within  close  range.  By  the  fire  of  their 
advanced  pieces  he  hoped  that  the  approach  to  the 
wood  would  be  commanded.  Col.  Walker's  group 
could  only  cross-fire  with  them  by  firing  very  obliquely 
to  the  left. 

Early  in  the  morning,  Meade's  Division  moved  down 
stream  about  700  yards  beyond  the  ravine  near  the 
Smithfield  house,  and  turning  sharply  to  the  right 
crossed  the  Richmond  road.  While  Meade  was  form 
ing  his  division  in  column  of  brigades  opposite  the  cop 
pice  which  projected  from  the  dip  in  the  ridge  held  by 
A.  P.  Hill,  under  cover  of  a  rise  in  the  ground  between 
the  road  and  the  embankment,  Jiis  supporting  batteries 
opened  a  desultory  fire  upon  the  Confederate  position 
as  if  feeling  its  strength,  but  no  reply  was  elicited. 

Maj.  Pelham  commanding  Stuart's  horse  batteries, 
and  the  light  batteries  assigned  to  Jackson's  extreme 
right,  had  moved  his  guns  forward  with  the  dismounted 
cavalry,  which  occupied  a  line  extending  from  the 
southern  base  of  Prospect  Hill  towards  the  river  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Massaponax.  With  the  unerring  eye 
of  genius,  he  now  seized  the  opportunity  which  the  ex 
posed  flank  of  Meade's  column  presented  him.  Gallop 
ing  forward  with  two  12-pounder  Napoleons  of  Henry's 
Battery,  along  the  road  leading  from  Hamilton's  Cross 
ing  to  the  Richmond  Road,  and  concealing  his  move 
ments  by  using  the  cover  of  the  ditches  and  hedges,  he 
gained  a  tangled  ravine  just  beyond  a  marshy  stream 
less  than  400  yards  from  Meade's  flank,  from  which 
point  he  opened  a  rapid  fire  upon  the  astonished  Fed 
erals.  Meade's  leading  brigade  at  once  began  to  waver 
and  seek  cover,  threatening  to  throw  the  whole  division 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  383 

in  confusion,  while  four  Pennsylvania  batteries,  called  to 
the  left  by  Meade,  and  soon  joined  by  two  others,  to 
gether  sought  to  overthrow  Pelham.  One  of  his  pieces 
was  soon  disabled,  but  rapid  changes  of  position  enabled 
him  to  defy  the  opposing  batteries  for  nearly  an  hour, 
though  well  in  advance  of  Jackson's  line  and  unsup 
ported  except  by  several  small  troops  of  dismounted 
cavalry.  Pelham  finally  retired  in  obedience  to  Stuart's 
peremptory  order,  but  not  until  his  limbers  had  been 
emptied,  nor  until  he  had  delayed  the  advance  of  4,500 
Federals  and  caused  Franklin  to  dispatch  Doubleday's 
entire  division  to  guard  Meade' s  flank,  a  task  which  ab 
sorbed  its  efforts  during  the  remainder  of  the  day.  He 
had  also  caused  the  explosion  of  one  of  the  enemy's 
caissons. 

Upon  his  withdrawal,  Pelham  took  up  a  position  with 
all  the  batteries  under  his  command  across  the  railroad 
from  Hamilton's  Crossing,  from  which  he  was  able  to 
cross-fire  to  some  extent  in  front  of  Hill's  center  with 
the  guns  of  Brockenb rough's  group  advanced  beyond 
the  railroad. 

Gens.  Lee  and  Jackson  were  present  together  on  the 
extreme  Confederate  right,  and  were  eye-witnesses  of 
the  contest  between  Pelham' s  Napoleon  and  the  Fed 
eral  batteries. 

Franklin  had  now  advanced  several  batteries  to  the 
Richmond  Road,  which,  together  with  the  batteries  on 
Stafford  Heights,  for  half  an  hour  subjected  the  wooded 
ridge  occupied  by  Hill  to  a  heavy  cannonade,  the  effect 
of  which  was  generally  slight,  except  upon  Walker's 
batteries.  The  position  of  these  batteries,  though  ob 
scured  from  the  view  of  the  enemy,  were  more  in  the 
open  than  the  infantry,  but  Walker's  guns  remained 
silent,  as  did  the  infantry,  reserving  their  fire  for 
Meade's  column  at  closer  range.  About  11  A.  M.,  the 
Federal  advance  was  resumed  under  cover  of  a  great 
number  of  guns,  and  when  the  first  line  came  within 
800  yards  of  Jackson's  center  the  silent  woods  awoke. 
First  Walker,  then  Davidson,  then  Brockenbrough, 


384  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

pushed  their  guns  from  the  covert,  and  as  Jackson's  35 
guns,  aided  by  those  of  Pelham  to  the  right,  which  were 
promptly  advanced,  opened  fire,  the  Federal  leader 
realized  the  insufficiency  of  his  artillery  preparation. 
"From  front  and  flank  came  the  scathing  fire;  the 
skirmishers  were  quickly  driven  in  and  on  the  closed 
ranks  behind  burst  the  full  fury  of  the  storm.  Dis 
mayed  and  decimated  by  this  fierce  and  unexpected  on 
slaught,  Meade's  brigades  broke  in  disorder  and  fell 
back  to  the  Richmond  Road."* 

Upon  Meade's  troops  the  effect  of  Pegram's  and  Mc- 
Intosh's  fire  from  Walker's  group  was  especially  de 
structive,  but  the  troops  on  their  left  were  not  so 
promptly  checked.  Gibbon's  Division  had  come  under 
the  fire  of  Brockenbrough's  and  Davidson's  guns,  which 
succeeded  in  at  once  driving  off  the  skirmishers  with 
canister,  but  in  doing  so  they  disclosed  their  positions 
and  drew  upon  themselves  the  concentrated  fire  of  a 
number  of  field  batteries  which  caused  them  much  loss. 
Again  and  again  the  skirmishers  advanced  into  the 
woods,  and  finally  working  around  to  the  right,  began 
firing  upon  the  batteries.  While  serving  as  gunners, 
Capts.  Brockenbrough  and  Wooding  were  both  shot. 
The  axles  of  two  rifled  field  pieces  in  Wooding's  and 
Caskie's  batteries  breaking  from  the  recoil,  and  the  am 
munition  of  Raine's  Battery  proving  so  defective  that 
none  of  the  shells  burst,  it  became  necessary  about  10 :30 
A.  M.  for  Brockenbrough  to  retire  from  his  advanced 
position,  and  for  Col.  Crutchfield  to  order  Capt. 
Latimer,  Early's  Acting  Chief  of  Artillery,  who  was 
holding  his  divisional  batteries  in  reserve,  to  take  the 
rifled  section  of  his  own,  and  the  three  rifles  of  Brown's 
Chesapeake  Battery,  under  Lieut.  Plater,  to  the  left  to 
replace  the  five  pieces  disabled  or  withdrawn. 

For  the  next  hour  and  a  half  an  artillery  duel,  in 
which  over  400  guns  took  part,  raged  over  the  whole 
field,  and  in  some  way  the  Confederate  batteries  man 
aged  to  hold  their  own  with  the  powerful  ordnance  of 

*Henderson,    p.    388. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  385 

the  Federals.  The  fire  of  Crutchfield's  three  groups  and 
Pelham's  guns  had  almost  alone  hurled  Meade  and 
Gibbon  back,  so  completely  sweeping  the  open  ground 
in  Walker's  front  that  the  attack  in  that  quarter  was 
not  renewed.  Meantime  Col.  Crutchfield  had  also 
directed  D'Aquin's  Battery,  and  the  Staunton  Battery 
under  Lieut.  Garber,  both  of  Latimer's  Battalion,  to 
join  Maj.  Pelham,  to  whom,  about  noon  during  the 
lull  succeeding  Meade's  repulse,  he  also  sent  Graham's 
10-pounder  Parrott  section  of  Poague's  Battery,  the 
rifled  section  of  the  3d  Howitzer's  under  Lieut.  Utz, 
and  a  short  while  later,  Watson's  2d  Howitzers  with 
two  10-pounder  Parrotts  and  a  brass  rifle,  and  one  3- 
inch  rifle  of  Dance's  Battery,  all  of  Col.  Brown's  Corps 
Reserve  then  being  held  in  readiness  behind  Hamilton's 
Crossing.  When  these  pieces  reached  Pelham,  Gen. 
Stuart  ordered  Col.  Rosser  to  take  one  of  Watson's 
rifles  under  Lieut.  Pleasants,  and  Dance's  piece,  and 
move  out  to  the  point  from  which  Pelham  had  fired  upon 
the  enemy  during  the  morning,  but  little  good  was  now 
accomplished  since  the  enemy's  flank  was  well  pro 
tected,  and  the  horses  and  gunners  suffered  greatly  be 
fore  the  pieces  were  retired. 

Nothing  had  been  accomplished  by  Reynolds'  at 
tack,  except  that  Gibbon  on  Meade's  right  had  suc 
ceeded,  with  great  loss,  in  driving  Brockenbrough's 
twelve  pieces  back  across  the  railroad,  the  artillery  on 
Jackson's  left  meanwhile  having  been  reenforced  by 
Latimer's  fresh  guns.  The  Confederate  line,  as  a  whole, 
remained  unshaken,  and  its  artillery,  which  had  borne 
the  brunt  of  the  contest,  with  a  few  exceptions,  had 
suffered  slight  loss,  that  having  been  more  than  made 
good  by  ordering  into  position  a  number  of  the  bat 
teries  which  had  been  held  in  reserve.  Truly  Second 
Manassas  was  being  repeated. 

Before  Reynolds'  attack  on  Jackson's  line  had  come 
to  a  standstill,  Burnside  about  11  A.  M.  had  ordered 
Sumner  to  make  a  diversion  against  Lee's  left  in  favor 
of  Franklin.  Unfortunately  for  Sumner  the  strongest 


25 


886  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

point  of  the  Confederate  position,  Marye's  Hill,  was 
designated  as  his  point  of  attack,  and  added  to  the  im 
pregnable  character  of  the  position  was  the  necessity 
of  his  crossing  the  mill  race  between  the  heights  and 
the  town  before  the  assaulting  columns  could  deploy. 
Having  crossed  the  obstacle,  however,  a  rise  in  the 
ground  enabled  the  Federals  to  deploy  under  cover. 
From  this  inequality  of  the  ground  the  land,  open  and 
somewhat  broken,  gently  rose  to  the  Telegraph  Road, 
at  the  base  of  Marye's  Hill.  Towards  the  left  of  the 
attacking  column,  the  Hazel  Run  ravine,  which  sepa 
rated  Marye's  Hill  from  Lee's  Hill,  or  Cabell's 
position,  ran  out  into  the  plain.  Along  the  depression 
ran  the  unfinished  roadbed  of  the  Fredericksburg  and 
Orange  Railroad,  which  branched  off  from  the  main 
line,  passing  southward  through  the  flats,  just  below 
the  town.  Between  the  old  railroad  bed,  and  the  Plank 
Road  lay  the  ground  over  which  Burnside  directed 
S limner  to  advance. 

At  the  base  of  the  hill  and  in  the  wide  roadbed  of  the 
Telegraph  Road,  sunken  about  four  feet  and  artificially 
prepared  by  throwing  dirt  forward  over  the  stone  wall 
which  bounded  it,  Gen.  Cobb  of  McLaws'  Division, 
with  three  regiments  of  infantry,  was  in  position.  From 
the  point  where  the  Telegraph  Road  struck  the  base  of 
Marye's  Hill  and  turned  southward,  the  Confederate 
line  was  prolonged  northward  to  the  Plank  Road  by  a 
shallow  trench,  in  which  the  24th  North  Carolina  lay. 
All  along  the  line  the  infantry  could  move  under  cover. 
To  the  rear  and  well  above  them,  occupying  a  front  of 
about  400  yards,  were  the  nine  gun-pits  of  Walton's  Bat 
talion,  supported  by  Cooke's  Brigade  of  Ransom's  Divi 
sion  200  yards  in  rear,  and  the  remaining  regiments  of 
the  same  division  400  yards  further  back  with  Moseley's 
Battery  of  6  guns.  Walton's  guns,  2  rifles  of  Maurin's 
and  3  pieces  of  Moody's  Battery  now  north  of  the  Plank 
Road,  bore  directly  upon  the  approaches  to  Marye's 
Hill,  and  Cabell's  and  Hamilton's  groups  on  Lee's  Hill 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  387 

were  able  to  cross  fire  in  its  front  with  Alexander's  and 
R.  H.  Anderson's  batteries  on  the  Stansbury  Hill,  but 
only  at  a  point  well  forward. 

S umner's  troops  had  been  formed  in  the  town  early 
in  the  morning,  French's  Division  of  the  2d  Corps  in 
the  lead.  When  Longstreet  detected  signs  of  their  ad 
vance,  he  directed  Alexander  "to  throw  a  hundred 
shells  down  the  streets  of  the  city,  and  towards  the 
(pontoon)  bridges,"  and  this  fire  had  hardly  begun 
when  French  moved  forward  about  noon,  Parker's, 
Rhett's,  Moody's,  and  Maurin's  batteries  continuing 
their  fire  all  the  while.  The  instant  French  cleared  the 
town,  Walton's  guns  opened  with  great  precision,  the 
effect  of  their  fire  being  so  destructive  that  Longstreet 
himself  sent  him  a  note  in  which  his  congratulations 
were  included,  urging  him  by  all  means  to  keep  his 
batteries  well  supplied  with  ammunition.*  Cabell's 
heavier  guns,  including  the  two  30-pounder  Parrotts 
under  Capts.  Barn  well  and  Nelson,  also  opened  with 
effect  until  French  succeeded  in  crossing  the  mill  race 
about  300  yards  from  the  town  and  so  sought  shelter 
behind  the  rise  400  yards  from  the  base  of  Marye's 
Hill.  Sturgis'  Division,  meanwhile,  had  been  directed 
to  support  French's  on  the  left.  Thrown  forward, 
Ferrero's  Brigade  and  Dickenson's  Battery  were 
immediately  brought  under  the  fire  of  Cabell's  guns  on 
Lee's  Hill,  which  completely  commanded  the  ravine 
and  the  unfinished  railroad  bed  by  means  of  which  the 
enemy  was  seeking  to  reach  the  right  rear  of  Marye's 
Hill.  The  conformation  of  the  ground  was  such  that 
Walton's  guns  were  unable  to  sweep  down  this  ravine. 
Dickenson  was  almost  immediately  killed,  and  his  bat 
tery  disabled  and  withdrawn.  Ferrero  was  checked  by 
Cabell's  fire  and  held  under  cover  of  a  depression  in  the 
ravine  from  which  his  men  engaged  in  a  heavy  musketry 
fire,  principally  upon  the  batteries  on  Lee's  Hill.  The 
various  brigades  and  divisions  which  during  the  day 
endeavored  to  advance  by  way  of  the  ravine  all  met  the 
same  fate.  It  was  simply  impassable  for  infantry. 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  LI,  p.  662. 


388  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

During  French's  deployment,  Arnold's  regular  bat 
tery  went  into  action  on  the  edge  of  the  town  and  opened 
upon  Marye's  Hill,  and  the  great  mass  of  guns  on 
Stafford  Heights,  which  had  been  shelling  the  Confed 
erate  position  generally,  now  concentrated  their  fire  on 
Walton's  batteries,  the  gunners  of  which  behind  their 
earthworks  devoted  their  energies  solely  to  the  infantry 
columns  of  French,  who  had,  after  deploying,  sent  for 
ward  three  regiments  of  skirmishers.  As  the  line  cleared 
the  cover  behind  which  the  Federals  had  deployed, 
Cobb's  Infantry  from  behind  the  stone  wall  rose  and 
opened  a  rapid  musketry  fire  upon  it  at  a  range  of  less 
than  500  yards,  and  Walton  now  began  to  hurl  canister 
at  the  enemy  until  the  skirmish  line  disappeared  be 
hind  a  low  terrace  about  250  yards  from  the  Confederate 
Infantry,  seizing  some  of  the  small  houses  on  the  Tele 
graph  Road  to  the  right.  The  remainder  of  Kimball's 
Brigade  now  reached  Col.  Mason's  three  regiments,  but 
as  Andrews'  and  Palmer's  brigades  left  their  cover  they 
were  swept  from  the  field  in  great  confusion  by  the 
fire  of  Walton's  and  Alexander's  guns,  a  few  only  reach 
ing  Kimball's  line,  the  great  majority  returning  to  their 
former  position.  After  eleven  separate  efforts  on  the 
part  of  the  Federals  to  reach  the  hill,  a  lull  of  about  20 
minutes  occurred  while  Hancock  was  preparing  to  at 
tack.  French,  Sturgis,  and  Griffin  had  all  been  re 
pulsed  with  great  loss,  and  the  Confederates  were  little 
shaken  by  the  tremendous  cannonade  of  the  Federal 
batteries,  although  they  had  lost  both  their  30-pounder 
Parrotts  by  explosion,  one  bursting  at  the  39th  and  the 
other  at  the  54th  round,  after  most  effective  use.  Near 
the  left  one  of  these  big  guns  under  Capt.  Nelson,  Gens. 
Lee,  Longstreet,  and  Pendleton  had  watched  the  awe- 
inspiring  conflict,  the  Chief  of  Artillery  himself  fre 
quently  directing  the  fire  of  the  big  piece.  Longstreet 
and  Pendleton  were  both  standing  within  10  feet  of  it 
when  it  burst.  A  smaller  Parrott  was  immediately  sub 
stituted,  and  orders  sent  to  Capt.  Lane  to  bring  the  big 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  389 

Whitworth  to  Lee's  Hill  from  its  position  below  the 
Massaponax  in  front  of  the  Yerby  house,  but  it  did  not 
arrive  until  after  dark. 

Before  Hancock  commenced  his  attack,  Longstreet, 
desiring  to  drive  Kimball's  men  from  behind  their 
cover,  directed  Capt.  O.  Latrobe  of  his  staff  to  take  a 
10-pounder  Parrott  of  Maurin's  Donaldsonville  Bat 
tery  from  out  its  pit,  and,  moving  it  forward  to  the  left, 
enfilade  the  enemy's  line.  The  attempt  meant  almost 
certain  destruction,  as  two  Federal  batteries  had  been 
concentrating  their  fire  throughout  the  morning  on 
Maurin's  gun-pits,  having  almost  silenced  his  pieces 
after  he  had  fired  about  200  rounds.  The  suggestion 
was  no  sooner  made  than  acted  upon,  however,  but  a 
staff  officer  alone  was  not  to  do  the  work,  for  Lieut. 
Landry  directed  his  gunners  to  move  the  pieces  forward 
by  hand  to  the  designated  position.  Before  the  first 
three  shots  were  fired,  five  gunners  were  down,  including 
the  corporal,  and  as  the  piece  was  loaded  for  the  fourth 
time,  it  was  struck  by  a  shell  which  destroyed  a  wheel. 
But  the  three  shots  directed  by  Landry  and  Latrobe 
were  not  wasted,  for  not  only  did  the  shells  burst  in  the 
very  midst  of  the  crouching  Federals,  but  the  daring 
deed,  seen  by  hundreds  of  the  Confederate  soldiers,  in 
spired  them  in  a  way  that  nothing  but  such  heroic  actions 
on  the  field  of  battle  can  do.  The  names  of  Lieut. 
Landry,  of  Corporal  Morel,  of  Cannoneers  Demon 
Leblanc,  Francis  Perez,  Claudius  Linossier,  Adolph 
Grilke,  and  Francis  Babin,  are  worthy  of  the  best  tra 
ditions  of  their  ancestors  who  fought  with  the  great 
Napoleon. 

Just  as  Hancock's  advance  commenced,  Ransom  sent 
Cooke's  Brigade  to  the  crest  of  Marye's  Hill,  one  regi 
ment  going  down  to  the  sunken  road  to  reenforce  the 
Georgia  regiments,  Cobb  having  been  killed  by  a  sharp 
shooter. 

Hancock's  superb  division  now  pressed  forward  in 
column  of  brigades  with  intervals  of  200  paces,  Cook 
leading,  then  Meagher,  with  Caldwell  in  rear.  Issuing 


390  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

from  the  town  under  a  terrific  artillery  fire,  they  formed 
along  the  canal,  and  then  charged  up  the  slope  towards 
the  sunken  road.  On  past  French's  isolated  skirmishers 
dashed  Hancock's  men.  As  they  advanced  up  the 
slopes  towards  the  Confederate  position,  the  support 
ing  batteries  from  the  Stafford  Heights  were  caused 
to  cease  firing  upon  Marye's  Hill  for  fear  of  throwing 
shells  among  their  own  infantry.  It  was  now  about  1 
p.  M.,  and  as  the  Federal  batteries  became  masked  the 
smooth-bore  or  lighter  Confederate  pieces  uncovered 
and  went  into  action,  adding  their  fire  to  that  of  the 
heavier  guns,  without  fear  of  the  hostile  artillery.  The 
Confederate  canister  swept  great  gaps  from  end  to  end 
through  the  Federal  column,  while  the  shells  bursting 
among  the  charging  lines  hurled  small  groups  of  men 
into  the  air.  As  they  swept  on  to  within  100  paces  of 
the  hill,  Walton's  guns  also  poured  canister  among  them, 
and  the  musketry  fire  both  from  the  sunken  road  and 
the  crest  of  Marye's  Hill  redoubled  in  intensity.  Under 
this  murderous  maelstrom  of  iron  and  lead,  the  Federal 
Infantry  was  at  last  checked,  and,  falling  like  leaves,  re 
tired  to  the  cover  which  marked  French's  farthest  ad 
vance,  but  not  until  a  number  of  the  bravest  men  had 
actually  approached  to  within  25  yards  of  the  sunken 
road,  only  to  be  shot  down  or  taken  prisoners. 
Meagher's  Brigade  kept  on  to  the  town.  Of  the  5,006 
men  led  forward  by  Hancock,  2,013  remained  dead  or 
wounded  upon  the  field.  In  the  sunken  road  and  on  the 
crest  were  less  than  2,000  infantry.  In  the  charge  of  400 
yards  they  could  not  have  averaged  more  than  two  shots 
apiece.  From  this  fact,  we  are  able  to  appreciate  what 
must  have  been  the  deadly  effect  of  the  Confederate 
guns.  In  several  of  the  Federal  accounts  of  the  bat 
tle,  it  is  stated  that  one-fifth  of  the  casualties  suffered 
by  Burnside  were  from  the  fire  of  artillery.  This  esti 
mate  covers  the  losses  on  the  whole  field,  so  that  in  the 
charge  of  Hancock's  Division  on  Marye's  Hill,  it  is  fair 
to  assume  that  not  less  than  half  of  the  losses  were  due 
to  the  artillery,  a  remarkable  record.  This  belief  is 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  391 

borne  out  by  the  fact  that  the  killed  were  found  in  great 
numbers  behind  cover  impenetrable  to  the  musket  balls. 

So  soon  as  the  Federal  batteries  were  unmasked  by 
the  withdrawal  of  Hancock's  troops,  the  short-range 
Confederate  guns  again  sought  cover  from  their  fire. 
A  lull  now  ensued,  and  only  the  field  batteries  near  the 
town  continued  to  fire  upon  Marye's  Hill,  Cabell  and 
Hamilton  concentrating  their  guns  upon  these. 

Hancock,  also,  had  been  severely  repulsed,  but 
Howard  was  moving  out  of  the  town  with  his  division 
to  renew  the  assault.  Meantime  the  four  Confederate 
regiments  in  the  sunken  road  were  reenforced  by  four 
more  while  the  infantry  force  on  the  forward  crest  was 
also  increased  by  Ransom,  and  additional  reserves 
brought  up  under  cover  of  the  ridge.  Behind  the  stone 
wall  the  Confederates  now  stood  in  four  ranks. 

Howard's  Division  charged  forward  as  gallantly  as 
had  Hancock's,  and  with  the  same  result.  Again  the 
assaulting  columns  masked  the  supporting  batteries, 
and  again  did  the  lighter  pieces  of  the  Confederates, 
more  effective  even  than  the  rifled  guns  at  short  range, 
uncover,  and  pour  canister  and  shell  into  the  dense  blue 
masses.  Here  and  there  the  Federals  sought  the  avail 
able  shelter,  but  most  of  those  who  escaped  unwounded 
retired  upon  the  town.  Fearing  a  counter  attack,  Gen. 
Couch  ordered  Hazard's  regular  battery  into  action 
near  the  edge  of  the  town  at  a  point  about  which  the  de 
feated  infantry  might  rally. 

It  was  now  3  p.  M.  and  four  of  the  five  divisions  under 
Sumner's  command  had  been  dashed  to  pieces  against 
Marye's  Hill,  and  two  under  Franklin  against  Prospect 
Hill.  In  neither  quarter  were  the  Confederates  shaken, 
but  Burnside  ordered  the  attack  to  be  renewed  all  along 
the  line. 

Meanwhile,  Poague  had  alone  been  engaging  Rey 
nolds'  batteries  with  his  20-pounder  section,  which  Col. 
Crutchfield  had  ordered  Col.  Brown  to  send  up  to 
Walker.  The  exact  range  of  the  Confederate  batteries 
having  been  obtained  by  the  enemy,  the  lighter  pieces 


892  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

were  withdrawn  again  to  cover.  While  bringing  up  the 
howitzer  section  of  Dance's  Battery,  Lieut.-Col.  Cole- 
man  of  the  Corps  Reserve  Battalion  was  severely 
wounded,  and  Lieut.  J.  B.  McCorkle  of  Poague's  Bat 
tery  was  killed.  Severe  losses  were  being  sustained 
from  the  accurate  fire  of  the  Federal  batteries.  It 
should  be  mentioned  here  that  Poague's  Battery  had, 
upon  receiving  orders  late  the  night  before  to  rejoin 
its  corps,  marched  16  miles  in  the  night  over  the  most 
difficult  half-frozen  roads,  in  four  hours,  a  fact  which 
seems  all  but  incredible. 

About  the  time  French  was  assaulting  Marye's  Hill, 
on  the  Confederate  left,  Reynolds  was  reforming  under 
the  cover  of  his  batteries  to  make  another  assault  on 
Jackson's  position.  Meade's  Pennsylvanians  were 
rallying,  Gibbon  was  constantly  strengthening  his 
line,  and  the  flank  was  well  protected  by  Doubleday, 
who  was  still,  however,  fully  occupied  by  Stuart's  dis 
mounted  men  and  Pelham's  guns.  When  Meade  and 
Gibbon  were  at  last  ready  to  renew  their  efforts,  Han 
cock  had  just  about  begun  his  assault  on  Marye's  Hill. 

Reynolds  had  posted  21  guns  on  the  right  of  Gibbon, 
and  30  on  the  left  of  Meade,  both  groups  near  the 
Richmond  Road,  those  on  the  Stafford  Heights  form 
ing  a  second  tier.  Preceded  by  clouds  of  skirmishers, 
and  under  cover  of  a  tremendous  artillery  fire,  Meade 
and  Gibbon  advanced  in  columns  of  brigades,  the  whole 
covering  a  front  of  about  a  thousand  yards.  As  they 
rushed  forward,  Crutchfield's  guns  opened  as  before, 
but  with  less  effect  than  formerly,  by  reason  of  the 
overwhelming  and  accurate  fire  of  the  batteries  of  the 
enemy  concentrated  on  his  positions,  hitherto  disclosed. 
Even  Pelham's  group  of  guns  was  receiving  full  at 
tention  from  the  enemy.  Those  portions  of  the  Federal 
line  opposite  Lane  and  Archer,  which  came  under  the 
direct  fire  of  Crutchfield's  guns,  were  soon  checked,  how 
ever,  but  the  center  reached  and  entered  the  tongue  of 
woods  extending  into  the  plain,  thus  at  once  threatening 
Archer's  left  and  Lane's  right  flank.  As  the  Federals 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  393 

swept  onward  through  the  wood  they  brushed  aside  the 
regiment  which  Archer  had  sent  into  the  thicket,  and, 
forcing  back  Lane's  and  Archer's  exposed  flanks,  took 
a  number  of  prisoners.  So  rapid  was  their  advance  that 
Gregg's  line  500  yards  in  rear  was  reached  almost  be 
fore  he  was  aware  of  the  enemy's  approach,  and  mis 
taking  the  charging  columns  for  a  Confederate  com 
mand  retreating,  he  was  struck  down  in  front  of  his 
brigade,  while  endeavoring  to  stay  its  fire.  A  desperate 
struggle  now  ensued  between  Gregg's  men  and  the  Fed 
erals,  a  part  of  the  former  having  been  thrown  into  con 
fusion  by  the  suddenness  of  the  attack.  But  Jackson, 
having  detected  the  victorious  advance  of  the  enemy, 
had  sent  for  Early's  and  Taliaferro's  divisions,  which 
soon  hastened  up  and,  threatening  to  surround  Sin 
clair's  Brigade  in  the  lead,  drove  it  back  in  confusion 
through  the  gap  into  which  it  had  penetrated,  involving 
Magenton's  supporting  brigade  in  the  disorderly  with 
drawal.  Hoke's  Brigade  of  Early's  Division  mean 
time  drove  off  the  Federals  who  had  carried  the 
trenches  on  Archer's  left,  and  the  whole  of  Meade's  Di 
vision  was  again  in  retreat.  Early  pursued  the  routed 
enemy  beyond  the  railroad,  but  as  Birney's  troops  of 
Hooker's  Corps  advanced  to  Meade's  assistance,  he  fell 
back  and  took  position  behind  the  embankment. 

While  Meade  was  forcing  his  way  through  the  center, 
Gibbon  was  engaged  in  an  assault  upon  A.  P.  Hill's 
left  center,  held  by  Lane.  Bringing  Hill's,  Thomp 
son's,  and  other  batteries  into  action  against  Davidson's 
and  Latimer's  guns  in  front  of  the  Bernard  cabins, 
Gibbon's  Division  advanced  in  three  lines,  the  first  two 
being  hurled  back  by  Lane's  musketry  and  the  left 
group  of  guns.  The  third  line  under  Root,  however, 
was  not  to  be  checked,  and  sweeping  over  Lane's 
trenches  drove  his  men  back  into  the  woods  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet.  But,  just  as  Early  and  Taliaferro  ar 
rived  and  drove  back  Sinclair's  leading  brigade  of 
Meade's  Division,  thus  uncovering  Root's  left  flank, 
Thomas'  Brigade  of  A.  P.  Hill's  Division,  which  had 


394  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

been  held  in  reserve  behind  Fender  on  the  left  of  Hill's 
line,  came  up  and  struck  Root's  exposed  right.  After 
a  stubborn  struggle,  Root's  Brigade  retired  in  confu 
sion  to  the  stage  road,  from  which  it  had  advanced. 

On  the  right  of  Reynolds  the  batteries  of  Smith's 
Corps  had  kept  up  a  heavy  cannonade  upon  the  guns 
of  Latimer  and  Davidson,  and  Frobel's  group  with 
Hood  north  of  Deep  Run,  but  it  was  not  until  about  3 
p.  M.,  after  Gibbon  and  Meade  had  both  been  repulsed, 
that  a  serious  effort  was  made  by  Brooks'  Division  of 
Smith's  Corps  to  seize  the  line  of  the  railroad  in  its  front. 
On  the  south  side  of  the  run  was  Fender's  Brigade,  of 
A.  P.  Hill's  Division,  with  skirmishers  behind  the  em 
bankment,  and  on  the  north  side  was  Law's  Brigade  of 
Hood's  Division.  Moving  under  cover  of  the  Deep 
Run  ravine,  the  Federals  came  upon  the  flank  of 
Fender's  advanced  line  and  drove  it  from  the  railroad, 
but  while  waiting  for  reinforcements,  two  regiments  of 
Law's  Brigade  and  one  of  Fender's  charged,  driving 
them  back  with  severe  loss  to  the  Richmond  Road  and 
reoccupying  the  line  of  embankment. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  the  Confederate  right 
when  Sickles'  Division  of  the  3d  Corps  came  up  to  the 
support  of  Reynolds  and  made  a  counter-attack  im 
practicable  on  the  part  of  Jackson.  Doubleday's  Divi 
sion,  on  Reynolds'  left,  had  been  completely  neutralized 
by  Stuart's  constant  threat,  and  the  fire  of  Pelham's 
guns.  Franklin's  efforts  had  thus  come  to  a  standstill 
by  2:30  p.  M.  Indeed,  he  was  not  only  defeated,  but 
had  probably  been  saved  the  loss  of  his  field  batteries 
by  the  timely  arrival  of  Sickles. 

When  about  3  P.  M.  Burnside's  order  came  to  Frank 
lin  to  renew  his  attack,  the  latter  took  upon  himself  the 
responsibility  of  remaining  quiet,  his  failure  to  obey 
the  orders  he  received  leading  to  his  subsequent  removal 
from  command.  The  sole  activity  on  his  part  for  the 
rest  of  the  day  was  a  heavy  artillery  fire  from  his  bat 
teries,  causing  considerable  loss  to  Crutchfield's  men. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  395 

About  3:30  p.  M.,  it  became  necessary  to  relieve 
Pegram's  and  Mclntosh's  batteries,  both  having  ex 
hausted  their  ammunition  and  suffered  severe  losses. 
The  fresh  batteries  of  the  corps  reserve  were  then 
brought  forward  to  take  the  place  of  the  batteries  with 
drawn,  and  Hupp's  Battery  was  sent  beyond  the  rail 
road  later  in  the  day,  to  drive  off  the  sharpshooters  of 
the  enemy,  which  had  for  some  time  annoyed  the 
gunners.  Col.  Brown's  six  batteries  lost  during  the  re 
mainder  of  the  day  no  less  than  10  killed  and  26 
wounded. 

At  1 :30  P.  M.,  Hooker  had  been  ordered  to  cross  the 
river  and  attack  Marye's  Hill,  but  with  a  knowledge  of 
what  had  befallen  French,  Hancock,  and  Howard,  and 
that  Franklin's  efforts  on  the  left  had  again  been  un 
successful,  he  urged  that  the  attempt  to  drive  Lee  from 
his  strong  position  be  abandoned,  at  least  for  the  day. 
But  Burnside  was  relentless. 

The  Confederates  employed  the  lull  during  Hooker's 
preparations  to  reenforce  the  force  in  the  sunken  road 
by  still  another  regiment,  and  to  bring  up  some  of  the 
reserves  to  the  infantry  position  along  the  crest.  Mean 
while  the  caissons  were  rapidly  being  refilled  from  the 
reserve  ammunition  train,  and  the  Artillery  was  gen 
erally  taking  a  long  breath  except  the  batteries  on 
Lee's  Hill,  which  continued  to  fire  on  the  Federal 
masses  near  the  town  and  in  the  Hazel  Run  ravine. 

With  eleven  regiments  in  the  sunken  road,  and  six  on 
the  forward  crest,  all  fully  resupplied  with  ammunition, 
Marye's  Hill  was  now  even  more  securely  held  than 
during  the  previous  attacks  upon  it.  The  fresh  assault 
was  preceded  by  the  heaviest  artillery  preparation  the 
Federals  had  yet  attempted.  Among  the  field  batteries 
Randall's  and  Hazard's  were  especially  active  and  ef 
fective. 

When  the  artillery  fire  was  at  its  height,  Hooker 
launched  Humphreys'  Division  along  the  Telegraph 
Road,  with  Sykes'  to  the  right  en  echelon.  As  these 
troops  advanced,  Griffin's  Division  moved  forward 


396  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

from  near  the  railroad  depot  and  joined  Humphreys' 
left.  Their  advance  to  the  line  occupied  by  the  men  of 
the  commands  which  had  preceded  them  was  quite  suc 
cessful  and  rapid,  for  they  were  all  but  free  from  the 
fire  of  artillery.  Just  after  the  attack  commenced  Col. 
Walton's  Battalion  had  exhausted  its  ammunition  and 
the  refilled  caissons  had  as  yet  failed  to  return  from  the 
ammunition  train  in  rear,  necessitating  the  substitution 
in  the  pits  of  other  pieces.  Col.  Alexander  had  held 
Woolfolk's  and  Jordan's  batteries  under  cover  of  the 
ridge  during  the  day  and  now,  quickly  ordering  for 
ward  the  four  pieces  of  the  former  and  two  guns  of  the 
latter,  he  undertook  to  relieve  Col.  Walton's  batteries 
in  the  face  of  a  heavy  fire,  losing  many  horses  and  men 
in  so  doing.  Moody  was  also  directed  to  transfer  three  of 
his  pieces  from  his  own  pits  to  the  left  to  those  formerly 
occupied  by  Capt.  Miller's  guns.  In  making  the  change 
a  piece  was  capsized  which  added  to  the  delay  in  open 
ing  fire  with  the  guns  which  did  not  begin  their  work 
until  the  enemy  was  within  300  yards  of  the  position. 
When  Alexander's  nine  guns  opened  upon  the  ad 
vancing  infantry  which  had  reached  the  cover  behind 
which  the  men  of  the  preceding  commands  were  lying, 
Humphreys'  leading  brigade  dropped  to  the  ground 
and  commenced  to  fire  wildly.  Walton's  guns  were 
now  seen  galloping  to  the  rear  and  the  rumor  sped  down 
the  Federal  line  that  the  hill  was  being  evacuated,  which 
enabled  Humphreys  to  get  his  men  to  their  feet.  Plac 
ing  himself,  mounted,  with  great  gallantry  at  their 
head,  he  induced  them  to  make  a  final  effort  to  cross 
the  200  yards  of  intervening  ground,  being  received  by 
a  whirlwind  of  musketry  fire  from  behind  the  stone 
wall,  and  canister  from  Alexander's  guns,  which  now 
opened  from  above.  But  when  the  brigade  came  within 
80  yards  of  the  Confederate  Infantry,  it  broke  and  fled 
to  the  rear.  Tyler's,  or  his  second  brigade  was  now 
coming  up,  and  Humphreys,  after  having  the  Federal 
batteries  directed  to  cease  firing,  again  essayed  to  lead 
his  men  to  the  Confederate  position,  with  a  view  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  397 

carrying  it  with  the  bayonet.  After  they  had  mingled 
for  a  time  with  those  seeking  cover  in  their  path,  as  in 
the  case  of  Allabach's  Brigade,  Humphreys  was  also 
able  to  lead  Tyler's  men  forward,  but  all  in  vain.  The 
shriveling  fire  of  the  Confederates  simply  swept  them 
from  the  field.  Over  1,000  men  of  the  division  com 
manded  by  the  noble  Humphreys  lay  killed  and 
wounded  upon  the  ground. 

Added  to  the  fire  of  the  guns  on  Marye's  Hill,  was 
that  of  Parker's  Battery,  which  Alexander  had  posted 
near  the  Stansbury  house.  The  fire  of  this  battery  was 
so  oblique  that  many  of  the  Federal  officers  mistook  it 
for  the  fire  of  their  own  guns  from  the  rear. 

Griffin's  Division,  exposed  to  the  fire  of  Cabell's  and 
Hamilton's  guns,  had  been  checked  on  the  left  of 
Humphreys,  and  Hooker,  seeing  their  failure,  had  re 
called  Sykes.  Although  several  fresh  brigades  pressed 
forward  to  Griffin's  most  advanced  line  before  dark, 
when  night  fell  the  Federals  had  been  hopelessly  de 
feated,  and  the  shattered  troops  under  cover  of  Sykes' 
Division,  which  was  sent  forward  about  11  p.  M.  to  re 
lieve  them,  withdrew  to  the  town  or  were  reformed 
along  the  canal  bank  and  from  thence  retired  from  the 
field. 

The  Confederate  fire  ceased  only  when  the  flashes 
of  the  Federal  guns  no  longer  gave  targets,  but  no 
one  in  Lee's  army  conceived  that  the  battle  was  over,  for 
only  four  of  the  nine  Confederate  divisions  had  been  en 
gaged.  Nor  had  Burnside  himself  abandoned  the  idea  of 
driving  the  Confederates  from  their  positions,  proposing 
during  the  night  to  form  the  Ninth  Corps  in  column  of 
regiments  and  lead  it  in  person  against  Marye's  Hill 
at  dawn.  During  the  night  he  issued  the  necessary 
orders  for  the  renewal  of  the  attack,  but  subsequent  to 
the  issuance  of  these  orders,  he  was  dissuaded  by 
certain  of  his  officers  from  making  another  effort.  This 
was  very  fortunate  for  the  Ninth  Corps,  for  a  copy 
of  the  order  directing  it  to  assault  at  dawn  had  come 
into  the  possession  of  the  Confederates.  With  full 


398  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

knowledge  of  the  plan  of  attack,  and  the  point  to  be 
assaulted,  Longstreet  had  strengthened  his  intrench- 
ments  and  the  force  holding  them,  and  had  caused  most 
careful  arrangements  to  be  made  during  the  night  for 
reenforcing  the  front  line,  and  supplying  the  men  en 
gaged  with  water  and  ammunition.  Every  gun  which 
could  be  spared  from  other  parts  of  the  line  was  brought 
up  by  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  and  placed  in  a  covered 
position,  from  which  it  would  bear  directly  upon  the 
ground  over  which  the  dense  Federal  column  was  to  at 
tack,  and  a  long  line  of  reserve  caissons  was  placed  im 
mediately  behind  the  ridge  from  the  filled  chests  of 
which  a  plentiful  supply  of  ammunition  could  be 
quickly  drawn  for  the  already  well  provided  batteries. 
Not  a  serviceable  piece  was  left  in  reserve,  except  those 
the  gun  detachments  of  which  were  so  depleted  and  ex 
hausted  as  to  render  them  unfit  for  further  exertions, 
such  being  the  case  with  Maurin's  Battery,  which  was 
relieved  by  Moody's  24-pounder  howitzer  section,  and 
a  rifled  piece  of  Jordan's  Battery.  The  12-pounder 
howitzer  section  of  Moody's  and  the  6-pounder  section 
of  Woolfolk's  batteries  had  also  to  be  relieved. 

Maj.  Nelson's  battalion  of  6-pounder  batteries  was 
so  disposed  as  to  be  able  completely  to  sweep  the  ascent 
to  Lee's  Hill,  and  Walton's  Battalion,  much  damaged, 
was  held  immediately  in  rear  of  Marye's  Hill. 

During  the  night,  Capt.  Parker  discovered  a  position 
from  which  the  canal  bank  in  his  front  could  be  en 
filaded,  and  the  Federals  thus  prevented  from  forming 
under  cover  as  before.  Col.  Alexander  immediately 
ordered  Moody  to  take  his  12-pounder  section  which 
had  been  relieved,  filling  up  his  detachments  from 
Woolfolk's  Battery,  and  construct  pits  for  his  guns  in 
this  position. 

Fearing  lest  Burnside  might  renew  the  attack  under 
cover  of  darkness,  Gen.  Pendleton  with  the  assistance 
of  his  staff  prepared  a  number  of  incendiary  shells,  with 
which  the  buildings  along  the  Telegraph  Road  in  front 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  399 

of  the  Confederate  position  might  be  set  on  fire,  thus 
illuminating  the  field,  but  as  events  turned  out  these 
shells  were  not  used. 

On  the  right,  Jackson  had  brought  up  to  his  front 
line  every  battery  in  his  corps  capable  of  going  into 
action.  Capts.  Carter  and  Latimer,  Acting  Chiefs  of 
Artillery,  of  D.  M.  Hill's  and  Early's  (Swell's)  divi 
sions,  respectively,  had  the  day  before  fully  engaged 
all  their  batteries  towards  the  close  of  the  day,  and  the 
corps  reserve  had  also  been  entirely  engaged  in  order 
to  relieve  Walker's  batteries.  The  latter,  meantime, 
had  found  time  to  rest  and  refit. 

In  the  Confederate  ranks  the  utmost  confidence  of 
administering  a  more  crushing  repulse  than  had  been 
previously  administered  to  the  Federals  was  enter 
tained,  and  the  men,  especially  the  gunners,  the  effect  of 
whose  fire  was  more  noticeable  than  that  of  the  infantry, 
awaited  the  enemy's  attack  with  keen  impatience. 
Never  in  the  history  of  war,  perhaps,  was  an  army  on 
the  defense  more  willing  to  be  attacked  by  overwhelm 
ing  numbers.  The  Confederates  were  even  anxious 
less  Burnside  might  fail  to  hurl  his  masses  upon  them, 
the  plan  of  the  latter  having  been  fully  disclosed  to  the 
troops  in  order  to  expedite  the  necessary  preparations 
which  had  to  be  made  during  the  night.  Not  only  were 
those  upon  whom  the  assault  was  expected  to  be  made 
pleased  to  occupy  the  post  of  greatest  danger,  but  the 
men  in  less  threatened  quarters  were  disappointed  that 
the  brunt  of  the  fighting  was  not  to  fall  upon  them.  In 
their  zest  for  the  fray,  there  was  even  something  savage, 
though  not  inhuman.  It  was  simply  the  desire  of  strong 
men  to  strike  hard  when  the  time  came.  So  when  the 
day  at  last  broke,  the  Confederates  eagerly  looked  and 
listened  for  signs  of  Burnside's  advance.  The  long 
hours  passed  away  in  silence  until  about  10  o'clock, 
when  the  fog  lifted  and  a  vicious  sharp  shoot  ing  broke 
out  from  Sykes'  regulars  in  front  of  Marye's  Hill.  A 
desultory  cannonade  from  Stafford  Heights  also  com 
menced. 


400  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Seeing  Sykes'  men  lying  down  in  the  swale,  and,  in 
the  language  of  Burnside,  "holding  the  first  ridge," 
Capt.  Moody,  from  the  advantageous  position  in  which 
he  had  placed  his  12-pounders,  opened  upon  them  from 
their  right.  The  Federals  were  amazed,  and,  after  a 
few  shots  from  Moody's  guns,  those  who  were  unable 
to  find  fresh  shelter  broke  and  fled  to  the  town,  pursued 
by  the  fire  of  the  guns  on  Marye's  Hill.  This  ended 
for  the  day  the  annoying  sharpshooting  from  the  "first 
ridge." 

The  day  wore  on  without  any  serious  effort  being 
made  by  the  Federals,  whose  batteries  across  the  river 
all  but  ceased  firing  on  Marye's  Hill,  by  reason  of  a 
number  of  premature  explosions  of  their  shells  having 
caused  losses  among  their  infantry  in  advance  of  the 
town.  Relieved  of  the  fire  of  these  batteries  as  well  as 
of  that  of  the  sharpshooters,  the  Confederate  gunners 
were  free  to  work  in  their  pits  and  continued  to  fire 
throughout  the  day  upon  any  masses  which  appeared  in 
or  about  the  town. 

During  the  night  of  the  14th,  the  earthworks  and 
lines  were  still  further  strengthened  by  the  Confeder 
ates,  abattis  being  prepared  and  arrangements  of  all 
kinds  for  defense  being  more  fully  completed.  A  large 
supply  of  ammunition  arriving  from  Richmond,  the 
ordnance  trains  moved  up  closer  to  the  Confederate 
position,  and  even  more  batteries  were  now  ready  to  re 
sume  activities.  But  again,  on  the  15th,  the  Federals 
remained  inactive,  while  the  Confederates  worked 
openly  at  their  defenses,  and  that  night  in  the  midst  of 
a  heavy  storm,  the  noise  of  the  wind  preventing  his 
movements  from  being  heard  by  his  enemy,  Gen. 
Burnside  withdrew  his  tremendous  army  from  the 
plain,  crossing  the  Rappahannock  with  all  the  troops 
and  guns  between  7  p.  M.  the  15th  and  7  A.  M.  the  16th. 
The  feat  was  a  superb  one,  and,  as  Gen.  Alexander 
states,  its  successful  accomplishment  reflected  upon  the 
vigilance  of  the  Confederates.  The  real  opportunity 
for  the  use  of  Pendleton's  incendiary  shells  was  lost. 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  401 

Had  Burnside's  movement  been  detected,  the  river 
crossing  lit  up  by  the  flames  of  nearby  buildings  would 
have  presented  a  rare  spectacle  to  the  Confederates. 
A  few  shells  from  the  longer  range  pieces,  the  Whit- 
worth  and  Poague's  20-pounder  Parrotts,  for  instance, 
would  most  certainly  have  thrown  the  Federal  columns 
into  confusion,  or  forced  them  to  forego  the  crossing 
and  remain  in  the  plain.  Had  they  persisted  in  the  at 
tempt  to  cross  the  river  a  second  Borodino  would  have 
ensued,  for  sending  only  a  part  of  his  infantry  forward 
to  the  town,  with  perhaps  a  dozen  short-range  batteries, 
Gen.  Lee  would  have  been  able  to  throw  Burnside's 
army  into  a  veritable  panic.  Meanwhile,  the  bulk  of 
his  army  with  the  longer  range  batteries  could  have 
held  the  position  against  a  possible  reverse,  the  guns 
neutralizing  to  some  extent  the  batteries  on  Stafford 
Heights.  But  those  batteries  would  in  all  probability 
have  been  unable  to  fire  upon  Lee's  pursuing  columns, 
all  but  mingled  with  the  enemy,  and  it  is  quite  im 
probable  that  in  the  circumstances  Burnside's  troops 
would  have  remained  sufficiently  in  hand  to  deliver  an 
effective  counter-stroke.  Night,  the  noise  and  confu 
sion  incident  to  the  storm,  the  turbulence  of  the  river, 
the  uncertainty  of  the  number  of  the  enemy  upon  their 
heels,  and  the  inevitable  losses  which  even  the  few  Con 
federates  would  have  been  able  to  inflict  upon  the  strug 
gling  masses  at  the  bridges  and  the  crowded  approaches 
thereto,  are  all  elements  which  would  have  contributed 
to  a  direful  disaster  to  the  Federal  Army.  It  is  in 
deed  a  grave  question  whether,  when  once  the  with 
drawal  had  begun,  Burnside  could  have  held  a  rear 
guard  in  position.  But  assuming  that  he  could  have 
held  off  the  Confederates,  he  would  have  at  least 
suffered  tremendous  losses  at  the  bridges  and  the  al 
most  certain  loss  of  his  rear  guard,  or  been  forced  to 
forego  the  withdrawal.  There  would  have  then  re 
mained  for  him  the  alternative  of  renewing  the  effort 
to  cross  the  river  a  succeeding  night,  or  the  task  of 
cutting  his  way  out  of  the  plain  through  Lee's  position. 


402  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

A  subsequent  attempt  to  recross  the  river  would  have 
been  anticipated  by  Lee,  whose  preparations  to  pre 
vent  the  withdrawal  would  have  been  complete,  and 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  other  assaults  on 
the  Confederate  position  would  have  been  more  dis 
astrous  than  those  already  made.  Indeed,  Burnside's 
Army,  conscious  of  the  cul-de-sac  in  which  it  had  been 
placed,  would  have  been  in  much  the  same  plight  as  that 
of  the  French  Army  at  Sedan.  Desperation,  unattended 
by  discipline  and  confidence,  would  have  taken  the 
place  of  the  fine  morale  which  inspired  the  Federals  in 
their  first  attacks,  and  while,  no  doubt,  they  would  have 
defended  themselves  with  the  stubbornness  of  the  wild 
animal  driven  to  bay,  the  army  would  have  been  utterly 
lacking  in  cohesion  and  that  collective  will-power  which 
makes  successful  effort  possible.  Surely  it  cannot  be 
argued  that  in  such  circumstances  Burnside  could  have 
secured  that  cooperation  which  under  the  most  favor 
able  conditions  he  had  failed  to  attain. 

The  inertia  of  the  Confederates  is  difficult  to  explain. 
The  escape,  for  escape  it  was  in  every  sense  of  the 
word,  of  Burnside  was  but  the  realization  of  the  fear 
which  had  led  both  Lee  and  Jackson  originally  to  op 
pose  the  defensive  position  of  Fredericksburg.  True, 
Jackson  had  urged  a  counter- stroke  in  the  form  of  a 
night  attack  on  the  13th,  his  proposition  being  over 
ruled  as  too  hazardous.  Gen.  Lee's  views  on  this  point 
were  no  doubt  well  considered  and  correct,  for  the  con 
ditions  on  that  night  were  by  no  means  similar  to  those 
obtaining  two  nights  later.  The  very  essentials  of  the 
Confederate  ability  to  destroy  Burnside's  army  lay  in 
the  latter's  attempt  at  recrossing  the  river,  no  thought 
of  which  was  entertained  by  the  Federals  when  Jack 
son  proposed  to  attack  them.  But  Gen.  Lee  had  every 
reason  to  believe  that  Burnside  would  make  another 
great  effort  to  drive  him  from  his  position,  the  very 
order  for  the  attack  being  in  his  hands.  There  was 
every  indication  that  the  Federal  effort  was  but  post- 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  403 

poned,  and  he  believed  that  his  task  of  destroying  the 
enemy  would  be  all  the  more  simple  after  the  latter  had 
received  another  crushing  repulse. 

Yet,  while  Gen.  Lee's  tactical  attitude  may  be  rea 
sonably  explained,  the  question  arises,  why  was  he  not 
informed  of  the  move  in  the  game  which  would,  if 
known  to  him,  have  required  aggressive  action?  The 
same  answer  has  to  be  made  to  this  question  that  has 
been  made  to  many  others — imperfect  provision  for 
securing  information.  In  this  instance  no  one  in  par 
ticular  was  at  fault.  The  men  were  exhausted  by  cold, 
hunger,  and  long  sustained  effort.  For  hours  they  had 
remained  under  the  greatest  tension  of  expectancy,  and 
at  last  when  it  became  apparent  to  all  that  the  enemy 
would  not  assault  in  the  blinding  storm,  the  nervous  re 
laxation  was  overpowering.  Not  only  did  the  out 
posts,  videttes,  and  contact  patrols  naturally  seek 
shelter  from  the  elements,  thereby  blinding  the  army 
as  a  whole,  but  Burnside  took  every  precaution  to  see 
that  they  should  remain  in  their  blind  security  and  as 
surance  that  no  offensive  move  would  be  made  by  him. 
Thus  coupled  with  the  negative  efforts  of  Lee's  out 
posts,  were  the  positive  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  keep 
them  in  darkness. 

To  the  cavalry  especially  no  blame  whatever  should 
attach  in  connection  with  Burnside's  withdrawal.  The 
peculiar  situation  of  the  two  armies  was  such  as  to  pre 
clude  its  presence  except  on  the  flanks,  and  in  its 
proper  sphere  of  action  Stuart's  brigades  had  more  than 
done  their  duty.  Particularly  was  this  true  as  regards 
Lee's  right  flank,  where  Stuart  and  Pelham  both 
rendered  splendid  service.  Recognizing  that  a  large 
cavalry  force  assigned  to  the  duty  of  guarding  a  flank 
should  not  remain  passive  and  merely  wait  until  it 
suited  the  enemy's  turning  columns  to  move  against  it 
and  drive  it  back,  Stuart  had  adopted  the  adage  that 
"prevention  is  better  than  cure"  and  had  hung  on  the 
enemy's  flank,  thereby  meeting  him  more  than  half  way. 
He  clearly  saw  that  by  pushing  forward  into  contact 


404  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

with  the  enemy's  flank,  any  enveloping  movement  on 
the  latter's  part  would  be  abandoned,  unless  in  force,  or 
in  any  circumstances  the  enemy's  infantry  masses  could 
be  delayed  sufficiently  long  to  enable  Gen.  Lee  to  make 
the  necessary  dispositions  to  meet  them.  Stuart's 
tactics  at  Fredericksburg  might  well  have  contained  a 
lesson  for  Kuropatkin's  cavalry  at  Mukden,  where 
great  masses  of  troopers  remained  inert  on  a  line  with, 
or  in  rear  of,  the  flank  they  were  supposed  to  protect, 
waiting  for  the  Japanese  to  arrive  before  even  the  mere 
intelligence  of  their  coming  was  transmitted.* 

Pelham  has  for  all  time  illustrated  the  power  of  guns 
in  the  hands  of  a  dashing  and  energetic  horse  artillery 
man,  associated  with  a  bold  cavalry  leader.  Almost  un 
aided  and  with  a  single  piece  he  entirely  neutralized 
Doubleday's  whole  infantry  division  throughout  the 
critical  hours  of  the  battle  after  first  breaking  the  shock 
of  Meade's  column  already  moving  to  the  assault. 
Hanging  upon  the  exposed  flank  of  the  enemy,  appear 
ing  and  reappearing  when  and  where  least  expected, 
like  a  gnat  in  the  eye  of  a  great  beast,  he  was  never 
driven  from  the  field,  but,  retiring  to  a  more  secure 
position  from  which  at  any  time  he  was  free  to  return 
to  the  immediate  flank  of  his  opponent,  he  brought  more 
and  heavier  guns  into  action.  Thus  when  his  original 
liberty  of  action  was  denied  him,  he  did  not  remain  idle, 
but  constantly  maintained  his  threat  as  a  cavalryman, 
while  rendering  yeoman  service  as  a  light  artilleryman.! 
And  so,  it  may  be  remarked,  the  study  of  Fredericks- 
burg  is  fruitful  of  many  positive  lessons  in  the  tactics 
of  the  mounted  arm,  both  for  its  troopers  and  its 
gunners. 

As  to  the  tactical  employment  of  the  artillery  in  gen 
eral,  little  need  be  said,  for  the  narrative  of  events  has 
already  disclosed  lessons  which  the  most  casual  reader 
could  not  fail  to  detect.  As  an  example  of  the  manner 
in  which  an  inferior  artillery  should  be  employed, 

'Cavalry  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  Count  Gustav  Wrangel. 
fHorse  artillery  is  cavalry  in  one  sense  of  the  word. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  405 

Fredericksburg  has  few  superiors.  The  expectations 
which  prompted  the  disposition  of  the  Confederate  guns 
were  more  than  realized.  Refusing  to  sacrifice  his  ar 
tillery  in  a  duel  against  great  odds,  Lee  simply  held  the 
bulk  of  it  under  cover  until  the  superior  guns  of  the 
enemy  were  masked,  whereupon  it  went  into  action  with 
the  utmost  liberty  and  effect.  Generally  speaking,  only 
his  heavier  ordnance  was  pitted  against  the  artillery  of 
the  enemy,  and  that  was  protected  by  intrenchments 
which  Sharpsburg  had  taught  to  be  necessary.  Thus 
the  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy's  guns  was  in 
a  measure  offset  by  art. 

Fredericksburg  was  in  a  much  higher  degree  than 
either  Second  Manassas  or  Sharpsburg  an  artillery  af 
fair.  The  Federal  Army  was  overthrown  by  the  guns 
of  Lee's  army.  The  fact  that  Burnside  was  vastly 
superior  to  Lee  in  point  of  artillery  is  the  best  evidence 
of  the  service  the  Confederate  gunners  rendered.  One- 
half  of  Lee's  infantry,  or  five  out  of  nine  infantry  divi 
sions  were  engaged,  while  the  batteries  which  crowned 
the  heights  above  them  were  in  almost  continuous  action. 
When  Pendleton,  Alexander,  Brown,  Cabell,  Walker, 
Pelham,  Hamilton,  Nelson,  Jones,  Carter,  and  Latimer 
contemplated  the  extent  to  which  they  had  warded  off 
the  blow  directed  at  the  gallant  infantry,  they  must 
have  experienced  a  feeling  of  supreme  satisfaction  in 
the  knowledge  that  they  had  done  their  duty.  No 
higher  ambition  can  come  to  the  gunner  than  to  merit 
the  full  confidence  of  his  sister  arm.  It  should  be  his 
one  desire,  as  it  is  his  duty,  to  relieve  the  infantry  of  so 
much  of  the  shock  of  battle,  as  he  can  divert  to  himself, 
even  if  he  succumb  under  the  blow.  By  such  unselfish 
conduct  alone  can  he  win  the  esteem  and  the  confidence 
of  the  whole  army  and  instill  in  the  breasts  of  his  com 
rades  in  arms  that  affectionate  regard  for  the  artillery 
which  Lee's  gunners  had  won  for  their  arm  before  the 
close  of  1862.  No  spirit  of  caste  jealousy  now  existed 
between  the  gunners  and  the  infantry  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  No  feeling  on  the  part  of  either 


406  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

that  they  had  left  aught  undone  which  they  well  might 
have  done  made  them  resentful  of  the  other's  prowess 
and  attainments.  Only  a  feeling  of  mutual  respect 
existed  between  them,  and  willingly  the  infantry  pressed 
to  the  roadside  to  help  forward  their  batteries.  For  each 
there  was  an  allotted  task  and  confidence  in  the  other's 
ability  to  perform  the  work  assigned  it  was  mutual.  The 
esprit  de  corps  of  many  of  the  batteries  was  superb. 
They  were  but  clans  with  tartans  distinct,  their  chief 
tains  known  to  all,  and  as  some  gallant  gunner  at  the 
head  of  his  battery  galloped  to  the  front,  the  infantry 
men  by  the  wayside,  or  in  the  trenches,  vied  with  each 
other  in  springing  to  their  feet  to  wave  a  generous  sa 
lute  of  recognition.  In  the  advancing  rush  and  rumble 
of  the  guns,  there  was  an  inspiring  note  for  the  foot 
soldier,  and  in  the  knowledge  that  no  sacrifice  in  their 
support  would  be  too  great  for  the  infantry,  there  was 
encouragement  to  the  gunners  to  make  that  sacrifice  un 
necessary.  The  entente  cordiale  existing  between  the 
sister  arms  was  the  natural  consequence  of  services 
rendered.  It  could  never  have  arisen  from  mere 
theoretical  potency.  What  soldier  of  Jackson's  army 
could  suppress  his  admiration  for  Pelham  and  his  men, 
who  under  the  very  eyes  of  the  whole  corps  had  with 
dauntless  courage  assailed,  unaided,  a  Federal  division? 
What  soldier  of  Longstreet's  Corps  whose  heart  failed 
to  respond  to  the  emotions  which  such  deeds  as  those 
of  Landry  and  of  Parker  are  wont  to  generate? 

Verily  the  plain  of  Fredericksburg  was  an  amphi 
theatre  upon  which  the  Confederate  Artillery  won  the 
proud  acclaims  of  a  martial  race,  the  leaders  of  which, 
whether  friend  or  foe,  have  echoed  their  applause 
through  the  pages  of  history.  Gens.  Lee,  Longstreet, 
Jackson,  A.  P.  Hill,  McLaws,  in  fact  all  the  Confed 
erate  commanders,  in  their  reports  of  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg,  speak  again  and  again  of  the  "rapid," 
"destructive,"  "well-directed,"  "demoralizing,"  "mur 
derous,"  "accurate,"  "efficacious"  fire  and  "extraordi 
nary"  effect  of  their  guns  at  all  points,  and  of  the  "un- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  407 

flinching"  courage,  "unshaken  steadiness,"  "animation 
and  spirit"  with  which  they  were  "admirably  served," 
and  repeatedly  mention  with  high  commendation  indi 
vidual  commanders  and  batteries. 

The  tribute  paid  the  Confederate  Artillery  by  the 
Federal  commanders  is  even  more  emphatic  as  to  the 
important  and  preeminent  part  it  played  in  the  re 
pulse  of  Burnside's  Army.  Their  reports — from  those 
of  Gens.  Burnside,  Franklin,  Sumner,  Hooker,  French, 
Hancock,  Howard,  Couch,  Meade,  Reynolds,  Birriey, 
and  Doubleday,  to  those  of  officers  commanding  bri 
gades,  regiments,  companies,  and  especially  batteries,— 
characterize  the  fire  of  the  opposing  artillery  as  mur 
derous,  deadly,  terrific,  destructive,  continuous,  severe, 
galling,  vigorous,  furious,  heavy,  enfilading,  cross,  and 
concentrated.  In  some  instances  special  reference  is 
made  to  the  effect  of  individual  batteries  or  guns,  which 
unless  exceptionally  well  served  would  have  made  no 
particular  individual  impression. 

But  of  all  the  encomiums  bestowed  by  the  com 
manders  of  high  or  low  degree,  the  most  prized  by  the 
soldiery  of  the  Army  was  that  epithet,  dearer  than 
life  itself  to  a  soldier,  which  Lee  himself  applied  to  a 
gunner  when  he  wrote  in  his  report  of  the  heroic  exploit 
of  "the  gallant  Pelham."  Was  it  mere  opportunity, 
was  it  fate,  or  was  it  genius  which  enabled  this  youth  to 
act  such  an  heroic  part  upon  the  stage  of  immortality? 
Glorious  indeed  was  that  feat  which  wrested  from  a 
great  commander  such  mention  of  a  subaltern's  name  in 
a  brief  account  of  so  great  a  battle.* 

Of  the  battery  expenditures  in  the  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg  there  is,  as  in  the  case  of  Sharpsburg,  no 
record. 

The  losses  of  the  Artillery  as  itemized,  and  only  in 
part  separated  from  those  of  the  infantry,  aggregate 
about  50  killed  and  250  wounded.  The  entire  loss 
probably  exceeded  400,  or  about  10  per  cent  of  the  per 
sonnel  engaged.  This  figure  is  relatively  enormous,  as 

*Gen.  Lee's  report  of  the  whole  battle  of  Fredericksburg  covers  less  than 
two  pages  in  the  Official  Records. 


408  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

compared  with  the  losses  of  the  Confederate  Army, 
which  were  608  killed  and  4,116  wounded.  Col. 
Walker's  Battalion  alone  lost  11  killed  and  88  wounded, 
including  a  disproportionate  number  of  officers,  while 
Brown's  Battalion  lost  10  killed  and  26  wounded.  The 
batteries  of  Taliaferro's  Division,  under  Brocken- 
brough,  lost  2  killed  and  28  wounded,  while  Pelham's 
casualties  were  3  killed  and  22  wounded,  and  Latimer's 
4  killed  and  21  wounded. 

On  the  left  the  artillery  was  less  exposed  to  the 
musketry  fire  of  the  infantry  and  the  losses  of  Alex 
ander's,  Cabell's,  and  Hamilton's  batteries,  principally 
by  reason  of  the  pits  which  protected  the  detachments, 
were  less  than  those  sustained  by  Jackson's  gunners,  al 
though  they  were  more  constantly  engaged. 

The  heaviest  individual  losses  were  those  of  Poague's 
Battery,  in  which  the  casualties  were  6  killed  and  10 
wounded  of  a  personnel  of  60  men ;  and  Carpenter's,  in 
which  the  losses  were  1  killed  and  25  wounded  out  of 
65  men. 

While  the  Confederates  lost  no  guns  and  captured 
none,  the  loss  of  the  batteries  in  horses  was  especially 
heavy.  Long  exposure  to  the  elements  in  the  severe 
weather  which  had  prevailed  added  a  heavy  toll  to  the 
number  killed  in  action. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  WINTER  OF  1862-63 KELLYSVILLE  AND  THE  DEATH 

OF  PELHAM — "THE  GALLANT,  THE  INCOM 
PARABLE" REORGANIZATION  AGAIN 

THE  battle  of  Fredericksburg  was  over,  but  Burn- 
side's  army  rested  securely  under  the  protection  of  its 
batteries  beyond  the  river,  the  Confederates  still  hold 
ing  with  their  pickets  the  line  formerly  occupied  by 
them.  The  troops,  meanwhile,  were  withdrawn  and  im 
mediately  commenced  the  construction  of  cabins,  huts, 
and  every  form  of  shelter  both  for  the  men  and  horses, 
but  all  remained  near  at  hand  in  rear  of  their  positions 
in  line.  Walton's  three  batteries  and  a  number  of  others 
were  at  first  left  in  position  on  outpost  duty,  but  most 
of  these  were  withdrawn  to  the  rear  on  the  18th.  The 
signal  for  the  various  batteries,  brigades,  and  divisions 
to  hasten  back  to  the  lines  was  to  be  given  by  Ander 
son's  batteries  on  the  left,  if  danger  threatened  in  that 
quarter,  and  by  one  of  Hood's  or  Pickett's  batteries  if 
on  the  right,  in  either  case  repeated  by  Cabell.  On  the 
morning  of  the  19th  undue  activity  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy,  his  bridges  still  being  intact,  caused  the  alarm 
to  be  given,  and  immediately  the  troops  moved  forward 
to  repel  an  attack,  but  the  alarm  proved  to  be  a  false 
one  and  the  Confederates  returned  to  their  unfinished 
camps. 

As  soon  as  actual  hostilities  ceased,  many  citizens  of 
Fredericksburg  returned  to  their  homes  and  all  orders 
to  destroy  the  enemy's  bridges  were  countermanded,  for 
fear  of  drawing  the  fire  of  the  hostile  batteries  upon  the 
town.  The  suffering  of  the  people  had  been  great 
enough,  many  returning  to  find  their  dwellings  in  ashes 
and  their  effects  destroyed  or  removed.  So  great  were 
the  hardships  imposed  upon  the  residents  of  Fredericks 
burg  that  Gen.  Longstreet  invited  his  troops  in  a  gen 
eral  order  of  the  18th  to  contribute  to  a  fund  for  their 


410  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

relief.  The  response  from  the  soldiery  was  immediate. 
The  officers  and  men  of  the  Washington  Artillery  Bat 
talion  had  previously  collected  a  purse  of  $1,391  for  the 
relief  of  the  Charlestonians,  whose  more-pressing 
wants,  however,  having  been  adequately  supplied,  they 
now  unanimously  voted  to  divert  the  fund  to  the  aid  of 
the  destitute  people  of  Fredericksburg.  Thus  we  see 
that  these  generous  Louisianians  not  only  contributed 
their  blood  and  valour  to  the  defense  of  Virginia,  but 
gave  of  their  wealth  for  the  alleviation  of  her  people's 
suffering  as  well. 

On  the  24th,  by  reason  of  the  scarcity  of  forage,  it 
became  necessary  to  disperse  the  batteries  of  the  Army. 
Lane's  Battery  of  the  General  Reserve,  Rhett's  of 
Alexander's  Corps  Reserve,  Lewis'  of  Anderson's, 
Read's  of  McLaws',  Stribling's  of  Pickett's,  Reilly's 
of  Hood's,  and  French's  of  Ransom's  divisions,  were 
retained  near  the  positions  they  had  occupied  along  the 
front  of  Longstreet's  Corps.  In  Jackson's  Corps, 
Poague's  Battery  of  the  Corps  Reserve,  Hardaway's 
of  D.  H.  Hill's,  Carpenter's  of  Taliaferro's,  and 
Brown's  of  Early's  divisions,  were  also  retained.  The 
remaining  batteries  of  the  1st  Corps  were  sent  under 
the  command  of  Col.  Walton,  Chief  of  Artillery,  to  the 
vicinity  of  Childsburg,  about  midway  between  the 
Mattapony  and  the  North  Anna  rivers,  Col.  Crutchfield 
conducting  those  batteries  of  the  2d  Corps  which  had 
been  relieved  to  a  point  about  five  miles  from  Bowling 
Green.  The  General  Reserve  Artillery  and  Alex 
ander's  Battalion  were  ordered  to  be  placed  in  canton 
ments  by  the  Chief  of  Artillery  along  the  North  Anna, 
as  he  might  see  fit,  and  Gen.  Pendleton  was  charged 
with  the  supervision  and  administration  of  the  entire 
arm,  and  with  the  rigid  enforcement  of  the  regulations 
for  the  care  of  the  animals,  lest  many  of  the  batteries 
should  have  to  be  disbanded  in  the  spring  for  lack  of 
horses.*  The  sections  to  which  the  Artillery  was  thus 
assigned  for  winter  quarters  possessed  particularly  good 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXI,  p.  1109. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  411 

grass  lands  and  it  was  hoped  that  a  sufficient  supply  of 
forage  would  be  found  to  carry  the  horses  through  the 
winter. 

Longstreet  with  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  Pickett 
and  their  respective  divisional  artillery  battalions  under 
Majs.  Henry  and  Dearing,  after  the  inactivity  of  Burn- 
side  was  assured,  was  ordered  February  18  to  the  dis 
trict  south  of  Petersburg,  where  the  ravages  of  war 
had  not  yet  been  seriously  felt.  Jackson's  Corps,  with 
McLaws'  and  Anderson's  divisions  of  the  1st  Corps, 
remained  along  the  Rappahannock  guarding  the  line 
from  United  States  Ford  above  Fredericksburg  to 
Port  Royal,  25  miles  below. 

Late  in  January,  the  Federals,  by  extending  along 
the  north  of  the  river,  seemed  to  threaten  renewed  activi 
ties,  and  Jackson's  men  were  kept  busy  preparing  to 
meet  the  enemy  wherever  he  might  attempt  a  crossing. 
Meanwhile,  Gen.  Lee  was  urging  forward  the  work  on 
the  Napoleons  and  the  Whitworth  gun  carriages,  which 
he  had  called  upon  the  Ordnance  Bureau  to  make  for 
use  along  his  front.* 

The  strength  of  the  Field  Artillery  of  the  Army  on 
the  last  day  of  1862  shows  an  increase  in  spite  of  the  in 
roads  of  the  Fredericksburg  campaign.  The  General 
Reserve  consisted  of  5  batteries,  30  pieces,  and  437 
horses,  with  a  personnel  of  30  officers  and  549  men 
present  for  duty,  and  an  aggregate  present  and  absent 
of  778.  In  the  1st  Corps  were  19  batteries,  83  pieces, 
and  405  horses,  70  officers  and  1,576  men  present  for 
duty,  with  an  aggregate  present  and  absent  of  2,311, 
and  in  the  2d  Corps  there  were  31  batteries,  with  125 
guns,  and  about  700  horses,  99  officers  and  2,365  men 
present  for  duty,  and  a  paper  strength  of  3,966. 

The  Field  Artillery  then  consisted  of  some  65  bat 
teries,  240  guns,  1,550  horses,  199  officers,  and  4,490 
men  present  for  duty.  The  average  battery  in  the  field, 
therefore,  was  composed  about  as  follows:  3  officers, 
81  men,  4  guns,  and  30  horses,  with  a  paper  strength  of 
about  130  officers  and  men.f 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I.  Vol.  XXI,  p.  1109. 
^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXI,  p.  1082. 


412  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Considering  the  vast  improvement  which  had  already 
been  made  in  its  material  and  the  measures  in  process 
of  completion  for  its  better  armament,  the  increase  both 
in  the  experience  and  the  numbers  of  its  personnel,  the 
condition  of  the  Artillery  was  relatively  good  in  all 
respects,  except  as  to  the  horses  and  the  horse  equip 
ment,  the  deficiency  in  these  two  items  being  a  serious 
menace  to  the  general  efficiency  of  the  arm  at  all  times. 

The  returns  for  January  1863  show  no  depletion  in 
artillery  personnel,  so  there  could  have  been  few  de 
serters. 

Early  in  January,  Gen.  Pendleton  assigned  Capt. 
G.  W.  Nelson,  and  1st  Lieut.  E.  P.  Dandridge,  both 
unattached,  to  batteries,  the  first  to  duty  as  Inspector 
of  the  Artillery  of  the  First  Corps  and  the  General  Re 
serve,  and  the  latter  to  the  same  duty  in  the  Second 
Corps.  They  were  ordered  to  enter  immediately  upon 
the  work  of  inspection,  and  were  particularly  directed  to 
report  upon  the  following  points : 

"1st.  Condition  of  horses,,  guns,  harness,,  ammunition,  and 
wagons. 

"2d.  The  strength  of  each  battery  in  officers,  enlisted  men, 
horses,  and  equipments. 

"3d.     The  supply  of  forage,  its  source,  and  prospect  in  future. 

"4th.     The  position  of  camp,  its  advantages  or  evils. 

"5th.     The  attention  to,  or  violation  of,  rights  of  citizens,  etc. 

"6th.  They  will  also  report  absences  and  their  occasion;  they 
will  attend  to  all  matters  of  importance  to  the  service  in  each  case, 
as,  for  instance,  what  hospital  arrangements  are  made;  they  will 
regularly  record  the  result  of  their  observations  and  inquiries, 
and  make  punctual  and  exact  reports  of  the  same.  When  horses 
are  presented  for  condemnation,  they  will  carefully  examine  them 
and  pass  upon  their  condition,  reporting  at  the  same  time  the 
apparent  causes  thereof.  It  is  very  desirable  that  these  inspections 
should  be  made  promptly,  and  to  this  end  great  diligence  will  be 
needed."* 

The  foregoing  plan  of  inspection  gives  one  an  ex 
cellent  idea  of  the  measures  adopted  to  bring  up  the 
batteries  to  a  more  efficient  footing.  The  inspections 
were  industriously  carried  out  as  ordered,  and  Pendle- 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  613. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  413 

ton  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to  see  that  every  effort 
was  made  to  correct  or  to  counteract  defects  as  they 
developed.  In  addition  to  this  work  he  had,  after  col 
laborating  with  Cols.  Crutchfield  and  Alexander,  whose 
judgments  he  most  respected  of  all  his  officers, 
prepared  a  comprehensive  plan  for  the  reorganization 
of  the  Artillery,  and  on  February  11,  submitted  it  in 
writing  to  the  Commander-in-Chief.*  In  this  plan  it 
was  contemplated  that  the  Artillery  should  be  com 
pletely  organized  into  battalions,  a  thing  which  had  only 
partially  been  effected.  We  have  frequently  spoken 
of  a  group  of  batteries  assigned  to  a  division  as  a  divi 
sional  battalion  when  in  fact  it  was  not.  The  plan  also 
included  the  promotion  of  many  officers  in  order  to 
furnish  the  requisite  field  officers  for  the  proposed  bat 
talions.  Promotion  on  a  large  scale  at  once  involved  a 
serious  question.  The  more  southern  states  were 
acutely  jealous  of  Virginia  in  the  matter  of  commis 
sions,  and,  cognizant  of  this  spirit  on  their  part,  Gen. 
Lee  had  ever  sought  to  minimize  the  evil  effects  result 
ing  therefrom  by  limiting  Virginia  to  a  number  of  field 
officers  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  troops  she 
furnished.  Even  then,  the  Old  Dominion  possessed  a 
preponderance  of  the  higher  officers.  But  no  man  could 
say  that  Virginians  unduly  profited  from  favoritism. 
In  fact,  good  men  were  frequently  kept  from  well- 
deserved  promotion  in  deference  to  this  rule  of  policy. 
Pendleton's  recommendations  comprise  a  brief 
history  of  the  artillery  arm  up  to  the  time  they  were 
made.  Between  the  lines  one  familiar  with  the  politics 
of  the  Army  may  read  much.  From  a  perusal  of  these 
lines  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  replete  with  suggestions, 
one  gains  a  most  comprehensive  idea  of  conditions  as 
they  were,  and,  in  order  that  nothing  may  be  lost  from 
the  meaning  of  Pendleton's  words,  they  are  here  given 
as  he  wrote  them: 

"The  objections  to  the  brigade  batteries  and  division  groups 
now  existing  are  obvious.  Burdened  as  are  brigade  and  division 
commanders,  they  can  scarcely  extend  to  batteries  thus  assigned 

*Rcbellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  614. 


414  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

that  minute  supervision  which  they  require,  and  the  supply  officers, 
whose  chief  care  lies  with  considerable  bodies  of  infantry,  cannot 
devote  to  one  or  more  batteries  the  time  and  attention  they  im 
peratively  need.  This  is  injuriously  experienced  in  time  of 
pressure.  The  existing  arrangement  moreover  affords  insufficient 
scope  for  field  officers  of  artillery.  Batteries,  besides,  permanently 
attached  in  this  way,  can  scarcely  be  assigned  elsewhere,  whatever 
the  emergency,  without  producing  some  difficulty,  almost  as  if  a 
vested  right  were  violated.  But,  most  injuriously  of  all,  this  system 
hinders  unity  and  concentration  in  battle. 

"Toward  remedying  these  evils,  it  is  respectfully  proposed  that 
in  each  corps  the  artillery  be  arranged  into  battalions,  to  consist 
for  the  most  part  of  four  batteries  each,  a  particular  battalion 
ordinarily  to  attend  to  a  certain  division,  and  to  report  to,  and 
receive  orders  from,  its  commander,  though  liable  to  be  divided, 
detached,  etc.,  as  to  the  commanding  general  or  corps  commanders 
may  seem  best;  past  associations  to  be  so  consulted  in  the  con 
stitution  of  these  batteries  as  that  each  shall,  as  far  as  practicable, 
contain  batteries  that  have  served  together,  and  with  the  division 
which  the  battalion  is  still  ordinarily  to  attend.  These  battalions 
ought  to  have,  it  is  believed,  two  field  officers  each,  a  surgeon,  an 
ordnance  officer,  and  a  bonded  officer  for  supplies,  if  not  both 
quartermaster  and  commissary.  Such  battalions,  with  the  officers 
proposed  to  command  them,  are  presented  to  view  in  the  accom 
panying  schedule. 

"It  will  be  noticed  that  two  batteries  are  proposed  to  be  trans 
ferred  from  the  Second  Corps  to  the  First,  in  order  to  equalize 
them  as  nearly  as  may  be.  One  of  these,  Thompson's,  the  Louisiana 
Guard  Artillery,  heretofore  attached  to  Gen.  Early's  Division,  is 
in  the  schedule  put  into  the  Battalion  P,  to  operate  with  Gen. 
Pickett's  Division.  The  other,  Latham's,  a  North  Carolina  Battery, 
heretofore  attached  to  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill's  Division,  is  placed  in  the 
Battalion  H  to  operate  with  Gen.  Hood's  Division. 

"In  the  Second  Corps,  Dement's  Battery,  now  attached  to  Gen. 
Early's  Division,  is  proposed  to  be  placed  in  the  Battalion  T  to 
operate  with  Gen.  Trimble's  Division,  because  Lieut. -Col.  R.  S. 
Andrews,  proposed  to  command  that  battalion,  expressly  requests 
it,  that  being  his  original  battery.  In  this  corps,  also,  five  batteries 
are  proposed  to  constitute  the  battalion  to  operate  with  Gen.  A.  P. 
Hill's  Division,  because  that  is  a  large  division,  and  because  it  has 
hitherto  been  attended  by  a  strong  artillery  force. 

"Four  batteries  remaining  in  the  Second  Corps,  after  thus  con 
stituting  battalions  to  attend  the  several  divisions,  are  combined  in 
a  new  reserve  battalion,  corresponding  in  that  corps  with  the 
Washington  Artillery,  First  Corps. 

"It  will  be  seen  that  this  plan  involves  the  least  possible  disturb 
ance  to  existing  relations,  while  it  equalizes  force  and  provides  a 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  415 

more  effective  organization.  Existing  reserve  battalions  are 
proposed  to  remain  as  they  are. 

"Batteries,  it  is  recommended,  should  be  rendered  homogeneous 
in  armament  as  soon  as  practicable  by  interchange  of  guns  with 
other  batteries.  All  the  batteries  of  each  corps  to  be  supervised 
by  and  report  to  the  Chief  of  Artillery  for  the  corps,  as  represent 
ing  the  Lieutenant-General  commanding,  and  the  whole  in  both 
corps  to  be  superintended  by  and  report  to  the  general  Chief  of 
Artillery,  as  representing  for  this  arm  the  General  commanding. 

"For  convenience,  a  certain  alphabetical  designation  is  sug 
gested  for  the  battalions,  the  initials  of  the  division  commanders 
at  the  present  time  being  adopted,  rather  than  the  usual  letters  in 
order,  because  the  latter  might  seem  like  a  numerical  designation 
to  assign  some  precedence  of  one  battalion  over  another. 

"Attention  is  asked  to  a  few  words  respecting  the  officers 
proposed. 

"First  Corps:  Battalion  A:  Maj.  J.  J.  Garnett,  who  is  well 
known  to  Gen.  Longstreet,  and  highly  appreciated  by  him  as  an 
efficient  officer.  His  merit  and  services  no  doubt  entitle  him  to 
the  command  and  grade  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  proposed  for  him.* 

"Maj.  Charles  Richardson,  with  Gen.  Anderson,  may  well  be 
retained  as  the  Second  Field  Officer  of  that  battalion.  These 
officers  are  both  from  Virginia. 

"Battalion  M:  Col.  Cabell,  of  Virginia,  and  Maj.  Hamilton,  of 
Georgia,  who  have  long  directed  the  artillery  attached  to  Gen. 
McLaws'  Division,  should  probably  have  command  of  this  battalion. 

"Battalion  P:  Maj.  Bearing,  well  known  to  and  approved  by 
Gens.  Longstreet  and  Pickett,  and  recently  promoted  to  command 
the  artillery  attached  to  Pickett's  Division,  can  well  command  this 
battalion.  He  is  from  Virginia. 

"Capt.  Read,  of  Georgia,  now  commanding  a  battery  in  Gen. 
McLaws'  Division,  has  been  heretofore  recommended  several  times, 
I  believe,  for  promotion  as  a  gallant,  intelligent,  and  meritorious 
officer,  and  may  be  usefully  and  justly  made  Major,  to  cooperate 
with  Maj.  Dearing  in  his  battalion. 

"Battalion  H:  Maj.  Kemper,  so  justly  appreciated  for  his 
gallantry  and  for  long  and  efficient  service,  may  well  be  given 
command  of  this  battalion,  with  the  rank  of  Lieutenant-Colonel. 
He  is  from  Virginia. 

"Maj.  Thomas  Jefferson  Page,  Jr.,  heretofore  associated  for  a 
season  with  Maj.  Kemper,  and  at  another  time  with  Gen.  Hood, 
might  serve  well  as  the  Second  Field  Officer  in  this  battalion. 

"Washington  Artillery  Battalion:  Col.  Walton,  of  course,  re 
mains  as  long  as  he  wishes  in  command  of  this.  He  is  known  to 
be  from  Louisiana. 


*Maj.   Garnett  had  previously  served  on   Longstreet's  staff,   having  rendered 
valuable  services  in  the  Artillery  on  the  Peninsula. 


416  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

"Alexander's  Battalion:  Lieut. -Col.  Alexander,  of  Georgia,  is 
really  entitled  to  the  full  rank  of  Colonel  at  the  head  of  this 
battalion.  We  have  no  more  accomplished  officer.  His  commission 
should  date  from  his  original  assignment  to  the  command. 

"Maj.  J.  R.  C.  Lewis,  for  some  time  attached  to  the  battalion 
as  its  Second  Field  Officer,  should  probably  retain  the  position.  He 
is  from  Virginia. 

"It  is  respectfully  suggested  that  the  officer  to  act  as  Chief  of 
Artillery  to  the  Corps  might  be  most  efficient  in  that  capacity  if 
relieved  from  the  burden  of  a  special  command. 

''Second  Corps:  Battalion  R:  Maj.  T.  H.  Carter,  some  time 
since  promoted  to  command  the  artillery  of  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill's 
Division,  was  even  then  recommended  for  the  rank  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel,  as  fully  earned  by  his  distinguished  services,  and  eminent 
merit,  and  may  well  be  made  Lieutenant-Colonel  and  given  com 
mand  of  this  battalion.  He  is  from  Virginia. 

"Capt.  C.  M.  Braxton,  now  commanding  a  battery  in  Gen.  A.  P. 
Hill's  Division,  has  been  recommended  for  promotion.  He  also  has 
fully  earned  it  by  efficient  service  and  would,  no  doubt,  be  highly 
approved  by  Lieut. -Col.  Walker  and  by  Gen.  Hill  as  the  Second 
Field  Officer  in  this  battalion.  He  is  from  Virginia. 

"Battalion  L:  Lieut. -Col.  R.  L.  Walker,  of  Virginia,  so  justly 
distinguished  for  long  and  gallant  service,  has  been  recommended 
for  the  full  rank  of  Colonel.  He  might  justly  receive  it  and  have 
command  of  this  battalion. 

"Capt.  W.  J.  Pegram,  now  commanding  a  battery  in  Gen.  A.  P. 
Hill's  Division,  has  been  recommended  for  promotion.  He  has  also 
fully  earned  it  by  efficient  service,  and  would  no  doubt  be  highly 
approved  by  Lieut.-Col.  Walker  and  by  Gen.  Hill  as  the  Second 
Field  Officer  in  this  battalion.  He  is  from  Virginia. 

"Battalion  T:  Maj.  R.  S.  Andrews,  so  severely  wounded  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  but  now  nearly  recovered  and  on  duty  in  Rich 
mond,  desires  and  richly  deserves  the  rank  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
and  the  command  of  this  battalion.  We  have  no  more  brilliant  and 
thoroughly  meritorious  artillery  officer.  His  recommendations  are 
ample,  nor  can  a  doubt  remain  as  to  the  propriety  of  his  having  this 
promotion  and  command.  He  is  from  Maryland. 

"Capt.  J.  W.  Latimer,  now  commanding  a  battery  in  Gen. 
Early's  Division,  is  highly  recommended  by  Col.  Crutchfield,  and 
earnestly  desired  by  Maj.  Andrews  to  be  promoted  and  associated 
with  him  as  the  Second  Field  Officer  in  this  battalion.  He  is  from 
Virginia. 

"Battalion  E:  Maj.  H.  P.  Jones,  now  in  command  of  the 
artillery  of  Gen.  Trimble's  Division,  under  special  request  from 
Gen.  W.  B.  Taliaferro,  when  in  command  of  that  division,  has 
been  recommended  for  promotion,,  and  might  worthily  be  made 


COLONEL  THOMAS   HILL   CARTER 
ACTING  CHIEF  OK  AUTILLKUY.   SECOND  COKPS 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  417 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  have  command  of  this  battalion.  In 
addition  to  much  gallant  service  he  is  a  very  judicious  and  faithful 
officer.  He  is  from  Virginia. 

"Capt.  J.  Gibbs  Barnwell,  of  South  Carolina,  is  well  entitled  to 
promotion,  and  would  make  an  excellent  field  officer  in  this  battalion. 
He  has  mainly  served  as  an  ordnance  officer  with  the  General 
Reserve  Artillery,  but  in  repeated  instances  has  taken  command  in 
action  and  admirably  performed  his  part.  He  is  a  capital 
artillerist,  and  in  general  merit  has  perhaps  no  superior. 

"Battalion  Nf  Reserve:  Capt.  Hardaway,  now  commanding  a 
battery  in  the  division  lately  under  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  at  present 
under  Gen.  Rodes,  is  a  fine  officer  entitled  to  promotion,  and  some 
time  since  recommended  for  it;  indeed,  his  initials  were,  to  the 
end  he  might  be  commissioned  as  Major,  asked  of  the  undersigned 
by  the  War  Department.  His  merit  and  his  services  entitled  him 
to  this  rank,  and  it  is  believed  he  would  well  command  this  battalion. 
He  is  from  Alabama. 

"Capt.  Brockenbrough,  of  Virginia,  now  suffering  from  a  pain 
ful  wound  received  at  Fredericksburg,  has  been  recommended  for 
promotion.  He  has  well  served  since  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
and  would  do  well  as  the  Second  Field  Officer  in  this  battalion. 

"Brown's  Battalion:  Col.  J.  T.  Brown,  of  Virginia,  for  months 
past  in  command  of  this  battalion,  should  of  course  retain  it. 

"Capt.  Poague,  of  Virginia,  now  commanding  a  battery  in  this 
battalion,  is  a  superior  officer,  whose  services  have  been  scarcely 
surpassed.  He  has  been  recommended  for  promotion,  and  should 
justly  receive  it.  He  might  well  be  made  a  Major  in  this  battalion. 

"General  Reserve:  Cutts'  Battalion:  Lieut.-Col.  Cutts,  an 
efficient  officer,  should  retain  command. 

"Capt.  Lane,  commanding  a  battery  in  this  battalion,  a  trained 
officer,  gallant,  and  efficient,  has  been  recommended  for,  and 
deserves  promotion.  During  a  long  furlough  of  Lieut.-Col.  Cutts, 
he  has  commanded  the  battalion,  and  would  make  for  it  a  good 
Major.  The  companies  are  large,  the  batteries  have  each  six  guns, 
and  a  second  field  officer  would  secure  its  greater  efficiency.  Capt. 
Lane  is  from  Oregon,  though  accredited  to  Georgia. 

"Nelson's  Battalion:  Maj.  William  Nelson,  long  in  command  of 
this  battalion,  is  as  gallant  and  efficient  an  officer  as  we  have  in  his 
grade.  He  has  served  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  as  Captain 
and  Major,  has  exhibited  courage  of  the  highest  order  and  fidelity 
undeviating,  and  well  deserves  the  rank  of  Lieutenant-Colonel. 
He  is  from  Virginia. 

"Maj.  A.  L.  Rogers,  also  of  Virginia,  might  usefully  serve  as 
the  Second  Field  Officer  in  this  battalion.  Its  batteries  are  all  of 
six  guns. 


27 


418  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

"The  recommendations  for  promotion  are  believed  to  be  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  merits  of  the  officers  and  the  wishes  of  Gens. 
Longstreet  and  Jackson,  and  of  other  commanders  best  qualified  to 
judge. 

"The  proportion  between  the  number  of  field  officers  of  artillery 
thus  proposed  belonging  to  Virginia  and  those  from  other  States 
is  very  nearly  coincident  with  that  between  the  number  of  batteries 
from  Virginia  and  those  from  other  States.  Of  the  whole  number 
of  batteries,  35  are  from  Virginia  and  24  from  other  States.  This 
would  give  of  the  28  field  officers  proposed,  about  17  from  Virginia 
and  11  from  other  States.  Of  those  actually  recommended  18  are 
from  Virginia  and  10  from  other  States. 

"Should  this  organization  be  mainly  approved  and  ordered, 
ordnance  officers,  surgeons,  and  supply  officers  can  be  applied  for 
by  the  several  battalion  commanders. 

"Toward  accomplishing  an  efficient  adjustment  of  the  whole 
in  time  for  the  probable  opening  of  the  spring  campaign,  it  is 
important  that  an  adequate  supply  of  suitable  guns  be  furnished 
as  soon  as  possible  by  the  Ordnance  Department.  Nearly  all  the 
bronze  short-range  guns  of  the  Second  Corps  were  several  weeks 
ago  sent  to  Richmond  to  be  recast  into  Napoleons.  None  have 
been  sent  from  the  First  Corps,  nor  from  the  General  Reserve, 
because  Col.  Gorgas  advised  against  it,  on  the  ground  that  the 
Department  had  as  much  metal  as  it  could  cast  for  a  number  of 
weeks. 

"Four  battery  battalions  might  be  armed  with  good  rifles  and 
Napoleons  in  nearly  equal  proportions,  two  batteries  to  have  rifles 
altogether,  and  two  to  have  Napoleons  altogether.  Larger 
battalions  to  have  perhaps  a  corresponding  proportion,  or  more 
Napoleons.  Batteries  in  reserve  to  have  heaviest  metal.  It  is 
hoped  that,  much  as  a  number  of  battery  horses  will  probably  be 
reduced  in  strength  by  the  occasional  scarcity  of  food  incident 
to  the  difficulty  of  transporting  it,  in  spite  of  all  efforts,  a  sufficiency 
will  be  at  hand  for  the  batteries  proposed  when  the  campaign  opens. 
Some  400,  sent  for  to  Georgia  in  the  fall  by  the  undersigned,  have, 
under  advisement  with  the  Quartermaster's  Department  in  Rich 
mond,  been  stopped  on  the  border  of  North  Carolina,  for  the  sake 
of  being  easily  foraged.  Other  droves  the  Quartermaster's  Depart 
ment  will,  it  is  hoped,  have  collected,  so  that  such  animals  as  are 
unserviceable  with  the  batteries  may  be  replaced  by  others  com 
paratively  fresh  and  strong." 

The  proposals  of  Pendleton  contemplated  that  in  the 
First  Corps  there  should  be  4  divisional  battalions  and 
2  corps  reserve  battalions,  with  a  total  of  26  batteries 
and  112  guns;  and  in  the  Second  Corps  27  batteries  with 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  419 

116  guns,  organized  into  6  battalions  as  in  the  First 
Corps.  The  General  Reserve  was  to  consist  of  2  bat 
talions,  of  3  batteries  each,  with  a  total  of  36  pieces. 
Thus  in  the  entire  Army  there  were  to  be  14  artillery 
battalions,  each  with  2  field  officers  and  a  staff,  and  a 
total  of  264  guns,  exclusive  of  those  of  the  Horse  Ar 
tillery. 

Four  days  after  the  receipt  of  Gen.  Pendleton's 
recommendations,  the  Commander-in-Chief  promul 
gated  the  proposed  organization  of  the  Artillery,  with 
holding,  however,  the  appointment  of  the  additional 
field  officers  pending  an  investigation  of  their  individual 
merits.  On  March  2,  Gen.  Lee  forwarded  his  recom 
mendations  to  the  President  with  such  revisions  in 
Pendleton's  as  seemed  proper  to  him  for  one  reason 
or  another,  the  appointments  being  soon  made,  and 
finally  announced  in  Special  Orders  No.  106,  A.  N.  V., 
April  16,  1863*  The  Field  Artillery  organization  was 
now  as  follows: 

IST  CORPS 

Col.  John  B.  Walton,  Chief  of  Artillery 
CABELI/S  BATTALION 

Col.  Henry  Coalter  Cabell 
Maj.  S.  P.  Hamilton 

1.  Troup   (Ga.)  Battery,  Capt.  Henry  H.  Carlton. 

2.  Pulaski  (Ga.)  Battery,  Capt.  John  C.  Fraser. 
8.  1st  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  E.  S.  McCarthy. 
4.  "A"  Battery,  1st  N.  C.  Reg't,  Capt.  B.  C.  Manly. 

GARNETT'S  BATTALION 

Lieut. -Col.  John  J.  Garnett 
Maj.  Charles  Richardson 

1.  Norfolk  Light  Artillery  Blues,  Capt.  Chas.  R.  Grandy. 

2.  Pittsylvania  Battery,  Capt.  John  W.  Lewis. 
8.  Donaldson ville  (La.)  Battery,  Capt.  Victor  Maurin. 
4.  Norfolk  (Huger's)  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  D.  Moore. 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  pp.  651,  728. 


420  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

BEARING'S  BATTALION 

Maj.  James  Dearing 
Maj.  J.  P.  W.  Read 

1.  Fauquier  Battery,  Capt.  R.  M.  Stribling. 

2.  Richmond  Hampden  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  H.  Caskie. 

3.  Richmond  Fayette  Battery,  Capt.  Miles  C.  Macon. 

4.  Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  Joseph  G.  Blount. 

HENRY'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  M.  W.  Henry 

1.  Charleston  German  Battery,         Capt.  W.  K.  Bachman. 

2.  Palmetto  (S.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  Hugh  R.  Garden. 
8.  Rowan  (N.  C.)  Battery,                 Capt.  James  Reilly. 

4.  Branch  (N.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  Alexander  C.  Latham. 

CORPS  RESERVE 
ALEXANDER'S  BATTALION 

Col.  E.  Porter  Alexander 
Maj.  Frank  Huger 

1.  Bath  Battery,  Capt.  J.  L.  Eubank. 

2.  Bedford  Battery,  Capt.  Tyler  C.  Jordan. 
8.  Madison  (La.)  Battery,                   Capt.  Geo.  V.  Moody. 

4.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  W.  Parker. 

5.  Brooks  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  A.  B.  Rhett. 

6.  Ashland  Battery,  Capt.  Pichegru  Woolfolk,  Jr. 

WASHINGTON  ARTILLERY  BATTALION 
Col.  John  B.  Walton 

1.  1st  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Squires. 

3.  2d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  John  B.  Richardson. 
8.  3d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  M.  B.  Miller. 

4.  4th  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  Benj.  F.  Eshleman. 

2o  CORPS 

Col.  Stapleton  Crutchfield,  Chief  of  Artillery 
WALKER'S  BATTALION 

Col.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker 
Maj.  William  J.  Pegram 

1.  Pee  Dee  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  E.  B.  Brunson. 

2.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  G.  Crenshaw. 
8.  Richmond  Letcher  Battery,  Capt.  Greenlee  Davidson. 
4.  Richmond  Purcell  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  McGraw. 

6.  Fredericksburg  Battery,  Capt.  E.  A.  Marye. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  421 

CARTER'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  H.  Carter 
Maj.  Carter  M.  Braxton 

1.  Jeff  Davis  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  J.  Reese. 

2.  King  William  Battery,  Capt.  W.  P.  Carter. 

3.  Richmond  Orange  Battery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Fry. 

4.  Morris  Louisa  Battery,  Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page. 

ANDREWS'  BATTALION* 

Lieut.-Col.  R.  Snowden  Andrews 
Maj.  Joseph  W.  Latimer 

1.  4th  Md.  or  Chesapeake  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  D.  Brown. 

2.  Alleghany  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  Carpenter. 

3.  1st  Maryland  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  F.  Dement. 

4.  Lee  Battery,  Capt.  Chas.  J.  Raine. 

JONES'  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  Hilary  P.  Jones 
Maj.  J.  B.  Brockenbrough 

1.  Charlottesville   Battery,  Capt.  James  McD.  Carrington. 

2.  Staunton  Battery,  Lieut.  Alexander  H.  Fultz. 

3.  Richmond  Courtney  Battery,  Capt.  W.  A.  Tanner. 

4.  Louisiana  Guard  Battery,  Capt.  C.  Thompson. 

CORPS  RESERVE 
BROWN'S  BATTALION 

Col.  John  Thompson  Brown 
Maj.  R.  A.  Hardaway 

1.  Warrenton  Battery,  Capt.  James  V.  Brooke. 

2.  Powhatan  Battery,  Capt.  Willis  J.  Dance. 

3.  1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  Archibald  Graham. 

4.  Salem  Battery,  Capt.  A.  Hupp. 

5.  3d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Benj.  H.  Smith,  Jr. 

6.  2d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  David  Watson. 

MC!NTOSH'S  BATTALION 

Maj.  D.  G.  Mclntosh 
Maj.  Wm.  T.  Poague 

1.  Alabama  Hardaway  Battery,  Capt.  William  P.  Hurt. 

2.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Marmaduke  Johnson. 

3.  2d  Rockbridge   Battery,  Capt.  John  A.  M.  Lusk. 
4-.  Danville  Battery,  Capt.  Geo.  W.  Wooding. 

*For   final   assignment   of   Thompson's,    Brown's,    and   Caskie's    batteries,    see 

Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  667,  Special  Order  No. . 

March  14,  1863. 


422  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

GENERAL  RESERVE 

Brig. -Gen.  William  Nelson  Pendleton 

CUTTS'  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  Allen  S.  Cutts 
Maj.  John  Lane 

1.  Battery  "A",  Sumter  (Ga.)Batt.,    Capt.  H.  M.  Ross. 

2.  Battery  "B",  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,    Capt.  Geo.  M.  Patterson. 

3.  Battery  "C",  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,    Capt.  John  T.  Wingfield. 

NELSON'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  William  Nelson 
Maj.  Thomas  Jefferson  Page,  Jr. 

1.  Amherst  Battery,  Capt.   Thomas  J.   Kirkpatrick. 

2.  Fluvanna  Battery,  Capt.  John  L.  Massie. 

3.  Georgia  Battery,  Capt.   John   Milledge,  Jr. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY 
Maj.  R.  F.  Beckham 

1.  Chew's  Battery,  Capt.  R.  Preston  Chew. 

2.  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  Capt.  James  Breathed. 

3.  Lynchburg   Beauregards,  Capt.  Marcellus  N.  Moorman. 

4.  2d  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  Capt.  Wm.  N.  McGregor. 

5.  Washington    (S.   C.)    Battery,  Capt.  James  F.  Hart. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  only  changes  in  Pendleton's 
plan  were  the  substitution  of  Maj.  M.  W.  Henry  as  a 
battalion  commander  for  Maj.  Del.  Kemper,  arid 
Maj.  D.  G.  Mclntosh  for  Maj.  R.  A.  Hardaway,  the 
latter,  however,  being  given  his  majority,  while  neither 
Capt.  Squires  nor  Capt.  Barnwell  was  promoted. 
Longstreet  desired  to  wait  until  Col.  Walton's  return 
in  the  case  of  the  former,  Walton  being  on  recruiting 
duty  in  Louisiana.  Majs.  J.  R.  C.  Lewis  and  A.  L. 
Rogers  were  also  omitted  in  the  new  organization.  The 
former  transferred  to  another  arm  of  the  service,  and 
was  succeeded  by  Capt.  Frank  Huger,  the  only  West 
Pointer  still  commanding  a  battery.* 

*Seo  letter  of  Pendleton  to  Lee,  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part 
II,  pp.  628-9. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  423 

The  law  approved  January  22,  1862,  authorized  field 
officers  for  the  Artillery  in  the  proportion  of  a  colonel 
for  every  40,  a  lieutenant-colonel  for  every  24,  and  a 
major  for  every  16  guns.  Based  upon  264  guns,  the 
Army  was  entitled  to  6  colonels,  11  lieutenant-colonels, 
and  16  majors.  The  organization  as  completed  in 
cluded  6  colonels,  7  lieutenant-colonels,  and  16  majors.* 
But  three  vacancies  existed,  therefore,  among  the  field 
officers. 

The  departure  from  Pendleton's  recommendations 
for  promotion  in  the  Second  Corps  were  due  almost  en 
tirely  to  Col.  Crutchfield,  who  warmly  advocated  the 
promotion  of  either  Brockenbrough  or  Chew  in  prefer 
ence  to  Maj.  Jones  and  Capt.  Barn  well,  and  in  his  op 
position  to  the  advancement  of  the  latter  officers  he  was 
supported  by  Jackson. t 

Col.  Crutchfield  particularly  urged  the  promotion  of 
Mclntosh,  which  he  finally  secured,  yet  Jones  was  also 
promoted.  The  placing  of  Hardaway  in  command  of 
a  battalion  was  also  opposed  by  Crutchfield.  "He  is 
an  excellent  artillerist,  a  good  shot,  and  very  fond  of 
the  scientific  parts  of  the  service,"  said  Crutchfield,  "but 
not  good  at  managing  men,  hard  on  his  own  horses,  and 
not  at  all  apt  to  require  the  captains  of  batteries  under 
him  to  take  good  care  of  their  horses.  He  is  rather 
indifferent  to  what  he  regards  as  the  drudgery  of  the 
service,  and  while  the  qualifications  he  does  possess  will 
render  him  a  very  valuable  field  officer  of  artillery,  it 
will  not  be  in  the  sphere  of  the  constant  commandant  of 
a  battalion." 

The  foregoing  remarks  are  quoted  because  they  give 
us  some  idea  of  the  qualities  which  were  considered 
requisite  on  the  part  of  a  battalion  commander.  More 
than  mere  brilliancy  seems  to  have  been  required. 

The  correspondence  between  Lee  and  Jackson  re 
specting  the  appointment  of  artillery  officers  in  the 
Second  Corps  is  quite  interesting,  the  latter's  attitude 

*Including  Lieut.-Col.  L.  M.  Coleman,  of  Brown's  Battalion,  invalided  from 
wounds  received  at  Fredericksburg. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  633-4. 


424  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

being  characteristic.  He  insisted  upon  the  privilege  of 
exercising  control  over  promotions  in  his  corps.  "I 
have  had  much  trouble  resulting  from  incompetent  of 
ficers  having  been  assigned  to  duty  with  me,  regardless 
of  my  wishes,"  he  wrote.  "Those  who  assigned  them 
have  never  taken  the  responsibility  of  incurring  the 
odium  which  results  from  such  incompetency."*  This 
was  strong  language  to  address  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief. 

When  Gen.  Lee  forwarded  his  recommendations  for 
promotion  in  the  Artillery  to  the  President,  he  took 
occason  to  state  that  "No  class  of  officers  in  the  Army 
has  learned  faster  or  served  better  than  the  Artillery,  "t 

Before  the  end  of  February,  Longstreet,  having  been 
informed  by  Col.  Crutchfield  that  Jackson  had  asked 
for  Col.  Alexander  to  be  made  brigadier-general  of 
infantry,  vice  Lawton,  wrote  Gen.  Lee  inquiring  if  Maj. 
Pelham  could  be  spared  by  Stuart  to  fill  Alexander's 
place,  suggesting  Pelham's  promotion,  and  Maj. 
Terrell's  appointment  to  succeed  him  in  command  of  the 
Horse  Artillery.  But  nothing  came  of  the  matter, 
probably  by  reason  of  Alexander's  unwillingness  to  re 
linquish  his  commission  as  colonel  in  the  Artillery  for 
one  as  a  brigadier-general  of  infantry.  His  present  du 
ties  were  far  more  important  and  attractive  to  one  of  his 
tastes  than  those  incident  to  the  office  of  a  brigadier. 
At  any  rate  he  was  not  transferred,  though  his  pro 
motion  was  requested  by  Gen.  Lee. if 

On  February  20,  Lieut.  Dandridge  returned  his  re 
port  covering  the  inspection  of  29  batteries  of  the 
Second  Corps.  §  The  items  of  the  report  comprise  an 
accurate  and  complete  record  of  the  condition  of  Jack 
son's  artillery,  which  may  be  regarded  as  typical  of 
the  arm.  The  harness  and  ammunition  was  generally  re 
ported  as  good  and  most  of  the  horses,  of  which  there 
was  an  average  number  of  about  55  to  a  battery,  were 

*RebeHion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  pp.  644-5-6. 
tlbid.,   p.   651. 

^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  645. 
§Ibiu.,  pp.  634,  638. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  425 

found  in  a  serviceable  condition,  very  few  instances  of 
neglect  having  been  detected.  Most  of  the  batteries  pos 
sessed  several  two-  or  four-horse  wagons  for  purposes  of 
foraging,  having  to  haul  their  hay  and  grain  varying 
distances,  some  as  far  as  60  miles  over  execrable  roads, 
until  provision  was  made  to  transport  forage  by  rail  to 
the  artillery  camps.  Until  these  arrangements  were 
completed,  corn  was  principally  secured  in  Essex 
County,  and  from  Hanover  Courthouse.  Some  forage 
was  found  about  Guiney  Depot,  Hamilton's  Crossing, 
Milford,  and  in  King  William  County. 

Most  of  the  batteries  mustered  a  personnel  of  about 
100  officers  and  men,  and  some  as  high  as  140,  but  few 
less  than  90.  The  number  of  absentees  exclusive  of  the 
sick  was  not  excessive,  though  there  were  exceptions. 
Carter's  Battery  reported  2  officers  and  133  men  present 
for  duty,  1  officer  and  6  men  detached,  4  absent  with 
leave  and  71  deserters.  The  last  figure  must  have  been 
for  the  whole  period  of  the  war.  Sickness  was  prev 
alent,  many  of  the  batteries  having  as  many  as  20  men 
on  the  sick  list,  and  few  less  than  8.  Latham's  Battery 
with  4  officers  and  114  men  present,  1  man  on  furlough, 
1  absent  without  leave,  and  9  on  detached  duty,  reported 
39  sick,  while  Pegram's  Battery  with  3  officers  and  108 
men  present,  1  officer  on  leave,  1  man  on  detached  duty, 
and  3  absent  without  leave,  reported  55  men  absent 
sick.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  frequently  men 
not  sufficiently  well  clad,  or  who  did  not  possess  shoes 
good  enough  to  permit  of  their  exposure  to  the  cold  and 
mud  of  winter,  were  carried  on  the  rolls  as  sick.  At 
any  rate,  the  poor  clothing  with  which  the  men  were 
provided  would  account  for  many  minor  cases  of  sick 
ness  during  this  exceptionally  severe  winter. 

The  condition  of  the  men  with  respect  to  clothing  was 
perhaps  no  better  or  no  worse  than  in  the  Army  in  gen 
eral.  Nothing  gives  a  better  understanding  of  the 
wants  in  this  respect  than  the  following  anecdote  con 
cerning  the  Chief  of  Artillery  himself.  Late  in  Decem- 


426  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

ber,  Gen.  Pendleton  was  found  one  afternoon  by  Maj. 
Page  of  his  staff  busily  engaged  with  needle  and  thread. 

"What  are  you  doing,  General?"  he  asked. 

"Mending  my  trousers.  The  only  thing  I  could  find 
for  a  patch  was  this  old  piece  of  collar,"  replied  the 
Chief. 

"Well,  it's  a  great  waste  of  time,  for  nobody  will 
ever  be  able  to  tell  one  end  of  your  shirt  from  the  other," 
rejoined  the  Major. 

Knowing  that  the  Chief  of  Artillery  was  forced  to 
rob  his  shirt  for  the  benefit  of  his  breeches,  we  are  led 
to  wonder  how  the  private  gunner  managed  to  hide  his 
nakedness ! 

Fortunately  for  the  poor  soldiers,  timber  was  plenti 
ful  with  which  to  erect  crude  but  comfortable  cabins. 
For  an  insight  into  the  life  they  led  during  the  cold 
winter  of  1862-63,  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  poverty 
and  distress,  the  reader  would  do  well  to  peruse  those 
vivid  pages  which  so  well  and  so  touchly  record  the 
minutiae  of  a  private  soldier's  life  in  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia.*  The  story  is  a  pathetic  one,  told  in  a 
vein  of  ineffable  sweetness  in  spite  of  the  ghastly  fea 
tures  which  the  recollections  must  have  conjured  up  be 
fore  the  writer.  It  is  a  classic  of  its  kind,  and  serves  to 
show  that  the  lowering  clouds  of  war  could  not  keep  at 
least  a  few  beams  of  sunlit  happiness  from  sifting 
through  the  chinks  in  the  huts  and  hearts  of  the  Con 
federate  gunners  during  that  long  and  trying  winter. 

January,  February,  and  March,  1863,  were  months 
of  ceaseless  activity  on  the  part  of  the  artillery  officers, 
of  whom  great  diligence  was  required  to  provide  the 
necessary  forage  which  had  to  be  located,  collected  and 
brought  in  from  the  back  country.  Then,  too,  the  work 
of  overhauling  harness  and  equipments,  refitting  the  ma 
terial,  and  culling  out  and  turning  in  the  inferior 
ordnance  to  be  replaced  by  the  new  Napoleons,  kept 
them  busy.  Some  were  dispatched  to  other  parts  of  the 

*8oldier  Life,  A.  N.  V.,  written  by  Carlton  McCarthy,  a  private  soldier  in  the 
2nd  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  427 

South  to  look  for  horses,  others  to  collect  stores  and  sup 
plies  of  all  kinds.  Col.  Cutts  even  visited  Georgia  and 
Florida  where  he  reported  a  large  supply  of  provisions 
and  thousands  of  beef  cattle  to  be  available  for  the 
Army.*  Cutts  had  been  absent  on  furlough  since  the 
return  of  the  Army  from  Maryland. 

Maj.  John  Page,  Chief  Quartermaster,  Artillery 
Corps,  was  forced  before  the  1st  of  February  to  scour 
the  country  between  Richmond  and  Gordonsville  along 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  and  the  rich  James  River 
Valley,  for  the  necessary  hay  and  grain  for  the  batteries, 
the  supply  in  Caroline  County  having  all  but  been  ex 
hausted,  t 

Constant  efforts  were  now  being  made  not  only  to 
expedite  the  delivery  of  the  new  guns  being  manu 
factured  by  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  but  to  complete 
the  quota  of  horses  for  every  battery  in  the  Army.  Late 
in  March  statements  of  the  various  battalion  com 
manders  showed  that  in  addition  to  those  already 
furnished,  at  least  1,200  horses  were  needed  for  the  bat 
talions,  exclusive  of  170  for  the  General  Reserve.^  The 
Chief  of  Artillery,  in  his  report  to  the  Inspector  of 
Transportation,  stated  three  causes  for  the  unusual  de 
ficiency  in  spite  of  the  extraordinary  efforts  which  had 
been  made  to  maintain  the  draught  animals  in  a  state  of 
efficiency.  First,  there  were  the  losses  in  action,  inci 
dent  to  the  battles  of  the  late  fall  and  early  winter; 
second,  the  breaking  down  and  sickness  of  many  animals 
due  to  the  labor  of  hauling  forage,  the  insufficiency  of 
feed,  and  the  rigours  of  the  winter  season ;  and  third,  the 
additional  demand  by  reason  of  the  substitution  of 
heavier  ordnance  for  the  discarded  6-pounders,  the 
former  requiring  6-horse  teams. 

By  April  1  the  weather  had  so  moderated  that  the 
deficiency  of  forage  was  partly  counteracted  by  turning 
the  horses  into  the  meadows  where  the  droves  might 
browse  and  rest,  the  shoes  of  the  horses  being  removed. 

*A  sufficient  supply  for  two  years,  Ibid.,  p.  738. 
•^Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  599. 
p.  695. 


428  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

The  condition  of  the  horses  of  the  Army,  and  the 
deficiency  in  their  number,  was  a  source  of  grave  con 
cern  to  Gen.  Lee.  On  April  16,  in  a  letter  to  the  Presi 
dent,  in  which  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  aggres 
sive  should  be  resumed  by  May  1,  he  declared  that  his 
only  anxiety  arose  from  the  immobility  of  the  Army, 
owing  to  the  condition  of  the  horses  and  the  scarcity  of 
forage  and  provisions.*  And  again,  on  April  25,  he 
wrote  Gen.  Pendleton  that  the  destruction  of  horses  in 
the  Army  had  been  so  great  he  feared  it  would  be  im 
possible  to  supply  all  wants. 

In  an  effort  to  economize  horses  the  Chief  of  Artillery 
had  ordered  the  field  transportation  in  each  battalion  for 
staff  purposes  to  be  reduced  to  one  4-horse  and  one  2- 
horse  wagon.  The  former  was  to  suffice  for  the  mess 
outfit,  desks,  papers,  and  tents  of  the  field  and  staff, 
while  the  other  was  set  apart  for  the  surgeon  and  his 
medical  supplies.  The  batteries  were  limited  to  one 
wagon  per  section  for  men  and  foraging  purposes.  The 
allowance  for  the  batteries  was  considered  inadequate 
by  Col.  Crutchfield,  who  asserted  that  three  wagons  to  a 
battery  were  absolutely  necessary,  that  being  a  reduction 
of  one-fourth  the  number  previously  allowed.  It  was 
necessary,  he  claimed,  to  have  an  ordnance  wagon  in 
which  spare  harness,  stores,  and  mess  equipment  could 
be  transported,  in  addition  to  two  forage  wagons,  one 
carrying  the  horse  feed,  while  the  other  remained  free  to 
forage.  The  escort  wagon  in  use  in  the  Artillery  had  a 
capacity  of  6  barrels  of  corn,  that  was  168  rations  of  10 
pounds  each,  or  only  two  days'  rations  of  corn  for  the 
battery  complete.  With  but  one  forage  wagon,  the  bat 
tery  could  not  secure  its  provender  until  after  it  had 
reached  camp  and  unloaded  the  wagon,  the  team  having 
been  on  the  march  all  day,  whereas  with  an  extra  wagon, 
forage  could  be  collected  on  the  march,  the  teams  saved 
extra  work,  and  the  battery  horses  regularly  fed.  Col. 
Crutchfield's  views  were  adopted  and  the  field  transpor 
tation  allowance  of  the  Artillery  fixed  at  three  per 

*Ibid.,  p.  725. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  429 

battery.  Thus  for  a  battalion  of  4  batteries,  the  train 
consisted  of  fourteen  4-horse  wagons.  The  Artillery 
train  of  the  entire  army,  exclusive  of  ammunition  col 
umns,  consisted  of  not  less  than  250  wagons  and  1,000 
horses,  a  saving  of  at  least  half  of  that  number  having 
been  effected  by  Pendleton's  rigid  measures.  Orders 
were  also  promulgated  providing  that  no  part  of  a  bat 
tery  or  train  should  remain  on  a  road  when  disabled,  the 
officer  in  charge  being  required  promptly  to  remove  the 
carriages  from  the  roadway.  Batteries  and  trains  were 
also  prohibited  from  stopping  in  the  line  of  march  to 
water,  or  from  attempting  to  regain  their  place  in 
column  when  once  having  lost  it  for  any  reason.*  The 
packs  of  dismounted  gunners  were  to  be  carried  by  the 
men,  and  the  baggage  of  field  officers  was  limited  to  65, 
and  that  of  battery  officers  to  50  pounds.  But  one  wall 
tent  was  allowed  battalion  headquarters,  and  one  tent 
fly  to  the  officers  of  each  battery,  f 

The  officers  and  men  of  the  batteries  with  Jackson, 
were  the  most  actively  engaged  of  all  during  the  winter. 
Of  the  work  in  which  they  were  ceaselessly  engaged, 
Maj.  A.  S.  Pendleton  of  Jackson's  staff,  son  of  the 
Chief  of  Artillery,  wrote  on  April  26: 

"The  greatest  destruction  and  change  in  the  appearance  of  the 
country  is  from  the  long  lines  of  trenches  and  the  redoubts  which 
crown  every  hillside  from  ten  miles  above  Fredericksburg  to  twenty 
miles  below.  The  world  has  never  seen  such  a  fortified  position. 
The  famous  lines  of  Torres  Vedras  could  not  compare  with  them. 
As  I  go  to  Moss  Neck  (Jackson's  headquarters)  I  follow  the  lines, 
and  'have  a  ride  in  the  trenches.'  These  are  5  feet  wide  and 
2%  deep,  having  the  earth  thrown  forward  towards  the  enemy, 
making  a  bank  still  higher.  They  follow  the  contour  of  the  ground 
and  hug  the  bases  of  the  hills  as  they  wind  to  and  from  the  river, 
thus  giving  natural  flanking  arrangements;  and  from  the  tops  of 
the  hills  frown  the  redoubts  for  sunken  batteries  and  barbette 
batteries,  ad  libitum,  far  exceeding  the  number  of  our  guns;  while 
occasionally,  where  the  trenches  take  straight  across  the  flats,  a 
redoubt  stands  out  defiantly  in  the  open  plain  to  receive  our 
howitzers. 


»G.  O.  No.  26,  Second  Corps,  April  13,  1863,  Ibid.,  p.  719. 
tG.  O.  No.  58,  A.  N.  V.,  April  20,  1863,  Ibid.,  p.  739. 


430  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Before  spring  arrived  much  had  been  done  under 
Pendleton's  administration  to  place  the  batteries  on  a 
more  effective  footing.  The  losses  among  the  officers 
had  been  especially  large,  and  the  comparatively  few 
unsuited  to  command  who  remained  were  ruthlessly 
culled  out,  making  way  for  the  more  efficient.  In  this 
respect  the  Field  Artillery  was  especially  favored.  The 
peculiar  character  of  the  service  of  the  guns  is  such  that 
no  officer  may  hide  his  inefficiency  beneath  the  cloak  of 
collectivism.  At  every  turn  even  the  junior  officer  of  a 
battery  is  called  upon  to  exercise  positive  command  and 
to  lead,  not  follow.  Thus  in  the  Field  Artillery  the 
laggard,  the  incompetent,  is  soon  discovered. 

One  great  incident  of  the  winter  should  not  be  ignored 
inasmuch  as  Gen.  Pendleton,  Chief  of  Artillery,  was 
not  only  constantly  engaged  in  it,  but  actually  led  the 
movement.  Religious  interest  and  services  had  been 
kept  up  among  the  artillery  commands  from  the  be 
ginning  of  the  war  under  Gen.  Pendleton's  direction  and 
guidance.  Under  the  influence  of  Lee,  Jackson,  and 
Pendleton,  the  spirit  of  religion  spread  broadcast 
through  the  Army  during  the  period  of  winter  quarters 
from  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  to  the  spring  cam 
paign  of  1863.  Log  chapels  everywhere  sprang  up 
along  Jackson's  lines,  and  in  them  the  men  of  all  arms 
gathered  together  during  the  long  winter  evenings  to 
hear  the  word  of  God.  To  systematize  the  religious 
work  providing  every  portion  of  the  field  army  with 
devout,  faithful  chaplains,  was  a  task  to  which  Jackson 
and  Pendleton  both  addressed  themselves  with  fervor, 
But  the  number  of  chaplains  proving  inadequate  to  meet 
all  demands,  the  men  themselves  not  infrequently 
preached  to  their  fellows.  The  spirit  of  revival  swept  on 
and  on  through  the  ranks  until  few,  however  callous, 
held  aloof  from  the  meetings  where  so  much  of  peaceful 
promise  was  to  be  found,  and  over  all  there  seemed  to 
spread  a  spirit  of  sanctity  which  did  much  to  lighten  the 
burdens  of  the  soldiery,  and  inspire  them  to  a  faithful 
discharge  of  their  duties.  Christ  walked  abroad  in  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  431 

camps,  and  whispered  many  a  word  of  consolation,  of 
cheer,  of  forgiveness  for  their  sins,  to  those  lonely 
desolate  men,  who,  in  spite  of  cold,  of  hunger,  of  doubt, 
of  loss  of  loved  ones,  and  separation  from  everything 
dear  to  their  lives,  clung  to  their  posts  through  that  aw 
ful  winter.  "Courage,  despair  not,"  the  sweet  and  hope 
ful  voice  whispered  in  their  ears,  and  each  dawn  found 
the  Confederate  sentinel  watching  upon  the  post  of  con 
secrated  duty. 

He  who  fails  to  accord  great  weight  to  the  religious 
influence  projected  into  the  Confederate  cantonments 
along  the  Rappahannock  while  Jackson  confronted  the 
Federal  host,  fails  utterly  to  understand  why,  when  the 
men  of  the  Northern  Army,  bountifully  supplied  with 
all  that  a  wealthy  nation  could  furnish,  were  deserting 
at  a  rate  of  200  a  day,  the  half-starved,  half -naked,  un 
paid  Confederates  stuck  to  their  tattered  colors.*  He 
fails  to  understand  that  it  was  that  divine  faith  in  them 
selves  and  in  their  cause,  instilled  by  their  leaders  into 
their  hearts  along  with  a  trust  in  God,  and  the  promise 
of  that  "peace  which  passeth  all  understanding"  which 
kept  the  soldiers  of  the  Confederacy  in  the  ranks,  and 
made  it  possible  for  the  frosted  colors  to  be  once  more 
unfurled  to  lead  them  on  to  fresh  victories.  To  such 
factors  in  war,  the  ordinary  strategist,  tactician,  military 
historian,  accords  little  consideration.  He  is  too  prone 
to  deal  merely  with  words  of  command  and  numbers. 
In  disregarding  the  tears  of  repentance  which  wet  the 
cheek  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  the  winter 
of  1863,  he  but  neglects  the  very  cause  of  the  steeling  of 
its  heart  to  all  the  sacrifices,  all  the  sufferings,  all  the 
privations  it  was  called  upon  to  endure.  "In  war  men 
are  nothing;  it  is  the  man  who  is  everything.  The  gen 
eral  is  the  head,  the  whole  of  an  army.  It  was  not  the 
Roman  Army  that  conquered  Gaul,  but  Csesar;  it  was 
not  the  Carthaginian  Army  that  made  Rome  tremble  in 

"Hooker  stated  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  that  when 
he  relieved  Burnside  desertions  were  at  the  rate  of  200  a  day  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  that  the  returns  showed  2,922  commissioned  officers  and 
81,964  enlisted  men  absent,  the  majority  from  causes  unknown. 


432  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

her  gates,  but  Hannibal;  it  was  not  the  French  Army 
that  carried  the  war  to  the  Weser  and  the  Inn,  but  Tu- 
renne;  and  it  was  not  the  Prussian  Army  which,  for 
seven  years  defended  Prussia  against  the  three  greatest 
powers  of  Europe,  but  Frederick  the  Great."  So  spoke 
Napoleon,  and  many  military  writers  tell  us  that  an 
army  is  but  the  reflex  of  its  commander.  The  leader  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  the  winter  of  1863 
was  Christ.  Its  moral  stamina  was,  in  the  highest  sense 
of  the  word,  God-given.* 

As  spring  began  to  approach  there  were  signs  of  re 
newed  activity  in  both  armies.  As  early  as  the  9th  of 
February,  Fitz  Lee's  Cavalry  Brigade  had  broken 
camp  in  Caroline  County,  and  leaving  its  winter  quarters 
moved  to  Culpeper  Courthouse,  where,  on  the  12th,  it 
relieved  Hampton's  Brigade  from  the  duty  of  picket 
ing  the  upper  Rappahannock.  Crossing  the  river  on 
the  24th,  at  Kelly's  Ford,  Fitz  Lee  reconnoitered  to 
wards  Falmouth,  encountering  the  enemy's  cavalry  at 
Hartwood  church  and  actually  driving  it  back  into  the 
camps  of  the  5th  Federal  Corps.  On  the  26th,  he  re 
turned  to  his  new  camp  after  taking  150  prisoners  and 
providing  his  men  with  a  number  of  horses,  much  equip 
ment,  forage,  etc.  This  exploit  provoked  the  Federals 
and  Brig.-Gen.  Averell,  with  his  cavalry  brigade,  was 
ordered  on  the  18th  of  March  to  cross  the  river  at  one  of 
the  upper  fords  and  to  "attack  and  rout  or  destroy" 
Fitz  Lee's  Brigade  reported  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  Cul 
peper  Courthouse.  After  detaching  a  force  of  900  men 
to  look  after  the  Confederate  patrols  north  of  the  river, 
Averell  with  2,100  men  and  a  horse  battery  reached 
Kelly's  Ford  on  the  morning  of  the  17th.  Lee's  pickets 
guarding  the  ford  were  driven  off,  and  then  Averell  set 
about  crossing  his  command.  The  river  was  high  and 
swift,  and  the  caissons  and  guns  were  entirely  sub- 

•The  reader  is  invited  to  consult  Soldier  Life,  A.  V.  V.,  McCarthy ;  Four 
Years  Under  Marse  Robert,  Stiles  ;  A  Cannoneer  Under  Stonewall  Jackson,  Moore ; 
Three  Years  in  the  Confederate  Horse  Artillery,  Neese ;  A  Soldier's  Recollections, 
McKim  ;  and  in  marked  contrast  with  these  is  Recollections  of  a  Private  Soldier 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Wilkeson. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  438 

merged,  the  artillery  ammunition  being  carried  across 
in  the  nose-bags  of  the  troopers.  By  10  A.  M.  he  was 
ready  to  advance. 

In  the  meantime,  Fitz  Lee  at  his  camp  near  Culpeper 
Courthouse  had  learned  that  the  ford  had  been  forced, 
and  immediately  set  his  command  in  motion,  meeting 
Averell's  column  within  half  a  mile  of  the  ford.  The 
Federal  line  extended  from  the  river  near  Wheatley's 
Ford  to  the  Brooks  house,  with  sharpshooters  posted 
behind  a  stone  fence  running  along  the  front  and  the 
mounted  reserves  drawn  up  in  the  fields  and  woods  in 
rear  on  both  sides  of  the  road  branching  off  from 
Wheatley's  to  Kelly's  Ford.  Along  his  front,  Averell 
had  deployed  two  regiments  armed  with  carbines,  and 
supported  by  two  sections  of  his  horse  battery.  Fitz 
Lee's  leading  regiment  charged  down  the  stone  fence  in 
columns  of  fours,  the  men  emptying  their  pistols  as  they 
galloped  along  and  driving  off  the  defenders. 

Gen.  Stuart  and  Maj.  Pelham  had  been  attending  the 
session  of  a  court-martial  in  Culpeper  Courthouse  as 
witnesses  and,  expecting  to  return  to  Fredericksburg 
on  the  17th,  borrowed  horses  and  joined  Lee's  Brigade 
when  they  learned  of  the  impending  cavalry  fight.  Be 
ing  present  by  mere  accident,  Stuart  declined  to  exer 
cise  command,  but  Pelham  could  not  remain  inactive  on 
the  battlefield,  and,  seeing  Lee's  3d  Virginia  Regiment 
preparing  for  the  charge  described,  rushed  to  its  head 
to  assist  Col.  Owen  in  leading  it.  With  the  shout  of 
victory  upon  his  lips,  and  while  waving  his  hat  aloft,  he 
was  struck  in  the  head  by  a  piece  of  shell  just  as  the 
column  passed  by  the  Wheatley  house.  A  single  Con 
federate  trooper  reined  up  to  carry  the  all  but  lifeless 
body  from  the  field  across  his  pommel.  Thus  was  the 
body  of  the  "gallant  and  incomparable"  Pelham  saved 
from  the  enemy. 

The  leading  Confederate  regiments  were  met  near  the 
Wheatley  house  by  a  part  of  the  Federal  reserves  and 
checked  after  a  sanguinary  mounted  combat,  the  result 
of  which  in  view  of  Averell's  superior  force  was  to  com- 


434  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

pel  Lee,  for  reasons  of  prudence,  to  retire  to  a  strong  po 
sition  where  he  could  employ  his  artillery  with  effect. 
Withdrawing  to  the  road  from  Brandy  Station  to 
Kelly's  Ford,  he  now  formed  a  line  across  it  near  Car 
ter's  Run  with  an  open  field  about  600  yards  wide  in  his 
front.  On  a  hill  north  of  the  road,  Capt.  James 
Breathed's  Battery  of  four  guns,  formerly  commanded 
by  Pelham,  took  up  its  position.  Soon  the  enemy  made 
his  appearance  and  opened  fire  with  three  pieces  of 
Lieut.  Brown's  section  at  long  range.  After  awaiting 
Averell's  attack  for  some  time,  Fitz  Lee,  growing  im 
patient,  ordered  a  charge,  and,  routing  the  enemy,  all 
but  captured  his  guns,  the  troopers  driving  the  gunners 
from  their  pieces  in  spite  of  their  double- shotted  canister 
and  spherical  case. 

Maj.  McClellan  states  that  Pelham  was  dead  when 
his  body  was  removed  by  the  trooper.  John  Esten 
Cooke  states  that  he  lingered  until  after  midnight,  at 
which  time  Stuart,  grieved  beyond  all  measure,  tele 
graphed  the  family  of  Pelham  in  Alabama: 

"The  noble,,  the  chivalric,  the  gallant  Pelham  is  no  more.  He 
was  killed  in  action  yesterday.  His  remains  will  be  sent  to  you 
to-day.  How  much  he  was  beloved,,  appreciated  and  admired,  let 
the  tears  of  agony  we  have  shed,  and  the  gloom  of  mourning 
throughout  my  command,  bear  witness.  His  loss  is  irreparable."* 

The  young  artilleryman's  body  was  sent  to  Richmond 
and  there  laid  in  state  in  the  Capitol  of  Virginia  at  the 
feet  of  Houdon's  statue  of  the  Arch  Rebel,  Washing 
ton,  t  Cooke  tells  us  that  "some  tender  hand  deposited 
an  evergreen  wreath,  entwined  with  white  flowers,  upon 
the  case  that  contained  all  that  was  mortal  of  the  fallen 
hero."  Soon  his  family  conveyed  the  youthful  soldier's 
remains  to  his  home  in  the  far  South,  Virginia,  the  field 
of  his  undying  fame,  surrendering  them  to  Alabama,  the 
land  of  his  birth. 

"The  Major-General  commanding,"  wrote  Stuart  in 
a  general  order,  "approaches  with  reluctance  the  painful 

*Pelham,  "the  Gallant,"  in  Wearing  of  the  Gray,  by  John  Esten  Cooke,  p.  127; 
The  Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,  McClellan,  p.  211. 

Col.  William  F.  Gordon's  famous  poem,  Secessia. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  435 

duty  of  announcing  to  the  division  its  irreparable  loss  in 
the  death  of  Maj.  John  Pelham,  commanding  the  Horse 
Artillery.  He  fell  mortally  wounded  in  the  battle  of 
Kellysville,  March  17,  with  the  battle  cry  on  his  lips, 
and  the  light  of  victory  beaming  from  his  eye. 

"To  you,  his  comrades,  it  is  needless  to  dwell  upon 
what  you  have  so  often  witnessed — his  prowess  in  action, 
already  proverbial.  You  well  know  how,  though  young 
in  years,  a  mere  stripling  in  appearance,  remarkable  for 
his  genuine  modesty  of  deportment,  he  yet  disclosed  on 
the  battlefield  the  conduct  of  a  veteran,  and  displayed  in 
his  handsome  person  the  most  imperturbable  coolness 
in  danger. 

"His  eye  had  glanced  over  every  battlefield  of  this 
army,  from  the  First  Manassas  to  the  moment  of  his 
death,  and  he  was,  with  a  single  exception,  a  brilliant 
actor  in  all. 

"The  memory  of  the  gallant  Pelham,  his  many 
virtues,  his  noble  nature  and  purity  of  character,  is 
enshrined  as  a  sacred  legacy  in  the  hearts  of  all  who 
knew  him. 

"His  record  has  been  bright  and  spotless,  his  career 
brilliant  and  successful. 

"He  fell — the  noblest  of  sacrifices — on  the  altar  of 
his  country,  to  whose  glorious  service  he  had  dedicated 
his  life  from  the  beginning  of  the  war." 

The  written  records  of  the  American  conflict  fail  to 
disclose  another  such  tribute  from  so  great  a  commander 
as  Stuart.  The  evergreen  wreath  placed  upon  his  bier 
has  long  since  shriveled  and  died — these  words  can  never 
fade  from  the  pages  of  history.  Pelham  is  now  a  tra 
dition  of  the  Southland,  nay  more,  of  the  American 
people.  His  fame  is  the  heritage  of  a  united  country 
and  an  inspiration  for  all  time  to  the  soldier  of  what 
ever  race.  Of  his  death,  the  poetic  Cooke  wrote : 

"Thus  passed  away  a  noble,  lofty  soul;  thus  ended  a  career 
brief  it  is  true,  but  among  the  most  arduous,  glorious,  and  splendid 
of  war.  Young,  but  immortal — a  boy  in  years,  but  heir  to  undying 
fame — he  was  called  away  from  the  scene  of  his  triumphs  and 


486  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

glory  to  a  brighter  world,  where  neither  wars  nor  rumours  of  wars 
can  come,  and  wounds  and  pain  and  suffering  are  unknown;    where 

"Malice  domestic,  foreign  levy,  nothing 
Can  touch  him  further!" 

It  would  be  vain  indeed  for  the  author  to  attempt  to 
trace  the  record  of  Pelham's  24  years  of  life  when  al 
ready  it  has  been  done  in  the  beautiful  words  of  one  of 
his  comrades.  In  order  that  not  even  language  may  de 
tract  from  his  due,  the  following  extract  from  John 
Esten  Cooke's  sketch  is  inserted: 

"A  son  of  the  great  State  of  Alabama,  and  descended  from  an 
old  and  honorable  family  there,  he  had  the  courage  of  his  race 
and  clime.  He  chose  arms  as  his  profession,  and  entered  West 
Point,  where  he  graduated  just  as  the  war  commenced;  lost  no  time 
in  offering  his  services  to  the  South,  and  received  the  appointment 
of  First  Lieutenant  in  the  Confederate  States  Army.  Proceeding 
to  Harper's  Ferry,  when  Gen.  Johnston  was  in  command  there, 
he  was  assigned  to  duty  as  drill  officer  of  Artillery,  and  in  the 
battle  of  Manassas  commanded  a  battery,  which  he  fought  with  that 
daring  courage  which  afterwards  rendered  him  so  famous.  He 
speedily  attracted  the  attention  of  the  higher  generals  of  the  Army, 
and  Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  entrusted  him  with  the  organization  of 
the  battalion  of  Horse  Artillery,  which  he  subsequently  commanded 
in  nearly  every  battle  of  the  war  upon  Virginia's  soil.  Here  I 
knew  him  first. 

"From  the  moment  when  he  took  command  of  that  famous  corps, 
a  new  system  of  artillery  fighting  seemed  to  be  inaugurated.  The 
rapidity,  the  rush,  the  impetus  of  the  cavalry  were  grafted  upon 
its  more  deliberate  brother.  Not  once,  but  repeatedly,  has  the 
Horse  Artillery  of  Pelham  given  chase  at  full  speed  to  a  flying 
enemy;  and  far  in  advance  of  all  infantry  support,  unlimbered  and 
hurled  its  thunders  on  the  foe.  It  was  ever  at  the  point  where 
the  line  was  weakest ;  and  however  headlong  the  charge  of  the 
cavalry,  the  whirling  guns  were  beside  it,  all  ready  for  their  part. 
'Trot,  march !'  had  yielded  to  'gallop !'  with  the  battalion ;  it  was 
rushed  into  position,  and  put  into  action  with  a  rush;  and  in  and 
out  among  the  guns  where  the  bolts  fell  thickest  was  the  brave 
young  artillerist,  cool  and  self-possessed,  but,  as  one  of  his  officers 
said  the  other  day,  'as  gay  as  a  schoolboy  at  a  frolic.'  He  loved 
his  profession  for  its  own  sake;  and  often  spoke  to  the  officers 
above  alluded  to  of  the  'jolly  good  fights'  he  would  have  in  the 
present  campaign;  but  I  anticipate  my  subject. 

"Once  associated  with  the  command  of  Stuart,  he  secured  the 
warm  regard  and  unlimited  confidence  of  that  general,  who  em- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  437 

ployed  his  services  upon  every  occasion.  Thenceforth  their 
fortunes  seemed  united,,  like  their  hearts,  and  the  young  man  became 
known  as  one  of  the  most  desperate  fighters  of  the  whole  army. 
He  was  rightly  regarded  by  Jackson,  and  others.,  as  possessed  of 
a  very  extraordinary  genius  for  artillery;  and  when  any  movement 
of  unusual  importance  was  designed,  Pelham  was  assigned  to  the 
Artillery  to  be  employed. 

"His  career  was  a  brief  one,  but  'how  glorious' !  Let  us  glance 
at  it. 

"When  the  Southern  forces  fell  back  from  Manassas  in  1861, 
his  batteries  had  their  part  in  covering  the  movement  and  guarding 
the  forks  of  the  Rappahannock.  During  the  campaign  of  the 
Peninsula,  his  Blakely  was  as  a  sentinel  on  post  near  the  enemy; 
and  at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg  his  courage  and  skill  transformed 
raw  militia  into  veterans.  In  the  Seven  Days'  battles  around  Rich 
mond,  he  won  fadeless  laurels.  With  one  Napoleon,  he  engaged 
three  heavy  batteries,  and  fought  them  with  a  pertinacity  which 
made  the  calm  face  of  Jackson  glow;  and  the  pressure  of  that 
heroic  hand,  warm  and  eloquent  of  unspoken  admiration.  Soon 
afterwards,  at  the  White  House,  he  engaged  a  gunboat,  and  driving 
it  away,  after  a  brief  but  hot  encounter,  proved  how  fanciful  were 
the  terrors  of  these  'monsters'.* 

"His  greatest  achievements  were  to  come,  however,  and  he 
hastened  to  record  them  on  the  enduring  tablets  of  history.  From 
the  moment  when  his  artillery  advanced  from  the  Rappahannock, 
to  the  time  when  it  returned  thither,  to  the  day  of  Fredericksburg, 
the  path  of  the  young  leader  was  deluged  with  the  blood  of  battle. 
At  Manassas  he  rushed  his  guns  into  the  very  columns  of  the 
enemy  almost;  fighting  their  sharpshooters  with  canister,  amid  a 
hurricane  of  balls.  At  Sharpsburg  he  had  command  of  nearly  all 
the  artillery  on  our  left,  and  directed  it  with  the  hand  of  a  master. 
When  the  Army  crossed  back  into  Virginia,  he  was  posted  at 
Shepherdstown  and  guarded  the  ford  with  an  obstinate  valour, 
which  was  spoken  in  the  regular  and  increasing  reverberation  of  his 
deep-mouthed  Napoleons,  as  they  roared  on,  hour  after  hour, 
driving  back  the  enemy. 

"Of  the  day  which  succeeded  that  exciting  period,  many  persons 
will  long  hold  the  memory.  It  was  in  an  honest  old  country-house, 
whither  the  tide  of  war  bore  him  for  a  time,  that  the  noble  nature 
of  the  young  soldier  shone  forth  in  all  its  charms.  There,  in  the 
old  hall  on  the  banks  of  the  Opequon,  surrounded  by  warm  hearts 
who  reminded  him  perhaps  of  his  own  beloved  ones  in  Alabama; 
there  in  the  tranquil  days  of  autumn,  in  that  beautiful  country,  he 
seemed  to  pass  some  of  his  happiest  hours.  All  were  charmed 
with  his  kind  temper  and  his  sunny  disposition;  with  his  refine- 

•This  was  later  done  by  Confederate  batteries  along  the  Rappahannock,  and 
by  Forrest's  batteries  in  Tennessee. 


438  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

ment,  his  courtesy,  his  high  breeding,  and  simplicity.  Modest  to 
a  fault,  almost  blushing  like  a  girl  at  times,  and  wholly  unassuming 
in  his  entire  deportment,  he  became  a  favorite  with  all  around 
him,  and  secured  that  regard  of  good  men  and  women  which  is  the 
proof  of  high  traits  and  fine  instincts  in  its  possessor.  In  the 
beautiful  autumn  forests,  by  the  stream  with  its  great  sycamores, 
and  under  the  tall  oaks  of  the  lawn,  he  thus  wandered  for  a  time, — 
an  exile  from  his  own  land  of  Alabama,  but  loved,  admired,  and 
cherished  by  warm  hearts  in  this.  When  he  left  the  haunts  of 
'the  Bower'  I  think  he  regretted  it,  but  work  called  him. 

"The  fiat  had  gone  forth  from  Washington  that  another  'On  to 
Richmond'  should  be  attempted;  and  where  the  vultures  of  war 
hovered,  there  was  the  post  of  duty  for  the  Horse  Artillery.  The 
Cavalry  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  met  the  advancing  column  at 
Aldie,  and  Pelham  was  again  in  his  element.  Thenceforward, 
until  the  banks  of  the  Rappahannock  were  reached  by  the  Cavalry, 
the  batteries  of  the  Horse  Artillery  disputed  every  step  of  ground. 
The  direction  of  the  Artillery  was  left,  with  unhesitating  confidence, 
by  Stuart  to  the  young  officer;  and  those  who  witnessed,  during 
that  arduous  movement,  the  masterly  handling  of  his  guns,  can  tell 
how  his  confidence  was  justified.  It  was  the  eye  of  the  great 
soldier,  the  hand  of  the  born  artillerist,  which  was  evident  in  his 
work,  during  those  days  of  struggle.  He  fell  back  neither  too  soon 
nor  too  late,  and  only  limbered  up  his  guns  to  unlimber  again  in 
the  first  position  which  he  reached.  Thus  fighting  every  inch  of 
the  way  from  Aldie,  round  by  Paris,  and  Markham's,  he  reached 
the  Rappahannock  and  posted  his  artillery  at  the  fords,  where  he 
stood  and  bade  the  enemy  defiance.  That  page  in  the  history  of 
the  war  is  scarcely  known;  but  those  who  were  present  know  the 
obstinacy  of  the  contest,  and  the  nerve  and  skill  which  were 
displayed  by  the  young  officer. 

"That  may  be  unknown,  but  the  work  done  by  Pelham  on  the 
great  day  of  Fredericksburg  is  a  part  of  history  now.  All  know 
how  stubbornly  he  stood  on  that  day — what  laurels  encircled  his 
young  brow  when  night  at  last  came.  This  was  the  climax  of  his 
fame — the  event  with  which  his  name  will  be  inseparably  con 
nected.  With  one  Napoleon  gun,  he  opened  the  battle  on  the  right, 
and  instantly  drew  upon  himself  the  fire,  at  close  range,  of  three 
or  four  batteries  in  front,  and  a  heavy  enfilading  fire  from  thirty- 
pound  Parrotts  across  the  river.  But  this  moved  him  little.  That 
Napoleon  gun  was  the  same  which  he  had  used  at  the  battle  of 
Cold  Harbor — it  was  taken  from  the  enemy  at  Seven  Pines, — and, 
in  the  hands  of  the  young  officer,  it  had  won  a  fame  which  must 
not  be  tarnished  by  defeat!  Its  grim  voice  must  roar,  however 
great  the  odds;  its  reverberating  defiance  must  roll  over  the  plain, 
until  the  bronze  war-dog  was  silenced.  So  it  roared  on  steadily 
with  Pelham  beside  it,  blowing  up  the  caissons,  and  continuing  to 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  439 

tear  up  the  enemy's  ranks.  Gen.  Lee  was  watching  it  from  the  hill 
above,  and  exclaimed,  with  eyes  filled  with  admiration,,  'It  is 
glorious  to  see  such  courage  in  one  so  young!'  It  was  glorious 
indeed  to  see  that  one  gun,  placed  in  an  important  position,  hold 
its  ground  with  a  firmness  so  unflinching.  Nor,  until  his  last 
round  of  ammunition  was  shot  away,  did  Pelham  retire;  and  then 
only  after  a  peremptory  order  sent  to  him.  He  afterwards  took 
command  of  the  entire  artillery  on  the  right,  and  fought  it  until 
night  with  a  skill  and  courage  which  were  admirable.  He  advanced 
his  guns  steadily,  and  at  nightfall  was  thundering  on  the  flank  of 
the  retreating  enemy,  who  no  longer  replied.  No  answering  roar 
came  back  from  those  batteries  he  had  fought  with  his  Napoleon 
so  long;  he  had  triumphed.  That  triumph  was  complete,  and 
placed  forever  upon  record  when  the  great  commander-in-chief, 
whom  he  loved  and  admired  so  ardently,  gave  him  the  name  in  his 
report,  of  'the  gallant  Pelham/ 

"Supreme  tribute  to  his  courage — immortalizing  him  in  history! 
To  be  the  sole  name  mentioned  beneath  the  rank  of  Major-General 
in  all  that  host  of  heroes — and  mentioned  as  'the  gallant  Pelham' !" 

"Thenceforward  there  was  little  for  him  to  desire.  He  had 
never  cared  for  rank,  only  longed  for  glory,  and  now  his  name  was 
deathless.  It  is  true  that  he  sometimes  said,  with  modest  and 
noble  pride,  that  he  thought  it  somewhat  hard  to  be  considered  too 
young  for  promotion,  when  they  gave  him  great  commands  at 
Sharpsburg  and  Fredericksburg, — and  called  on  him  when  the 
hardest  work  was  to  be  done.  But,  he  never  desired  a  mere  title  he 
had  not  won,  and  did  his  soldier's  duty  thoroughly,  trusting  to  time. 
So  noble  and  important,  however,  had  been  his  recent  services 
that  promotion  was  a  matter  of  course.  The  President  said,  'I  do 
not  need  to  see  any  papers  about  Maj.  Pelham,'  and  had  appointed 
him  a  Lieutenant-Colonel;  and  it  only  awaited  the  formal  con 
firmation  of  the  Senate,  when  he  fell  on  the  Rappahannock.  His 
fall  was  a  public  calamity  to  the  nation,  but  none  to  him.  It  was 
fit  that  such  a  spirit  should  lay  down  its  great  work  before  the 
hard  life  of  the  world  had  dimmed  the  polish  of  the  good  knight's 
spotless  shield.  He  wanted  no  promotion  at  the  hands  of  men. 
He  had  won,  if  not  worn,  the  highest  honors  of  the  great  soldier; 
and  having  finished  his  task,  the  gentle  spirit  took  its  flight, 
promoted  by  the  tender  hand  of  death  to  other  honors  in  a  brighter 
world."* 

Such  was  the  character,  such  were  the  military  serv 
ices  of  Maj.  John  Pelham,  who  in  two  years  had 
thrice  won  the  personal  thanks  of  Jackson,  and  indi 
vidual  mention  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  these  two 

•Pelham,  "the  Gallant,"  in  Wearing  of  the  Gray,  Cooke. 

Every  child  should  read  Cooke's  Surry  of  Eagle's  Nest,  Mohun,  Fairfax,  etc. 


440  THE  LONG  ABM  OF  LEE 

being  among  the  best  and  the  bravest  men,  and  certainly 
the  greatest  soldiers,  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 
Well  might  Jackson  have  said  to  Stuart  on  the  bloody 
field  of  Fredericksburg,  "Have  you  another  Pelham, 
General?  If  so,  I  wish  you  would  give  him  to  me!" 

Pelham  has  been  likened  to  both  Murat  and  Marceau. 
Had  he  merely  embodied  the  characteristics  of  such 
soldiers  so  extensive  a  mention  of  his  name  had  not  been 
made.  He  was  far  more  than  a  skilled  and  dashing 
soldier.  He  was  not  only  the  pattern  of  his  arm,  in 
jecting  into  the  service  of  the  guns  an  elan  and  spirit 
of  self-sacrifice  remarked  by  all,  but  he  is  to-day  the 
Galahad,  sans  peur  et  sans  reproche,  of  all  artillerymen. 
Modern  formulae  have  by  no  means  rendered  impossible 
the  deeds  of  another  Pelham,  nor  is  the  effectiveness  of 
field  artillery  yet  determined  by  the  rank  of  the  gunner 
who  lays  the  piece. 

Pelham' s  brilliant  career  was  but  a  phase  of  the  Con 
federate  artillery  service.  In  the  final  analysis  of  his 
deeds,  it  was  not  so  much  what  he  actually  did  as  what 
his  name  stood  for  among  his  comrades  and  his  as 
sociates.  The  influence  of  such  a  spirit  as  his  is  far 
leaching.  It  is  easy  to  place  limits  upon  his  actual  ac 
complishments  in  a  tactical  sense — it  is  impossible  to 
define  the  extent  of  his  moral  ascendency. 

Yet,  it  must  not  be  thought  that  the  Field  Artillery  of 
Lee's  army  boasted  no  other  figures  of  exceptional 
individualism.  Indeed,  there  were  many  in  whom  may 
be  noted  those  strong  traits  of  character  which  typified 
the  arm.  Crutchfield,  Walker,  Alexander,  Carter,  Pe- 
gram,  Chew,  Caskie,  Mclntosh,  Haskell,  Breathed,  Mc- 
Graw,  McCabe,  Cutshaw,  Thomson,  Latimer,  Carpen 
ter,  Poague,  and  many  others  were  the  very  embodiment 
of  all  that  was  skillful,  courageous,  gallant,  each  pos 
sessing  a  peculiar  individualism  developed  to  the  highest 
degree.  From  the  sentiments  and  character  of  these 
men  were  developed  the  elan  and  the  morale  which  gave 
to  their  arm  that  distinctive  mien  so  characteristic  of  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  441 

Field  Artillery.  In  their  make-up  there  was  decidedly 
something  of  the  Cavalier ;  their  features  were  unhidden 
by  the  helmet  of  uniformity.  No  cuirass  concealed  their 
familiar  figures;  their  hearts  were  encased  only  by  that 
heroic  resolve  which,  though  powerless  to  shield  from 
the  dangers  of  mortal  conflict,  kept  their  souls  unsullied, 
enabling  them  to  breach  the  works  of  fame  and  tran 
scend  the  ordinary  limits  of  military  glory. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE  BATTLE  OF   CHANCELLORSVILLE PRELIMINARY 

DISPOSITIONS 

THE  Army  of  the  Potomac,  now  under  Hooker,  num 
bered  May  1  not  less  than  111,000  infantry,  11,000 
cavalry,  and  8,000  artillery  with  404  guns,  organized  in 
seven  corps.*  To  this  impressive  force,  Lee  was  pre 
pared  to  oppose  less  than  60,000  men  of  all  arms  and 
about  228  guns.f 

The  Confederate  Artillery  was  distributed  as  follows : 

IST  CORPS 

McLaws'  Division,  Cabell's  Battalion,  4  batteries,  18  guns. 

R.  H.  Anderson's  Division,  Garnett's  Battalion,  4  batteries, 
18  guns. 

1st  Corps  Reserve  Artillery,  Alexander's  Battalion,  6  batteries, 
23  guns,  and  Walton's  Battalion,  4>  batteries,  13  guns,  the  effective 
personnel  of  the  two  battalions  numbering  about  850,  or  85  officers 
and  men  per  battery. 

2D  CORPS 

A.  P.  Hill's  Division,  Walker's  Battalion,  6  batteries,  24  guns. 

Rodes'  Division,  Carter's  Battalion,  4  batteries,  18  guns. 

Early 's  Division,  Andrews'  Battalion,  4  batteries,  18  guns. 

Colston's  Division,  Jones'  Battalion,  4  batteries,  18  guns. 

2d  Corps  Reserve  Artillery,  Brown's  Battalion,  6  batteries,  24 
guns,  and  Mclntosh's  Battalion,  4  batteries,  16  guns,  with  a  total 
effective  personnel  for  the  two  battalions  of  about  900,  or  90  officers 
and  men  per  battery. 

GENERAL  RESERVE  ARTILLERY 

Cutts'  Battalion,  3  batteries,  14  guns,  and  Nelson's  Battalion, 
3  batteries,  12  guns,  with  a  total  effective  personnel  for  the  two 
battalions  of  about  600,  or  60  officers  and  men  per  battery. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY 
Beckham's  Battalion,  4  batteries,  18  guns.} 


•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  320. 

tHood  and  Plckett  with  Bearing's  and  Henry's  battalions,  or  8  batteries, 
with  a  total  of  about  35  guns,  were  still  detached  from  the  1st  Corps. 

tChew's  Battery  was  detached  with  Jones'  Brigade,  and  on  duty  In  Western 
Virginia. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  443 

Thus,  there  were  54  batteries  present  with  232  guns 
and  a  total  artillery  personnel  of  about  5,000  officers 
and  men.  In  this  campaign  we  should  figure  on  the 
Confederate  divisional  battalions  as  possessing  about  95 
officers  and  men  per  battery,  whereas  the  average 
strength  of  Hooker's  74  batteries  was  not  less  than  135. 

When  Lee  should  have  had  every  man  and  gun  avail 
able  to  ward  off  the  blow  which  Hooker  proposed  to  de 
liver  to  him,  he  found  himself  deprived  of  three  of  Long- 
street's  divisions,  numbering  about  20,000  effective 
infantry,  and  two  battalions  of  artillery  with  a  total 
personnel  of  about  30  officers,  and  800  men,  with  over 
30  guns.* 

Soon  after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Gen.  D.  H. 
Hill  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  force  defending 
the  seaboard  of  the  Carolinas,  and  at  the  beginning  of 
the  New  Year,  Ransom's  Division  of  the  1st  Corps  had 
been  detached  from  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and 
assigned  to  this  command.  The  strength  of  this  division 
was  not  far  short  of  4,000  men.  About  the  middle  of 
February  Gen.  Lee  had  also  been  induced  by  Mr. 
Seddon  to  send  Longstreet  with  the  divisions  of  Hood 
and  Pickett  to  cover  Richmond,  which  the  administra 
tion  believed  to  be  menaced  from  the  directions  of 
Fortress  Monroe  and  Suffolk.  While  Lee  deemed  a 
single  division  sufficient  to  ward  off  the  danger,  he  sub 
mitted  to  the  detachment  of  the  two  divisions,  which 
numbered  about  15,000  officers  and  men,  but  cautioned 
Longstreet  to  so  dispose  his  troops  that  they  could  re 
turn  to  the  Rappahannock  at  the  first  alarm.  The  warn 
ing,  however,  was  totally  disregarded,  nor  was  Gen.  Lee 
able  in  spite  of  persistent  representations  to  Mr.  Davis 
and  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Seddon,  to  overcome 
their  fears  and  have  these  troops  ordered  to  rejoin  him. 
In  their  counsels,  the  President  and  the  Secretary  held 
Longstreet's  views  superior  to  those  of  Gen.  Lee,  whose 
lieutenant  had  become  wedded  to  the  idea  of  operations 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXVIII,  p.  915  ;  for  return  of  Hood's  and 
Pickett's  Division,  March  19,  1863,  Ibid.,  p.  929. 


444  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

independent  of  the  main  army.  And  so,  when  Hooker 
was  becoming  active  on  the  Rappahannock,  thoroughly 
informed  by  Gen.  Peck  at  Norfolk  of  Lee's  weakened 
condition,  Longstreet  was  puttering  about  east  of  Rich 
mond  120  miles  away  from  his  proper  post,  either 
ignorant  of  the  value  of  concentration,  or  careless  of  the 
necessity  therefor,  in  order  that  his  own  pet  project 
might  be  carried  out. 

While  many  of  the  accusations  brought  against  Long- 
street  since  the  war  are  to  a  great  extent  the  outgrowth 
of  political  prejudice,  this  willful  desertion  of  his  com- 
mander-in-Chief  is  the  most  unpardonable  error  of 
which  he  was  guilty.  He  left  Gen.  Lee  with  a  thorough 
understanding  between  them  that  he  would  return  in  the 
spring.  So  soon,  however,  as  he  tasted  the  sweets  of 
independence,  he  found  himself  unable  to  accede  to  the 
wishes  and  the  views  of  his  commander-in-chief,  and 
actually  played  upon  the  fears  of  the  President  and  Mr. 
Seddon  to  the  end  that  his  own  wishes  prevailed.  It 
seems  certain  that  Mr.  Davis  would  never  have  taken 
the  responsibility  of  going  counter  to  Gen.  Lee's  advice 
had  Longstreet  properly  supported  his  commander-in- 
chief.  Longstreet's  conduct  is  in  marked  contrast 
to  that  of  Jackson,  who,  without  delay,  hastened 
from  the  Valley  to  the  Peninsula  in  June,  1861,  when 
summoned  by  Lee.  The  true  value  of  a  lieutenant  lies 
in  his  ability  and  willingness  to  subordinate  his  own  de 
sires  to  those  of  his  captain.  This  Jackson  did,  and 
this  Longstreet  failed  to  do. 

Of  Longstreet's  detachment  from  the  Army,  Gen. 
Alexander  has  this  only  to  say:  "The  great  need  of 
rations  for  the  coming  summer  led  the  War  Depart 
ment  to  send  Longstreet  with  two  divisions  for  a  cam 
paign  in  the  vicinity  of  Suffolk.  Its  object  was  to  col 
lect  forage  and  provisions  from  counties  near  the 
Federal  lines.  The  campaign  was  not  initiated  by  Lee, 
and  he  thought  but  one  division  would  have  been  suffi 
cient,  as  the  result  showed.  For  the  little  fighting  done 
was  unnecessary,  being  initiated  by  the  Confederates. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  445 

And,  although  Lee  at  Chancellorsville  repulsed 
Hooker's  attack,  it  was  poor  policy  to  take  the  risk  of 
battle  against  enormous  odds,  with  one-fourth  of  his 
infantry  absent."* 

Truly  this  is  a  remarkable  criticism!  Poor  policy  on 
the  part  of  whom?  The  insinuation  is  at  least  an  in 
volved  one.  It  is  clearly  directed  at  Lee,  who  in  the 
very  words  of  the  writer  was  not  to  blame  for  the  poor 
policy  pursued.  After  spending  the  whole  winter  forti 
fying  and  strengthening  his  lines,  was  Gen.  Lee  to  de 
sert  them  without  striking  a  blow  and  take  up  a  less 
favorable  position  to  resist  Hooker?  The  suggestion  is 
absurd.  Or  perhaps  Gen.  Alexander  meant  that  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  should  have  conformed  to 
Longstreet's  movements!  We  agree  with  him  that  an 
error  was  committed  which  prevented  the  Confederates 
from  reaping  the  fruits  of  the  victorious  battle  which 
necessity  forced  upon  Lee,  but  Longstreet  and  others, 
and  not  Lee,  were  guilty  of  the  poor  policy  of  which 
he  complains.  It  is  strange  how  one,  generally  so 
scathingly  critical  of  others  as  Gen.  Alexander  was,  can 
dismiss  so  important  a  question  involving  Longstreet, 
his  commander,  in  so  few  words.  The  way  in  which  he 
has  almost  ignored  the  point  is  indicative  of  a  total  lack 
of  real  defense.  Longstreet  attempted  none  for  him 
self  except  to  state  that  his  trains  were  busy  collecting 
forage  and  that  he  could  not  rejoin  Lee  without 
abandoning  them.  Why,  we  may  ask,  did  he  set  about 
collecting  forage  at  so  important  a  crisis  ?t 

The  absence  of  Dearing's  and  Henry's  battalions, 
and  the  batteries  of  Blount,  Macon,  Stribling,  Thomp 
son,  Bachman,  Garden,  Latham,  and  Reilly,  from  the 
field  of  Chancellorsville,  was,  as  we  shall  see  later, 
keenly  felt  by  Gen.  Lee. 

With  the  exception  of  Burnside's  famous  "Mud 
March"  shortly  after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  and 
the  cavalry  fight  on  March  17,  at  Kelly's  Ford,  nothing 

*  Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.  319. 
•fFrom  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  Longstreet,  p.  326. 


446  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

of  interest  in  the  main  theater  of  war  had  transpired 
since  the  great  battle  of  December.  On  the  former  oc 
casion,  some  of  the  Artillery  had  been  ordered  up  from 
the  camps  along  the  North  Anna,  but  had  returned 
after  traversing  about  half  the  distance  to  the  front. 
But  the  Artillery  had  not  been  inactive  elsewhere. 

When  Jackson  was  ordered  across  the  Blue  Ridge 
in  November,  Chew's  Ashby  Battery  was  attached  to 
Gen.  W.  E.  Jones'  Cavalry  Brigade,  which  had  been 
left  in  the  Valley  with  headquarters  at  New  Market,  to 
cooperate  with  Gen.  George  H.  Steuart's  mixed  com 
mand  known  as  the  Maryland  Line.  The  Artillery  of 
Steuart's  force  consisted  of  the  2d  Baltimore  Battery, 
or  the  Baltimore  Light  Artillery,  formerly  commanded 
by  Capt.  Brockenbrough  and  now  by  Capt.  William  H. 
Griffin.  The  operations  in  which  Steuart  and  Jones 
engaged  during  the  severe  winter  of  1862-63  were  very 
trying,  for  they  were  kept  constantly  on  the  alert  guard 
ing  Lee's  flank  against  hostile  movements  up  the  Valley. 
April  21  Chew's  and  Griffin's  batteries  accompanied 
Jones  on  his  raid  into  West  Virginia,  where,  co 
operating  with  Gen.  J.  D.  Imboden,  much  damage  was 
done  to  the  Northwestern  Railroad.  It  was  for  the 
purpose  of  this  expedition  that  Griffin's  Battery  was 
fully  mounted  and  thus  converted  into  a  horse  battery. 

All  through  the  winter  Chew's  and  Griffin's  batteries 
had  rendered  splendid  service,  in  repelling  the  raiding 
parties  of  the  enemy,  and  although  they  had  not  been 
present  at  Fredericksburg  and  only  returned  to 
Harrisonburg  from  West  Virginia  on  May  1,  too  late 
to  participate  in  the  Chancellorsville  campaign,  it  is 
safe  to  say  that  no  other  batteries  of  the  Army  had  seen 
as  much  arduous  service  as  they  had  since  the  return  of 
the  Army  from  Maryland  in  the  fall. 

As  early  as  April  13  Hooker  had  dispatched  Stone- 
man  at  the  head  of  10,000  finely-equipped  cavalry  to 
ascend  the  Rappahannock  and,  swinging  around,  to 
attack  Stuart's  troops  wherever  they  might  be  found, 
and  "Fight!  Fight!  Fight!"  Receiving  intelligence  on 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  447 

the  14th  of  the  concentration  of  the  Federal  Cavalry  on 
the  upper  Rappahannqpk,  Stuart  in  person  had  moved 
with  Fitz  Lee  and  two  regiments  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee's 
Brigade,  accompanied  by  Hart's  and  Moorman's  Horse 
batteries,  to  oppose  the  movement.  This  opposition, 
together  with  the  swollen  condition  of  the  river,  checked 
Stoneman's  passage  to  the  south  side  and  so  deranged 
Hooker's  plans  that  he  was  constrained  to  suspend  his 
advance  until  the  27th.  He  had  hoped  that  his  splendid 
cavalry  column  would  at  once  gain  the  railroad  between 
Fredericksburg  and  Richmond,  by  which  Lee  received 
his  supplies,  and  by  cutting  the  main  line  of  their  com 
munications  compel  the  Confederates  to  evacuate  their 
fortified  line  and  fall  back  upon  Richmond.  The  Fed 
eral  commander  also  anticipated  that  in  drawing  off 
Stuart,  Stoneman  would  make  it  possible  for  the  bulk 
of  his  army  to  be  transferred  to  the  south  side  of  the 
river  with  little  or  no  resistance,  and  having  effected  the 
crossing  he  expected  to  find  space  to  maneuver  his  im 
mense  force. 

Hooker's  grand  movement  was  preceded  by  several 
demonstrations  intended  to  deceive  Lee.  On  the  21st 
small  bodies  of  his  infantry  had  appeared  at  Kelly's 
Ford  and  the  Rappahannock  Bridge,  and  on  the  23d, 
a  small  force  had  been  thrown  across  the  river  at  Port 
Royal.  From  such  activity  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
Lee  at  once  concluded  active  operations  were  soon  to  be 
resumed  in  earnest  by  Hooker. 

At  this  time,  the  Confederates  occupied  the  powerful 
line  of  works  they  had  constructed  during  the  winter, 
reaching  from  near  United  States,  or  Bark  Mill  Ford 
on  the  west,  to  Port  Royal  on  the  east,  a  distance  of 
about  30  miles.  The  brigades  of  Mahone  and  Posey, 
of  Anderson's  Division,  with  Grandy's  and  Lewis'  bat 
teries,  observed  United  States  Ford;  that  of  Wilcox, 
with  Maurin's  and  Huger's  batteries,  Banks'  Ford; 
while  the  remaining  troops  of  the  division  held  the 
heights  about  Fredericksburg,  including  Marye's  Hill. 
McLaws'  Division  held  the  works  on  Lee's  Hill  and 


448  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

the  line  running  to  Hamilton's  Crossing,  and  Jackson's 
Corps  lay  in  position  between  that  point  and  the  ex 
treme  right  at  Port  Royal.  Stuart,  with  the  main  body 
of  the  cavalry,  some  2,400  strong,  at  Culpeper,  was  now 
observing  the  Federal  horsemen  at  Warrenton  Junc 
tion,  while  picketing  the  Rappahannock  with  the  rest 
of  his  command. 

Early  on  the  27th  Hooker  set  his  llth  and  12th 
corps  in  motion  for  Kelly's  Ford,  25  miles  up  the  river, 
where  they  concentrated  on  the  evening  of  the  28th. 
The  5th  Corps  left  the  Federal  camp  on  that  day.  The 
object  of  the  expedition  was  unknown  even  to  the  corps 
commanders  until  after  their  arrival  at  the  ford.  The 
llth  Corps  crossed  the  Rappahannock  at  once,  fol 
lowed  in  the  morning  by  the  12th  and  5th  corps,  the 
first  two  striking  for  Germanna  Ford  on  the  Rapidan, 
and  the  last  for  Ely's  Ford  lower  down  that  stream. 

After  having  been  forced  to  deploy  the  advance 
guard  several  times,  and  much  annoyed  by  one  of  Fitz 
Lee's  regiments  with  Lieut.  Phelps'  section  of  Moor 
man's  Battery  at  Wilderness  Run,  and  again  being 
checked  at  Wilderness  Tavern  by  Stuart  himself,  who 
had  arrived  from  Culpeper  with  the  rest  of  the  brigade, 
and  Breathed's  and  McGregor's  batteries,  the  heavier 
or  more  southern  column  of  the  enemy  under  Slocum 
arrived  at  Chancellorsville  the  evening  of  the  30th.  In 
the  meantime,  Meade  with  the  5th  Corps  had  also  ar 
rived  at  the  designated  point  of  concentration.  But, 
while  Stuart  had  been  powerless  to  stay  the  advance  of 
the  enemy,  he  had  secured  the  information  which  en 
abled  Lee  to  fathom  Hooker's  design,  until  now  skill 
fully  concealed. 

In  order  to  confound  the  enemy,  Hooker  had  as 
sembled  his  1st,  3d,  and  6th  corps  under  Sedgwick,  at 
Franklin's  Crossing,  and  Pollock's  Mill,  about  3  miles 
below  Fredericksburg,  before  dawn  on  the  29th,  and 
thrown  two  pontoon  bridges  across  the  river,  and  on 
the  28th,  holding  a  single  division  in  camp  at  Falmouth 
in  view  of  the  Confederates,  he  had  withdrawn  the  other 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  449 

two  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps  and  dispatched  them  with 
all  haste  to  Banks'  Ford  four  miles  upstream.  Finding 
this  crossing  held  by  Wilcox,  the  column  continued  to 
United  States  Ford,  from  which  Mahone  and  Posey 
had  been  forced  to  retire  by  Meade's  advance  on  the 
29th.  Throwing  a  pontoon  bridge  at  this  point  they 
reached  Chancellorsville  the  same  night  as  the  5th, 
llth,  and  12th  corps.  The  same  day,  the  30th,  Sedg- 
wick  was  instructed  to  place  a  corps  across  the  river 
and  make  a  demonstration  against  the  Confederate  line 
below  Fredericksburg  in  his  front,  and  the  3d  Corps 
was  ordered  to  proceed  with  haste  to  Chancellorsville 
where  Hooker  arrived  and  established  his  headquarters 
during  the  evening. 

Immediately  upon  discovering  the  movement  of  the 
enemy  across  the  Rappahannock  on  the  28th,  Stuart  had 
reported  the  fact,  and  been  instructed  by  Gen.  Lee  to 
take  the  necessary  precautions  to  protect  the  property 
along  the  railroads.  For  this  purpose,  W.  H.  F.  Lee 
with  two  regiments  of  his  brigade,  Hart's  Battery  and 
Shoemaker's  section  of  Moorman's  Battery,  was 
ordered  to  proceed  by  way  of  Culpeper  Courthouse  to 
the  Rapidan,  and  endeavor  to  cover  Gordonsville  and 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad.  The  manner  in  which 
W.  H.  F.  Lee  with  the  9th  and  13th  Virginia  Cavalry, 
Hart's  Battery,  and  Shoemaker's  two  guns,  clung  to 
Stoneman's  overwhelming  force  for  the  next  week,  im 
peding  its  movements  by  reappearing  in  his  front  at 
every  defensible  position,  threatening  his  flank  by  day 
and  night,  and  dropping  shells  into  his  columns  when 
ever  opportunity  presented,  is  a  story  in  itself,  a  part  of 
the  glory  of  which  is  due  the  Horse  Artillery.  Hart 
and  Shoemaker  returned  with  exhausted  horses  and 
men,  but  the  Federal  Battery  of  six  pieces,  with  which 
they  had  been  frequently  engaged  during  the  seven 
days  of  constant  marching,  had  never  once  silenced  the 
Confederate  guns. 

While  Stuart  was  attempting  to  delay  the  Federal 
advance  and  secure  all  the  information  he  could,  Gen. 


450  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Lee  was  actively  engaged  in  moving  the  larger  part  of 
his  army  to  the  left  to  meet  the  Federal  advance.  At 
9  p.  M.  on  the  29th  Anderson  was  directed  to  proceed 
with  his  division  to  Chancellorsville  and  cover  the  roads 
leading  therefrom  to  Fredericksburg  with  Mahone's, 
Posey's  and  Wright's  brigades,  the  first  two  of  which 
had  retired  to  that  point  from  United  States  Ford.  The 
following  morning  Anderson  withdrew  to  the  inter 
section  of  the  Mine  and  Plank  Roads,  near  Tabernacle 
Church,  and  began  to  intrench.  Mahone  was  placed 
astride  the  old  turnpike,  and  Wright  and  Posey  on  the 
Plank  Road.  That  afternoon,  leaving  a  portion  of  his 
force  to  observe  the  Federals,  Stuart  marched  by  way 
of  Spotsylvania  Courthouse  to  Todd's  Tavern,  from 
which  point  he  proceeded  in  person  with  his  staff  to 
join  Lee. 

On  the  forenoon  of  the  29th,  Gen.  Pendleton  at  Ar 
tillery  Headquarters,  near  Chesterfield  Depot  on  the 
Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  Railroad,  received  tele 
graphic  orders  to  bring  up  all  the  Artillery.  Col. 
Crutchfield  with  most  of  the  artillery  of  the  2d  Corps, 
in  camp  near  Bowling  Green,  and  Alexander's  Bat 
talion,  two  batteries  of  Cabell's,  and  one  of  Garnett's 
Battalion  of  the  1st  Corps,  in  camp  at  Mt.  Carmel 
Church,  about  five  miles  north  of  Hanover  Junction, 
took  up  the  march  to  Fredericksburg  at  1  o'clock  that 
afternoon.  The  following  morning  Walton's  Battalion 
and  Nelson's  and  Cutts'  battalions,  of  the  General  Re 
serve,  broke  their  camps  about  Chesterfield.*  In  spite  of 
the  extremely  bad  condition  of  the  roads  and  the  heavy 
rain  which  fell  during  the  night  of  the  29th,  Alexander's 
Battalion  reached  Tabernacle  Church  at  10  A.  M.  on  the 
30th,  Jordan's  Battery  at  once  went  into  position  on 
Anderson's  line,  an  attack  being  expected,  while  the 
other  batteries  were  held  in  reserve.  Manly 's  and 
Carlton's  batteries  of  Cabell's  Battalion  under  Maj. 
Hamilton  reported  to  McLaws  during  the  afternoon. 
McCarthy's  and  Fraser's,  the  other  two  batteries  of 

*Lane's  Battery  of  Cutts'  Battalion  was  on  detached  duty  with  Longstreet. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  451 

Cabell's  Battalion,  had  remained  at  the  front  with  the 
infantry  during  the  winter  and  were  already  in  position 
on  Lee's  Hill. 

During  the  movement  of  the  Artillery  to  the  front, 
Gen.  Pendleton  himself  remained  on  the  road  near 
Massaponax  Church,  where  he  arrived  about  noon  on  the 
30th.  All  the  batteries  in  the  rear  had  reached  this 
point  from  their  camps  by  nightfall,  and  were  parked 
awaiting  orders  from  the  commander-in-chief,  except 
those  of  Walton's  Battalion  which  lost  the  road. 

Meantime,  the  enemy  below  Fredericksburg  had  con 
tinued  inactive,  and  it  became  apparent  from  Stuart's 
reports  that  the  main  attack  would  be  made  in  the  di 
rection  of  Chancellorsville  or  on  the  Confederate  left 
rear.  Gen.  Lee,  therefore,  determined  to  leave  a  suffi 
cient  force  to  hold  the  intrenched  line,  and  with  the  main 
body  of  the  Army  to  oppose  Hooker's  turning  column. 
Early's  Division  of  the  2d  Corps  and  Barksdale's  Bri 
gade  of  McLaws'  Division  of  the  1st  Corps  were  held 
in  position  opposite  Sedgwick,  and  at  midnight  on  the 
30th  McLaws  marched  with  the  rest  of  his  command 
toward  Chancellorsville,  Jackson  following  at  dawn 
with  the  divisions  of  Rodes,  Colston,  and  A.  P.  Hill, 
and  all  of  his  artillery  except  Maj.  Andrews'  Battalion, 
which  remained  with  Early. 

The  brigades  of  Kershaw,  Semmes,  and  Woff ord,  left 
their  works  at  12 :30  A.  M.  May  1  and  marched  along  the 
Plank  Road.  By  6  A.  M.  they  were  in  position  behind 
the  rifle  pits  about  Smith's  Hill,  McLaws'  left  joining 
Anderson's  right,  thus  protecting  the  approaches  from 
the  United  States  Ford,  and  that  from  Chancellorsville 
on  the  right.  Maj.  Hamilton,  leaving  Fraser's  and 
Carlton's  batteries  of  Cabell's  Battalion  in  the  works  on 
Lee's  Hill,  followed  the  division  with  Manly's  and 
McCarthy's  batteries  at  2  A.  M.  Upon  the  departure 
of  part  of  the  battalion  Carlton  at  once  placed  two  of 
his  Parrotts  in  the  works  opposite  Deep  Run,  a  third 
in  a  pit  in  rear  of  the  Howison  house,  holding  the  fourth 
piece,  a  12-pounder  howitzer,  in  reserve. 


452  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

While  Mahone's,  Posey's,  and  Wright's  brigades  of 
Anderson's  Division,  and  Kershaw's,  Semmes',  and 
Wofford's  brigades  of  McLaws'  Division,  Manly's  and 
McCarthy's  batteries  of  Cabell's  Battalion,  Granby's 
and  Lewis'  batteries  of  Garnett's  Battalion,  and 
Jordan's,  Moody's,  Woolfolk's,  Eubank's,  and  one 
section  of  Parker's  Battery  of  Alexander's  Battalion, 
were  opposing  Hooker's  four  corps  at  Chancellorsville, 
and  Jackson's  divisions  were  rapidly  moving  from 
Hamilton's  Crossing  to  unite  with  them,  it  will  be  well 
to  see  what  had  been  done  to  hold  Sedgwick  in  check. 

When  the  regiment  on  picket  at  the  mouth  of  Deep 
Run  reported  to  Early  at  dawn  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th  that  the  enemy  had  thrown  a  brigade  across  the 
river  in  boats  under  cover  of  the  fog,  he  at  once  notified 
Jackson  and  without  orders  moved  his  division  to  the 
front,  deploying  three  regiments  as  skirmishers  along 
the  River  Road.  Meantime,  however,  the  Federals  had 
thrown  a  bridge  and  crossed  over  an  entire  division  of 
infantry  with  its  batteries.  About  a  mile  lower  down 
the  river,  Sedgwick  also  succeeded  in  throwing  a  bridge 
but,  due  to  the  opposition  of  the  Confederate  pickets, 
was  delayed  in  effecting  a  crossing  until  after  10  A.  M., 
when  another  division  was  sent  over.  The  Federal 
troops,  protected  by  the  steep  river  banks,  at  once  com 
menced  to  intrench  and  construct  epaulments  for  their 
guns,  and  on  the  opposite  bank  great  masses  of  infantry 
appeared.  To  resist  the  threatened  attack,  Early 
placed  some  of  Andrews'  guns  behind  his  right  on 
Prospect  Hill,  and  others  in  rear  of  his  left.  Jackson 
soon  sent  forward  Rodes'  Division  which  extended 
Early's  line  to  the  right  across  Massaponax  Creek,  and 
a  WMtworth  gun  of  large  caliber  under  Lieut.  Tunis 
was  placed  in  position  near  the  Yerby  house  hill,  from 
whence,  safe  from  hostile  fire,  it  could  enfilade  the 
ground  in  Early's  front.  Colston's  and  A.  P.  Hill's 
divisions  were  brought  up  during  the  day  and  the  latter 
was  placed  in  position  in  rear  of  Early.  McLaws'  Di 
vision  manned  the  lines  on  Early's  left,  and,  beyond, 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  453 

three  brigades  of  Anderson's  Division  were  intrenched, 
Barksdale's  Brigade  occupying  the  town.  During  the 
day,  the  Federals  made  no  attempt  to  advance  and  the 
Whit  worth  effectually  kept  down  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  whenever  they  showed  a  disposition  to  open. 
On  the  30th  there  was  no  increase  in  the  activity  of  the 
enemy,  but  the  diminution  of  his  force  on  the  opposite 
bank  by  the  movement  of  the  3d  Corps  to  Chancellors- 
ville  was  apparent.  Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs 
when  Anderson's,  McLaws',  and  Jackson's  divisions 
were  withdrawn  and  Early  was  left  to  hold  the  line  he 
had  established  with  his  own  division,  and  Andrews' 
Battalion,  now  reduced  to  12  pieces,  viz.,  six  Napoleons, 
three  3-inch  rifles,  and  two  10-pounder  Parrotts.  Barks- 
dale's  Brigade  of  McLaws'  Division  was  left  to  occupy 
Fredericksburg,  and  Tunis  with  the  Whitworth  was 
placed  under  Early 's  command.  At  daybreak  on  the 
1st,  however,  the  Chief  of  Artillery  was  assigned  the 
artillery  defense  of  the  lines,  and  directed  to  report 
to  Gen.  Early.  No  more  batteries  were  to  be  sent  to 
the  left  from  his  reserve  column,  then  parked  at  Massa- 
ponax  Church. 

When  Pendleton  arrived  on  the  scene  he  at  once  in 
company  with  Early  made  a  reconnaissance.  The  weak 
ness  of  the  line  was  apparent  to  them  both.  With  six 
miles  of  front  to  defend,  there  were  but  9,000  muskets 
available,  including  Barksdale's  men.  Since  it  was  im 
possible  to  occupy  the  whole  line,  the  interval  between 
Deep  Run  and  the  base  of  Lee's  Hill  had  to  be  left 
vacant.  The  principal  threat  was  on  the  right,  for  the 
enemy  was  below  Deep  Run. 

Turning  over  the  artillery  defense  of  the  right  to 
Maj.  Andrews,  Pendleton  directed  his  attention  to  the 
left.  Andrews  had  placed  four  Napoleons  and  two  3- 
inch  rifles  under  Maj.  Latimer  in  gun-pits  behind 
Early's  left,  and  two  Parrotts  on  Prospect  Hill. 
Graham's  1st  Rockbridge  Battery  of  four  rifles,  which 
had  been  sent  him  by  Pendleton,  was  also  posted  at  this 
point.  Below  Hamilton's  Crossing,  two  Napoleons  and 


454  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

two  rifles  were  posted  in  a  grove  of  pines,  while  the 
Whitworth,  entirely  unsupported,  still  occupied  the 
Yerby  height  across  the  Massaponax.  There  were  thus 
17  pieces  under  Andrews  disposed  in  three  groups,  so  as 
to  give  a  cross  fire  on  Early's  front. 

By  10  A.  M.  Pendleton  had  occupied  the  gap  north 
of  Deep  Run  with  Nelson's  Battalion  of  the  General 
Reserve,  Massie,  Milledge,  and  Kirkpatrick  placing 
their  12  pieces  on  the  slope  to  the  left  of  the  broad  flat 
extending  past  the  infantry  line  behind  the  railroad. 

On  the  extreme  right  of  Lee's  Hill,  Carlton's  Battery 
of  Cabell's  Battalion  had  already  taken  position,  with 
Fraser's  on  the  left.  Rhett's  Battery  of  Alexander's 
Battalion  had  also  been  left  behind  to  occupy  the  center, 
with  three  20-pounder  Parrotts.  Alexander  had  sent 
back  a  section  of  Parker's  Battery  under  Lieut.  J. 
Thompson  Brown,  Jr.,  to  man  two  of  the  10-pounder 
Parrotts  of  Rhett's  Battery,  which  at  this  time  were  the 
only  guns  in  position  on  Marye's  Hill.  Pendleton 
therefore  ordered  Ross's  Battery  of  Cutts'  Battalion 
to  occupy  this  important  position,  having  been  forced 
to  dispatch  Patterson's  to  Port  Royal,  where  two  Fed 
eral  gunboats  were  reported  to  be  shelling  the  place.* 
The  Washington  Artillery  was  momentarily  expected 
to  arrive,  but  did  not  make  its  appearance  until  the  after 
noon.  Fortunately  the  enemy  had  not  been  active. 
During  the  evening,  in  response  to  a  call  from  Early 
for  a  battery  of  rifled  pieces,  Richardson's  Battery  of 
this  battalion  was  directed  to  report  to  Maj.  Andrews. 
The  following  morning  Walton  was  directed  to  assume 
charge  of  the  artillery  defense  of  the  left  and  place 
two  guns  to  the  right  of  the  Marye  house  near  the  old 
graveyard,  to  command  the  plain  in  front;  two  in  the 
epaulments  to  the  left  to  sweep  the  Telegraph  Road  and 
the  Plank  Road ;  and  several  in  the  works  on  the  Stans- 
bury  Hill,  to  command  the  bridges  over  the  canal  in 
front. 

"The  third  battery,  Lane's,  of  this  battalion  was  on  detached  duty  with 
Longstreet. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  455 

Upon  examining  the  foregoing  dispositions  one  is 
much  impressed  by  Lee's  lack  of  artillery  on  his  right. 
At  no  place  could  guns  have  been  used  to  better  ad 
vantage  or  have  so  well  contributed  to  overcome  the 
deficiency  in  the  infantry  available  for  the  defense  of 
the  heights,  which  Early  was  expected  to  hold.  The 
setting,  as  we  have  before  noted,  was  ideal  for  the  em 
ployment  of  artillery  to  the  fullest  extent.  But  in  the 
absence  of  Henry's  and  Dearing's  battalions,  even 
Pendleton's  batteries  had  to  be  absorbed  in  the  first  line 
of  defense,  thus  leaving  Lee  without  an  artillery  reserve. 

Turning  to  Chancellorsville,  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
Hooker's  movements  up  to  the  night  of  the  30th  had 
been  attended  with  the  greatest  success.  Full  of  con 
fidence,  his  troops  had  marched  with  a  celerity  hitherto 
unknown  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  In  three  days, 
Hooker's  turning  column  of  70,000  men  had  marched 
46  miles  over  bad  roads,  had  forded  two  difficult  rivers, 
thrown  several  bridges,  brushed  aside  Stuart,  and  con 
centrated  in  a  position  which  not  only  took  Lee's  entire 
system  of  river  defense  in  reverse,  but  lay  upon  the 
principal  roads  leading  to  his  line  of  communication. 

In  order,  however,  to  gain  the  advantages  of  the 
position  Hooker  held  by  concentrating  three  corps  at 
Chancellorsville,  it  had  been  necessary  to  divide  his 
army,  and  the  line  of  communication  between  the  wings 
by  way  of  United  States  Ford  was  not  less  than  20  miles 
long.  It  was  imperative  that  this  line  be  at  once  short 
ened  since  a  bold  enemy  lay  between  the  two  wings  and 
the  seizure  of  Banks'  Ford  became  more  important  to 
Hooker  with  every  hour  of  his  occupancy  of  Chan 
cellorsville.  Yet,  nothing  was  done  on  the  night  of  the 
30th  but  to  send  out  a  cavalry  regiment  towards 
Spotsylvania  Courthouse  to  feel  for  the  enemy. 

Colliding  with  Stuart  by  chance  this  small  Federal 
column  was  driven  back  without  securing  the  slightest 
information  of  importance,*  No  effort  whatever  was 

*See  Pleason ton's  extravagant  account,  Battles  and  Leaders  of  Civil  War. 
Vol.  Ill,  p.  172. 


456  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

made  to  sweep  down  on  Wilcox  and  secure  Banks' 
Ford,  which  might  have  been  done  with  ease  had  the 
proper  amount  of  energy  been  expended. 

There  were  three  roads  over  which  Hooker's  right 
wing  could  move  upon  Fredericksburg  and  Lee's  rear: 
the  Orange  Turnpike  from  the  west  passed  through 
Chancellorsville  and  was  the  most  direct;  the  United 
States  Ford  Road,  which,  crossing  the  former  at  Chan 
cellorsville,  became  the  Plank  Road,  bent  to  the  left  and 
united  with  the  turnpike  five  miles  or  so  from  Chancel 
lorsville  toward  the  Rappahannock,  passed  along  by 
Banks'  Ford,  six  miles  distant,  and  continued  to  Fred 
ericksburg.  The  two  important  points  were  Chancel 
lorsville,  which  consisted  of  a  large  dwelling,  and 
Tabernacle  Church,  some  four  miles  nearer  Fredericks- 
burg,  both  owing  their  importance  to  the  junction  of 
the  various  roads  at  those  places.  The  satisfaction 
Hooker  displayed  over  his  successful  concentration  at 
Chancellorsville  was  marked.  He  had  evidently  studied 
his  map,  and  on  paper  his  move  was  a  masterstroke,  but 
one  which  splendidly  illustrates  the  impractical  charac 
ter  of  "Kriegspiel."  It  is  not  merely  location  in  war,  but 
position  with  regard  to  terrain,  that  is  of  practical  value. 
It  is  not  so  much  the  number  of  miles  as  the  topo 
graphical  features  which  separate  the  hostile  forces  that 
are  of  practical  importance,  and  of  these  facts  Hooker 
displayed  striking  ignorance.  His  expressed  intention 
was  to  gain  elbow  room  in  which  to  maneuver.  He 
should  never  have  halted  his  magnificent  corps  until  that 
was  gained,  especially  since  no  opposition  was  to  be  en 
countered  in  gaining  it.  Meade,  whom  he  had  halted 
at  Chancellorsville  late  on  the  30th,  might  just  as  well 
have  pushed  on  towards  the  line  occupied  by  Anderson 
and  McLaws,  and,  with  Slocum's  two  divisions  following 
hard  behind,  the  open  country  would  have  enabled  the 
Federal  masses  to  deploy.  As  it  was,  only  the  cavalry 
followed  up  Anderson  and  McLaws  as  they  retired. 
Instead  of  elbow  room  Hooker  found  his  turning 
column  choked  in  the  dense  woods  surrounding  Chan- 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  457 

cellorsville,  from  which  point  only  a  few  narrow  and 
difficult  roads  issued  to  the  open  country.  The  shock 
he  was  able  to  deliver  to  his  enemy  was  not  the  dynamic 
power  of  the  mass,  but  merely  that  of  the  small  currents 
which  he  could  bring  into  contact  with  the  resisting 
force.  His  map  had  deceived  him.  It  would  have  been 
better  had  Stoneman's  command  been  sent  to  clear 
Hooker's  way  and  seize  the  true  point  of  vantage  from 
which  the  latter  might  maneuver  than  it  was  to 
eliminate  the  services  of  so  valuable  a  body  of  horsemen. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

CHANCELLORSVILLE MAY  1ST 

ON  the  morning  of  May  1  Hooker  reconnoitered  the 
Confederate  position  and  issued  orders  for  a  general 
advance.  Delays  now  supplanted  the  celerity  which  had 
hitherto  characterized  the  Federal  movements,  for  it  was 
hours  after  daylight  before  the  start  was  made.  Meade 
was  finally  pushed  out  on  the  left  over  the  River  and 
Turnpike  roads,  Slocum  and  Howard  on  the  right 
along  the  Plank  Road.  Meade  was  directed  to  arrive 
near  Banks'  Ford  by  2  p.  M.  and  the  right  column  at 
Tabernacle  Church  by  noon.  But  the  movement  was 
undertaken  just  12  hours  too  late,  as  we  shall  see. 

Jackson's  three  divisions  with  all  the  artillery  of  the 
2d  Corps,  except  Andrews'  Battalion,  moved  at  3  A.  MM 
May  1,  along  the  Military  Road,  and  then  following  the 
Plank  Road  arrived  at  the  line  held  by  Anderson  and 
McLaws  about  8  A.  M.,  Jackson  taking  command  of  the 
left.  By  his  orders  work  was  at  once  discontinued  on 
the  intrenchments  and  preparations  for  an  advance  were 
made.  About  11  A.  M.  Anderson  was  directed  to  ad 
vance  along  the  turnpike  with  Mahone's  Brigade  lead 
ing.  Wilcox  supported  McLaws'  right.  Soon  the 
enemy  was  encountered  in  force  and  Mahone  deployed 
across  the  turnpike  with  Jordan's  Battery  in  the  front 
line  while  Semmes  formed  line  on  his  left  with  Wofford 
and  Perry  on  his  right  covering  the  Mine  Road.  Wright 
and  Posey  with  Moody's,  Woolfolk's  and  Eubank's 
and  a  section  of  Parker's  Battery  advanced  along  the 
Plank  Road.*  Lieut.  James  Woolfolk,  of  the  Ash 
land  Battery  accompanied  the  skirmishers  with  a 
howitzer  and  rendered  conspicuously  gallant  service. 
Jackson's  divisions  in  column  followed  Anderson  along 
the  Plank  Road. 

*  Eubank's  Battery  was  commanded  by  Lieut.  O.  B.  Taylor  at  this  time,  and 
is  frequently  referred  to  in  the  records  as  Taylor's  Battery. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  459 

The  enemy  was  soon  encountered  on  both  the  Plank 
Road  and  the  turnpike  and  heavy  skirmishing  with 
infantry  and  artillery  ensued.  A  strong  attack  upon 
McLaws  was  repulsed  by  Semmes'  Brigade,  and  one 
gun  of  Jordan's  and  one  of  Grandy's  batteries  re 
pulsed  a  body  of  cavalry,  which  bravely  sought  to  take 
the  leading  guns.  Grandy's  Battery  had  been  brought 
up  from  the  intrenchments  held  by  Mahone  and 
Semmes,  to  the  support  of  Jordan's  single  rifle.  But, 
only  one  piece  under  Lieut.  Wm.  T.  Peet  could  be 
brought  into  action  which,  together  with  Jordan's,  en 
gaged  Weed's  regular  battery  for  over  an  hour,  alter 
nating  their  fire  by  pouring  canister  at  a  range  of  300 
yards  upon  Sykes'  Infantry  on  the  turnpike.  In  this 
affair,  Grandy's  Battery  lost  1  killed,  and  6  wounded, 
including  Lieut.  Peet,  whose  platoon  was  not  withdrawn 
until  but  two  men  remained  to  work  the  gun.  After 
going  into  position  again  the  next  day  on  the  Plank 
Road,  Gen.  Lee  in  person  at  6  p.  M.  ordered  Grandy  to 
withdraw  his  guns,  most  of  which  were  light  pieces,  and 
to  proceed  to  Chesterfield  Depot  to  remount  his  com 
mand,  the  horses  of  which  were  so  much  worn  and  de 
pleted  in  number  as  to  render  the  battery  unfit  for  fur- 
their  service.* 

When  Hooker  heard  heavy  firing  in  his  front  and 
learned  that  strong  opposition  had  been  encountered,  he 
ordered  Couch  to  take  Hancock's  Division  and  proceed 
to  the  front.  Moving  out  along  the  turnpike  about  1% 
miles  Couch  encountered  Sykes'  Division  of  regulars, 
which  was  heavily  engaged  with  Mahone  and  Semmes. 
Soon  after  he  deployed  Hancock's  men  both  he  and 
Sykes  were  ordered  by  Hooker  to  withdraw  their  divi 
sions  to  Chancellorsville.  The  move,  in  view  of  the  im 
portance  of  gaining  the  open  country  in  their  front,  ap 
peared  so  undesirable  to  all  those  on  the  spot,  that  Couch 
requested  a  change  of  orders,  but  instead  of  being  al 
lowed  to  proceed,  he  was  peremptorily  directed  to  re- 

*From  Chesterfield  Depot  Grandy  was  ordered  by  Gen.  Pettigrew  to  Hanover 
Junction  to  guard  the  bridges  at  that  point. 


460  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

turn.  While  Couch  was  withdrawing,  Hooker  again 
changed  his  mind  and  ordered  him  about  2  p.  M.  to  "hold 
on  till  5  o'clock." 

The  resistance  of  the  enemy  proving  stubborn, 
Anderson  had  directed  Wright  about  noon  to  proceed 
to  the  left  along  the  unfinished  railroad  and  endeavor 
to  turn  the  Federal  right.  About  6  p.  M.  Wright 
reached  the  Welford  Iron  Furnace,  1%  miles  southwest 
of  Chancellorsville,  where  he  was  informed  by  Stuart 
that  the  enemy  occupied  a  strong  position  in  the  woods 
north  of  the  furnace.  At  this  juncture  Maj.  Beckham 
arrived  at  the  furnace  from  Spotsylvania  Courthouse 
where  the  Horse  Artillery  had  bivouacked  the  night  be 
fore,  and  joined  Wright  with  six  guns,  three  of  Mc 
Gregor's,  one  of  Breathed's,  and  Phelps'  section  of 
Moorman's  Battery. 

It  was  supposed  that  the  force  of  the  enemy  some 
1,200  yards  north  of  Wright  possessed  no  guns.  As 
there  was  little  room  for  the  movement  of  artillery, 
Beckham  was  able  to  bring  but  four  pieces  into  action  in 
support  of  Wright's  attack.  The  infantry  assailed  the 
enemy  with  great  fury,  and  together  with  the  fire  of  Mc 
Gregor's  and  Moorman's  four  guns  scattered  the  more 
advanced  Federals  and  drove  them  back  upon  their 
works  from  which  two  well-masked  batteries  at  once 
opened  a  destructive  fire.  Beckham  now  shifted  the  fire 
of  his  guns  upon  the  hostile  artillery  and  engaged  it  in  a 
duel  for  nearly  an  hour  in  which  the  Federal  guns  had 
the  advantage  of  position.  But  as  Wright's  advance 
ceased,  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns  slackened  and  Beck- 
ham  was  ordered  to  withdraw  his  guns. 

The  officers  and  men  of  the  Horse  Artillery  engaged 
in  the  duel  with  the  two  Federal  batteries  subsequently 
declared  this  affair  to  be  one  of  the  hottest  they  had  ever 
participated  in.  It  is  certain  that  Beckham's  gunners 
were  severely  punished.  One  piece  of  McGregor's  Bat 
tery  under  Lieut.  Burwell  had  every  cannoneer  wounded 
but  one,  and  another  piece  of  the  same  battery  was 
struck  by  a  shell.  Beckham's  loss  was  1  officer,  Lieut. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  461 

Burwell,  and  2  men  killed,  5  men  wounded,  3  horses 
and  1  piece  disabled.  Lieuts.  Burwell,  Ford,  and  Wig- 
fall  were  especially  gallant  in  their  conduct. 

While  Beckham  was  engaged  at  the  furnace, 
Breathed,  who  had  accompanied  Fitz  Lee's  Brigade  on 
a  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  right,  had  been  engaged 
with  the  enemy  occupying  Talley's  farm.  Unopposed 
by  artillery  he  had  moved  up  with  two  rifled  pieces  to 
within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  a  heavy  mass  of  infantry 
and  without  loss  to  his  own  battery  killed  and  wounded 
probably  100  of  the  enemy,  driving  them  to  the  cover 
of  their  works. 

Meantime,  McLaws  had  been  checked  on  the  right 
and  it  was  reported  that  the  enemy  was  advancing  in 
strength  along  the  Mine  Road.  Kershaw  was  now  ex 
tended  beyond  Semmes'  left  and  Wilcox  with  Lewis' 
and  Huger's  batteries  came  up  on  McLaws'  right  and 
occupied  the  rifle  pits  running  from  Banks'  Ford  to 
the  Mine  Road.  Lewis'  Battery  from  a  position  near 
the  turnpike  at  once  engaged  the  enemy's  batteries, 
which  soon  ceased  firing. 

McLaws  and  Anderson  had  been  ordered  to  advance 
about  4  P.  M.  and  pressed  forward  with  energy,  assisted 
by  the  fire  of  their  own  guns  and  Walker's  Battalion 
under  Pegram,  which  arrived  later  in  the  day.  As  the 
Federal  troops  moved  back  the  whole  Confederate  line 
followed  them  closely  to  the  new  position  in  which  they 
established  themselves  about  a  mile  from  Chancellors- 
ville.  "Here  the  enemy  had  assumed  a  position  of  great 
natural  strength,  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  a  dense 
forest,  filled  with  tangled  undergrowth,  in  the  midst  of 
which  breastworks  of  logs  had  been  constructed,  with 
trees  felled  in  front,  so  as  to  form  an  almost  impene 
trable  abattis.  His  artillery  swept  the  few  narrow  roads 
by  which  the  position  could  be  approached  from  the 
front,  and  commanded  the  adjacent  woods."* 

During  the  night  the  Confederates  held  a  line  from 
the  Mine  Road  on  the  right  to  Welford's  or  Catherine 

*Lee's  Report. 


462  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Furnace  on  the  left.  Wilcox  had  been  ordered  to 
Banks'  Ford.  Two  regiments  of  cavalry  held  the  River 
Road  while  Stuart  with  the  rest  of  Fitz  Lee's  Brigade 
was  on  the  extreme  left  near  the  furnace.  McLaws' 
Division  bivouacked  along  the  crest  just  east  of  Big 
Meadow  Swamp  where  the  Mine  Road  and  Turnpike 
intersect,  and  Anderson  continued  the  line  to  the  left. 
At  11  p.  M.  Wright  returned  to  the  Plank  Road  along 
which  Posey  had  pressed  to  within  a  short  distance  of 
the  enemy's  works. 

The  Federal  line  extended  from  the  Rappahannock 
on  the  left  to  the  vicinity  of  Wilderness  Church,  a  point 
two  miles  west  of  Chancellorsville,  on  the  right.  For 
nearly  the  whole  of  that  distance  it  ran  through  an  al 
most  impenetrable  forest  of  scrubby  oak  and  pine, 
which  had  given  to  the  region  the  name  of  the  Wilder 
ness.  Beginning  near  Tabernacle  Church  on  the  east, 
the  forest  extended  over  10  miles  westward  and  per 
haps  an  equal  distance  southward  from  the  Rappahan 
nock.  Once  within  the  confines  of  this  densely-wooded 
region,  in  which  there  are  few  commanding  eminences, 
it  was  difficult  to  determine  what  was  transpiring  a  few 
yards  away.  The  thoroughfares,  if  the  crude  roadways 
penetrating  the  forest  and  connecting  the  various 
portions  of  the  Federal  position  could  be  so  called,  were 
few  in  number,  and  the  bordering  woods  which  stood  in 
a  sea  of  dense  underbrush  would  hardly  permit  the 
movement  of  foot  troops  through  them.  The  move 
ment  of  artillery  was  therefore  restricted  to  the  roads, 
except  when  by  great  labor  communications  were  cut 
through  the  forest.  While  the  abundant  supply  of 
timber  made  the  construction  of  breastworks  for  a  de 
fense  a  simple  undertaking,  every  debouche  from  the 
forest  towards  Fredericksburg,  or  the  pike,  the  Plank 
Road,  the  unfinished  line  of  railway  a  mile  south  of 
their  junction,  and  the  River  Road,  about  two  miles 
north,  was  commanded  from  the  Confederate  position. 
The  position  which  Hooker  had  abandoned  was  one  on 
high  ground,  more  or  less  open  in  front,  over  which  an 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  463 

army  might  move  freely,  maneuver  and  employ  artillery 
to  the  best  advantage.  In  directing  the  retrograde 
movement,  not  only  did  Hooker  shut  his  army  up  in 
the  forest,  thereby  sacrificing  all  freedom  of  movement, 
but  he  at  once  destroyed  confidence  in  him  on  the  part 
of  that  army  which  he  declared  to  be  the  finest  on  the 
planet.  Having  advanced  with  high  expectation  of 
victory,  his  officers  and  men  now  found  themselves  pre 
paring  to  fight  a  defensive  battle  behind  breastworks, 
with  no  telling  what  odds  against  them.  The  very 
nature  of  the  country  seemed  to  harmonize  with  the 
gloom  of  their  suddenly  downcast  spirits.  Thus  does 
the  single  act  of  a  leader  depress  the  morale  of  an  entire 
army  and  change  enthusiasm  to  despondency. 

Within  the  Federal  position  were  a  number  of  clear 
ings  which  Hooker's  masses  occupied,  and  in  which  his 
reserve  artillery  and  trains  were  parked.  On  the  ex 
treme  right  of  his  line  and  north  of  Chancellorsville  a 
narrow  expanse  of  open  land  extended  from  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Quisenberry's  Mill  near  Ely's  Ford  on  the 
Rapidan,  along  the  road  from  that  ford  in  a  south 
westerly  direction,  past  the  White  House  and  the 
Bullock  Road,  terminating  several  hundred  yards  north 
of  the  Chancellorsville  house.  The  main  clearing  about 
the  Chancellorsville  house  began  at  Mott's  Run,  fol 
lowed  the  road  in  a  narrow  strip  until  within  a  few  hun 
dred  yards  of  the  house,  and  then  opened  out  northward 
to  the  strip  of  woods  separating  it  from  the  White 
House  clearing,  and  southward  for  perhaps  a  half-mile, 
where  it  turned  sharply  to  the  west.  Narrowing  to 
wards  the  southwest  corner  half  a  mile  below  the  Plank 
Road,  the  Chancellorsville  clearing  joined  a  smaller  one 
about  a  mile  from  the  Chancellorsville  house,  the  latter 
embracing  an  eminence  known  as  Hazel  Grove,  which 
lay  on  the  north  of  Scott's  Run.  Hazel  Grove  at  this 
point  was  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  north  of 
Catherine  Furnace.  From  the  Chancellorsville  house, 
the  Plank  Road  ran  almost  due  west  past  the  Wilder 
ness  Church,  at  a  distance  of  about  two  miles.  About 


464  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

the  church  spread  out  an  irregular  clearing  for  half 
a  mile  in  all  directions  with  its  eastern  edge  not  over  a 
mile  from  the  western  limit  of  the  Chancellorsville 
clearing  on  the  Plank  Road,  and  its  southern  boundary 
along  Scott's  Run  less  than  half  a  mile  from  the  Hazel 
Grove  clearing.  Near  the  church  and  on  the  road  stood 
Dowdall's  Tavern,  occupied  as  a  residence  by  Dr.  Melzi 
Chancellor. 

During  the  night  of  the  1st,  Hooker's  troops  were 
disposed  solely  for  purposes  of  defense.  Meade  with 
the  5th  Corps  held  the  left,  covering  the  River  and  Mine 
roads  and  extending  to  the  Rappahannock.  On  his 
right  was  Couch's,  or  the  2d  Corps  blocking  the  pike. 
Slocum  with  the  12th  Corps  occupied  the  lines  east 
and  south  of  the  Chancellorsville  clearing,  while  Sickles 
with  the  3d  Corps  held  those  about  Hazel  Grove.  On 
the  extreme  right,  the  llth  Corps  under  Howard  oc 
cupied  a  line  of  hasty  intrenchments  running  south  of 
the  road  through  the  church  or  Dowdall  clearing,  west 
ward  as  far  as  a  small  clearing  known  as  Talley's  farm. 
Strong  outposts  of  infantry  were  thrown  out  into  the 
woods,  and  the  men  worked  steadily  during  the  night 
throwing  up  intrenchments.  Batteries  were  disposed 
so  as  to  sweep  every  approach  from  the  south,  southeast, 
and  southwest,  and  the  line  was  held  by  no  less  than  five 
muskets  to  every  yard  of  parapet.  The  whole  line, 
however,  was  six  miles  long  from  flank  to  flank,  and  in 
order  to  strengthen  the  defense,  about  2  A.  M.,  May  2, 
Hooker  ordered  Sedgwick  to  send  the  1st  Corps  to 
Chancellorsville,  although  his  corps  commanders  had 
declared  their  ability  to  hold  their  respective  positions. 
Earlier  in  the  night,  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  34  guns, 
principally  of  the  Horse  Artillery,  had  been  dispatched 
from  Falmouth  to  Banks'  Ford,  this  being  the  move 
of  the  enemy  which  had  necessitated  the  return  of  Wil- 
cox  to  that  point. 

Among  the  Federal  leaders  differences  of  opinion  de 
veloped  at  a  council  of  war  held  during  the  night.  Some 
advised  an  immediate  advance  in  accordance  with  the 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  465 

original  plan,  and  others  a  strictly  defensive  attitude. 
Hooker,  lacking  the  divine  genius  for  war  possessed  by 
Lee,  decided  upon  the  latter  course,  much  to  the  dis 
gust  of  his  bolder  lieutenants.  But  in  the  conference 
between  Lee  and  Jackson  as  they  sat  upon  the  Federal 
cracker  boxes  in  the  woods  three  miles  down  the  Plank 
Road,  there  was  no  conflict  of  views.  Jackson's  re 
connaissance  of  the  Federal  left  had  discovered  it  to  be 
all  but  impregnable,  but  Fitz  Lee  had  found  a  weak 
spot  and  reported  through  Stuart  that  Howard's  right 
on  the  Plank  Road  beyond  the  Wilderness  Church  was 
completely  in  the  air,  protected  by  no  natural  obstacle. 
Such  breastsworks  as  there  were  in  this  quarter  faced 
south,  and  thus  again  had  Hooker  paid  too  much  regard 
to  his  map  and  too  little  to  the  topography  of  his  po 
sition. 

Jackson  proposed  to  turn  Hooker's  right  with  the 
2d  Corps  while  Lee  held  his  left  in  check  with  the  divi 
sions  of  Anderson  and  McLaws,  The  plan  was  a  bold 
one,  and  violated  the  first  principle  of  war.  With  less 
than  42,000  muskets,  Lee  was  in  the  presence  of  70,000. 
To  divide  his  army  in  such  circumstances  was  indeed 
hazardous,  but  the  very  audacity  of  the  maneuver,  if  it 
could  be  executed  with  secrecy  and  dispatch,  was  a 
guarantee  of  success,  and  Jackson  was  directed  to  carry 
it  out. 


30 


CHAPTER  XXV 

CHANCELLORSVILLE MAY   2D JACKSON^S  ATTACK 

ORDERS  for  the  movement  of  the  2d  Corps,  which  had 
bivouacked  along  the  Plank  Road,  were  at  once  given. 
Rodes'  Division  was  to  lead,  followed  in  order  by 
Colston's  and  A.  P.  Hill's  divisions.  Alexander's  Bat 
talion  was  directed  to  accompany  Jackson's  column. 
About  6  A.  M.,  or  one  hour  after  sunrise,  the  column 
took  up  the  march.  Manly's  and  McCarthy's  batteries 
of  Cabell's  Battalion,  under  Maj.  Hamilton,  soon  re 
lieved  the  batteries  of  Walker's  Battalion,  which  Maj. 
Pegram  had  taken  into  action  about  6:30  A.  M.  on 
Anderson's  right.  Pegram  had  been  ordered  to  advance 
as  many  rifled  pieces  as  possible  along  the  turnpike  and 
shell  the  enemy's  infantry  behind  their  works  in  the 
woods.  While  placing  his  batteries  in  position  two  Fed 
eral  batteries  opened  a  brisk  fire  upon  them.  In  the 
long-range  duel  which  ensued  for  20  minutes  or  more, 
McGraw's  Purcell,  and  Brunson's  batteries,  and  a 
section  of  the  Letcher  Battery,  only  were  engaged,  while 
some  of  the  guns  of  these  batteries  were  directed  by  Pe 
gram  to  fire  only  upon  the  woods.  Soon  reporting  the 
cannonade  to  be  but  a  waste  of  ammunition,  Pegram 
was  ordered  by  Gen.  Heth,  who  commanded  at  this 
point,  to  withdraw,  whereupon  the  battalion  followed 
Jackson's  column  already  under  way.  McGraw's  Bat 
tery  had  suffered  heavily  from  the  explosion  of  a  number 
of  caissons. 

Maj.  Hardaway  was  placed  in  command  of  the  ar 
tillery  from  the  Plank  Road  to  Mine  Creek  near  the 
furnace.  Including  Jordan's  Battery  of  Alexander's 
Battalion,  he  had  but  eight  pieces  at  his  disposal.  Order 
ing  Jordan's  Battery  over  from  its  position  left  of  the 
turnpike,  he  placed  one  rifle  and  one  Napoleon  so  as  to 
sweep  the  Plank  Road,  two  howitzers  120  yards  to  their 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  467 

left,  commanding  a  woods  road  leading  from  Chancel- 
lorsville,  and  the  others  at  intervals  of  about  400  yards 
along  the  Mine  Road  commanding  the  ravines  leading 
into  Mine  Creek.* 

Maj.  Hamilton  commanded  the  artillery  along  the 
turnpike,  consisting  of  only  two  batteries,  while  Maj. 
Garnett  exercised  general  supervision  over  the  battalion 
distributed  between  Wilcox  at  Banks'  Ford  and  Mc- 
Laws. 

Cols.  Alexander  and  Brown  joined  the  extreme  rear 
of  Jackson's  column  at  the  intersection  of  the  Plank 
and  Mine  roads  near  the  furnace  about  10  A.  M.  With 
the  exception  of  Breathed's  and  Moorman's  horse  bat 
teries,  the  artillery  battalions  followed  their  respective 
divisions,  while  the  reserve  battalions  and  trains  brought 
up  the  rear. 

One  again  pauses  to  note  how  valuable  to  Lee  would 
have  been  a  strong  reserve  force  of  artillery  at  this  time. 
With  McLaws  and  Anderson,  and  spread  over  a  front 
of  seven  or  eight  miles,  were  not  over  32  guns.  Had  Lee 
had  the  equivalent  of  Longstreet's  two  battalions  of  32 
guns,  he  could  have  retained  both  Alexander's  and 
Brown's  corps  reserve  battalions  to  strengthen  the  at 
tenuated  line  which  McLaws  and  Anderson  held,  thus 
overcoming  in  a  measure  the  deficiency  in  the  number  of 
muskets.  It  was  for  just  such  purposes  that  the  reserve 
battalions  of  his  army  were  created,  but  Lee  was  robbed 
of  the  benefits  which  he  had  a  right  to  expect  from  them 
by  the  absence  of  part  of  his  artillery  from  the  main  field 
of  operations. 

Jackson's  column  consisted  of  three  divisions  of 
infantry,  or  70  regiments,  4  regiments  of  cavalry  of 
Fitz  Lee's  Brigade  under  Stuart  himself,  the  artillery 
battalions  of  Brown,  4  batteries  present,!  Walker's  Bat 
talion  of  5  batteries,  Jones'  of  4,  Mclntosh's  of  4,  or 

*The  Mine  Creek  and  Mine  Road  here  referred  to  are  in  the  neighborhood  of 
the  furnace  and  northeast  thereof,  and  not  generally  shown  on  the  maps.  The 
Mine  Road  connected  the  furnace  with  the  Plank  Road.  Mine  Creek  runs  north 
from  Lewis'  Creek  almost  to  Chancellorsville. 

fGraham's  or  the  1st  Rockbridge  Battery  was  left  with  Early  and  Brooke's 
with  Hardaway. 


468  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 


17  batteries  of  the  2d  Corps,  3^  batteries  of  Alex 
ander's  Battalion  of  the  1st  Corps,  and  Beckham's  2^ 
horse  batteries.*  Thus  exclusive  of  the  Horse  Artillery 
there  were  under  Crutchfield's  command  as  Chief  of 
Artillery  20^  batteries  with  about  80  guns. 

Turning  to  the  left  from  the  Plank  Road  about  half 
a  mile  in  rear  of  Anderson's  line,  Jackson  led  his  column 
by  the  Mine  Road  to  Catherine  Furnace  through  the 
dense  forest  south  of  Chancellorsville.  While  his 
column  was  moving  off  to  the  west,  the  10,000  Confed 
erates  which  Lee  held  opposite  the  Federal  left  kept  up 
a  brisk  demonstration,  Hardaway's  and  Hamilton's 
guns  maintaining  an  active  fire  in  order  to  divert  the 
enemy's  attention.  But  as  early  as  8  A.  M.  Birney,  from 
his  commanding  position  at  Hazel  Grove,  looking  down 
the  valley  of  Lewis  Creek,  had  detected  Jackson's 
column  and  reported  it  to  Sickles,  and  the  latter  in  turn 
to  Hooker.  At  the  furnace  the  road  turned  due  south 
from  the  direction  of  Jackson's  march,  and  from  the  fact 
that  trains  were  visible  in  rear  of  the  column  Hooker  at 
once  concluded  that  Lee's  army  was  retreating  towards 
Gordonsville.  Moving  on  a  mile  or  more  to  the  south 
the  Confederate  column  turned  westward,  crossed  the 
Brock  Road  after  following  it  a  short  way  southward 
and  then  moved  north  by  way  of  a  woods  road  over 
which  a  resident  of  the  section  led  the  way  to  the  Orange 
Plank  Road,  about  four  miles  west  of  Chancellorsville. 
Meanwhile,  Stuart  guarded  the  flank  of  the  column,  the 
head  of  which  advanced  at  the  rate  of  only  about  2^ 
miles  and  the  rear  about  1^,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to 
press  on  more  rapidly.  The  whole  column  was  perhaps 
ten  miles  in  length,  of  which  the  infantry  occupied  only 
six  miles,  the  artillery  and  ammunition  trains  the  rest. 

As  the  long  column  continued  to  file  by  the  furnace, 
Birney  secured  permission  to  open  with  Clark's  rifled 
battery  at  Hazel  Grove,  the  range  being  about  1,600 
yards.  A  few  shots  dispersed  the  troops  in  sight,  and 

•Hart's  Battery  was  with  Hampton's  Brigade  and  not  present  during  the 
campaign. 


COLONEL   WILLIAM    JOHNSON   PBGEAM 

Mortally   wounded   at   Five  Forks,   1865 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  469 

caused  the  column  to  seek  another  route  further  to  the 
south,  out  of  reach  of  the  Federal  guns  and  out  of  sight 
of  Hazel  Grove.  About  noon,  Berdan's  sharpshooters 
were  thrown  forward  by  Sickles  and  advanced  towards 
the  furnace,  and  soon  Birney's  Division  followed  by 
Whipple's  moved  out  from  Hazel  Grove.  While 
Anderson  from  his  position  astride  the  Plank  Road  en 
gaged  the  left  of  this  force,  a  part  of  Birney's  Division 
pressed  on  down  the  Furnace  Road,  actually  reaching 
the  unfinished  railroad,  thus  threatening  to  cut  Lee's 
army  in  two.  Sickles'  men  had  actually  captured  the 
greater  part  of  the  3d  Georgia  Regiment,  acting  as 
rear  guard  for  Jackson's  train,  and  were  pressing 
rapidly  down  the  Furnace  Road  when  Col.  Brown, 
whose  battalion  was  passing  nearby,  threw  one  of  his  bat 
teries  into  action  near  the  Welford  house  and  drove  the 
more  advanced  skirmishers  and  a  Federal  battery  back. 
Entirely  unsupported  in  this  position  except  by  a  few 
of  the  Georgia  infantrymen,  who  had  escaped  capture, 
Brown  with  a  single  battery  had  rendered  a  most 
valuable  service.  Had  Sickles'  men  reached  the  trains, 
the  success  of  the  whole  movement  might  have  been  en 
dangered.  But,  while  single-handed  Brown  held  the 
enemy  at  bay,  Archer's  and  Thomas'  brigades  rapidly 
retraced  their  steps  from  the  rear  of  the  column  and 
saved  the  situation.  Meanwhile  Hardaway  had  brought 
up  a  howitzer  to  the  support  of  Anderson's  extreme  left, 
and  together  with  the  infantry  succeeded  in  checking 
the  left  of  Sickles'  column.  He  then  brought  Jordan's 
Battery  over  to  Anderson's  left  and  soon  the  enemy 
gave  up  the  attack.  Archer's  and  Thomas'  brigades 
and  Brown's  Battalion  after  remaining  in  observation 
for  an  hour  or  more  continued  their  march,  but  failed  to 
overtake  the  column  until  after  nightfall. 

Henderson,  Alexander,  and  others  state  that  Jackson 
was  responsible  for  the  timely  action  which  Col.  Brown 
took  with  his  guns  near  the  furnace,  but  no  authority 
is  to  be  found  for  such  a  belief.  Brown's  Bat 
talion  happened  to  be  a  part  of  Jackson's  force  and  this 


470  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

fact  alone  probably  gave  rise  to  the  assertion  that  its 
commander  was  acting  under  the  direct  orders  of  the 
corps  commander.  That  such  was  the  case  seems  ob 
viously  incorrect,  for  Jackson  was  at  least  ten  miles  from 
the  Welford  house  when  Sickles  commenced  his  attack, 
and  in  the  short  interval  of  time  between  the  advance  of 
Berdan's  men  which  commenced  about  11  A.  M.,  and  the 
moment  when  Brown  threw  his  battery  into  action  at 
noon,  it  would  have  been  quite  impossible  to  communi 
cate  by  courier  with  Jackson.  There  were  no  field  wires 
connecting  the  head  and  rear  of  the  column.  To  Col. 
Brown  alone  seems  to  belong  the  credit.  Yet,  after  all, 
he  simply  performed  the  duty  which  was  his,  for  he  had 
been  ordered  to  join  the  rear  of  the  column  as  it  filed 
past  a  stated  point.  Upon  him,  therefore,  fell  the 
responsibility  of  the  artillery  commander  of  the  rear 
guard.  Alexander  states  that  Archer  and  Thomas  re 
traced  their  steps  without  orders.  If  Jackson  did  not 
send  them  back,  he  certainly  did  not  direct  Brown,  un 
supported,  to  oppose  the  enemy. 

Between  1  and  2  p.  M.,  Jackson  arrived  at  a  point  on 
the  Orange  Plank  Road,  about  two  miles  south  of  the 
Talley  farm,  where  he  met  Gen.  Fitz  Lee,  who  took  him 
to  the  top  of  the  elevation  at  Burton  farm.  From  this 
point  he  secured  a  perfect  view  of  the  position  of  the 
enemy's  llth  Corps  at  the  Dowdall  clearing,  some  two 
miles  along  the  road  to  the  east.  Most  of  Howard's 
troops  were  in  sight  at  the  Dowdall  and  Talley  farms, 
and  some  of  those  at  the  Hawkins  farm  half  a  mile 
north  of  the  Wilderness  Church,  but  a  part  of  Devens' 
Division  was  concealed  in  the  woods,  and  the  whole  of 
Von  Gilsa's  Brigade  which  formed  the  extreme  Federal 
right  was  in  the  woods  north  of  the  pike  and  half  a  mile 
west  of  the  Talley  house.  But  two  guns  commanded  the 
road.  The  position  of  Von  Gilsa  was  not  discovered 
until  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  when  a  party  of 
cavalry  drew  his  fire. 

Until  now,  it  had  been  Jackson's  intention  to  attack 
that  part  of  the  enemy's  line  between  the  Dowdall  and 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  471 

the  Talley  farms,  by  way  of  the  Plank  Road,  but  his 
personal  reconnaissance  led  to  a  change  of  plans.  Order 
ing  the  Stonewall  Brigade  under  Paxton  to  advance 
along  the  Orange  Plank  Road  to  within  1^  miles  of  the 
Wilderness  Church,  and  the  four  regiments  of  cavalry 
under  Fitz  Lee  to  occupy  the  Burton  farm  on  the  same 
road,  he  led  his  column  northward  to  the  Luckett  farm 
on  the  turnpike,  two  miles  west  of  Dowdall  Tavern, 
where  Howard's  headquarters  were  located. 

It  was  about  4  P.  M.  when  Rodes'  Division  at  the 
head  of  Jackson's  column  began  its  deployment  on  both 
sides  of  the  turnpike,  and  it  was  after  5  p.  M.  when  eight 
of  the  twelve  Confederate  brigades  had  formed  in  two 
lines,  Rodes'  four  in  front,  Colston's  four  a  hundred 
yards  behind.  A.  P.  Hill's  Division  was  designated  for 
the  third  line.  Only  a  part  of  this  division  was  deployed, 
the  rest  in  column  following  the  road.  The  attacking 
column  now  presented  a  front  of  two  miles,  extending  a 
mile  or  more  north  of  the  pike  and  to  the  rear  of  the  llth 
Corps,  which  still  faced  south.  A  heavy  skirmish  line  led 
by  Cols.  Willis  and  Blackford  was  thrown  out  400  yards 
to  the  front  by  Rodes,  and  Breathed  with  two  Napoleons 
on  the  road  accompanied  the  first  line,  closely  followed 
by  his  other  section.  Behind  Breathed,  McGregor's 
Battery  and  Phelps'  section  of  Moorman's  Battery  oc 
cupied  the  road,  there  being  space  only  for  the  deploy 
ment  of  two  pieces  at  a  time.  The  Horse  Artillery  under 
Beckham,  consisting  of  2^/2  batteries,  had  joined  the 
head  of  Jackson's  column  when  it  reached  the  Orange 
Plank  Road  about  noon. 

In  about  1^  hours,  notwithstanding  the  dense  woods, 
the  Confederate  divisions  were  deployed.  Jackson  was 
determined  that  the  lines  should  move  forward  in  good 
order  and  minute  instructions  had  been  given  every  bri- 
grade  commander,  while  staff  officers  were  detailed  to 
maintain  the  general  direction  and  alignment.  The  three 
lines  were  to  move  forward  simultaneously  through  the 
woods  without  pausing  until  the  open  hill  in  the  Talley 
clearing  about  1,000  yards  eastward  was  carried.  If, 


472  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

after  the  seizure  of  this  hill  which  commanded  the  ridge 
running  north  from  the  road  at  Dowdall's  Tavern,  the 
Federals  showed  a  determined  front  in  their  secondary 
position,  Rodes  was  to  halt  under  cover  until  Beckham's 
batteries  could  dislodge  them.  But  under  no  other  cir 
cumstances  was  a  halt  to  be  called.  A  regiment  of  the 
first  line  was  detailed  to  guard  the  left  flank  and  Ran 
som's  Brigade  to  guard  the  right.  The  field  hospital 
was  established  at  the  Wilderness  Tavern  in  the  rear  and 
Crutchfield  was  already  assembling  some  of  his  artillery 
in  the  open  spaces  thereabout  preparatory  to  moving 
forward  when  needed. 

It  has  frequently  been  stated  that  the  avalanche  which 
fell  upon  Hooker's  right  flank  May  2  was  entirely  un 
suspected,  and  even  Henderson  fell  into  this  error.* 
But  nothing  is  further  from  the  truth,  nor  was  the  much 
maligned  llth  Corps  at  fault  for  the  disaster  which  be 
fell  Hooker's  right.  No  troops  in  the  same  circum 
stances  could  have  opposed  a  firmer  resistance  to  Jack 
son's  immense  column.  The  fault  was  with  those  higher 
up  and  not  with  the  gallant  German  troops  which  re 
ceived  the  shock  of  the  blow.  One  would  suppose  from 
the  ordinary  account  of  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville 
that  these  men  alone  failed  Hooker.  But  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  their  conduct  in  the  main  was  superb,  and  it  was 
Hooker  who  failed  them.  He  and  others  cast  the 
obloquy  of  defeat  upon  innocent  shoulders  in  order  to 
excuse  their  own  defaults.  Hooker  had  made  up  his 
mind  that  Lee  was  retreating  in  spite  of  many  warnings 
of  the  impending  attack  on  the  right.  Sickles  was 
positive  that  such  was  the  case,  and  repeatedly  repre 
sented  that  he  was  actually  among  the  fleeing  foe.  So 
firmly  had  the  belief  taken  root  that  Howard's  supports 
were  withdrawn  to  assist  Sickles  on  his  wild-goose  chase 
to  the  south,  at  the  very  instant  Jackson  was  massing 
his  column  of  attack  three  miles  to  the  north  and  west. 
Hooker's  conduct  on  May  2  is  a  military  anomaly.  It 
would  almost  seem  that  his  powers  of  reason  left  him  the 

*See  p.  539,  Henderson's  Life  of  Jackson. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  473 

minute  he  established  his  headquarters  in  the  Chancel- 
lorsville  house.  With  Anderson  and  McLaws  thunder 
ing  away  on  his  left,  with  Early  firmly  planted  before 
Sedgwick  at  Fredericksburg,  and  with  Wilcox  still  hold 
ing  the  crossing  at  Banks'  Ford,  yet,  he  was  convinced 
that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  retreating  to 
Gordonsville  or  some  other  point. 

If  Lee  had  undertaken  to  withdraw  his  army,  surely 
he  would  not  have  retreated  squarely  across  the  Federal 
front.  In  the  nature  of  things,  his  trains  would  have 
moved  more  to  the  rear  and  the  troops  farthest  from 
the  point  upon  which  his  army  was  to  fall  back  would 
have  moved  off  first.  With  Gordonsville  as  the  point  of 
concentration,  Early,  then  Wilcox,  would  have  receded 
before  the  enemy,  then  McLaws  and  Anderson  in  turn. 
Nor  would  every  available  Confederate  gun  on 
Hooker's  left  have  been  kept  continuously  in  action  to 
tempt  Hooker  to  move  out  and  interfere  with  the  with 
drawal.  No.  Hooker's  wish  on  this  occasion  was  father 
to  the  thought,  and  Sickles  by  his  absurd  reports  did 
much  to  create  the  delusion.  In  the  morning  the  Fed 
eral  commander  had  ridden  his  lines  from  left  to  right 
and  upon  his  return  to  headquarters  had,  at  9:30  A.  M., 
cautioned  both  Howard  and  S locum  to  beware  of  a 
movement  of  the  enemy  to  their  right,  a  movement  which 
he  had  good  reason  to  suspect.  This  warning  on  the 
part  of  Hooker  does  not  excuse  him,  but  all  the  more  is 
he  guilty  of  a  gross  neglect  in  allowing  Barlow's  Divi 
sion,  or  Howard's  reserve,  to  be  withdrawn  in  favor 
of  Sickles  later  in  the  day.  The  minute  a  more- 
favorable  interpretation  of  the  enemy's  movement  was 
advanced,  Hooker  seemingly  forgot  all  about  the  danger 
of  his  right,  and  supinely  waited  for  the  outcome  of 
Sickles'  movement.  Instead  of  cautioning  Howard 
and  S  locum  he  should  have  himself  directed  the  neces 
sary  dispositions  to  counteract  the  threatened  danger. 

But  in  the  llth  Corps  the  danger  was  not  overlooked. 
Hooker's  order  of  the  morning  had  been  received  and 
opened  by  Gen.  Carl  Schurz,  who  had  temporarily  as- 


474  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

sumed  command,  while  Howard  was  resting.  Schurz, 
convinced  that  an  attack  would  be  made  from  the  west, 
urged  Howard  to  allow  him  to  withdraw  Devens'  Divi 
sion  and  part  of  his  own  from  the  Talley  and  Haw 
kins  farms  and  the  woods  beyond,  and  place  them  in  a 
strong  position  behind  Hunting  Run,  east  of  the 
junction  of  the  Orange  Plank  Road  from  the  southwest 
and  the  turnpike  from  the  west,  the  new  line  facing 
directly  to  the  west.  From  the  proposed  position,  which 
was  one  of  great  strength,  the  artillery  would  have  a 
clear  field  of  fire  across  the  Hawkins  and  Talley  clear 
ings,  and  command  both  roads  over  which  the  enemy 
could  attack.  But  Howard  saw  no  need  of  any  change, 
and  the  only  one  that  was  made  by  Schurz  was  of  his  own 
volition  when  he  changed  the  front  of  some  of  his  regi 
ments  at  the  Hawkins  farm  to  the  west.  These  troops 
about  11  A.  M.  threw  up  a  line  of  shallow  rifle  pits,  but 
Devens  did  nothing.  And  in  spite  of  Hooker's  order, 
Warren,  his  Chief  Engineer,  although  apprised  of  the 
movement  of  a  heavy  column  past  the  furnace,  did  not 
visit  the  right,  a  fact  which  testifies  to  the  views  at  head 
quarters. 

Although  nothing  of  moment  was  done  by  Howard, 
the  new  commander  of  the  llth  Corps,  to  ward  off  the 
threatened  danger,  the  feeling  was  more  or  less  gen 
eral  among  his  subordinate  officers  that  something 
momentous  was  impending.  These  men  had  had  ex 
perience  in  the  Valley  with  Jackson,  and  agreed  among 
themselves  that  "it  was  never  too  late  for  him  to  turn." 
Until  they  learned  that  he  was  positively  placed  it  was 
their  habit  to  look  for  him  in  the  most  unlikely  quarter. 
They  seemed  to  feel  the  spell  of  the  forest,  the  mystery 
of  its  forbidding  silence,  and  as  the  day  wore  on  even 
the  men  of  the  Corps  began  to  believe  that  danger  was 
lurking  in  the  impenetrable  fastness  which  closed  in 
upon  them  from  all  sides.  Early  in  the  morning  a  field- 
officer  in  charge  of  a  portion  of  the  picket  line  had  heard 
the  rumble  of  a  large  number  of  wheels  past  his  front  to 
the  west  and  upon  reporting  the  fact  was  told  that  his 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  475 

fears  were  unduly  aroused.  At  10  A.  M.  other  officers 
actually  observed  troops  moving  towards  the  right,  and 
later  on,  Col.  Friend,  the  officer  of  the  day  of  Devens' 
Division,  reported  a  movement  of  the  enemy  to  the 
right  rear,  but  each  report  was  discredited  and  made 
light  of  by  Howard,  and  Friend  was  actually  rebuked 
and  warned  not  to  bring  on  a  panic  by  circulating  such 
a  tale.  More  than  ever  confirmed  in  his  views  by  the 
occurrences  of  the  morning,  Gen.  Schurz,  who  had, 
meanwhile,  himself  observed  the  enemy  marching  in  a 
southwesterly  direction,  ordered  Capt.  Hubert  Dilger 
to  examine  the  rear  of  the  line,  with  a  view  to  meeting 
an  attack  from  that  direction.  Dilger,  who  commanded 
an  Ohio  Battery  attached  to  Schurz's  Division,  had  been 
an  officer  in  the  German  Horse  Artillery,  resigning  to 
take  part  in  the  American  Civil  War.  He  was  not  only 
a  trained  soldier  and  regarded  as  one  of  the  best  artillery 
officers  in  the  Army,  but  his  veteran  battery  was  con 
sidered  to  be  the  best  in  the  llth  Corps. 

Early  in  the  afternoon,  accompanied  by  a  single 
orderly,  the  young  artilleryman  set  out  to  reconnoiter 
the  terrain  in  his  rear  and  determine  for  himself  the  con 
dition  of  affairs.  Passing  westward  along  the  pike,  he 
was  met  and  urged  by  Gen.  Von  Gilsa  not  to  proceed 
further  lest  he  should  be  captured.  Von  Gilsa  was  ab 
solutely  satisfied  that  the  enemy  was  massing  a  large 
force  down  the  road  beyond  his  brigade  and  had  sent 
numerous  reports  to  that  effect  to  Devens.  But  Dilger 
kept  on  for  about  a  mile  when  he  ran  into  Rodes'  men 
deploying  north  of  the  Luckett  farm.  Cut  off  from  the 
road  by  a  body  of  cavalry  and  pursued  northward  for 
some  distance,  he  finally  succeeded  in  eluding  his 
enemies  in  the  woods,  and  reached  the  United  States 
Ford  Road,  which  he  followed  direct  to  Hooker's  head 
quarters  at  Chancellorsville.  It  was  perhaps  4  P.  M. 
when  Dilger  informed  a  member  of  the  commanding 
general's  staff  of  what  he  had  seen  only  to  be  insulted 
for  bothering  superiors  with  "such  a  yarn."  Im 
mediately  he  galloped  back  to  the  headquarters  of  the 


476  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

llth  Corps,  where  he  was  in  effect  reprimanded  for  his 
trouble  and  assured  in  no  uncertain  terms  that  Lee  was 
in  full  retreat  towards  the  south  with  Sickles  on  his 
heels !  But  Dilger,  confident  that  the  storm  would  soon 
burst,  returned  with  haste  to  his  battery  near  the  church, 
placed  his  guns  in  the  best  possible  position,  and  even 
refused  to  allow  his  teams  to  be  taken  to  water.  Hardly 
had  his  dispositions  been  made  when  the  distant  popping 
of  Rodes'  skirmishers  announced  the  advance  of  the 
enemy. 

The  foregoing  are  but  a  few  instances  of  personal 
knowledge  on  the  part  of  Howard's  officers  of  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  on  their  right  and  rear.  Gen. 
Devens,  who  commanded  the  extreme  right,  and  who, 
like  Howard,  was  also  a  newcomer  in  the  Corps,  was 
repeatedly  informed  by  field  officers  of  the  fact,  but 
even  after  the  pickets  were  attacked,  when  there  was 
time  to  change  front,  Devens  refused  to  do  so.* 

While  the  eager  but  silent  Confederates  were  being 
deployed,  their  quick  intelligence  having  already 
grasped  the  situation,  Jackson  sat  astride  "Little 
Sorrel"  on  the  road.  With  his  old  slouch  hat  pulled 
well  forward  and  his  lips  tightly  compressed,  he  calmly 
but  impatiently  awaited  the  completion  of  the  dispo 
sitions  for  advance.  Who  shall  know  what  were  his 
feelings  during  this,  the  supreme  hour  of  his  life? 
Certainly  few  soldiers  since  the  world  began  have  been 
so  situated.  Less  than  half  a  mile  before  him  lay  the 
vulnerable  flank  of  his  enemy  entirely  unprepared  to 
meet  the  rush  of  his  battalions.  It  almost  seemed 
that  Fame,  even  had  she  never  favored  him  before,  had 
already  spread  over  his  shoulders  the  cloak  of  im 
mortality!  With  that  supreme  confidence  in  himself 
and  a  confidence  in  his  men  which  few  leaders  have  ever 
experienced  in  so  high  a  degree,  the  hawk  of  the  Valley 
was  deliberately  spreading  his  pinions  for  the  sudden 
swoop.  On  the  familiar  faces  of  his  leaders,  Jackson 

*See  Chapter  VI  entitled  "Warnings  of  Danger  Unheeded,"  in  a  remarkably 
accurate  and  able  work  on  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  by  Lieut.-Col.  A.  C. 
Hamlin. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  477 

discovered  only  the  expression  which  gladdened  his 
heart  and  forbade  thought  of  failure.  There  were 
Rodes  and  Colston  in  front,  whom  he  had  tutored  in 
the  game  of  war,  and  led  to  manhood's  estate,  and 
in  their  divisions  were  not  less  than  200  brigade, 
regimental,  battalion  and  company  leaders  whom 
he  had  drilled  upon  the  parade  ground  at  Lexington 
for  this,  the  greatest  maneuver  of  his  life.  On  his  right 
at  the  head  of  the  leading  regiment  of  cavalry  was  the 
dashing  Munford,  and  in  his  rear  the  brilliant  Crutch- 
field  in  command  of  the  Artillery,  both  of  whom 
had  been  his  pupils,  then  associates,  in  the  Faculty  of 
Virginia's  great  School  of  Arms.  Small  wonder 
was  it  that  the  inspiration  which  animated  the  soul  of 
the  chieftain  penetrated  to  the  very  core  of  his  army. 
With  these  facts  in  mind,  one  may  readily  understand 
Jackson's  remark  as  he  set  his  column  in  motion  in  the 
morning:  "The  Virginia  Military  Institute  will  be 
heard  from  to-day."* 

At  5  o'clock  Jackson  said  to  Rodes,  "Are  you  ready?" 
"Yes,"  replied  Rodes,  who  then  nodded  to  the  com 
mander  of  the  skirmish  line.  At  5:15  p.  M.  the  signal 
for  the  general  advance  was  given  and  almost  im 
mediately  Willis'  skirmishers  struck  the  Federal  pickets 
along  the  pike,  who  fell  back,  giving  the  alarm.  The 
Confederate  bugles  rang  out  all  along  the  advancing 
line  like  the  cry  of  wild  fowl  in  the  teeth  of  a  gale. 
On  past  the  foremost  skirmishers  dashed  Breathed  with 
the  leading  section  of  his  battery,  and,  unlimbering  on 
the  pike,  from  each  of  his  two  guns  was  fired  a  round  of 
solid  shot,  which  raked  the  roadway  and,  bounding  on, 
fell  in  the  front  yard  of  the  Talley  house,  a  mile  distant, 

*In  addition  to  the  officers  named  many  other  prominent  actors  in  the  battle 
of  Chancellorsville  had  been  cadets  under  Jackson.  Gen.  James  H.  Lane;  Maj. 
T.  S.  Tosh,  Colston's  Adjutant-General ;  Col.  Thomas  H.  Carter.  Chief  of 
Artillery  of  Rodes'  Division  ;  Capt.  H.  E.  Whiting,  A.  A.  G.,  Rodes'  Division  ;  Col. 
John  M.  Brockenbrough,  commanding  Heth's  Brigade ;  Col.  R.  M.  Mayo,  47th  Vir 
ginia ;  Col.  Frank  Mallory,  55th  Virginia;  and  Lieut.-Col.  T.  W.  Cox,  Lieut -Col 
E.  P.  Taylor,  22d  Virginia  Battalion  ;  Gen.  R.  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery, 
A.  P.  Hill's  Division ;  Col.  Briscoe  G.  Baldwin,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  A.  N.  V. ; 
Col.  R.  W.  Carter.  1st  Virginia  Cavalry;  Col.  Thomas  H.  Owen,  3d  Virginia 
Cavalry ;  and  Col.  W.  H.  Payne,  4th  Virginia  Cavalry,  were  among  the  graduates 
of  the  Institute.  Thus  it  is  seen  that  all  four  of  Jackson's  cavalry  regiments, 
two  of  his  divisions,  and  two  battalions  of  his  artillery  were  commanded  by 
former  pupils,  besides  many  batteries  and  regiments. 


478  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

where  Devens  was  resting.  But  still  Devens  refused  to 
allow  his  division  to  change  front.  In  the  meantime, 
Rodes'  line,  rushing  forward  like  a  tornado,  had  swept 
all  before  it  and  captured  the  two  guns  of  Dieckmann's 
Battery,  which  were  in  position  on  the  pike,  after  they 
had  fired  but  a  few  rounds.  Von  Gilsa's  Brigade  in  the 
woods  to  the  north  was  almost  immediately  overlapped, 
and  Devens'  men  facing  south  along  the  pike  were  sub 
jected  to  a  whirlwind  of  musketry  fire  from  flank  and 
rear  as  they  finally  endeavored  to  change  front.  A  few 
of  the  latter  crossed  the  road  and  joined  Von  Gilsa's 
men,  and  together,  though  not  over  1,000  in  number, 
they  checked  Rodes'  advance  until  Colston's  line 
pressed  forward  and  overbore  them.  Retreating  after 
firing  three  volleys,  the  wreck  of  Von  Gilsa's  Brigade 
fell  back  upon  a  Federal  regiment  forming  line  some 
400  yards  to  the  rear.  Upon  the  new  line,  Breathed 
poured  a  deliberate  fire  of  canister  at  close  range,  while 
two  Confederate  brigades  assailed  it,  the  men  firing  as 
they  trotted  forward.  In  ten  minutes  the  survivors, 
after  losing  a  great  number  of  officers  and  men,  were 
swept  back  500  yards  to  the  line  forming  in  front  of  the 
Talley  house,  consisting  of  portions  of  Von  Gilsa's  and 
Devens'  men.  All  about  them  the  Confederate  Infan 
try  were  now  swarming,  while  Breathed  on  the  pike 
plied  his  guns  with  renewed  vigor.  It  was  no  longer  a 
fight  but  a  massacre.  Musketry  fire  and  canister  liter 
ally  swept  the  brave  Federals  from  their  feet,  and  soon 
bore  them  back  towards  the  church  where  Schurz  had 
formed  his  division  in  a  secondary  line  of  defense.  A 
large  number  of  Devens'  men  rushed  through  Schurz' s 
line,  intermingled  with  two  of  his  veteran  regiments  in 
the  act  of  changing  front,  and  carried  them  on  down 
the  pike  to  the  Dowdall  Tavern,  where  the  panic- 
stricken  mob  was  met  by  Howard.  Seizing  the  colors 
of  one  of  the  broken  regiments,  the  Corps  Commander 
sought  to  check  the  fleeing  men.  Many  kept  on  while 
others  rallied  on  Schurz's  and  Buschbeck's  lines  and  con 
tinued  in  the  fight. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  479 

In  30  minutes  Jackson  had  swept  Devens'  Division 
of  4,000  men  from  his  path,  and  all  but  destroyed  it,  and 
before  6  P.  M.  he  had  seized  the  Talley  plateau.  But  his 
attack  had  in  part  miscarried,  for  Colquitt,  who  com 
manded  Rodes'  right  brigade,  in  spite  of  the  most 
positive  orders  to  press  forward  had  delayed  to  investi 
gate  a  supposed  threat  to  his  flank  and  was  not  in  sight 
when  Jackson  reached  the  Talley  house.  Instead  of 
having  reached  Dowdall's  Tavern  as  he  had  been  ex 
pected  to  do,  he  had  changed  front  to  the  south  just  be 
fore  reaching  the  Burton  farm.  Not  only  had  he  failed 
to  move  forward  himself,  but  having  the  right  of  way 
he  had  blocked  the  Stonewall  Brigade  and  Fitz  Lee's 
Cavalry  on  the  Plank  Road  and  brought  Ramseur's  Bri 
gade  in  his  rear  to  a  standstill.  And  so,  by  an  act  of 
singular  stupidity,  Colquitt  held  17  regiments,  including 
all  the  cavalry,  out  of  action  for  45  minutes.  Had 
Colquitt  pressed  on  and  allowed  Fitz  Lee  and  Paxton 
to  do  the  same,  it  is  doubtful  if  Schurz  could  have 
formed  to  retard  Jackson's  advance,  for  the  Stonewall 
Brigade  and  the  cavalry  would  have  debouched  from 
the  woods  on  the  immediate  flank  of  the  position  in 
which  he  subsequently  resisted  Jackson's  advance  long 
enough  to  allow  Buschbeck  to  form  in  his  rear. 

The  Confederates  in  their  advance,  after  taking 
Dieckmann's  two  guns,  had,  fortunately  for  them,  en 
countered  very  little  artillery.  When  the  attack  com 
menced  Dilger's  Battery  and  a  part  of  Weidrick's 
occupied  a  position  on  a  slight  rise  abreast  of  the  church, 
and  facing  northwest  had  done  what  they  could  to  sup 
port  Von  Gilsa's  men  as  the  enemy  crossed  the  Hawkins 
farm.  Wheeler's  Reserve  Battery  in  their  rear  also 
came  into  action  and  fired  over  the  heads  of  the  infantry 
upon  the  enemy  half  a  mile  distant.  Dilger's  conduct 
throughout  was  heroic  and  though  scarcely  mentioned 
in  the  accounts  of  the  battle,  his  services  would  have  won 
for  him  from  a  Napoleon  instant  promotion  on  the  field. 
But  Dilger  was  a  German  of  the  despised  llth  Corps, 
and  remained  a  captain  to  the  end  of  the  war,  though 
recommended  many  times  for  promotion. 


480  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Shortly  after  the  attack  commenced  he  moved  his  bat 
tery  to  the  western  edge  of  the  Dowdall  clearing  near 
the  road  and,  leaving  the  way  open,  as  soon  as  Devens' 
men  rushed  by,  opened  fire  with  his  six  pieces  upon  the 
enemy  as  they  cleared  the  woods  1,000  yards  away. 
In  a  few  minutes  Hill's  Battery  of  3-inch  Rodman  rifles 
swung  into  action  on  Dilger's  left  and  opened  on  the 
Confederate  line  advancing  across  the  Talley  fields 
south  of  the  pike.  Weidrick's  and  Wheeler's  batteries 
from  their  positions  were  unable  to  fire  down  the  pike, 
so  for  more  than  30  minutes  Dilger,  single-handed, 
maintained  his  position,  changing  from  shell  to  charges 
and  double  charges  of  canister,  as  the  enemy  crept  for 
ward  through  the  little  thickets  in  his  front.  Hill's  Bat 
tery,  entirely  without  canister,  had  been  sent  to  the  rear. 
Finally,  after  staying  the  advance  along  the  road  for 
some  time,  Dilger,  not  wishing  to  sacrifice  his  guns,  re 
luctantly  gave  the  order  to  retire,  but  too  late  to  save 
the  entire  battery,  for  one  piece,  which  had  lost  nearly 
all  its  horses,  had  to  be  abandoned  after  a  vain  attempt 
to  drag  it  to  the  rear  by  hand.  Some  time  before  Dilger 
withdrew,  Weidrick's  Battery  had  also  been  driven 
from  its  second  position  south  of  the  Dowdall  house  and 
in  front  of  Buschbeck,  by  the  Confederate  skirmishers 
passing  around  his  flank  below  the  road,  and  two  of  its 
pieces  had  been  captured,  all  of  the  horses  of  one  and 
the  cannoneers  of  the  other  having  been  wounded.  All 
of  the  Reserve  Artillery  had  been  ordered  to  retire 
sometime  previously,  as  there  was  no  opportunity  to  use 
it  in  the  narrow  space  in  rear  of  the  line  of  rifle  pits  in 
the  woods.  Up  to  this  time  the  Confederates  had  taken 
eight  pieces  of  ordnance  and  lost  none.  Breathed's  and 
McGregor's  batteries  had  kept  up  with  the  infantry, 
seizing  every  available  position  from  which  to  fire  upon 
the  Federals,  paying  particular  attention  to  their  bat 
teries.  Beckham  had  reaped  a  rich  reward  for  his  serv 
ices.  From  the  first  salvo  of  his  guns  the  daring  of  the 
horse  batteries  had  attracted  the  attention  of  Jackson. 
As  Breathed  would  dash  forward,  often  in  advance  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  481 

the  infantry,  Lieut.  Johnston  with  his  rear  section  con 
tinued  the  fire  soon  in  turn  to  limber  up  and  gallop  to 
the  first  position  beyond  Breathed,  while  Beckham,  al 
ways  in  the  lead,  encouraged  the  gunners  by  his  ex 
ample.  The  strain  upon  the  men  and  horses  was  tre 
mendous,  but  Moorman  relieved  them  from  time  to  time 
by  sending  up  his  own  cannoneers  for  the  use  of  whose 
guns  no  space  was  available,  to  take  the  place  of  the 
exhausted  men  of  the  more  advanced  batteries.  Meet 
ing  the  young  major  in  the  road  at  the  first  pause  in 
the  advance  of  the  infantry,  the  great  leader  leaned  for 
ward  on  his  horse  and  extended  his  hand  to  Beckham 
saying,  as  he  passed,  "Young  man,  I  congratulate  you." 
Thus  did  the  successor  of  the  heroic  and  lamented  Pel- 
ham  lead  the  Horse  Artillery  in  the  first  great  battle  in 
which  he  commanded  it.  Beckham  was  no  doubt  the 
last  one  to  grasp  the  hand  of  Jackson  before  it  hung 
limp  and  all  but  lifeless  by  his  side. 

While  Dilger  remained  in  his  isolated  and  exposed 
position  near  the  road,  maintaining  the  fire  of  his  single 
piece  against  Breathed's  four  guns  and  the  musketry  of 
the  approaching  infantry,  he  was  all  but  captured  by  the 
latter.  Thrown  heavily  to  the  ground  by  the  fall  of  his 
wounded  horse,  a  number  of  the  enemy  were  almost 
upon  him  when  he  succeeded  in  extricating  himself  and 
took  to  his  heels.  Running  about  100  yards  down  the 
pike  before  his  pursuers,  he  was  unexpectedly  succoured 
by  a  little  boy  friend  named  Ackley,  who,  missing  his 
devoted  companion  from  the  battery  as  it  retired,  had 
ridden  to  the  front  under  fire  in  search  of  him.  Spring 
ing  from  his  horse  and  assisting  Dilger  to  the  saddle,  to 
gether  they  escaped  on  the  single  mount.  Dilger  over 
took  the  remains  of  his  battery  in  rear  of  Bartow's  in 
complete  line  of  rifle  pits,  and  ordering  his  lieutenant 
to  retire  with  four  pieces  he  kept  the  other  on  the  road  in 
the  gap  in  the  line  of  intrenchments,  and  again  opened 
rapid  fire  to  the  front.  Meanwhile,  Buschbeck  had  oc 
cupied  the  line  of  pits  constructed  in  the  morning  by 
Barlow,  and  upon  which  Schurz  now  fell  back  partly 
under  cover  of  Dilger's  single  piece. 


31 


482  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  exploits  of  Capt.  Dilger  have  been  gone  into  in 
some  detail  for  a  dual  reason.  First  to  illustrate  the 
power  which  a  bold  battery  commander  holds  in  his 
hand,  and  the  influence  which  even  a  single  piece  well 
handled  may  exert  in  battle,  and  in  the  second  place  to 
show  that  the  Federal  gunner  wore  the  same  stripe  as 
his  Southern  brethren  whose  deeds  are  recounted  in 
these  pages.  We  read  much  of  Hunt,  of  Ricketts,  of 
Griffin,  of  Hazlett,  of  Greble,  and  of  other  gallant  Fed 
eral  artillerymen,  but  seldom  do  we  find  mention  of 
"Leather-breeches"  Dilger,  the  soldier  of  fortune  from 
Baden,  who  was  the  peer  of  the  best  of  them.  And  as 
for  his  little  friend  Ackley,  there  are  no  words  in  which 
to  commend  adequately  his  act  of  heroism.  It  is  such 
incidents  as  that  of  Dilger  and  the  boy  that  make  war 
live  in  story  and  in  song  when  the  more  formal  record 
of  history  is  forgotten. 

Here  it  should  be  stated  that  modern  developments 
have  by  no  means  precluded  the  element  of  individual 
ism  among  field  gunners.  Indeed,  with  the  increased 
power  and  efficiency  of  the  modern  weapon,  greater  op 
portunities  for  the  individual  prowess  of  a  subordinate 
will  present  themselves.  If  with  a  muzzle-loading  piece 
capable  of  firing  under  extraordinary  circumstances 
from  three  to  four  rounds  a  minute,  a  battery  or  platoon 
commander  was  able  to  stay  the  advance,  check  the  at 
tack,  and  even  turn  the  assault  of  an  entire  army  into  a 
rout,  surely  with  the  modern  field  gun  the  effect  of  which 
is  equivalent  to  that  of  many  of  the  earlier  ones,  the  re 
sults  which  one  may  expect  from  artillery  officers  of 
ready  perception,  consummate  skill,  and  high  courage, 
cannot  be  limited.  Nor  is  this  expectation  a  prob 
lematical  one.  In  the  battle  of  Motienling,  a  brave 
Japanese  officer  with  a  battery  of  mountain  guns,  se 
cured  a  victory  when  the  issue  was  at  least  doubtful. 
And  there  were  numerous  other  instances  in  Manchuria 
where  artillery  subalterns,  acting  solely  upon  their  own 
initiative,  altered  the  complexion  of  a  battle. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  483 

The  shallow  line  of  intrenchments  held  by  Buschbeck 
ran  just  west  of  the  woods  bordering  the  Dowdall  clear 
ing  on  the  east,  and  extended  some  1,000  yards  north 
well  into  the  forest,  and  less  than  half  that  distance  south 
of  the  road.  In  the  latter  quarter  the  line  was  held  by 
three  regiments  of  Steinwehr's  Division  and  a  few  of  De- 
vens'  and  Schurz's  men,  while  that  part  of  the  line  north 
of  the  road  from  left  to  right  was  defended  by  three  regi 
ments  of  Steinwehr's  Division,  a  mingled  mass  of 
Devens'  and  Schurz's  men,  two  more  regiments  of  Stein 
wehr's  Division  at  the  edge  of  the  woods,  and  two  un 
broken  regiments  of  Schurz's  Division  within  the  woods. 
Behind  the  extreme  right  another  regiment  was  held  in 
reserve.  Dilger's  single  gun  on  the  road  was  the  only 
piece  of  artillery  present.  Of  Howard's  entire  corps  of 
11,000  men,  less  than  5,000  remained  on  the  Buschbeck 
line.  Barlow's  Brigade  was  three  miles  away  at  the 
furnace,  1,500  men  killed  and  wounded  lay  upon  the 
field,  about  1,000  had  been  captured,  and  perhaps  2,000 
had  fled  towards  Chancellor sville.  Yet  from  three  suc 
cessive  positions  Jackson  had  been  resisted  by  these 
troops  for  over  an  hour  without  the  slightest  aid  from 
without  the  Corps.  In  fact,  Hooker  had  just  learned 
of  the  disaster  which  had  befallen  Howard. 

The  line  of  intrenchments  commenced  by  Barlow  in 
the  morning  before  he  was  called  away  was  so  shallow 
that  it  afforded  only  slight  shelter  for  the  defenders 
when  kneeling.  In  front  from  the  ravine  south  of 
Dowdall's  house  well  into  the  woods  north  of  the  Haw 
kins  farm  and  beyond  their  right,  the  dense  Confed 
erate  line,  from  four  to  eight  men  deep,  surged  like  a 
tidal  wave  of  bayonets.  Along  the  road  and  about  the 
Talley  house  Breathed's  and  McGregor's  batteries  were 
in  action  and  behind  them  glistened  the  forest  of 
bayonets  of  A.  P.  Hill's  Division  in  the  third  line.  Fitz 
Lee,  Paxton,  Colquitt  and  Ramseur  were  now  pouring 
out  of  the  woods  into  the  Plank  Road  half  a  mile  away 
and  hurrying  forward  to  the  battlefield. 


484  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Buschbeck's  men  resisted  Jackson's  third  assault  for 
perhaps  20  minutes  and  not  until  the  flanks  were 
turned  by  Iverson's  and  Nichols'  brigades  on  the  right 
and  Colquitt's  and  Ramseur's  on  the  left  and  the  en 
filading  fire  from  both  directions  reached  their  center 
did  they  retire.  It  was  about  7:15  p.  M.  when  the  Fed 
eral  regiments  in  perfect  order  moved  slowly  back  within 
the  edge  of  the  woods  where  well  under  control  they 
were  again  halted  to  check  pursuit.  Dilger  deliberately 
moved  his  piece  down  the  road,  firing  both  canister  and 
solid  shot  as  he  retired,  Gen.  Howard  and  Schurz 
mingling  with  and  encouraging  the  gunners. 

The  effort  to  force  the  Buschbeck  line  broke  the  im 
petus  of  Jackson's  attack.  So  commingled  had  the  Con 
federate  divisions,  brigades,  regiments  and  even  com 
panies  become,  that  a  halt  was  declared  by  Gen.  Colston 
to  be  a  necessary  evil,  for  the  men  had  become  much  dis 
organized  during  the  rapid  advance  through  the  dense 
thickets  and  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  lead  them 
farther  in  the  gathering  dusk.  But  whether  necessary 
or  not,  the  delay  which  Jackson  reluctantly  consented 
to  seems  now  to  have  been  a  fatal  one,  for  the  White 
House  was  but  2,000  yards  along  the  Bullock  Road  in 
his  front,  and  the  only  force  to  oppose  his  advance  in 
that  direction  was  some  1,200  men  of  Schurz's  Division, 
which  had  fallen  back  through  the  woods  from  the  Haw 
kins  farm  and  were  halted  on  the  dirt  road,  Buschbeck's 
regiment  and  Dilger  having  passed  along  the  Plank 
Road  to  Fairview  on  the  Chancellorsville  plateau. 

Confusion  and  dismay  suddenly  succeeded  the  utter 
peace  which  had  reigned  at  Army  Headquarters  during 
the  day.  Hooker  had  been  resting  quietly  on  the 
veranda  of  the  Chancellor  house.  Sickles  and  Pleason- 
ton  had  long  since  disappeared  in  the  forest  and  the 
12th  Corps  was  engaging  Anderson  and  McLaws. 
There  were  hardly  any  troops  in  sight,  for  only  a  few 
reserve  batteries,  wagons,  and  ambulances  remained  on 
the  Chancellorsville  plateau.  A  desultory  fire  was  to  be 
heard  to  the  eastward  and  in  the  south  the  sound  from 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  485 

Sickles'  guns  grew  fainter  and  fainter.  There  was 
nothing,  in  fact,  to  indicate  unusual  activity  in  any 
quarter.  Even  Dilger  had  been  driven  off  with  his 
absurd  yarn  about  the  enemy  before  he  could  disturb 
the  commanding  general's  peace  of  mind.  Suddenly 
about  6:30  p.  M.,  however,  the  heavy  roar  of  a  cannon 
ade  was  heard  in  the  west,  and  while  Hooker  and  his 
military  family  were  speculating  on  what  this  might 
mean,  one  of  the  officers  detected  Howard's  fugitives 
rushing  up  the  Plank  Road.  "My  God,  here  they 
come!"  he  cried.  Springing  upon  his  horse  and  riding 
rapidly  along  the  road,  Hooker  met  the  panic-stricken 
fugitives  inextricably  mingled  with  wagons,  ambulances, 
pack-mules,  caissons,  and  the  other  impedimenta  of  an 
army.  "The  whole  of  the  right  wing  has  been  over 
whelmed  by  Stonewall  Jackson  and  is  falling  back  in 
disorder  upon  Chancellorsville,"  the  stragglers  cried  as 
they  fled  by. 

Hooker's  situation  was  a  deplorable  one,  but  he  had 
no  one  to  blame  but  himself.  For  years  an  effort  was 
made  to  saddle  the  blame  on  the  llth  Corps,  the  men  of 
which  in  the  face  of  an  overwhelming  force  on  their 
flank  and  rear  had,  by  their  stubborn  resistance  alone, 
disorganized  the  attacking  column  and  checked  it  long 
enough  for  night  to  fall  and  prevent  Jackson  from  reap 
ing  the  fruits  of  victory. 

The  Federal  center  was  held  by  only  two  brigades  of 
the  12th  Corps  at  the  Fairview  Cemetery,  while  the 
works  at  Hazel  Grove,  the  key-point  of  Hooker's  whole 
line,  were  occupied  by  a  small  force  of  artillery  and  some 
trains.  Couch  and  Meade  were  fully  occupied  by  Mc- 
Laws  and  Anderson,  who  increased  the  activity  of  their 
demonstrations  upon  hearing  Jackson's  guns.  Sickles 
with  the  3d  Corps  had  wandered  off  in  the  forest  and 
was  all  but  cut  off  from  the  Army,  while  the  line  of  re 
treat  to  United  States  Ford  and  the  Bullock  Road  to 
the  White  House  were  entirely  unprotected.  But, 
while  Jackson  was  urging  A.  P.  Hill's  Division  for 
ward  to  resume  the  advance  along  the  Bullock  Road, 


486  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

and  chafing  at  the  necessary  delay  caused  by  the  dis 
organization  of  Rodes'  and  Colston's  divisions  which 
had  become  mingled  and  were  in  great  confusion  in  the 
woods,  Hooker  found  time  to  throw  a  small  force  across 
the  path  of  the  Confederates.  The  only  troops  im 
mediately  at  hand  were  those  at  Fairview,  and  those  he 
ordered  to  move  forward  rapidly  and  occupy  the  ground 
Howard's  men  had  abandoned,  also  sending  word  to 
Sickles  to  retrace  his  steps  in  hot  haste.  Of  course, 
Berry  and  Hayes  could  not  retake  the  lost  ground,  but 
they  did  occupy  a  line  in  the  woods  in  front  of  and  be 
low  the  Fairview  position,  and  thus  presented  a  front  to 
the  Confederates  behind  which  other  troops  soon  formed 
while  the  Federal  artillery  began  to  mass  on  the  edge 
of  the  plateau.  Meanwhile,  the  general  confusion 
within  the  Federal  position  was  increased  by  Harda- 
way's  activity,  whose  guns  from  Anderson's  left  front 
were  hurling  shell  and  solid  shot  into  the  trains  on  the 
high  ground  at  a  range,  however,  which  rendered  ac 
curate  practice  impossible. 

When  Jackson  consented  to  the  fatal  halt,  he  had  five 
brigades  of  Rodes'  and  Colston's  divisions  intact  near 
the  Wilderness  Church.  Rodes'  Brigade,  the  foremost 
of  Rodes'  Division,  halted  in  the  woods  on  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  Dowdall  farm,  south  of  the  road,  while  Col- 
quitt's  and  Ramseur's  brigades  rested  in  the  rear  of  the 
Dowdall  farm  house.  Paxton's  Brigade  was  drawn  up 
in  line  north  of  the  house,  across  the  field  in  front  of  the 
rifle  pits.  Iverson  and  Nichols  had  come  to  a  standstill 
in  the  woods  on  the  north  side  of  the  road,  and  near  the 
log  hut,  where  Colston  was  endeavoring  to  reform  his 
men.  Stuart  with  the  cavalry  was  near  the  church  pre 
paring  to  move  with  a  small  infantry  support  around 
the  Federal  right.  The  command  to  halt  was  not  heard 
by  the  extreme  right  of  Rodes'  line,  and  several  groups, 
leaving  the  road  to  avoid  the  fire  of  Dilger's  gun,  pushed 
slowly  on  through  the  woods  to  the  south  and  soon  ran 
up  against  the  log  works  in  the  woods  of  Williams'  Divi 
sion  of  the  12th  Corps  some  distance  in  front  of  Fairview 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  487 

Heights  and  held  by  three  or  four  companies  of  a  New 
York  regiment.  While  the  Confederates  were  demand 
ing  the  surrender  of  Williams'  men,  a  great  battle,  en 
tirely  mythical  however,  was  occurring  at  Hazel  Grove. 
It  is  mentioned  with  the  sole  purpose  of  contributing 
something  to  dispose  of  a  fictitious  artillery  affair  which 
has  been  accepted  in  good  faith,  even  by  such  an  eminent 
and  usually  accurate  historian  of  the  war  as  Col. 
Willam  Allan,  Jackson's  Chief  of  Ordnance.* 

Before  moving  out  into  the  woods  towards  the 
furnace  about  noon,  Sickles  had  left  the  three  batteries 
of  Whipple's  Division  in  park  under  Capt.  Huntingdon, 
the  divisional  chief  of  artillery,  at  Hazel  Grove,  and 
finding  the  country  unsuitable  for  the  use  of  cavalry, 
Gen.  Pleasonton  had  also  returned  to  that  point  with  his 
regiments  and  Martin's  Horse  Battery  about  6  p.  M. 
Pleasonton,  sublimely  ignorant  of  all  that  was  occurring 
within  two  miles  of  Hazel  Grove,  received  orders  from 
Sickles  to  dispatch  a  cavalry  regiment  to  Howard  at 
Dowdall's  Tavern,  and  directed  the  8th  Pennsylvania 
Regiment  to  proceed  to  that  point.  As  the  regiment 
moved  off  to  the  northeast  along  a  dirt  road  which  con 
nected  Hazel  Grove  with  the  Plank  Road  a  mile  away, 
it  was  followed  by  the  immense  ammunition  pack  train 
of  the  3d  Corps  under  Col.  Hall,  who  desired  to  return 
to  Chancellorsville  with  the  mules  and  ambulances  of  his 
column.  Soon  the  cavalry  regiment  unexpectedly  col 
lided  with  some  of  the  Confederates  in  the  woods  and 
was  forced  to  cut  its  way  through  them  to  escape  by  the 
Plank  Road,  but  the  pack  train  stampeded  to  the  rear 
and  dashed  pellmell  through  the  batteries  and  cavalry 
which  had  remained  at  Hazel  Grove.  This  was  the  first 
indication  Pleasonton  had  of  any  trouble.  Not  a  sound 
had  disturbed  his  repose.  The  batteries  were  at  once 
prepared  for  action  and  the  troopers  sprang  to  their 
horses.  In  a  short  while  about  200  Confederates  under 
Cols.  Mercer  and  Winn  wandered  through  the  woods 

*  Chancellorsville,  Hotchkiss-Allan,  p.  52.  Also  see  The  Campaigns  of  Stuart's 
Cavalry,  McClellan,  p.  238. 


488  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

to  the  western  edge  of  the  Hazel  Grove  clearing  and  be 
gan  to  fire  upon  the  Federals.  Whereupon  Hunting- 
ton's  batteries  opened  upon  them,  as  did  Martin's  under 
Pleasonton's  direction,  and  soon  drove  the  small  force 
of  surprised  Confederates  off.  Pleasonton  afterwards 
greatly  exaggerated  this  accidental  brush,  claiming  in 
effect  that  by  his  remarkable  presence  of  mind  and  by 
assuming  charge  of  the  30  or  more  guns  at  Hazel  Grove, 
he  had  repulsed  not  less  than  5,000  Confederate  infan 
try!  Huntington,  who  was  not  the  least  disturbed,  and 
was  really  cool,  handled  his  own  batteries,  however,  and 
made  no  such  extravagant  claims,  characterizing  Plea 
sonton's  account  as  an  impertinent  falsehood,  which  it 
was.  In  his  excitement,  Pleasonton  also  mistook 
Sickles'  pack  train  as  it  dashed  past  for  the  routed  llth 
Corps,  which  at  the  time  he  did  not  know  was  routed! 
Pleasonton's  brilliant  and  graphic  report  to  Hooker  and 
his  subsequent  account  of  the  affair  at  Hazel  Grove  in 
which  he  claimed  that  he  sent  the  Pennsylvania  Regi 
ment  on  a  death  charge  to  retard  the  masses  of  the 
enemy,  while  he  personally  directed  the  fire  of  his  great 
battery  of  22  pieces,  are  among  the  greatest  pieces 
of  fiction  concerning  the  Civil  War.*  He  even  went 
so  far  as  to  explain  the  manner  in  which  he  em 
ployed  the  principal  of  ricochet  of  solid  shot  in  sweeping 
the  dense  lines  of  the  enemy  from  the  field,  thus  catch 
ing  the  poor  Confederates  both  "coming  and  going,"  as 
it  were,  on  the  rebound !  Thus  did  he  adopt  that  general 
principle  of  the  equality  of  the  angles  of  incidence  and 
reflection  to  the  fire  of  his  guns!  It  was  no  doubt  the 
intense  concentration  of  his  mental  faculties  upon  this 
physical  phenomenon  that  kept  him  in  ignorance  of 
what  was  really  transpiring  about  him. 

In  the  gathering  gloom  Berry  and  Hayes  had  formed 
in  the  woods  at  right  angles  to  and  north  of  the  road, 
while  Buschbeck's  and  Williams'  brigades  prolonged 
his  line  to  the  left  and  immediately  in  front  of  the  Fair- 

*See  Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  172,  but  also  pp.  186-188;  and  the 
Battle  of  Chancellor sville,  Hamlln,  pp.  82-96. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  489 

view  Cemetery.  Not  less  than  3,000  men  of  the  broken 
llth  Corps,  including  those  of  Buschbeck's  intact  bri 
gade,  rallied  on  the  new  line  nearly  two  miles  east  of 
Dowdall's  Tavern,  and  one  and  a  half  miles  from  the 
point  where  the  Confederate  advance  was  halted.  Im 
mediately  upon  learning  of  the  rout  of  Howard's  Corps, 
Capt.  Best,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  12th  Corps,  had 
occupied  Fairview  Cemetery  with  his  own  and  some  of 
the  batteries  of  the  llth  Corps,  and  was  later  joined  by 
the  indefatigable  Dilger.  In  all  Best  massed  34  pieces 
in  this  position  which  completely  dominated  the  Plank 
Road  approach  and  the  woods  on  both  sides.  Including 
the  22  pieces  under  Huntington  and  Pleasonton  at 
Hazel  Grove,  a  mile  southeast  of  Fairview,  to  the  sup 
port  of  which  two  of  Sickles'  infantry  regiments  had 
come  up  from  the  south,  Jackson  was  now  confronted  by 
56  guns  in  strong  positions. 

It  was  some  time  before  A.  P.  Hill  was  ready  to  ad 
vance  in  spite  of  Jackson's  exhortations  to  push  on,  and 
at  last  about  8  P.  M.,  when  Lane's  Brigade  was  ready 
to  resume  the  movement,  an  unfortunate  incident  oc 
curred.  About  6:30  p.  M.  Col.  Crutchfield  at  the  Wil 
derness  Tavern  had  directed  Maj.  Pegram  of  Walker's 
Battalion  to  send  two  guns  to  Gen.  Pender  on  the  Plank 
Road  and  two  to  Gen.  McGowan  in  the  woods  to  the 
south,  and  about  the  same  time  Carter  was  ordered  to 
lead  the  artillery  column  forward.  Crutchfield,  him 
self,  taking  a  section  of  Napoleons  and  a  Parrott  from 
the  King  William  Battery  of  Carter's  Battalion,  moved 
on  to  join  the  infantry  behind  which  Carter  was  ordered 
to  follow  at  a  distance  of  half  a  mile.  When  Crutch- 
field  reached  a  point  about  1,200  yards  from  Fairview, 
for  some  unknown  reason  the  three  guns  with  him  were 
opened  upon  the  Federal  artillery  position,  on  which  by 
this  time  43  guns  had  been  massed,  whereupon  six  of 
Capt.  Osborne's  pieces  replied.  Lane,  urged  on  by 
Jackson  himself,  had  moved  up  to  the  rear  of  Crutch- 
field's  guns  when  the  rapid  return  fire  of  Osborne's  ar 
tillery  raked  his  column  in  the  road  and  forced  him  to 


490  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

seek  cover  in  the  woods  to  the  left,  where  he  remained 
until  Hill  directed  Crutchfield  to  cease  firing.  In  the 
meantime,  under  the  hail  of  shell  and  canister  from  the 
Federal  guns  the  artillery  horses  of  Carter's  Battalion 
in  the  road  had  become  unmanageable,  and  were  with 
difficulty  prevented  from  stampeding  to  the  rear  by  the 
personal  efforts  of  Jackson,  Colston  and  their  staff 
officers.  The  Federal  fire  ceased  with  that  of  Crutch- 
field's  guns. 

To  fire  upon  the  enemy,  especially  upon  so  formid 
able  an  array  of  hostile  guns,  in  such  circumstances  was 
a  mistake  which  nothing  can  excuse.  It  was  indeed 
stirring  up  a  hornets'  nest.  There  is  no  question  about 
a  mistake  having  been  committed.  The  sole  inquiry  is, 
who  was  to  blame?  Alexander,  who  was  miles  away  in 
the  rear  at  the  time,  states  that  the  error  was  due  to 
Crutchfield's  partaking  of  Jackson's  impetuosity.  Per 
haps  so,  but  this  statement  in  itself  is  not  an  illuminating 
one.  There  is  something  so  inconsistent  in  this  affair 
with  our  knowledge  of  Crutchfield's  character,  and  es 
pecially  his  ability  as  an  artillerist,  that  it  is  difficult  to 
believe  he  was  entirely  to  blame  for  committing  so 
grievous  an  error.  The  reports  throw  very  little  light 
upon  the  subject.  Lane,  who  was  actually  among 
Crutchfield's  guns  and  suffered  most  from  the  enemy's 
fire,  stated  in  his  reports  that  just  as  he  was  deploying 
in  the  road,  the  enemy  "opened  a  terrific  artillery  fire, 
which  was  responded  to  by  our  batteries."  Had  Crutch- 
field  been  responsible  for  provoking  the  enemy's  fire,  it 
seems  certain  Lane  would  have  known  who  fired  first  and 
attributed  the  blame  to  Crutchfield.  On  the  contrary  he 
expressly  declares  that  the  Federals  opened  first. 
Captain  Osborne,  however,  states  that  the  Confederate 
battery  fired  first,  and  that  its  challenge  was  accepted 
by  two  of  his  lieutenants.  But  Osborne  was  not  him 
self  responsible  for  the  duel  and  was  obviously  only  re 
peating  what  had  been  reported  to  him.  When  the  men 
of  Rodes'  and  Colston's  lines  became  mingled  and  dis 
organized,  Rodes,  after  calling  a  halt  in  the  woods,  rode 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  491 

forward  to  reconnoiter  the  front  and  satisfied  himself 
that  there  was  no  enemy  between  him  and  the  Fairview 
Heights.  On  his  return  he  informed  Col.  Crutchfield, 
then  on  the  road  with  his  three  guns,  of  the  result  of  his 
reconnaissance  "and  he  opened  his  batteries  on  that 
point,"  wrote  Rodes  in  his  report.  He  also  wrote  that 
"the  enemy  instantly  responded  by  a  most  terrific  fire, 
which  silenced  our  guns.  It  did  but  little  execution  on 
the  infantry,  as  it  was  mainly  directed  down  the  Plank 
Road,  which  was  unoccupied,  except  by  our  artillery." 

The  evidence  of  Lane,  Osborne,  and  Rodes,  suggests 
that  even  if  Crutchfield  provoked  the  unfortunate  duel 
the  information  and  advice  of  Rodes,  the  commander 
of  the  advance  line,  had  something  to  do  with  it.  Un 
less  Rodes  desired  some  action  on  the  part  of  his  artillery 
support,  it  is  hardly  probable  that  he  would  have  so 
promptly  communicated  the  result  of  his  personal  re 
connaissance  to  Crutchfield.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the 
latter,  who  was  wounded  within  a  short  time,  left  no  re 
port.  Had  he  done  so,  his  almost  inexplicable  conduct 
would  no  doubt  have  been  accounted  for.  The  writer 
it  loath  to  believe  to  the  contrary. 

In  this  connection  we  are  bound  to  note  with  some  de 
gree  of  satisfaction  the  manner  in  which  Crutchfield  had 
pressed  forward  with  his  available  artillery  to  the  very 
foremost  line.  The  Wilderness  was  no  less  unsuited  to 
the  maneuver  of  artillery  masses  than  the  Peninsula, 
yet,  instead  of  lurking  far  in  the  rear  we  find  all  the  bat 
teries  which  had  come  up  well  to  the  front,  and  therefore 
available  for  use  in  any  emergency.  Crutchfield  was 
at  least  prepared  to  secure  the  ground  that  Jackson  had 
taken  against  recovery  by  the  enemy. 

After  the  delay  of  some  15  minutes  occasioned  by  the 
artillery  duel,  A.  P.  Hill's  Division  advanced.  Lane 
in  the  lead  soon  came  upon  Williams'  deserted  log 
works  in  the  woods  south  of  the  road,  while  two  brigades 
of  the  rear  lines  were  ordered  into  position  to  guard  the 
road  from  Hazel  Grove.  Meanwhile  Jackson  was  urg 
ing  Hill  to  press  on  and  cut  the  enemy  off  from  the 


492  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

United  States  Ford  road,  offering  him  the  services  of 
Capt.  Boswell,  the  chief  engineer  officer  of  his  staff,  and 
one  familiar  with  the  terrain,  to  act  as  guide  to  the 
White  House.  Passing  rapidly  to  the  front  along  a 
woods  road  just  above  the  Plank  Road  with  his  staff, 
Jackson  then  undertook  to  make  a  personal  reconnais 
sance  of  the  ground  in  his  front.  The  Federals  could  be 
plainly  heard  chopping  trees  and  at  work  on  their  in- 
trenchments.  The  fire  of  musketry  had  broken  out  south 
of  the  Plank  Road,  occasioned  by  a  collision  between 
some  of  Sickles'  men,  who  were  returning  to  occupy  the 
line  of  deserted  works,  with  Lane's  skirmishers.  Turn 
ing  his  horse  to  the  rear,  Jackson  met  A.  P.  Hill  and  his 
adjutant.  The  firing  of  the  pickets  of  both  armies  had 
now  become  active,  and  rolled  along  the  Federal  front 
to  the  north  of  the  road,  causing  Lane's  men  in  the  wood 
in  rear  of  Jackson  to  become  very  alert.  Hearing  the 
rush  of  a  small  party  of  Confederate  horsemen  on  the 
pike,  but  seeing  only  those  in  the  woods  80  yards  to  his 
front,  Maj.  Barry,  in  command  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
18th  North  Carolina  Infantry,  whose  men  were  already 
aroused  by  the  musketry  fire  of  the  enemy  in  their  front, 
and  had  not  seen  Jackson's  party  pass  in  that  direction, 
gave  the  order  to  fire  and  repeat  the  firing.  The  first 
volley  was  a  fatal  one,  for  inflicting  three  wounds  upon 
Jackson,  it  also  destroyed  the  right  arm  of  Lee.  With 
a  bullet  in  the  palm  of  his  right  hand  and  two  in  his 
left  arm,  one  of  which  crushed  the  bone  just  below  the 
shoulder  and  severed  the  main  artery,  Jackson  was  un 
able  to  control  his  horse,  which  plunged  forward  to 
wards  the  enemy's  line  to  escape  the  fire  of  Lane's  men. 
As  "Little  Sorrel"  dashed  across  the  path,  a  heavy  oak 
branch  struck  his  wounded  rider  a  heavy  blow  in  the 
face  and  all  but  unseated  him,  but  seizing  the  bridle  with 
his  bleeding  hand,  Jackson  managed  to  stop  the  horse  as 
he  fell  from  the  saddle  into  the  arms  of  Capt.  Wilbourne 
of  his  staff.  Soon  A.  P.  Hill  arrived  and  assumed  com 
mand,  while  the  stricken  chieftain  was  tenderly  borne  to 
the  rear  along  the  Plank  Road. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  493 

It  was  now  bright  moonlight  and  objects  could  be 
plainly  discerned  in  the  roadway.  Capt.  Osborne,  who 
happened  to  be  with  two  Federal  guns  some  800  yards 
down  the  Plank  Road  at  the  base  of  the  hill,  saw  the 
party  bearing  Jackson  from  the  front  and  opened  fire 
with  canister.  The  discharge  of  the  picket  guns  was 
taken  as  the  signal  of  alarm  by  the  enemy,  and  at  9 :30 
p.  M.  the  43  guns  at  Fairview  directed  a  terrific  fire  down 
the  Plank  Road  in  which  Carter's  artillery,  still  in 
column  of  pieces,  and  probably  20,000  infantry  were 
massed.  The  effect  was  fearful.  Jackson's  litter 
bearers  were  struck  down  twice,  causing  him  to  fall 
heavily  to  the  ground  upon  his  side  and  the  injured  arm. 
As  he  continued  on  his  way  to  the  rear  he  heard  Gen. 
Pender,  whose  brigade  in  column  in  the  road  was  being 
torn  to  pieces,  declare  his  inability  to  hold  his  men  in 
position,  and  it  was  to  Pender  that  Jackson  gave  his 
last  order  on  the  field  of  battle.  Raising  himself  upon 
his  elbow  as  best  he  could,  the  wounded  leader  em 
phatically  exclaimed:  "Pender,  you  must  hold  your 
ground!"  Repeated  along  the  column  these  last  words 
of  their  leader  had  a  magical  effect  upon  the  sorely- 
tried  men,  and  the  wild  confusion  into  which  the  Fed 
eral  artillery  fire  had  thrown  them,  threatening  to 
break  up  two  whole  divisions,  soon  gave  way  to  order. 
Meanwhile,  however,  A.  P.  Hill,  Col.  Crutchfield  and 
many  other  valuable  officers  had  been  wounded. 

Although  the  Federal  Artillery  continued  to  fire  until 
after  10  o'clock,  the  sole  part  taken  in  this  affair  by  the 
Confederate  guns  was  the  firing  of  a  few  rounds  of 
shell  over  the  heads  of  the  infantry  by  the  two  pieces 
which  had  been  sent  to  Pender,  and  by  the  section  of 
Napoleons  under  Lieut.  Chamberlayne,  with  Mc- 
Gowan  on  the  road  to  Hazel  Grove.  Of  course  the  fire 
was  random  and  accomplished  nothing,  as  no  Federals 
were  advancing  to  the  attack.  Yet,  even  so  accurate  an 
officer  as  Pegram,  under  whose  direction  the  fire  was 
conducted,  reported  that  heavy  loss  was  inflicted  upon 
the  enemy.  And  here  it  should  be  remarked  that  the 


494  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

statements  of  artillery  officers  as  to  the  effect  of  their 
fire,  the  number  of  losses  it  inflicts,  the  batteries  it 
silences,  etc.,  etc.,  are  ordinarily  valueless.  It  was  even 
more  impossible  for  Pegram  to  observe  the  effect  of  his 
fire  in  the  circumstances  in  which  he  found  himself,  than 
it  was  for  Osborne  and  Best  to  see  the  damage  they  had 
done,  and  Osborne  had  no  knowledge  whatever  of  the 
destruction  he  had  caused,  except  that  subsequently  ac 
quired  from  captured  Confederates.  Had  the  officers 
engaged  in  the  Civil  War  confined  their  reports  to  de 
tailed  accounts  of  their  movements,  positions,  matters 
of  ammunition  expenditure,  and  their  own  losses  in  men, 
horses,  and  equipment,  and  not  filled  them  with  useless 
speculations  as  to  the  loss  of  the  enemy  and  congratula 
tions  for  their  men,  the  official  records  would  be  more 
illuminating  and  far  less  confusing. 

While  Stuart,  who  had  moved  towards  Ely's  Ford 
with  his  cavalry  and  some  of  Beckham's  batteries  to  at 
tack  the  enemy's  camps  and  trains,  was  being  sent  for 
to  take  command  after  Hill  was  wounded,  Rodes  as 
sumed  general  control  and  immediately  commenced  to 
prepare  for  an  attack  in  the  morning,  cheerfully  re 
linquishing  command  when  Stuart  arrived  at  midnight. 
Throughout,  his  whole  conduct  was  marked  by  the 
greatest  magnanimity  of  spirit.  Poor  Crutchfield,  with 
a  leg  shattered,  had  been  borne  to  the  rear  in  the  same 
ambulance  with  Jackson.  For  a  second  time  during 
the  war  this  gallant  soldier  had  received  a  desperate 
wound.  Meanwhile  Col.  Alexander  had  arrived  on  the 
scene,  and  upon  him  devolved  the  duties  of  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery,  while  Col.  Brown  assumed  command  as  Chief 
of  Artillery  of  the  2d  Corps.  Carter's  Battalion  was 
now  ordered  to  retire  to  the  Dowdall  house,  and  refit 
for  the  work  of  the  morning,  and  went  into  bivouac  in 
the  surrounding  fields,  where  Alexander's,  Brown's, 
Walker's,  Jones',  and  Mclntosh's  battalions  were  also 
parked  for  the  night,  most  of  the  batteries  of  which  had 
arrived  about  8  p.  M.  Beckham's  batteries  bivouacked 
for  the  night  nearby. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  495 

A.  P.  Hill's  Division  now  held  the  advance  line  of  the 
Confederates,  while  Rodes  and  Colston  were  with 
drawn  and  bivouacked  in  line  near  the  Dowdall  Tavern, 
after  reforming  in  the  open  fields.  Jones'  Brigade  of 
Colston's  Division  was  detached  to  guard  the  road  from 
the  furnace,  and  Colquitt's  Brigade  of  Rodes'  Division 
assigned  to  a  similar  duty  on  a  road  also  from  the  south, 
but  farther  to  the  west.  Paxton's  Brigade  occupied  the 
Buschbeck  intrenchments. 

Learning  that  the  Confederate  attack  had  come  to  a 
standstill  before  the  Fairview  line,  and  that  the  Con 
federate  right  extended  toward  Hazel  Grove,  Hooker 
ordered  Sickles,  who  had  reached  the  latter  position,  to 
attack  by  moonlight.  Forming  Birney's  Division  in 
two  lines,  with  supporting  columns,  Sickles  set  his  corps 
in  motion  through  the  forest  south  of  the  Plank  Road 
about  midnight.  The  left  wing  of  his  column  grazed 
the  skirmishers  of  McGowan's  Brigade,  and  later 
struck  the  right  flank  of  Lane's  line,  of  which  several 
regiments  became  engaged.  But  Sickles'  whole  column 
glanced  off  towards  Fairview,  a  part  of  his  men  re- 
occupying  the  deserted  works  which  Williams  had  con 
structed  and  from  which  Lane  had  withdrawn.  Mean 
time  his  troops,  advancing  almost  northeast,  were  en 
gaged  in  a  desperate  conflict  with  the  Federal  Infantry 
in  front  of  Fairview,  while  the  Federal  guns  about  the 
cemetery  shelled  the  underlying  woods  with  vigor.  Dur 
ing  this  assault  which  Sickles  made  upon  his  friends, 
and  in  which  the  participants  on  both  sides  suffered 
heavily,  the  puzzled  Confederates  listened  to  the  roar 
of  artillery  and  musketry  and  the  cheering  of  the  enemy 
with  profound  amazement.  Not  until  Sickles'  report 
was  published  were  many  of  them  able  to  learn  what 
had  befallen  them.  Sickles  says  that  his  men,  in  spite  of 
a  terrific  fire  of  musketry  and  of  20  guns  at  Dowdall's 
Tavern,  regained  the  Plank  Road;  that  Howard's  rifle 
pits  were  reoccupied;  that  all  the  guns,  caissons,  etc.,  of 
the  llth  Corps  were  recovered;  that  two  guns  and  three 
caissons  of  the  enemy  were  captured,  and  that  Jackson 


496  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

was  wounded;  and  that,  thrown  into  confusion  on  their 
right,  the  enemy,  after  being  also  repulsed  by  Berry  on 
the  left,  were  so  completely  taken  by  surprise  that  they 
fell  back,  etc.,  etc. !  Of  course,  the  Confederate  Artillery 
in  bivouac  over  a  mile  away  did  not  fire  upon  Sickles. 
Lane's  loss  was  trifling;  the  Confederates,  while  sur 
prised  at  the  roar  of  the  battle  in  their  front,  did  not 
fall  back;  Howard's  guns  were  not  recovered,  and  the 
Confederates  were  not  repulsed  by  Berry.  The  guns 
taken  by  Sickles  were  those  of  the  Federal  3d  Corps, 
which  Winn  had  captured  and  left  in  the  dirt  road  when 
driven  off  by  Huntington  and  Pleasonton  from  Hazel 
Grove,  and  the  works  Sickles  occupied  were  those 
which  Lane  had  withdrawn  from  and  were  over  1^ 
miles  from  Buschbeck's  works  in  the  Dowdall  clearing, 
or  the  nearest  intrenchments  of  Howard's  Corps.  So 
we  see  that  Sickles  was  imaginative  if  not  accurate  and 
must  be  relegated  to  the  same  category  to  which 
Pleasonton  has  been  assigned.  What  a  combination 
Sickles  as  commanding-general  and  Pleasonton  as  his 
cavalry  leader  would  have  made!  Together  their  re 
ported  deeds  furnish  material  for  a  wonderful  work  of 
fiction.  But  while  the  midnight  fiasco  of  Sickles' 
desperate  attack  by  moonlight  is  in  many  ways  one  of 
the  comical  incidents  of  the  war,  yet  there  is  an  element 
of  sadness  about  it,  for  many  brave  men  were  sacrificed 
during  the  hour  or  two  of  its  duration. 


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This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 

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LD  21-100m-12,'46(A2012sl6)4120 


•:AV  o  1 1989 

o»so   APR  2  2  1989 


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